A Chinese madhyamaka theory of truth: The case of OF Chi-Tsang

·期刊原文

A CHINESE MADHYAMAKA THEORY OF TRUTH: THE CASE OF CHI-TSANG

By Ming-Wood Liu

Philosophy East and West

Volume 43, Number 4(October 1993)

Pp.649-673

(C) by University of Hawaii Press

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P.649

Chi-tsang (549-623) was the key figure in the

revival of Chinese Madhyamaka in the late sixth

century, and his teaching is commonly acknowledged

to be the apex of the development of Madhyamaka

thought in China.(1) This essay attempts to examine

the conception of truth underlying a number of ideas

generally considered as central to Chi-tsang's

philosophy, including "refutation of falsehood"

(p'o-hsieh), "revelation of truth" (hsien-cheng),

and "two truths" (erh-ti).(2) But before entering

into these ideas, we shall take a brief look at one

idea which determines the overall direction of

Chi-tsang's thought and which constitutes the very

theoretical basis of his teaching of truth, namely,

the idea of nonattachment.

Nonattachment as the Central Spirit of Chi-tsang's

Teaching

Chi-tsang is very fond of quoting the words of

Fa-lang (507-581), his teacher, to support his own

theories. In the following resume which Chi-tsang

gives of Fa-lang's instruction, students are

enjoined to follow the rules of "nonabidingness"

(wu-chu) and "nonacquisitiveness (wu-te) in their

speech and thought:

Whenever our teacher, the Reverend [Fa-]lang,

ascended the hish seat and instructed his

followers, he often said: [Our] words should

take "nonabidingness" as the point of departure,

and [our] minds should take "nonacquisitiveness"

as the principal [guide]. Hence, the profound

suutras and eminent masters enlighten living

beings by making their minds free from

attachment. It is so because attachment is the

root of encumbrances. As the origin of all

sufferings is attachment, Buddhas of the three

periods (of past, present, and future) devise

sutras and lecture `saastras, all in order to

make the minds of sentient beings free from

attachment.(3)

Chi-tsang takes up Fa-lang's view of attachment as

the "root of encumbrances'' when he observes that

"the existence of dependence and attachment is the

root of various defilements" and when he disparages

those practitioners liable to the error of

attachment as "ignorant'' and "devoid of the [ture]

way and the [true] fruit."(4) Chi-tsang also follows

Fa-lang in considering the cultivation of

nonattachment as the principal objective of the

teaching of all Buddhist scriptures, when he makes

out that "nondependence" and "nonattachment" are the

main principles of all suutras and `saastras:

Buddhas of the three periods, for the sake of

sentient beings of the six ways whose minds are

attached,5 appear in the world to preach the

sutras. The "four catagories of enlightened

masters" (ssu-i k'ai-shih),(6) for the sake of

P.650

[those] Mahaayaana and Hiinayaana learners whose

minds are dependent, appear in the world to

compose the `saastras. Hence, dependence and

attachment are the roots of sa.msaara and

nondependence and nonattachment are the major

principles of the suutras and `saastras.(7)

In Chi-tsang's writings, nonattachment is

represented as the basis of deliverance and the

entrance to the true Way.s Lauded as the "one mark

and one taste" of the Buddha Dharma,(9) it is looked

upon as forming the very essence of the superior

Buddha-vehicle.(10)

The importance attributed to the practice of

nonattachment by Fa-lang and Chi-tsang is grounded

on the Buddhist scriptures. Its origin can be traced

back to the very beginning of the Buddhist religion,

when `Saakyamuni, prompted by the realization that

desire is the root of all ills,(11) formulated such

doctrines as the "five skandhas" and "non-self" with

a view to eliminating the attachment of sentient

beings to sa.msaaric existence.(12) The emphasis on

nonattachment in Buddhism came to a head in the

Praj~naapaaramitaa-suutras and the early Madhyamaka

works of Naagaarjuna and Naagaarjuna's followers.

These works exempted nothing, not even the cardinal

Buddhist ideals of nirvana and Buddhahood, from the

rule of abandonment.(13) Chi-tsang's clear knowledge

of the thorough form of nonattachment which the

Madhyamaka tradition advocates is clearly

demonstrated in the following comments he makes on

the purpose of Naagaarjuna's writings:

Further, the general purport of the works which

Naagaarjuna composed during his appearance in

the world is first of all to refute and to

eliminate all errors of acquisitiveness, until

they are totally done away with. Any mind with

the slightest [proclivity for] dependence and

any discourse with the smallest [sign of]

determinateness, whether they be Mahaayaana or

Hiinayaana, Buddhist or non-Buddhist, based upon

the words [of the scriptures] or created without

the support of the words [of the scriptures],

are all to be cleansed, until they are made

entirely pure. However, when the impure have

been got rid of, the pure also do not

remain.(14)

According to Chi-tsang, Naagaarjuna aimed to achieve

with his treatises the eradication of all forms of

acquisitions, including not only the eradication of

the acquisition of the thoughts and words of the

Hinayana and the non-Buddhists, but also the

eradication of the acquisition of the thoughts and

words of the Mahaayaana and the Buddhists. Hence, he

prescribed that the pure should be given up together

with the impure, for grasping at the pure is as

serious a mistake as grasping at the impure. Quoting

the words of Fa-lang, Chi-tsang laments how often

truth, wisdom, and meditation become additional

obstacles on the path of enlightenment due to the

deliberate frame of mind of the practitioners:

Further, whenever my teacher, the Reverend

Master of the Hsing-huang [Monastery], ascended

the high seat, he often said as follows:

Practitioners of

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the Way want to forsake the false ways and seek

the True Way, and thus are bound by [their

longing for] the Way. Practitioners of

meditation [try to] stop disturbances and seek

calmness, and thus are bound by [their fondness

for] meditation. Pursuers of scholarship claim

that there is wisdom [to be cultivated], and

thus are bound by [their love of] wisdom. They

further say, "We should practice contemplating

[the truth of] nonorigination so as to eliminate

the mind of acquisition." As a consequence, they

are bound by [the idea of] nonorigination.

Living in the midst of bondages, they want to

abandon bondages, not really knowing that [their

attempts to abandon bondages] are all

[additional causes of] bondages.(15)

Among the objects of nonattachment cited by

Chi-tsang is the notion of nonattachment itself. So

Chi-tsang chides those practitioners who are

attached to the practice of nonattachment as blind

to the Buddha's real intention,(16) and warns his

readers not to adhere to the idea of

"non-acquisitiveness" as definitely correct:

If we definitely take "nonacquisitiveness" as

right, it would still be [a form of]

acquisitiveness and is not called

"nonacquisitiveness." Just the complete absence

of dependence is called

"nonacquisitiveness."(17)

In Chi-tsang's opinion, real abandonment is achieved

only when one abandons "abandonment" as well as

"procurement.'"(18)

Chi-Tsang's Concept of Truth as Nonattachment

A. Nonattachment as the Criterion of Truth. That

Chi-tsang's teaching of absolute nonattachment has a

direct bearing on his teaching of truth is testified

to by where Chi-tsang draws the line between the

true and the false:

If we harbor [the distinction between] Buddhist

and non-Buddhist and dwell upon [the division

between] Mahaayaana and Hiinayaana, we shall

fall into the falsehood of one-sidedness and

lose sight of the true principle.... Only the

simultaneous allaying of [the thoughts of]

Buddhist and non-Buddhist and the concurrent

subduing [of the ideas of] Mahaayaana and

Hiinayaana are known as the true principle.(19)

This passage links "falsehood" to the harboring, and

"truth" to the forsaking, of the distinction between

Hiinayaana and Mahaayaana, between Buddhist and

non-Buddhist, and so forth. Another passage

associates falsehood with acquisitiveness and truth

with nonacquisitiveness:

Falsehoods are innumerable, and truths are also

of many kinds. Roughly speaking, they do not

fall outside two categories: "with

acquisitiveness" and "without acquisitiveness."

Those [ideas] which are with acquisitiveness are

false and have to be refuted; those [ideas]

which are without acquisitiveness are true and

have to be expounded.(20)

P.652

In sum, as Chi-tsang sees it, truth rests entirely

upon nonattachment.

