An appraisal of the Svaatantrika-Prasangika debates

·期刊原文
An appraisal of the Svaatantrika-Prasangika debates
By Nathan Katz

Philosophy East and West

Vol.26, no.3 (July 1976)

P 253-267

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P.253

I. THE PROBLEM: ITS SCOPE AND OUR PROCEDURE

There were myriad issues in conflict between the
Prasa^ngika and Svaatantrika schools of Maadhyamaka
Buddhism: philosophic, formal, and practical. It
seems to us that the central focus of these
interrelated problems is where the limit of
speakability is to be drawn. This issue is reflected
in their understanding of the relationships and
levels of the relative (sa.mv.rtti) and ultimate
(paramaartha) truths, the validity of syllogistic
(formal) reasoning, as well as the absolute or
relative quality of the prasa^nga (reductio ad
absurdum) methodology of refutation.

Our procedure in this article shall be as
follows: First we shall view Maadhyamaka scholarship
in the West, demonstrating its Prasa^ngika bias, and
pointing out some errors. We shall then consider the
question of the two truths, comparing the
systematizations of Bhaavaviveka and Candrakiirti.
It is by understanding Bhaavaviveka's pivotal
position here that we may address the question of
the validity of his syllogistic reasoning, as well
as to conjecture at his purpose behind the
syllogism, which we see as an attempt at (1)
salvaging the integrity of other Buddhist schools
from the Maadhyamaka critique, and (2) pointing to
the fundamental contradiction of sa.mv.rtti and
paramaartha, which is not the mere accident of
illogicality. Finally we shall consider the debates
held at bSam.yas. in Tibet between exponents of the
Svaatantrika and Prasa^ngika positions, although the
latter debator has long been erroneously thought to
have been of another school.

II. BACKGROUND: SCHOLARSHIP ON THE QUESTION

Scholars of Maadhyamaka have not been kind to
the Svaatantrikas. Edward Conze expresses utter
incomprehension at the Svaatantrikas who, he claims,
"have upheld the well-nigh incredible thesis that in
Maadhyamika logic valid positive statements can be
made."(l) Bhikshu Sangharakshita chides Bhaavaviveka
for holding "...the heterodox view that realization
of 'Suunyata was not indispensible for the
attainment of Nirvaana"(2) which he sees as
"...evidence of ennervation and the precursor of
decline."(3) T. R. V. Murti more bluntly states that
the Svaatantrika "...is against the correct
standpoint of the Maadhyamika."(4) L. de la Valee
Poussin erroneously claims that "...the official
school of Tibet is called the Prasa^ngika."(5)

Th. Stcherbatsky applauds Candrakiirti because
"He succeeds in driving Bhaavaviveka's school into
the shade and finally settles that form of
Maadhyamika system which is now studied in all
monastic schools of Tibet and Mongolia, where it is
considered to represent the true philosophic basis
of Mahaayaana Buddhism."(6) However, Richard H.
Robinson keenly observed

Nathan Katz is a Ph.D candidate, University Fellow,
and teacher in the Dept. of Religion, Temple
University, Philadelphia.

P.254

that "...Naagaarjuna's system has not been clearly
distinguished from Candrakiirti's, "(7) an
observation we would second.

Poussin shows greater insight when he writes of
Bhaavaviveka and Dharmapaala: "These two each
represent an extreme; together they indicate the
Middle Way. They are in accord and not in
contradiction."(8) Frederick Streng concurs: "We
follow the lead of L. de la Valee Poussin...who
suggests that together the Prasa^ngikas and
Svaatantrikas show the `middle way', one destroying
the voidness of existence and the other destroying
the existence of the void."(9) Although Streng
nowhere does so, it shall be the purpose of this
article to indicate some of the vital contributions
of Bhaavaviveka.

III. HISTORY OF THE SVAATANTRIKAS

Bhaavaviveka(490-570 C.E.) , or Bhavya (Tib.
Legs.Idan. 'byed.pa. or Legs. Idan.), is credited
with having founded the Svaatantrika school. His
contemporary, Buddhapaalita, is considered the
founder of the Prasa^ngikas. Both schools claim
Maadhyamaka self-identity and refer in their
writings to Naagaarjuna's works.

The Prasa^ngikas derive their name from the
methodology of reductio ad absurdum refutation
(prasa^nga) employed by Naagaarjuna in his
Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa. This methodology claims the
refutation of all views (d.r.sti) without offering
any view of its own. The Prasa^ngikas (and most
contemporary scholars of Buddhism) claim that the
utilization of the prasa^ng methodology defines one
as a Prasa^ngika.

