A Study of Svatantrika. By Donald S. Lopez

·期刊原文
A Study of Svatantrika. By Donald S. Lopez
The Heart Sutra Explained. By Donald S. Lopez
Reviewed by Georges Dreyfus
Philosophy East & West

Vol:41 no.3

July 1991

Pp.431-437

(C) by University of Hawaii Press

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P.431
The last ten or fifteen years have seen great
developments in our understanding of the Maadhyamika
philosophy. In particular, the encounter of Western
scholarship with Tibetan Buddhism has considerably
enhanced our grasp of the Maadhyamika philosophical
system. Donald Lopez is one of several scholars who,
through their study of the Tibetan traditions, have
made a substantial contribution to the development
of a genuine appreciation of this philosophy; and he
has here given us two useful contributions in the
domain of the philosophy of the Middle Way: A Study
of Svaatantrika and The Heart Suutra Explained.
Since these two books are quite different, aside
from their common link to Tibet, I will review them
separately.

The title of the first work should not mislead
the reader to believe that this book is a study of
the Svaatantrika subschool of the Maadhyamika
P.432
done from the point of view of Indian authors such
as Bhavya, 'Saantarak.sita, and so forth, who are
usually classified as belonging to this school.
Rather, this book offers a description of the
Svaatantrika school taken from one of the most
interesting doxographical works in the Tibetan
dGe-lugs-pa tradition, the Presentation of Tenets
(Grub mtha'i rnam bzhag) by ICang-skya Rol-pa'i
rdo-rje (1717-1786). Lopez himself is quite clear
about the importance of the distinction between an
interpretative work such as this one and a more
original work. He says:
The presentations of the Svaatantrika schools
developed by the dGe-lugs-pas represent a
development of Maadhyamika thought. For our
understanding of Svaatantrika they should be
regarded as more than simply heuristic, less
than strictly apodictic. (A Study, p.32)

The limitations of this text are those of
the reconstructive approach followed by
doxographical texts. These limitations are an
inherent part of the attempt to understand thinkers
through general labels (such as realist, nominalist,
and so forth) or descriptions. The problem exists
within the Indian Buddhist tradition as well, in
which the schema of the four schools of thought
(Vaibhaa.sika, Sautraantika, Yogaacaara, and
Maadhyamika)(1) was devised in order to develop a
more systematic understanding of the philosophies of
individual authors.(2)

General appellations such as Maadhyamika and
so forth given to a group of authors are quite
useful in making us understand the kind of issues
and positions that these authors are struggling
with, although they can also act as obstacles to
the understanding of the thought of individual
authors. For example, the description of Bhavya as
a Svaatantrika philosopher is certainly true to a
certain degree. However, we would make a serious
mistake if we assumed that this characterization
fully captures what this author was doing. It fails
to convey the particularity of his investigation
and does not adequately represent the
self-understanding that is manifested in his
writings.

In fact,the description of Bhavya,'Saantarak.sita,
and so forth as Svaatantrika did not even exist in
India, for these authors simply thought of
themselves as Maadhyamikas and did not perceive
their points of view as any different from
Candrakiirti's. As Tsong-kha-pa reports, the terms
Praasa^ngika and Svaatantrika were coined during the
time of the second dissemination of the teaching
(bstan-pa'i phyi-dar) on the basis of some passages
of Candrakiirti's Prasannapadaa.(3) In her excellent
article on the subject, Lang attributes this
distinction to the translator sPa-tshab Nyi-ma-grags
(1055-1145?), who translated Candrakiirti's works
and differentiated his point of view from
Bhavya's.(4)

A Study is thus a successful attempt to present
a masterful recreation of some aspects of the Indian
Buddhist tradition; it is not a historical analysis
of the question. As Lopez puts it quite well:
P.433
[It is] a representation, not that of an
eyewitness photographer but that of a portrait
painter of a later age, perhaps
impressionistic, painted in broad strokes here
and intricate there, the pentimento of Indian
Svaatantrika lying below the Tibetan pigment
vaguely visible. The historical accuracy of
the Tibetan portrait remains to be
discerned,that the portrait is a masterpiece
is not in question.(A Study, p.32)