B. "Refutation of Falsehoods" /s Equivalent to

"Revelation of Truths" (P'o-hsieh chi hsien-cheng).

The implications of Chi-tsang's conception of truth

as nonattachment can be seen from Chi-tsang's

exposition of the two ideas of "refutation of

falsehoods" and "revelation of truths," which are

made out in Chi-tsang's writings as the two main

themes of the Three Treatises, the principal Indian

Madhyamaka texts in the eyes of the Chinese

Buddhists:(21)

However, although there are three treatises,

their purports are just two: first, revealing

truths, second, refuting falsehoods. By refuting

falsehoods, they rescue [sentient beings] sunk

[in sins] below; by revealing truths, they

promote the Great Dharma above. Hence, summing

up the essential points, [we obtain] just these

two [principles].(22)

However, just to say in general that the Madhyamaka

is concerned with "refuting falsehoods" and

"revealing truths" tells us little about the

peculiar character of Madhyamaka thought, for the

same can be said of the thought of all other

Buddhist schools, and, as a matter of fact, of the

thought of all non-Buddhist schools as well. What is

special about the Madhyamaka in this respect is its

singular way of conceiving the relation between the

two functions, a way arising from its conception of

the quintessence of truth as nonattachment:

The other `saastras refute [some ideas] and

establish [other ideas]. This is to aggravate

[the error of] acquisitiveness. Not only are

they incapable of expounding [truths], but they

are also incapable of refuting [falsehoods]....

These `saastras (the Four Treatises) only refute

and never establish. [As a result,] not only are

they capable of refuting [falsehoods], but they

are also capable of establishing [truths].(23)

While "refuting falsehoods" and "revealing

truths" are tasks common to all Buddhist schools,

whether Madhyamaka or non-Madhyamaka, the

non-Madhyamaka schools generally espouse some

special theories of Reality, such as the theory of

the real existence of dharmas in the case of the

Sarvaastivaadins, the theory of universal

nothingness in the case of the Satyasiddhi-`saastra,

the theory of ideation-only in the case of the

Yogaacaarins, and so forth.(24) Ideas and practices

in conflict with these theories are rejected by them

as definitely false, whereas ideas and practices in

agreement with these theories are embraced by them

as definitely true; and "refuting falsehoods" and

"revealing truths" appear as two distinct functions

in their teachings. The Madhyamaka, on the other

hand, admits nothing other than nonattachment to be

the truth, and nonattachment, as we have just

explained, is understood in the Madhya make as the

nongrasping of any form of idea and practice, up to

the very idea and practice of nonattachment.

Consequently, "revealing truths" in

P.653

the Madhyamaka consists not in establishing the

validity of certain doctrinal and behavioral

patterns, but rather in demonstrating the

untenability of any such attempt, that is, in

"refuting falsehoods"; and "refuting falsehoods" and

"revealing truths" are actually two sides of the

same coin in the Madhyamaka's case.

This explains why Chi-tsang would fault the

other schools for "aggravating the error of

acquisitiveness" and for "being incapable of

refuting falsehoods" in practicing "refuting

falsehoods" and "revealing truths" in separate. This

also explains why Chi-tsang, while proffering

"refutation of falsehoods" and "revelation of

truths" as the dual concerns of the Three Treatises,

would declare at the same time that the Madhyamaka

"only refutes and never establishes." In Chi-tsang's

opinion, just because the Three Treatises do not

establish any truth, they establish most perfectly

the truth of nonattachment.

C. The Two forms and Three forms of Truth. In thus

making nonattachment the sole criterion of truth,

Chi-tsang empties the concept of truth of any

determinate content. And if he still describes some

statements and beliefs to be true, he makes it

perfectly plain that his primary consideration is

their efficacy in refuting false views and

cultivating nonattachment. We can see this from his

analysis of truth into the two aspects of

"substance" (t'i) and "function" (yung):

[What is] neither "supreme" nor "mundane" is

called 'truth qua substance"; the "supreme" and

the "mundane" are designated "truths qua

function." It is so because the true character

of dharmas defies description and is beyond

thought, and is never [to be considered as]

"supreme" or "mundane." Hence, we call it

"substance." Since it transcends all [forms of]

one-sidedness and falsehood, we designate it

"truth." Hence, we speak of "truth qua

substance."

As for "truths qua function," since [the

"truth qua] substance" is beyond names and

speech, [ordinary] beings have no means of

realizing it. [Hence,] although [the holy man]

is without the thoughts of "being" and

"nonbeing," he talks tentatively of [the idea of

nonbeing as the] "supreme [truth]" and of [the

idea of being as the] "mundane [truth]." Thus,

we call [their ideas of "supreme" and "mundane"]

"function." [As] these [ideas of] "supreme" and

"mundane" are also not one-sided and false, we

designate them "truth." Thus, we call them

"truths qua function."(25)

The terms "supreme" and "mundane" in the passage

above refer to the "supreme truth" and the "mundane

truth," the former pertaining to the realm of the

enlightened and the latter pertaining to the realm

of the nonenlightened. We shall deal with

Chi-tsang's interpretation of these two forms of

truth in detail later. Meanwhile, for our present

purpose, it is significant to observe that Chi-tsang

maintains that the "truth qua substance," that is,

truth-in-itself, is neither supreme nor mundane,

that is, is not tied to any specific truth, be it of

the supramundane or of the mundane order.

p.654

Chi-tsang duly notes the need to resort

tentatively to the supreme and mundane truths in

order to reveal the "truth qua substance." For

instance, in order to make his followers give up the

belief in a permanent self, which he considered to

be the most serious impediment to the realization of

nonattachment, the Buddha disparaged this belief as

a notion of the mundane world, and lauded the

doctrine of five skandhas, which he put forward to

undermine the belief, as a case of supreme

truth.(26) In like manner, the

Praj~naapaaramitaa-suutras apply the epithet

"mundane" to the AAbhidharmika theory of the real

existence of self-sufficient dharmas and append the

description "supreme" to its own teaching of

emptiness.(27) Yet, it should always be borne in

mind that such judgments of "mundane" and "supreme"

derive their validity entirely from their

effectiveness as means to make known the "truth qua

substance"; that is, they are "truths qua function."

As such, they enjoy no independent status as truth

outside the function of eradicating false beliefs,

and should not be held onto irrespective of change

in circumstances.

Chi-tsang goes on to give another analysis of

truth into three forms:

But there are three forms of truth:

1. What is designated "truth" in contradistinction

to the error of one-sidedness. It is called "truth

in contradistinction to one-sidedness" (tui-p'ien

cheng).

2. What is called truth due to the complete

clearance of one-sidedness. It is referred to as

"truth qua complete [clearance] of one-sidedness"

(chin-p'ien cheng).

3. When the error of one-sidedness has been removed,

the truth also is not retained, and there is neither

one-sidedness nor truth. Not knowing how to laud

[this state], we tentatively extol it as true, and

refer to it as the "non-conditioned truth"

(chueh-tai cheng).(28)

The first form of truth, "truth in contradistinction

to one-sidedness," earns the title of "truth" for

its potency to eliminate the error of one-sidedness,

and is equivalent to "truth qua function." Its

successful application results in the "complete

clearance of one-sidedness," which is enumerated as

the second form of truth. Yet, if one grasps at the

complete clearance of one-sidedness as the truth,

that would also be a kind of one-sidedness Hence,

one has to get rid of the thought of the distinction

between one-sidedness and truth before the real

abolition of one-sidedness can be achieved. The

consummate state of nonattachment thus attained, in

which reliance on every category of thought and

action has disappeared, is presented as the third

form of truth and is given the name

"non-conditioned." It is equivalent to "truth qua

substance."