The Svaatantrikas see the question differently.
According to their sources, a Prasa^ngika is one who
absolutizes the prasa^nga methodology. It was
Buddhapaalita, say the Svaatantrikas, and not
Naagaarjuna who was the first Prasa^ngika, and he
was followed by Candrakiirti, 'Santideva, and
others.

The Svaatantrikas' name means "self-styled, or
independent, argumentation." This means that
although a system of argumentation (for example, the
prasa^nga) may be valid on one level, it does not
necessarily follow that it is valid on all levels.
One must adapt his argumentation to correspond to a
particular level of truth, which would seem to
follow better Naagaarjuna's claim that he has no
position of his own, but adopts his opponent's
presuppositions and logic to point to their
self-contradictory nature.

Poussin sums up their initial positions as
follows:

Buddhapaalita founded a school, the official school
of Tibet (sic), which is called the Prasa^ngika,
and, one believes, is well within the lineage of the
thought of Naagaarjuna. The Maadhyamika, or `man of
the middle', with nothing to affirm, nothing to
negate; he has neither thesis, nor argumentation,
nor example. The only procedure available to him to
destroy adversary doctrines, all doctrines, is the
prasa^nga, reasoning ad hominem to absurdity...Thus
he establishes emptiness. His position is pure
criticism. Bhaavaviveka demonstrated the weakness of
this methodology and replaced the prasa^nga of
Buddha-

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paalita with fromal reasoning, a svatantraanumaana:
'From ultimate reality, perception is not
self-born...' (`En verite vrai, l'oeil ne nait pas
de soi...') The name Svaatantrika is given by
scholars who trace themselves back to him.(10)

Poussin's observation is formal: that whereas the
Prasa^ngikas content themselves with the negation of
all views as their modality for the cognition of
'suunyataa, the Svaatantrikas want to demonstrate
'suunyataa by positive argumentation.

Yuichi Kajiyama sees the fundamental question
separating the two schools more philosophically:

Although yearning for the absolute truth is
naturally accompanied by negation of the relative
and conditioned knowledge...(a) question should in
this context be reflected upon; that is, whether the
system of the relative knowledge can be, so far as
the phenomenal world is concerned, recognized as
valid or not, though it is always delusive from the
absolute point of view. This very problem seems to
have been a fork which divided...the Maadhyamaka
itself into the Prasa^ngika and the
Svaatantrika.(11)

What is in question here is the very nature of the
relative (sa.mv.rtti) itself, and its relation to
the ultimate (paramaartha). Is the absolute to be
found only in the negation of the relative, or is
the stuff of the relative somehow contiguous to the
absolute, allowing one to attain cognition of the
absolute by means of the relative? Bhaavaviveka
employs syllogism in order to state that the two
truths are contiguous, as we shall see later.
However the question is not, as some scholars would
have us believe,(l2) of the implicit value of logic
or syllogism. The question, rather, is of the
continuity of sa.mv.rtti and paramaartha.

There were divisions within the Svaatantrika
school itself. As dKon.mchob. 'jigs.med.dbang.po.
writes in the Grub.pa'i.mtha'i.rnam.par.bzhag.pa.rin.po.
che'i.phrang.ba.:

If one divides it, there are two (that is) the
Yogaacaara-Svaatantrika-Maadhyamaka and the
Sautraantika-Svaatantrika-Maadhyamaka among them.
The Maadhyamika who maintains self-awareness
(rang.rig.; Skt. svaasa.mvedana) while rejecting the
external object, has the character of the first,
namely AAcaarya 'Saantirak'sita...The Maadhyamika
who rejects self-awareness but admits the external
object established through its particular
(svalak.sana) has the latter characteristic, namely
AAcaarya Bhaavaviveka. This is a further explanation
of terms: As far as the most basic points are
concerned, by reasoning of maintaining agreement
with the Vijnnaanavaadin, is called a
Yogacaara-Maadhyamika. By reasoning of maintaining
the external object as an aggregate of atoms, in the
manner of the Sautraantikas, he is called a
Sautraantikacara-Maadhyamika.(13)

The differences between the two subschools of
the Svaatantrika are not signiticant for the
purposes of our discussion. On fasc. 26a of the same
work, we find the conclusion that they differ only
with regard to the status of self-awareness
(rang.rig.) and of external objects. Both of these
categories apply to the level of sa.mv.rtti only,
and both maintain the ultimate unspeakableness of
paramaartha, and the role of logic and syllogism in
general. As Poussin rightly notes, "...the