The limitations of these interpretative recon-
structions are real but do not warrant the lack of
consideration with which these texts are met by some
scholars. Doxographical works have a great deal to
offer to the reader who knows how to keep a critical
appreciation of the great understanding displayed by
the authors of some of these texts. (Bhavya himself
was the great master in the genre). By systemating
presenting the views of the authors who seem to fit
in the category of Svaatantrika, the doxographer is
able to show their shared assertions and presuppositions.
He is thus able to present an understanding of an author
which is quite removed from the author's own perspective
but which can succeed in conveying some insights about
the author that were unavailable to the author him/herself.
Thus, the interpretative picture of the doxographical
work is nothing but an exemplification of the aim
of interpretative reappropriation, the understanding
of the author better than he could understand him/
herself.

Lopez' work is a good example of the great value
of these hermeneutical reconstructions of Buddhist
philosophy. It is a gold mine of information for the
reader interested in a detailed analysis of the
Maadhyamika philosophy. Let me mention just one
point I have found particularly interesting. The
analysis of the object to be refuted (dgag-bya),
which is a central point in the dGe-lugs-pa approach,
is often presented from the perspective of the refutation
of the object apprehended by the innate ignorance
(Ihan-skyes-kyi ma-rig-pa) grasping things as truly
existing(bden-grub).As Tsong-kha-pa has said, the
identification of this putative object is esshaential
since the aim of the whole practice of emptiness is
to undo the hold that this innate ignorance has on
us.(5) However, most of the Indian Maadhyamika texts
(with the exception of Kamala'siila's
Madhyamakaaloka)(6) do not seem to take the object
held by innate ignorance as the object of their
reasonings; rather, they show that the ignorance
apprehending conventional things as objects of the
mind cognizing the ultimate is mistaken.(7) An
adequate treatment of the object of refutation cannot
ignore the way in which the target of the Maadhyamika
analysis is presented by the basic texts (such as
Naagaarjuna's Praj~nnssmuula) of the tradition. How
can we reconcile these two ways of presenting the
object of negation?

Lopez offers one possible solution for articu-
lating these two different descriptions, namely,that
the description of conventional things as being
perceived by the ultimate mind refers to a faulty
apprehension by artifi-
P.434
cial ignorance (kun-brtags kyi ma-rig-pa), while the
object of refutation usually described in the
dGe-lugs-pa tradition, true or ultimate existence
(also found in Kamala'siila's Madhyamakaaloka) ,
refers to the object grasped by innate ignorance.

However seductive this solution is, I am not
sure that it will do, for one cannot find in the
early Maadhyamika any description of this innate
grasping. Therefore, it seems that if one wants to
assert (as Kamala'siila and Tsong-kha-pa do) that
Naagaarjuna's texts refute true existence, one must
provide a way to derive the object grasped by innate
ignorance (true existence) from that grasped by
artificial ignorance (object of an ultimate
consciousness). ICang-skya's own proposal is that
true existence is implied by existence as an object
of an ultimate consciousness because "if a sprout is
truly established, it must be truly established for
a reasoning consciousness analyzing suchness."(8)
ICang-skya's answer does not hold from a purely
logical standpoint. It is only by a further
explanation of the kind of implication we are
dealing with here that we can get at what he is
indicating. This is obviously not the place to
elaborate this point; my aim here is merely to
identify what seems to me one of the difficult
points in the interpretation of the Maadhyamika
philosophy.