P.655

D. The Concept of "Truth as Nonattachment" as a

Hermeneutic Principle. Chi-tsang's highly

negativistic conception of truth and pragmatic view

of the truth of propositions are clearly reflected

in his opinion about the purpose of Buddhist

teachings and scriptures. Chi-tsang reports these

words of Fa-lang on the significance of Buddhist

teachings:

[My] teacher said: Whatever we say [should] all

be for the sake or stopping errors. When errors

are stopped, speech ceases. It is just like

hailstones which crush grass. When the grass is

dead, the hailstones disappear. We should not

adhere to words and form opinions. If we adhere

to words and form opinions, we shall fall into

errors once again and can not attain

deliverance.(29)

In the opinion of Fa-lang and Chi-tsang, Buddhist

ideas and theories are not formulated as eternal

truths depicting the constituents and essence of the

ultimate reality, but are invented as instruments to

check errors. Consequently, they should be abandoned

right away once they have fulfilled their intended

role. Chi-tsang is hotly hostile to any tendency to

divorce scriptural teachings from their original

function of refuting falsehoods and to treat

Buddhist doctrines as fixed dogmas. Commenting on

those Buddhists who, having missed the critical

intent of Naagaarjuna's system of eight negations,(30)

construct various positive theories based on their

surface meanings, Chi-tsang writes:

Such a person cannot be converted. It is so

because he who harbors fixed opinions on

investigating [the meanings of] the suutras

cannot be converted even by the Buddhas, and he

who forms the mind of attachment after studying

the `saastras cannot be converted even by the

Bodhisattvas. When a person cannot be converted,

whether by sutras or `saastras, both Buddhas and

Bodhisattvas, we know that his faculties are

dull and his sins are serious. To this person,

whether suutras or `saastras, both Buddhas and

Bodhisattvas, all are poisons.(31)

He who reifies the provisional remarks of the

Buddhas and Bodhisattvas and looks upon the sayings

of the suutras and `saastras as eternally valid

"cannot be converted, " for whatever advice is

addressed to him will be taken up by him forthwith

as another object to adhere to, and will become

another cause of attachment as a result. Thus, it is

asserted that "to this person, whether suutras or

`saastras, both Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, all are

poisons."

But if what are originally beneficial will turn

harmful when they are 'being approached in an

acquisitive frame of mind, what are judged harmful

by the common standard would become beneficial when

they contribute to the realization of the state of

nonattachment. Hence, after criticizing

miscellaneous theories about the central theme of

the Saddharmapu.n.dariika-suutra, Chi-tsang turns

around and observes:

P.656

Supposing [an explanation] agrees with the

suutras but hearing it does not lead to

awakening, it is not the [right] medicine for

its objects [of instruction] and should be

abandoned. [On the other hand, ] if an

explanation conflicts with the Buddhist suutras

and yet hearing it results in acceptance of the

[Buddhist] Way, it becomes [salutary like] sweet

dews and it is only right that it should be

recorded down. Hence, whether [an explanation

is] sweet or poisonous is not definite. Only

awakening is the essential principle.(32)

Chi-tsang considers the central theme of the

Saddharmapu.n.dariika-suutra and, as a matter of

fact, of all Buddhist suutras to be "awakening"

(wu), which means, in the concext of his teaching of

nonattachment, the liberation from all adherences to

and reliances on definite patterns of thought and

behavior. So long as an exposition of the scripture

serves this end, it should be adopted even if it

seems to go against the outward meaning of the text.

On the other hand, an explanation which appears to

be truthful to the text should be rejected, when its

promulgation produces the opposite effect. Chi-tsang

goes so far as to suggest that diverse

interpretations of the same scripture can all be

judged "not wrong" when they lead similarly to

awakening, and should all be deemed "not right" if

they give rise alike to delusion:

To sum up what has been said, there are

altogether three ways (of looking at these

diverse explanations]: first, if their objects

[of instruction] all achieve awakening [on

listening to them], then these various

explanations are not wrong. Second, if on

hearing them, [the objects of instruction] all

become deluded, then these diverse theories are

not right. Third, there may be occasions [when

an explanation is conducive to] awakening at one

place and produces delusion at another place.

Then, it is called "true" at one place and is

named "false" at another place.(33)

All in all, practical religious consideration

has superseded consistency and accuracy as the

guiding principle of Chi-tsang's hermeneutics.

Chi-tsang's Teaching of Two Truths

An examination of Chi-tsang's theory of truth

would not be complete without some discussion of his

interpretation of the important Buddhist concept of

"two truths," an interpretation so innovative that

it is commonly regarded as Chi-tsang's most

important achievement as a Buddhist thinker.(34)

A. Theories of Two Truths before Chi-tsang. The

Sanskrit original of the term "two truths, "

satyadvaya, suggests the existence of two levels of

Reality and their corresponding states of knowledge:

the first, pertaining to the common world of

everyday discourse, is named "mundane truth"

(sa.mv.rti-satya, su-ti, shih-ti) ; the second,

understandable only to the transcendental wisdom of

the enlightened, is called "supreme truth"

(paramaartha-satya, chen-ti, ti-i-i ti).(35) The

notion of two levels of Being

P.657

and knowledge, one inferior and one superior, was

already present in Early Buddhist writings.(36) It

later found its way into various Hiinayaana texts,

such as the Abhidharmamahaavibhaa.saa-`saastra and

the Abhidharmako`sa-`saastra,(37) and was touched

upon in such early Mahaayaana works as the

Praj~naapaaramitaa-suutras.(38) We find in early

Madhyamaka writings constant reference to the

concept. The best-known case by far is the

following, in chapter 24 of Naagaarjuna's famous

Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa:

The Buddhas have recourse to the two truths on

preaching the Dharma for sentient beings: first,

the mundane truth, second, the supreme truth.

If a person does not know how to distinguish

between the two truths,

He will not know the real meaning of the

profound Buddha Dharma.(39)

The Madhyamaka-`saastra, the earliest extant

exegesis on the Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa, comments

thus on these verses:

With respect to the "mundane truth," all dharmas

are in nature empty. Yet, [the opinion of] the

world is fallacious, and hence there arise false

dharmas which are [regarded as] real "from the

standpoint of the world" (yu shih-ch'ien). The

sages and the holy men truly know the fallacious

nature [of the opinions of the world], and hence

they know that all dharmas are empty and

nonoriginating. [This knowledge] is the "supreme

truth" [seen] "from the standpoint of the holy

men" (yu sheng-jen) and is called "real." The

Buddhas have recourse to these two truths on

preaching the Dharma for sentient beings. If a

person cannot correctly distinguish between the

two truths, then he will not know the real

meaning of the very profound Buddha Dharma.(40)

The "mundane truth" is truth by the standard of the

world. For example, ordinary people do not realize

that dharmas are conditioned in nature, and

erroneously look upon them as real. This view of the

real existence of dharmas is a "mundane truth." The

"supreme truth" is truth as known to the saints. For

example, recognizing the conventional belief of real

existence to be erroneous, the saints deem all

dharmas to be in essence empty and nonoriginating.

This view of the emptiness of dharmas is a "supreme

truth." According to the Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa

and Madhyamaka-`saastra, the distinction between

"mundane truth" and "supreme truth" is postulated by

the Buddhas in order to instruct sentient beings,

and we can never come to see the true meaning of the

Buddha Dharma without first comprehending its real

significance.

It is important to note that the Madhyamaka does

not dismiss the "mundane truth" offhandedly as

worthless, despite the intimation of its being the

truth of the worldly realm. This can be seen from

the next stanza of the Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa and

the Madhyamaka-`saastra's exposition of it:

P.658

Without having recourse to the two truths, the

supreme [truth] cannot be obtained.

Without obtaining the supreme [truth], nirvaa.na

can not be obtained.(41)

The supreme [truth] is [made known] entirely

through speech, and speech is [a kind of]

mundane [object]. Hence, [it is said that]

without having recourse to the mundane [truth],

the supreme [truth] cannot be taught. And

without obtaining the supreme [truth], how can

nirvaa.na be attained? Hence, although dharmas

are nonoriginating, there are [two forms of]

truth.(42)

Here, the Madhyamaka-`saastra goes further to

identify the "mundane truth" with speech, which is

generally considered in Buddhism as an outgrowth of

the worldly belief in the real existence of dharmas.

Now, although the "supreme truth, " being the

negation of the belief of real existence, has

basically nothing to do with speech, it cannot be

communicated to the noninitiated without the aid of

speech. Hence, it is said that without the "mundane

truth" (now understood as "speech"), people cannot

obtain the "supreme truth." And without obtaining

the "supreme truth," people naturally cannot realize

nirvaa.na.(43)

The translation of the Madhyamaka-`saastra, as

well as of the Davaada`samukha-`saastra, the

`Sata-`saastra, and the

Mahaapraj~naapaaramitaa-`saastra, into Chinese by

Kumaarajiiva in the first decade of the fifth

century marked the beginning of the Chinese

Madhyamaka movement. Since most of the

aforementioned texts contain remarks about the two

truths,(44) it was not surprising that the attention

of Kumaarajiiva's followers would become drawn to

the concept. Both Seng-tao and Chu Tao-sheng (ca.

