A reply to Munitz

•期刊原文

A reply to Munitz

By A. S. Cua

Philosophy East and West

vol. 25 (1975)

pp. 353-355

Copyright 1975 by University of Hawaii Press

Hawaii, USA

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p. 353

In my "Confucian Vision and Experience of the World," I have sought to determine how far Munitz' notions of the mystery of existence and transcendence of the world are applicable to the Confucian theme of central harmony of man, Heaven and Earth. I have concentrated on the classic Chung Yung [The Doctrine of the Mean] as a base for the discussion. My aim in a way differs from Munitz'. Whereas for him the twin notions of mystery of existence and transcendence are arrived at through a philosophical journey of arguing for the unanswerability of the question "Is there a reason-for-the-existence-of-the-world?" and the inapplicability of conceptual formula to answer the question "What is the world?" I have taken these notions as a point of departure for understanding the Confucian vision as a sort of root-metaphor in which metaphysical speculations may be developed. Moreover, I have taken the initial statement of this vision as having an import independent of its metaphysical promise. To a Confucian, this import lies in its capacity to answer a practical question that concerns the attainment of moral excellence. My project is admittedly tenuous. For one thing, Munitz' works are addressed to the possibility for setting forth an acceptable ontology, and not to a point in ethical theory. Also, there appear to be no literal equivalents, in Chinese, for Munitz' notions of the mystery of existence and transcendence of the world. In one place, I have suggested that perhaps "tao" can be regarded as functionally equivalent to Munitz' notion of existence as a verbal noun (CW, p. 230). Perhaps I have been misled by Munitz' special sense of "what the world does" as designating "the special and unique form of activity of the world" (ME, p. 93). My proposal rests on the following: there is a sense in which tao acts in a unique way that is not describable in cosmological or ontological terms. But I do maintain that this sort of conceptual failure does not in any way detract from the import of this notion of tao if it is construed in terms of an ideal vision or theme that furnishes a point of orientation for man in relation to his world. This conception naturally transforms an intellectual response into a moral one. What is intellectually an unanswerable question concerning the world is now seen to have a practical import if the intellectual response is embedded in man's quest for his existence in the world. An insight, derived from philosophical argument, on the nature of an unanswerable question, is in this manner transformed by a moral agent to an answerable one in the sense of answering to a perplexity that resists problematic formulation. This point can be elucidated perhaps in terms of a distinction between two sorts of attitudes one may adopt toward Munitz' question. In one posture, we may take the question as a problem-indicator in which solution is called for. Implicit in this attitude is, of course, the intellectual assumption that the question, to be intelligible, must be formulable in the form of a problem to which solutions may be preferred and satisfactorily evaluated. If a question fails to receive any final rational answer in this problematic form, one may, like Munitz, rest content with its unanswerability and claim it as an insight into its mystery. However, one may accept

p. 354

this form of unanswerability and yet embed the notions of mystery and transcendence of existence in the context of man as an agent that concerns his status within the world. The original question, deemed unanswerable in problematic form, can be seen as a question that calls for a nonintellectual answer. This question is, in effect, our responsional characterization of the mystery of existence and transcendence of the world -- notions that amphibiously characterize our vision without a pretense to offering any truth-claims on the vision as descriptive of the world. This form of answer may be regarded as an intelligible response to the question as a perplexity indicator that resists problematic formulation. In the end, the adequacy of the answer depends on the agent's experience and actions that comport with the vision as an ideal theme, as a focal point of orienting one's way of life and activities that occur within one's cultural setting. In this way, a vision of the world as an ideal theme can be seen to be a target of polymorphous achievement.

I hope it is now clear that the question "what, specifically, are the particular ways of life the wise man would choose ?" cannot be answered in terms of having a solution to a problem, since the vision, as I have pointed out, is an ideal theme rather than a norm that functions as a sketch for which blueprints or ways of life may be developed. A focal point of orientation is a perspective in which one organizes and endows significance to one's life, not a moral principle with preceptorial implications. One looks to individuals who paradigmatically embodied the theme in their lives for guidance, as a "standard of inspiration" rather than as an action-guiding principle. [1] This seems also to be the point in Aristotle's conception of the "man of high moral standards" who is, "as it were, the standard and measure" for particular moral questions. [2]

Munitz quite rightly points out that from a mere notion of tao as existence in his special sense, no moral consequences follow. But if tao is taken, as I have suggested, as having also the status of a moral vision, it does furnish a limit to what one can morally do. This does not follow from the mere ontological awareness of the existence of tao, but from such an awareness as being embedded in the context of a moral concern. Since the Confucian vision is an ideal theme, it furnishes no precepts in which to act. One can still conduct one's life in the light of "whatever the best available scientific knowledge tells us at a given time," provided that such knowledge is infused with the ideal vision in the way I suggested in my essay.

Toward the end of Munitz' paper, a suggestion is made that perhaps the Confucian theme be understood as an achievement of that "type of insight which comes from having philosophically and ontologically discriminated the nature of existence and the status of existents." This, I believe, is contrary to the intent of Chung Yung. Undoubtedly, the Confucian vision, if personally experienced in one's life, is an achievement. If the vision be construed as a "supreme good," then the realization of the vision as permeating one's life may be regarded as a supreme moral achievement. But I should like to think

p.355

this to be an achievement of a quality of moral excellence rather than an attainment of an ultimate end in the traditional sense.

In my original paper, I have merely attempted to establish a modest base for a dialogue rather than a convenient "marriage of souls." In applying Munitz' notions of mystery and transcendence to the Confucian theme of central harmony I have inevitably extended the uses of these terms beyond their original home. If this dialogue has failed, it is not without some gains. Perhaps we are here confronted with two different conceptual schemes for dealing with the same question that concerns man's perplexity over the nature of the existence of the world. Both appear to be complementary rather than exclusive strategies for dealing with the question that perhaps originates in man's experience of the gap between himself and his world. The one inquires into this experience by regarding himself as a knower in search of solutions to his problem. The other approaches the experience as agent in search of a vision that answers his perplexity. The gap is now transformed into a challenge to action, to what man can do in the light of his moral concerns. Viewed in this light, the two approaches, as Kant has forcefully shown, depict the two aspects of humanity. In this way the Confucian vision can be understood as a contribution to one facet of this vital philosophical question on the relation of the two aspects of man.

NOTES

1. See my "Morality and Paradigmatic Individuals," American Philosophical Quarterly 6, no. 4 (1969), and "The Concept of Paradigmatic Individuals in the Ethics of Confucius," Inquiry 14, nos. 1 and 2 (1971).

2. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. M. Ostwald (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1962), 113b.