Lastly, let me make a methodological suggestion
that would have substantially improved the present
work. A doxographical work belongs to a definite
genre of literature, and, as such, it follows
certain procedures in the exposition of its subject
matter. However, each work is written by an author
whose context is quite individual. The Tibetan
scholars (such as 'Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa, Thu'u-bkvan,
and ICang-skya) who wrote doxographical works were
not merely following the rules of an already
established literary genre, but were also attempting
to make some points, refute some particular views,
assert the superiority of their schools, and so
forth. ICang-skya's text is to be understood in
relation to the Tibetan context it is part of.

Although the meaning of a work is not completely
defined by the context in which the orgin the work
was produced is certainly not indifferent to its
meaning. The reader of Lopez' book would have
benefitted if the author had provided some historical
background to his revealing doctrinal explanations.

Quite different is Lopez' more recent
production, an explanation of the Heart Suutra. This
work hardly needs to be defended, for its quality
and originality are obvious. In this well-written
book, Lopez has followed a double approach: in the
first part, he has grouped seven Indian commentaries
on the Suutra and summarized them. The book takes the
Suutra sentence by sentence and presents the
explanations of the seven Indian commentators. The
interesting points made by these commentators are
carefully explained and put in their proper context.
Large abstracts of
P.435
these commentaries are given so that the reader can
verify the accuracy of Lopez' gloss. In the second
part, Lopez has, perhaps unfortunately, changed his
approach: instead of giving his own commentary,
Lopez gives us translations of two Tibetan
commentaries written by two dGe-lugs-pa scholars,
bsTan-dar-Iha-ram-pa (1758-1840) and Gung-thang
bsTan-pa'i-sgron-me (1762-1823), without integrating
these texts into the flow of his arguments.

The interest of this excellent book is of a
double nature: on one hand, it presents a valuable
guide to the Heart Suutra, probably the most popular
scripture of the Mahaayaana tradition. The easy
style of Lopez' book makes it valuable for both
layman and specialist. The interested layman can use
it as an inspiring commentary on one of the most
challenging scriptures of the tradition. On the
other hand, the specialist will find an intriguing
picture of Indian Buddhism during the Paala dynasty
(eighth ot twelfth centuries). This is the last
phase of Buddhism in India, which comes after the
period of elaboration of the suutras of the
Mahaayaana tradition and at the end of a period of
exceptional philosophical creativity, during which
the great 'saastras were written. This period, which
is marked by the increasing place taken by tantric
elements in the Buddhist tradition and during which
Buddhism was transmitted to Tibet, is of great
interest for the understanding of Tibetan Buddhism.
The close link between the Indian and Tibetan
traditions of this time is illustrated by the fact
that most of the seven Indian commentators went to
Tibet.

The diversity of Paala Buddhism is reflected in
the different approaches taken by these seven
commentators. Vimalamitra gives a classical
explanation in which he displays great erudition.
Kamala'siila's commentary is mainly concerned with
relating the Suutra to the sturcture of the path.
Atii'sa supplements these commentaries with a few
remarks. J~naanamitra, Pra'sastrasena, and Mahaajana
give precise and clear explanations of the Suutra
and present some philosophically interesting
perspectives such as a strong Yogaacaara influence
or a Maadhyamika-Yogaacaara syncretism. Quite
different is Vajrapaani's commentary, which is made
from the point of view of practice. Vajrapaani
glosses quickly over the famous "form is emptiness
and emptiness is form" line and devotes most of his
efforts to the explanation of the way in which the
Bodhisattva passes beyond all errors. He also
discusses most extensively the famous dhaara.nii
contained in the Suutra and explains it as a secret
mantra. In general, his text manifests an important
tantric influcence and repeatedly introduces tantric
concepts such as primordial mind (sems-gnas-ma),
mindfulnessless (dran-pa med-pa),and so forth.

Besides being an interesting presentation of
Buddhism under the Paala dynasty, Lopez' book
explores several issues of general interest to our
understanding of Indian Buddhism: the appearance of
the doctrine of Buddha-nature in the Maadhyamika
tradition, the relation between suutras
P.436
and tantras, the structure of the path, and so
forth. I would just like to say a few more words
on what is classically considered the crucial part of
the Suutra, the "form is emptiness" line. These
words are of great importance for the person who
wants to develop a real understanding of emptiness,
for it exposes what I would call the double
corrective strategy of the practice of emptiness.