360-434) had written special treatises on the two

truths,(45) and T'an-ying and Seng-chao (374-414)

cited the terms "supreme truth" and "mundane truth"

a number of times in their Writings.(46) While the

influence of Madhyamaka texts was on the wane by the

mid-fifth century with the ascendancy of the

Satyasiddhi-`saastra and the Mahaayaana

Mahaaparinirvaa.na-suutra, the interest of Chinese

Buddhists in the two truths did not subside, since

discussions about the two truths also figure

prominently in these two newly revered

scriptures.(47)

By the early sixth century, the "two truths" had

established itself as a cardinal Buddhist theme in

the minds of most Chinese Buddhist thinkers A

considerable amount of information about the various

interpretations of the two truths in circulation at

that time, mostly of a piecemeal, secondary nature,

has been passed down to us, from which we learn that

the idea had been analyzed from a variety of

perspectives and had been correlated with other

currently popular Buddhist ideas, such as the

"misddle path, " "Buddha-nature," and so forth.

However, since most of the presently known exponents

of the idea of two truths of that period had left

behind no comprehensive, systematic philosophical

writing,it is impossible for us today to place their

fragmentary observations about the

P.659

two truths in the context of their overall teachings

in order to apprehend their precise import. On the

whole, it is safe to assume that with respect to the

two main Chinese Buddhist doctrinal traditions of

the sixth century, commonly referred to as the

Ch'eng-shih School and Ti-lun School, the former,

basing its teaching upon the Satyasiddhi-`saastra

(Ch'eng-shih lun) , took over the `Saastra's

interpretation, considering the notion of the real

existence of everyday objects and dharmas to be the

"mundane truth," and regarding the knowledge of the

nonexistence of all forms of beings to be the

"supreme truth."(48) As for the latter, we shall

take the opinion of Ching-ying Hui-yuan (523-592), a

leading Ti-lun master of Chi-tsang's time, as

representative.

In his monumental work, the Ta-cheng I-chang,

Hui-yuan devotes a special section to the topic of

the two truths, where he considers the relation

between the "mundane truth" and the "supreme truth"

from the two aspects of "dependence" (i-ch'ih) and

"origination" (yuan-ch'i):

When the two [truths] are explained from [the

perspective of] "dependence, " the false

phenomena are taken as the dependent [objects]

and the true [consciousness] is [considered as

the subject] being depended on. The false

phenomena which are dependent are said to be the

"mundane truth''; the true [consciousness] being

depended on is classified as the "supreme

truth." When the two [truths] are explained from

[the perspective of] "origination," the pure

Dharmadhaatu, [that is,] the tathaagatagarbha,

[engages in the activities of] origination and

gives birth to [the realms of] sa.msaara and

nirvaa.na. The true nature [of the

tathaagatagarbha] itself is said to be the

"supreme truth"; the function of "origination"

is classified as the "mundane truth."(49)

In this passage, the "supreme truth" is equated with

the true consciousness, which constitutes the

ontological ground of both sa.msaaric and nirvaa.nic

existence in the Ti-lun picture of Reality; and the

"mundane truth" is identified with false phenomena

which arise from the true consciousness, also known

as the tathaagatagarbha, when the latter comes under

the influence of ignorance. The aspect "origination"

indicates that the false phenomenal order originates

from the true consciousness; the aspect "dependence"

indicates that the false phenomenal order is

sustained by the true consciousness. All in all, in

the Ta-cheng I-chang, the concept of "two truths"

has been assimilated into the Ti-lun metaphysical

framework, and is used to illustrate the teaching of

consciousness-only 'espoused by the School.(50)

B. The Two Truths qua Instruction (Chiao-ti). The

preceding sketch of the early Chinese

interpretations of the "two truths" has shown that

there existed a general tendency to associate the

"supreme truth'' and the "mundane truth" with two

ontological levels of Reality, one actual and the

other illusory. Chi-tsang devotes a large part of

his exposition of the two truths to demonstrating

the untenability of this approach. Quoting

P.660

Naagaarjuna's statement that "the Buddhas have

recourse to the two truths on preaching the Dharma

for sentient beings, " he asserts that the

distinction between "supreme truth" and "mundane

truth" is postulated by the Buddhas as a "means of

instruction," and that the two truths do not stand

for two objective "realms" and "principles":

[Naagaarjuna] explains that the Tathaagatas

always have recourse to the two truths on

preaching the Dharma: first, the mundane truth,

second, the supreme truth. Hence, the two truths

are just means of instruction and are not

concerned with objects and principles.(51)

To take the two truths as indicating two separate

realms and principles is an instance of dualistic

thinking; and dualistic thinking is synonymous with

attachment in Madhyamaka thought. Being a

Maadhyamika and strongly opposed to attachment of

any form, Chi-tsang naturally deems it impossible

that the Buddhas would conceive the two truths as

referring to two separate realms and principles:

Further, if [we take] the two truths as two

principles, that would constitute

"acquisitiveness."... Sentient beings already

have the error of [harboring] dualistic views.

If the Buddhas further teach that the true

principle is dual, then not only is their old

error not got rid of, but new delusions would

also be added. For this reason, the Buddhas,

[with a view to] adapting to [the understanding

of] sentient beings, say that there are two

truths. Actually, the true principle is not

dual.(52)

Pivotal to Chi-tsang's teaching of the two

truths is the concept of "two truths qua

instruction," which is defined as follows:

By [the two truths qua] "instruction" [we mean

that] the true [principle] is originally

nondual, and it is for the sake of the objects

[of instruction] that it is spoken of as dual.

Hence, [the two truths] are called

"instruction."(53)

Given the centrality of the precept of nonattachment

in Chi-tsang's teaching, the "true principle"

mentioned here should be none other than the

principle of nonattachment. As nonattachment is the

abolition of all thoughts of duality, it is said

that "the true principle is originally nondual."

However, sentient beings cling to all sorts of

beliefs, and to make them abandon their clingings,

the Buddhas disparage the beliefs they cherish as

"mundane" and extol the opposite beliefs as

"supreme." Hence, it is said that "it is for the

sake of the objects of instruction that the true

principle is spoken of as dual." In Chi-tsang's

opinion, the duality of "mundane" and "supreme" is

invented by the Buddhas purely as a pedagogical

device to uproot attachments, and does not reflect

the Buddha's true state of knowledge, which is

absolutely nondiscriminating. This opinion is

reflected in Chi-tsang's rejection or the popular

understanding of the "mundane" as "void and

fleeting" and of the "supreme"

P.661

as "real and solid." It is also implied in the

following remarks, which assert that "mundane" has

"nonmundane" and "supreme" has "nonsupreme" as

meaning:'"

The two truths are also like that. As "supreme"

signifies "nonsupreme" and "mundane" signifies

"nonmundane, " "supreme'" and "mundane" are

provisional expressions. Being provisional

expressions, [the two] terms do not have the

effect of acquiring things, and things do not

have the substances corresponding to [the two]

terms.(55)

According to Chi-tsang, only when one gives up the

idea that the terms "supreme" and "mundane" indicate

specific "supreme" and "mundane" objects will one

truly come to comprehend the real significance of

the Buddhas' usage of the terms "supreme" and

"mundane."

C. The Two Truths qua Standpoints (Yu-ti). If

"supreme truth" and "mundane truth" do not denote

two distinct levels of Reality, the question then

arises as to why the Madhyamaka-`saastra cites the

popular belief in the real existence of dharmas as a

case of "mundane truth" and gives the holy man's

perception of the emptiness of dharmas as an

instance of "supreme truth." Are "real existence"

and "emptiness" not two levels 'of Reality? Are

their cognitions not two levels of knowledge?

Chi-tsang answers these queries by postulating

another form of "two truths," the "two truths qua

standpoints." The concept "two truths qua

standpoints" is derived from the

Madhyamaka-`saastra, which, as we have seen, says

that everyday objects are considered as real "from

the standpoint of the world" but are recognized as

empty "from the standpoint of the holy man":(56)

The `Saastra itself explains: dharmas are empty

in nature. [Yet, the opinion of] the world is

fallacious, and maintains that they are

existent. From the standpoint of the people of

the world, [the view of existence] is true to

the fact and is called a "truth." The sages and

holy men truly know the fallacious nature [of

worldly opinions] and the empty nature [of

dharmas]. From the standpoint of the holy men,

[the view of emptiness] is true to the fact and

is called a "truth." These [views of "existence"

and "emptiness"] are the "two truths qua

standpoints." What the Buddhas preach having

recourse to these [views] are called the "[two]

truths qua instruction."(57)

As Chi-tsang sees it, when the Madhyamaka-`saastra

puts forward the idea of real existence as the

"mundane truth" and the idea of emptiness as the

"supreme truth, " it is relating two opposite

"standpoints" concerning the nature of Reality,

standpoints which the Buddhas bring up on preaching

the Dharma without actually endorsing either of

them. Thus, in order to counteract the everyday

man's realistic standpoint, the Buddhas have

recourse to the contrary standpoint of emptiness,

disparaging the former as "worldly" and "mundane,"

and praising the latter as "holy" and "supreme."

P.662

However, it should be remembered that the

standpoint of emptiness is brought in by the Buddhas

solely as an antidote to the standpoint of real

existence. When the Buddhas picture "real existence"

as a "mundane" concept and "emptiness" as a

"supreme" concept, they are not asking their

audiences to exchange "real existence" for

"emptiness" as the true ontological idea. When the

role of "truths qua standpoints" to eliminate

attachment to every standpoint is properly

comprehended, it would be perceived that the "truths

qua standpoints" actually function in the Buddhas'

teaching as "truths gua instruction."

The term "two truths qua standpoints" is coined

for the sake of sentient beings. it is for the

sake of sentient beings that [the Buddhas] say

that [the view of] "existence" [represents] the

standpoint of the ordinary [people and] is the

mundane truth; it is for the sake of sentient

beings that [the Buddhas] say that [the view of]

"emptiness" [represents] the standpoint of the

holy men [and] is the supreme truth. Since it is

for the sake of sentient beings that [the

Buddhas] talk about "emptiness" and "existence,"

which are the "two truths qua standpoints," the

"two truths' qua standpoints" are also "[truths

qua] instruction."(58)

Judging from the fact that "existence" and

"emptiness" are two conflicting opinions about the

nature of Reality, they are "truths qua

standpoints." Judging from the fact that "existence"

and "emptiness" are propounded by the Buddhas for

the sake of guiding sentient beings and not for the

sake of establishing a specific metaphysical

position, they are "truths qua instruction." To

perceive that "truths qua standpoints" serve in the

teaching of the Buddhas mainly as tentative devices

to negate standpoints is highly important, for

failing to do so has resulted in the erroneous

identification of some metaphysical standpoints as

the Buddhas' standpoints. It is in order to guard

against misunderstanding of this sort that Chi-tsang

differentiates between two types of "truth qua

standpoints": "truths qua standpoints [the Buddhas]

have recourse to" (so-i yu-ti) and "truths qua

standpoints missing the heuristic [intent] (mi-chiao

yu-ti) [of the Buddhas]":(59)

If it is so, then there are two forms of "truths

qua standpoints": first, "truths qua standpoints

[the Buddhas] have recourse to," second, "truths

qua standpoints missing the heuristic

[intent]."... The "truths qua standpoints [the

Buddhas] have recourse to" are "original"; the

"truths qua standpoints missing the heuristic

[intent]" are "derivative."

The "truths qua standpoints [the Buddhas]

have recourse to" being original, let us discuss

this by referring to `Saakyamuni's life work.

Before the appearance of Saakyamuni, there were

already these "two truths qua standpoint s."

`Saakyamuni had recourse to these two truths on

preaching the Dharma for sentient beings. For

what reason? [It is because] all Buddhas without

exception preach the Dharma by having recourse

to the two truths. Hence, [`Saakyamuni] had

recourse to the two truths from the very start

on preaching [the Dharma.

P.663

Thus,] it should be known that the "truths qua

standpoints [the Buddhas] have recourse to" are

"original."

The "truths qua standpoints missing the

heuristic [intent]" are derivative because they

are "[truths qua] standpoins" formed when

sentient beings entertain the opinions of

"existence" and "nonexistence" after receiving

the Tathaagata's teaching of the two truths of

"existence" and "nonexistence." These ["truths

qua standpoints"] come later [and so are known

as "derivative"].(60)

According to Chi-tsang, the two ideas of

"existence" and "emptiness" were already a part of

the popular conceptual apparatus before

`Saakyamuni's appearance in the world,(61) and they

were adopted by `Saakyamuni as expedient teaching

devices from the very beginning of his preaching

career. So they are called "truths qua standpoints

the Buddhas have recourse to," Those practitioners

of dull faculties could not discern the

soteriological intent behind `Saakyamuni's

discourses on "existence" and "emptiness, " and

regarded `Saakyamuni's references to the former

notion as "mundane" and to the latter notion as

"supreme" as judgments about ontological primacy.

They mistook provisional ideas for definite

opinions, and so their definite opinions of

"existence" and "emptiness" are called "truths qua

standpoints missing the heuristic intent of the

Buddhas."

Since the "truths qua standpoints the Buddhas

have recourse to" inaugurated `Saakyamuni's mission

of universal salvation, they are said to be

"original." Since the "truths qua standpoints

missing the heuristic intent" came about due to the

misconceiving of the real purpose of the "truths qua

standpoints the Buddhas have recourse to," they are

said to be "derivative." Chi-tsang goes further to

distinguish "three alternatives" (san-chu) in

connection with the correct comprehension and the

incorrect comprehension of the "two truths qua

standpoints":

There are three alternative [judgments] with

respect to the "[two] truths qua standpoints":

first, they are both correct, second, they are

both incorrect, third, they are [one] correct

and [one] incorrect.

[1] [The two truths qua standpoints are one]

correct and [one] incorrect: from the standpoint

of the ordinary [people, things] are existent.

This [view of] existence is incorrect. The sages

and the holy men truly know that [things are] in

nature empty. This [view of] emptiness is

correct.

[2] The two [truths qua standpoints] are both

incorrect: since the two [views of "existence"

and "emptiness"] are both standpoints, both are

incorrect.

[3] The two [truths qua standpoints] are both

correct: on knowing the two standpoints [of

"existence" and "emptiness"], one knows right

away [the truth of] "nonduality." Seeing neither

"duality" nor "nonduality," one transcends all

the five alternatives.(62)

P.664

Now, of these alternatives, the first two

alternatives are equivalent to "truths qua

standpoints," while the last alternative is

equivalent to "truth pua instruction."(63)

The alternative of "one correct and one

incorrect" is exemplified by the initial propagation

of the two truths by `Saakyamuni, when the

standpoint of existence was dismissed as "mundane"

and "incorrect" and the opposite standpoint of

emptiness was proffered as "supreme" and "correct."

It is the same as the "truth qua standpoint the

Buddhas have recourse to." The alternative of "both

incorrect" points to the fallacious interpretation

of `Saakyamuni's reference to the standpoint of

existence as "correct" and to the standpoint of

emptiness as "incorrect" as an injunction to discard

one ontological standpoint in favor of another

ontological standpoint. It is none other than the

"truths qua standpoints missing the heuristic intent

of the Buddhas." Lastly, the alternative of "both

correct" is the correct knowledge of `Saakyamuni's

method of making use of one standpoint to undermine

another standpoint, the final goal being the

transcending of all specific standpoints, that is,

the realization of the truth of nonduality. It

rightly recognizes the role which the standpoints of

existence and emptiness play in `Saakyamuni's

teaching, that is, as "truth qua instruction."