The teaching of emptiness is essentially
apophatic in that it denies ultimate reality to
phenomena. In the experience of emptiness, the
intrinsic nature of things and their nonrelatedness
is radically negated. When engaged in the practice of
the view of emptiness, the meditator must be careful
not to fall into the danger of merely negating his
own mental creations. It is not an artificial concept
which is empty, but the actual form which is empty of
any intrinsic identity. Thus, "form is emptiness."

This is the first element in the corrective strategy,
which aims at preventing the practitioner from being
absorbed in a mentally created emptiness (blos-byas
kyi stong-nyid).It aims at obliging the practitioner
to situate his understanding in the actuality of
things. In this way, the insight achieved by the
practitioner can be authentic and therefore,
effective. This essentially negative strategy is,
however, not enough to guarantee the success of the
practice and is itself in need of some correction.

The person who comes to understand the entitylessness
of phenomena is tempted to separate it from empirical
objects and to reify it into an Absolute, thus
devaluing empirical reality. It is at this point that
a second corrective strategy must intervene for
he/she must understand that this entitylessness is
basically at unity with the phenomena it
characterizes. Emptiness is not something separate
from empirical objects, but merely the way in which
these things exist. They, in turn, are only the way
in which emptiness appears. Thus, "emptiness is
form."

This double corrective strategy is necessary to
attain a genuine insight into the essential
entitylessness of phenomena and has been recognized
as such by different traditions, which warn the
meditator against two fundamental mistakes, that of
taking one's fabrication for the ultimate reality
and that of hypostasizing emptiness. These
corrections can be made in different ways: certain
traditions have introduced the cataphatic element in
their teaching. Lopez' book gives an example of such
a strategy through the commentary of Pra'sastrasena,
who introduces a cataphatic approach of the
Tathaagatagarbha tradition, in which the teaching of
emptiness is understood through that of the
Buddha-nature ( buddhagotra, sang-rgyas-kyi rigs ).
This approach is characteristic of a later segment
of the Mahaayaana tradition and is quite
appropriately found in a book describing the last
phase of Indian Buddhism. The Suutra, though,seeks
to impart insight into the ultimate nature of things
in a simpler form: "form is emptiness, emptiness is
form"!
P.437
1. See Sopa and Hopkins, Practice and Theory of
Tibetan Buddhism (New York: Grove, 1976).
2. The classical works of tenets in Indian Buddhist
literature are Aary-deva's J~naanasaarasamuccaya
and jitaari's Sugatamatavibha^ngakaarikaa.
Another important source of the doxographical
tradition is Bhavya's Tarkajvaalaa. See: Katsumi
Mimaki, Le Chapitre du Blo gsal grub mtha' sur
les Sautraatika (Presentation et edition) (Kyoto:
Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyusyo, 1979), and Blo gsal grub
mtha' (Kyoto: Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyusyo, 1982).
3. See: Lopez, A Study, p.57.
4. See Karen Lang, "sPa tshab Nyi ma grags and the
Introduction of the Praasa^ngika Madhyamaka into
Tibet" (forthcoming).
5. Tsong-kha-pa, Clarification of the Maadhyamika
Thought (dbu ma dgongs pa rab gsal)(Varanasi:
Press of Elegant Sayings, 1973), P.131.
6. Lopez, A Study, p.144.
7. Thus, these texts present us with an alternative
object of refutation, existence as an object of
ultimate consciousness. This object of
refutation, which is described by Tsong-kha-pa in
his Clarification (p.131) , is known in the
dGe-lugs tradition as "the object of negation
from the perspective of the reasoning
consciousness" (rigs ngor dgag bya).
8. Lopez, A Study, p.316.