D. The Three forms and Four Forms of Two Truths. The

foregoing discussion of the "two truths qua

instruction" and the "two truths qua standpoints"

underscores Chi-tsang's pragmatic view of truth. To

be sure, pragmatism had already played a significant

part in discussions of the two truths before

Chi-tsang, in the form of affirming the necessity of

resorting to the mundane truths in order to reveal

the supreme truth. But pragmatism had seldom been

extended to the reading of the very distinction

between mundane truth and supreme truth. White the

remark of the Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa that "the

Buddhas have recourse to the two truths on preaching

the Dharma for sentient beings" does suggest that

the duality of "mundane truth" and "supreme truth"

is adopted by the Buddhas to cater to the needs of

ordinary sentient beings, this meaning is hinted at

and is not directly expressed. The same is true of

the reference to the duality of "existence" and

"emptiness" to throw light upon. the relation

between the two truths in the Madhyamaka-`saastra.

Chi-tsang's ability to make explicit the implicit,

thereby turning the theory of two truths into a

powerful illustration of his conception of truth as

nonattachment, bespeaks keen intellectual acumen.

In conclusion, we shall take a brief look at

Chi-tsang's schemes of three forms and of four forms

of two truths. They are good illustrations of

Chi-tsang's idea of two truths as means of

instruction. The three forms of two truths are:

P.665

The first [form of two truths] takes "existence"

as the mundane truth and "emptiness" as the

supreme truth. The next [form of two truths]

takes "existence" and "emptiness" as both

mundane [truths] and [considers] "neither

existence nor emptiness" as the supreme [truth].

The third [form of two truths] takes the

"duality" and the "nonduality" [of existence and

emptiness] as mundane [truths] and [considers]

"neither duality nor nonduality" as the supreme

[truth].(64)

The passage above can be summed up in a table (Table 1).

Chi-tsang gives the following explanation of how

teaching the three forms of two truths helps to free

the minds of sentient beings from clinging to

determinate ideas:

From the beginningless past, [sentient beings]

cherish their bodily forms, their minds,

external objects, and so forth, and maintain

that they are real. Hence, the Buddhas appear in

the world and preach for them as follows: "These

[things] are real [at the level of] the mundane

[truth] only, and are not real [in the eyes of]

the holy [man]. lust [the knowledge that] all

dharmas are empty in their original nature is

called the supreme truth...." Then sentient

beings maintain that "existence" is not the real

[truth] and that "emptiness" is the real

[truth]. They abandon [the idea of] "existence"

[only] to grasp at [the idea of] "emptiness."

Hence, [the Buddhas go on to] tell them,

"Regarding `emptiness' and 'existence,' these

are two extremes and are both mundane truths.

[Only the idea of] 'neither emptiness nor

existence,' [that is] the truth of the middle

way, is the supreme truth."

Although the deluded ones [on hearing the

second form of two truths] abandon the two

extreme [ideas of "existence" and "emptiness"],

they in turn get bogged down in [the idea of]

the "middle way." Hence, [the Buddhas address

them] the third time land] explain that not to

become attached to the "middle way" after

leaving far behind the two extremes [of

"existence" and "emptiness"] is the supreme

truth, and that the two extremes and the "middle

way" are all mundane truths.(65)

Seeing that sentient beings cherish their bodily

forms, their minds, and the objects of the external

world, the Buddhas teach the first form of

Table 1. The Three Forms of Two Truths

-----------------------------------------------------------

Form Mundane Truth Supreme Truth

-----------------------------------------------------------

1 Existence Emptiness

2 Duality of "existence" and "emptiness" Nonduality of

"existence" and

"emptiness"

(neither "existence"

nor "emptiness")

3 Duality of "duality" and "nonduality" Neither "duality"

nor "nonduality"

------------------------------------------------------------

P.666

two truths, upholding "emptiness" as the supreme

truth in order to refute the mundane belief in real

"existence." On hearing the Buddhas' words, those

sentient beings of sharp faculties see right away

the Buddhas' real objective to cultivate

nonattachment, and would give up the standpoint of

"existence" without retaining the standpoint of

"emptiness." The majority of listeners, however,

being of dull intelligence, are prompted by their

ingrained habit of discriminative thinking to

consider the ideas of "existence" and "emptiness" as

two opposite ontological standpoints, the former to

be discarded and the latter to be accepted. They

abandon the standpoint of "existence," only to grasp

at the standpoint of "emptiness.'' Noticing this,

the Buddhas go on to bring in the second form of two

truths, pointing out that their dualistic conception

of "existence" and "emptiness" is still a case of

mundane truth, and that the supreme truth is the

foregoing of the standpoint of "emptiness" as well

a; the standpoint of "existence" ("neither being nor

emptiness").

Yet, the listeners' proclivity for grasping at

standpoints persists. Although they forsake the

"duality" of existence and emptiness following the

instruction of the second form of two truths, they

take up the "nonduality" of existence and emptiness

as the standpoint to be endorsed. Consequently, the

Buddhas preach the third form of two truths, which

tells that to oppose "nonduality" to "duality" is

itself a form of dualistic thinking pertaining to

the realm of mundane truth, and that only the

abolition of the duality of "duality" and

"nonduality" ("neither duality nor nonduality") is

the true nonduality characteristic of the supreme

truth. Theoretically, this negative dialectic of

successive cancellation and production of

contradictions could go on ad infinitum;(66)

practically it would stop once the roots of

attachment of the listeners have been eradicated.

The scheme of four forms of two truths brings

into focus the heuristic function of the teaching of

three forms of two truths by introducing an

additional form of two truths, in which the three

forms of two truths are bracketed together as

"mundane":

[1] They (the Ch'eng-shih masters) merely take

"existence" as the mundane truth and "emptiness"

as the supreme truth.

[2] Now, we explain that "existence" and

"emptiness" are both mundane truths and only

"neither emptiness nor existence" is the supreme

truth.

[3] "Emptiness" and "existence" are a [form of]

duality; "neither emptiness nor existence" is a

[form of] nonduality. "Duality" and "nonduality"

are both mundane truths; "neither duality not

nonduality" is called the supreme truth. [4]

These three forms of two truths are all means of

instruction. We speak about these three

categories [of two truths] in order to make

[people] realize [the] non[difference of the]

three [categories of two truths]. Only

nondependence and nonacquisitiveness are called

[the true] principles.

P.667

Table 2. The Four Forms of Two Truths

------------------------------------------------------------------

Form Mundane Truth Supreme Truth

---------------------------------------------------------------- --

1 Existence Emptiness

2 Duality of "existence" and "emptiness" nonduality of

"existence" and

"emptiness"

3 Duality of "duality" and "nonduality" Neither "duality"

nor "nonduaiity"

4 The three forms of two truths Nondiffernece of

the three forms of

two truths

-------------------------------------------------------------------

QUESTION: [Do you mean that] the first three

[forms of two truths] are all mundane truths and

the non [difference of the] three [forms of two

truths] is the supreme truth?

REPLY: It is so.(67)

The thesis of each of the four forms of two

truths is illustrated in Table 2. Comparing Table 2

with Table 1, we can see right away that the first

three of the four forms of two truths correspond to

the three forms of two truths. The adding of the

fourth form makes it clear that the three forms of

two truths are "all means of instruction," that is,

they are distinctions invented for the purpose of

eliminating distinctions. Hence, they belong to the

group of mundane truths to be transcended. The

supreme truth is the "nondifference of the three

forms of two truths," that is, it is the true

principle of nonattachment which rises above all

distinctions, including the distinction between

three forms of two truths.

NOTES

This essay is a part of an ongoing research on the

development of Madhyamaka thought in China. I would

like to take this opportunity to thank Professor

Kenneth K. S. Ch'en for kindly agreeing to read over

my research manuscript and offering many insightful

comments. I am indebted to the Hsu Long-sing

Research Fund administered by the University of Hong

Kong for a grant which defrayed part of,the cost of

producing this manuscript.

1 - On Chi-tsang's life and contribution to the

Chinese Madhyamaka movement, consult Tao-hsuan

(596-667), Hsu Kao-seng chuan, T 50.513c-515a,

and Hirai Shunei, Chuugoku hannya shisohi

kenkyuu (Tokyo, 176), pp. 60-79, 345-352.

P.668

2 - Fa-lang's biography, in Tao-hsuan, Hsu Kao-seng

chuan, T 50.477b-478a.

3 - Sheng-man-ching Pao-k'u, T37.5c8-12.

4 - Ching-maing hsuan-lun, T38.888b21; and Fa-hua

i-su, T34.580c1-12.

5 - The "six ways" are the six forms of rebirth as

beings of hell, hungry ghosts, animals, asuras,

human beings, and gods.

6- "K'ai-shih" ("enlightened masters") is an epithet

used in praise of Bodhisattvas and learned

monks. The idea of "ssu-i" comes from the

Mahayana Mahaaparinirvaa.na-suutra, in which we

find mentioned "four" (ssu) categories of sages,

from those who have just left the world up to

the arhat, on whom sentient beings can rely (i)

to give comfort and protection. See T 12.396c.

In Chi-tsang's writings, the term "ssu-i

k'ai-shih" usually refers to Naagaarjuna. See,

for example, Chung-kuan-lun su, T 42.1c.

7 - San-lun hsuan-i, T45.7a23-26.

8 - Fa-hua yu-i, T34.644a1-2; and Fa-hua i-su,

T34,483b24.

9 - Chung-kuan-lun su, T34.418b1-2.

10 - Fa-hua hsuan-lun, T34.418b1-2.

11 - The Buddha frequently mentioned "desire" on

discussing the cause of suffering:

Whatsoever III arising has come upon me in the

past,--all that is rooted in desire, is joined

to desire. Whatsoever III arising may come upon

me in future time-all that is rooted in desire

is joined to desire. Desire is the root of III.

(Caroline A. F. Rhys Davids and Frank L.

Woodward, trans., The Book of the Kindred

Sayings [Samyutta-nikaaya], 5 vols. [London:

Pali Text Society, 1917-1930], vol. 4, p. 233)

12 - The Buddha traced the origin of desire to the

identification of one's self with the five

skandhas (body, feeling, perception,

activities, and consciousness), which are the

five main aspects of sentient existence:

And how, brethren, is there grasping and worry?

Herein, brethren, the untaught

many-folk,...--these regard body as the self,

the self as having body, body as being in the

self, the self as being in the body. Of such a

one the body alters and becomes otherwise.

Owing to the altering and the otherwiseness of

the body, his consciousness is busied with the

altering body. From this being busied with the

altering body, worried thoughts arise and

persist, laying hold of the heart. From the

laying hold of the heart he becomes troubled,

and owing to vexation and clinging he is

worried. He regards feeling as the self, the

self as having feeling, feeling as being the

self, the self as being in feeling. Of such a

one feeling alters and becomes otherwise...with

the same result. So also with perception... the

activities... the consciousness. Thus,

brethren, comes grasping and worry. (Ibid.,

vol. 3, pp. 16-17)

P.669

13 - The A.s.tasaahasrikaapraaj~naaparamitaa-suutra

mentions among the objects to be abandoned not

only the Hiinayaana fruits of Arhatship and

Pratyekabuddhahood, but also the Mahaayaana

fruit of Buddhahood:

I will teach you how a Bodhisattva should stand

in perfect wisdom. Through standing in

emptiness should he stand in perfect wisdom.

Armed with the great armour, the Bodhisattva

should so develop that he does not take his

stand on any of these: not on form, feeling,

perception, impulses, consciousness; not on

eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind;...not on

Pratyekabuddhahood, not on Buddhahood. (Edward

Conze, trans., The Perfection of Wisdom in

Eight;Thousand Lines & its Verse Summary, 2nd

rev. ed. [Bolinas, California: Four Seasons

Foundation, 1975], p. 97) The

Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa teaches the

nondifference of sa.msaara and nirvaa.na:

There is nothing whatever which

differentiates sa.msaara from nirvaa.na. And

there is also nothing whatever which

differentiates nirvaa.na from sa.msaara.

The extreme limit of nirvana is also the

extreme limit of sa.msaara;

There is not the slightest bit of difference

between these two limits.

(T 30.36a4-11)

14 - Fa-hua hsuan-lun, T34.391b16-20.

15 - Ching-ming hsuan-lun, T38.874b15-20.

16- Fa-hua i-su, T34.487c19.

17 - Nieh-p'an-ching yu-i, T38.232c17-19.

18 - Pai-lun su, T.42.239a22.

19 - San-lun hsuan-i, T45.6c12-16.

20 - Ta-ch'eng hsuan-lun, T45.68c19-21.

21 - The "three treatises" are the

Madhyamaka-`saastra (verse by Naagaarjuna,

commentary by Ch'ing-mu) , the

Dvaada`samukha-`saastra (attributed to

Naagaarjuna), and the `Saata-`saastra (verse by

AAryadeva, commentary by Bodhisattva Vasu).

22 - San-lun hsuan-i, T45.1a13-15.

23 - Ta-ch'eng hsuan-lun, T45.70a3-6.

24 - The teachings of the Sarvaativaadins, the

Satyasiddhi-`saastra, and the Yogaacaarins were

very popular in China in the sixth century, and

were constantly mentioned and criticized in

Chi-tsang's writings. Central to the

Sarvaastivaada picture of reality is the system

of seventy-five dharmas made out to be the most

basic elements of existence. The

Satyasiddhi-`saastra subjects the dharmas to

further analysis, and contends that the final

reality is the total emptiness arrived at

through continuous division. The Yogaacaara

postulates the existence of a

P.670

basic consciousness in every sentient being,

and considers all object of experience to be

formed from the ideas produced by this

consciousness.

25 - San-lun hsuan-i, T45.7b9-15.

26 - Refer to note 12 above for information about

the early Buddhist doctrines of "five skandhas"

and "nonself."

27 - Regarding the Hiinayaana belief of the real

existence of dharmas, see note 24 above. To

counter this belief, the

Praj~naapaaramitaa-suutras teach the emptiness

of all forms of existence. Hence, the

A.s.tasaahasrikaapraj~naapaaramitaa-suutra

asserts that all objective facts, all classes

of saints, and even nirvaa.na, are "like a

magical illusion, like a dream":

Like a magical illusion are these beings, like

a dream.... All objective facts also are like a

magical illusion, like a dream. The various

classes of saints, from Streamwinner to

Buddhahood, also are like a magical illusion,

like a dream.... Even Nirvaa.na, I say, is like

a magical illusion, is like a dream. How much

more so anything else! (Edward Conze, trans.,

The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand

Lines & its Verse Summary, pp. 98-99)

28 - San-lun hsuan-i, T 45.7b23-27.

29 - Chung-kuan-lun su, T42.27b13-16.

30 - The eight negations are negations of four pairs

of concepts, namely, origination and

extinction, permanence and annihilation,

identity and difference, and coming and going.

31 - Chung-kuan-lun su, T42.31c26-32a2.

32 - Fa-hua hsuan-lun, T34.381a15-17.

33 - Ibid., T34.381b16-19.

34 - On Chi-tsang's teaching of two truths, consult

Aaron K. Koseki, "Chi-tsang's

Ta-cheng-hsuan-lun: The Two Truths and the

Buddhanature" (Ph.D. diss., University of

Wisconsin-Madison, 1977), pp. 14-185; Hsueh-li

Cheng, "Zen and San-lun Maadhyamika Thought:

Exploring the Theoretical Foundation of Zen

Teachings and Practices," Religious Studies 15

(1979) : 346-351; Tokiwa Diajo, Zoku Shins

Bukkyo no kenkyuu (Tokyo, 1941), pp. 337-49;

Hirai Shunei, Chuugoku hannya shisoshi kenkyuu,

pp. 457-477, 561-592; Muranaka Yuusho, "Kajo

Daishi no o-kyo nitai ni tsuite," Indogaku

Bukkyogaku kenkyuu 8, no. 1 (1960): 160-161;

Sato Seijun; "Kichizo no shijuu nitai setsu,"

Sanko Bunka Kenkyuujo nempo 8 (1976): 155-180;

and Mitsugiri Jikai, "Kichizo no nitai-gi,"

Otani gakuho 60, no. 4 (1980): 1-10.

35 - See Mervyn Sprung,"The Madhyamaka Doctrine of

Two Realities as a Metaphysic," in Mervyn

Sprung, ed., The Problem of Two Truths in

Buddhism and Vedanta (Dordrecht,

Holland/Boston, Massachusetts: D. Reidel,

1973), p. 40.

P.671

36 - On the inception of the idea of two levels of

truth in Buddhism, consult Kulatissa N.

Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge

(London: George Alien & Unwin, 1963), pp.

361-368; Steven Collins, Selfless Persons

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982),

pp. 153-156; and Yasui Kosai, Chuugan shiso no

kenkyo (Kyoto, 1961), pp. 43-49.

37 - Abhidharmamahaavibhaa.saa-`saastra, T27.399c-400b,

and Abhidharma- ko`sa-`saastra, T 29.116b.

38 - See, for example, the

Pa~ncavi.m`satisaahasrika.

38 - See, forapaaramitaa-suutra, T8.378c, 397b-c and

405a.

39 - T 30.32c16-19.

40 - T 30.23c20-25.

41- T30.33a2-3.

42 - T 30.33a4-7.

43 - The Madhyamaka theory of two truths is

discussed in most works on Madhyamaka thought,

and is also the subject of numerous special

studies. See, for instance, the papers by

T.R.V. Murti, Frederick J. Streng, Mervyn

Sprung, and Bimal K. Matilal, in Mervyn Sprung,

ed., The Problem of the Two Truths in Buddhism

and Vedanta.

44 - For references to the two truths in the

`Sata-`saastra, see T 30.165a, 181c-182a. The

key passages on the two truths in the

Mahaapraj~naapaaramitaa-`saastra are listed in

Tamiki Koshiro, Chuugoku Bukkyo shiso no keisei

(Tokyo, 1971), pp. 462-467, and are discussed

in Paul L. Swanson, "The Two Truths Controversy

in China and Chih-i's Threefold Truth Concept"

(Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison,

1985), chap. 2, sec. 2.

45 -Among Chu Tao-sheng's writings mentioned in Chu

Tao-sheng's biography in Hui-chiao's (497-554)

Kao-seng chuan is one titled the Erh-ti lun

("On the two truths"), T50.366c18. The Kao-seng

chuan also mentions that Seng-tao was the

author of a treatise called the K'ung-yu erh-ti

lun ("On the two truths of emptiness and

being"), T 50.371b2.

46 - T'an-ying's preface to the Madhyamaka-`saastra

contains the earliest Chinese reference to the

terms "mundane truth" and "supreme truth" (T

55.77b1-6) . Seng-chao's writings also make

reference to these two terms. See T

45.154a5-26. Contemporary scholars have

stressed the contribution of these sources to

the formation of Chi-tsang's idea of "two

truths qua instruction." Consult Hirai Shunei,

"Kichizo Nitaisho no shiso to kozo," Komazawa

Daigaku Bukkyogakubu kenkyuu kiyo 27 (1969):

60-62; Chuugoku hannya shisoshi kenkyuu,

P.672

pp. 462-466; and Ikeda Shuujo, "Sojo no shuui

no hannyagaku shoshi no shiso ni kanshite,"

Taisho Daigaku Sogo Bukkyo Kenkyuujo nempo 7

(1985): 34-36.

47 - See, for instance, the Mahaayaana

Mahaaparinirvaa.na-suutra, T 12.443a-b, 465b-c,

603c; and Satyasiddhi-`saastra, T 32.316c-317a,

327a-c, 333a-b.

48 - So the Satyasiddhi-`saastra observes:

The annihilation of the marks of the five

skandhas is called the supreme truth. (T

32.316c25)

The five skandhas are really inexistent, and

are [only deemed to be] existent from [the

aspect of] the mundane truth. (T 32.333a8)

It should be known that [at the level of]

"supreme truth," beings are ail [considered to

be] inexistent. It is only from [the aspect of]

the "mundane truth" that [it is said that]

there are various beings. (T 32.333c15-17)

49 - T44.483c14-21.

50 - On the early Chinese interpretations of the two

truths, see Whalen W. Lai, "Sinitic

Understanding of the Two Truths Theory in the

Liang Dynasty (502-557): Ontological Gnosticism

in the Thought of the Prince Chao-ming, "

Philosophy East and West 28, no. 3 (1978);

339-351; "Once More on the Two Truths: What

Does Chi-tsang Mean by the Two Truths as

'Yueh-chiao'?" Religious Studies 19 (1983):

505-521; Paul L. Swanson, "The Two Truths

Controversy in China and Chis-i's Threefold

Truth Concept", chap. 2, sec. 3, and chaps.

4-6; Tokiwa Daijo, Zoku Shina Bukkyo no

kenkyuu, pp. 330-337; Fukushima Kosai, "Ryotai

nitai shiso no tokushitsu," Bukkyogaku seminaa

2 (1965): 45-55, and "Myoho toshite no ennyuu

santai to sono shiso teki haikei, " Otani

Daigakuu kenkyuu nempo 28 (1976): 16-24.

51 - Ta-ch'eng hsuan-lun, T 45.15a15-17. The idea of

"two truths qua instruction" was not invented

by Chi-tsang. According to Chi-tsang it was put

forward by Seng-lang, Seng-ch'uan, and Fa-lang

to counter the Ch'eng-shih masters'

interpretation of the two truths as two

independent ontological principles. see

Ta-ch'eng hsuan-lun, T 45.15a25-27, 22c10-11;

Erh-ti i, T45.86a29-b11; and Chung-kuan-lun su,

T 42.28c19-26. Chi-tsang also mentioned the

Elder Liang of Kuang-chou (in present Kuangtung

Province) , identified as Tao-liang of the

mid-fifth century, as its advocate. See Erh-ti

i, T45.90a24-b6 Also see Sato Tstsuei, "Sanron

gakuha ni okeru yalukyo nitai setsu no keifu,

Ryuukoku Daigaku ronshuu 380 (1966): 12-15.

Recent scholars even trace its beginning back

to Seng-chao and T'an-ying. See the works listed

in note 46 above. As for the scriptural sources

or the idea, Chi-tsang cites, besides the

Otani gakuho 60, no. 4 (1980): 1-10.

P.673

Pa~ncavi.m`satisaahasrikaapraj~naapaaramitaa-su

Pa~ncavi.m`saaayaana Mahaaparinirvaa.na-suutra

and the Sata-`saastra, See Ta-ch'eng hsuan-lun,

T 45.23a8-12, Erh-ti i, T45.78b7-8, 86b11-16;

and Ching-ming hsuan-lun, T 38.894b9-14. 52 -

Erh-ti i, T45.108c17-23.

53 - Ching-ming hsuan-lun, T38.894a16-17. See a

similar passage in Erh-ti i, T45.88c6-9.

54 - Ta-ch'eng hsuan lun, T45.16a10-14.

55 - Ibid., T45.16c26-28.

56 - See note 40 above.

57 - Ta-ch'eng hsuan-lun, T45.15.15b7-10. For

similar remarks, see Erh-ti i, T45.86c1-5.

58 - Erh-ti i, T 45.92c23-26. Chi-tsang continues to

comment that the "two truths qua standpoints"

and the "two truths qua instruction," when

correctly comprehended, are actually not

different (ibid. T 49.93c3-11).

59 - They are referred to as "two truths qua

conditional, provisional names" (yin yuan

ch'ia-ming erh-ti) and "two truths qua

determinate natures" (ting-hsing erh-ti) ,

respectively, in the Ching-ming hsuan-lun, T

38.891c20-892a8.

60 - Erh-ti i, T 45.79b1-10.

61 - Refer to ibid., T45.92c26-93a9.

62 - The "five alternatives" are five different ways

of reading the terms "truth" and "nontruth"

mentioned in the paragraph preceding this

quotation (Ta-ch'eng hsuan-lun, T45.16b12-c3).

63 - Ibid., T45.16c14-20. A more detailed analysis,

on which our explanation of this quotation

below is based, is found in the Erh-ti i, T

45.93c23-94a9.

64 - Fa-hua hsuan-lun, T34.396a25-27. Also see

Erh-ti i, T45.90c2-8.

65 - Fa-hua hsuan-lun, T34.396b19-29. Also see

Erh-ti i, T 45.90c26-91a15.

66 - Unlike Hegel's "positive dialectic," in which

the opposition between two conflicting moments

is resolved in a higher moment incorporating

the elements of the two lower moments, the

"negative dialectic" of the Madhyamaka

reconciles the contradiction between the two

moments of the earlier level by writing off

both of them as objects of attachment to be

abolished at the next level.

67 - Ta-ch'eng hsuan-lun, T 45.15c5-11. Also see

Chung-kuan-lun su, T 42.27c27-28b6.