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distinction is not carried to the conception of
ultimate truth, but to their theories of relative
truth."(14)

'Saantirak.sita, the founder of the
Yogaacaara-Svaatantrika-Maadhyamaka school, lived
from 705-762 C.E. and played a great role in the
establishment of Buddhism in Tibet. He was one of
the first Indian aacaaryas to teach there, and it
was at his suggestion that Guru Padmasambhaava was
invited to Tibet. His disciple, Kamala'siila
(713-793), represented the Indian (Svaatantrika)
position in the great debate of bSam.yas. (792-794),
which shall be discussed in detail later, and
established the svaatantrika norm for Maadhyamaka
philosophy among the early lineages of Tibetan
Buddhism.

IV. THE TWO TRUTHS

The question of the relationship between the two
levels of truth, sa.mv.rtti and paramaartha, is of
utmost importance in understanding Maadhyamaka
philosophy in general and the
Svaatantrika-Prasa^ngika debates in particular. Two
key verses of Naagaarjuna underscore the vitality of
the question:

ye 'nayorna vijaananti vibhaaga.m satyayordvayo.h/
te tattva.m na vijaananti gambhiira.m buddha'saasane//

Those who do not know the distinction between the
two truths cannot understand the profound nature of
the Buddha's teaching.

vyavahaaramanaa'sritya paramaartha na de'syate/
paramaarthamanaagamya nirvaa.na.m naadhigamyate//

Without relying on everyday common practices (that
is, relative truths), the absolute truth cannot be
expressed. Without approaching the absolute truth,
nirvaa.na cannot be attained.(15)

The point which we wish to make in citing these
two verses is that apparently the Prasa^ngika school
concentrates on the former, while the Svaantantrika
school relies more heavily on the latter. For the
Prasa^ngikas, paramaartha is utterly beyond
constructed thought; they "...stress the
contradictions between absolute reality and the
human attitude of understanding, which constitutes
the ground of logic."(16) Because of this
assumption, they claim that paramaartha is the
absolute negation of sa.mv.rtti. (`Absolute
negation' means negation without counter thesis, or,
the negation of A does not imply B. 'Relative
negation', on the other hand, means negation from a
position, that not A implies B.)

The Svaatantrikas, on the other hand, follow
more closely verse 10 above, the charge that
paramaartha cannot be expressed without samv.rtti.
Due to their understanding of the contiguity of the
relationship between paramaartha and sa.mv.rtti, the
Svaatantrikas seek to establish paramaartha not only
by the negation of samv.rtti, as do the
Prasa^ngikas, but also by positive argumentation of
the syllogistic form. As Herbert V. Guenther
observes: "What the MaadhyamikaSvaatantrikas wanted
to emphasize was that all human experience, inasmuch
as it is experience and not mere propositions or the
like, is an insight into

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reality, an awareness of coherence which is not its
own authentication of reality, but reality
itself."(17) This validity of all human experience
of which Guenther speaks is a way of expressing the
contiguity of paramaartha and samv.rtti, a way of
reminding us that paramaartha is not something above
and beyond our experience, but a way of experiencing
reality directly (yathaabhutadar'sana), insofar as
it is not 'mere proposition' (d.r.sti).

Kajiyama offers a helpful, though somewhat
misleading, analysis of the problem. He writes that
"...one of the most important subjects of the
Maadhyamaka philosophy...is if the absolute is
immanent in the phenomenal world or transcends it,
in other words, if the two worlds are absolutely
disparate or can have any kind of logical
connection."(18) We do not believe that any good
Maadhyamika would care to speculate about any
immanence or transcendence of worlds, but the point
to be discussed is whether paramaartha is
transcendent to or expressible in logico-linguistic
construction; and if so, to what extent. Both
Bhaavaviveka and Candrakiirti agree that the highest
truth is beyond speech.(19) But Bhaavaviveka adds
the most interesting category in his systematization
(vibhaaga) of the two truths: he divides paramaartha
into aparyaaya (that paramaartha which could not be
inferred) and paryaaya (that paramaartha which could
be inferred), the former having a higher position
than the latter.(20) This is done to express the
contiguity of the two truths; it gives "...a kind of
logicality to the relation of the absoluteness and
the ground of our delusion."(21)

Some scholars see this systematization as a
concession to the Vij~naanavaadins, leading them to
label the Svaatantrika movement as, unhappily,
`synchronistic.'(22) But whereas the
Vij~naanavaadins are speaking of a metaphysical
immanence, Bhaavaviveka is merely trying to call to
our attention the value of the teachings of Buddhism
for our spiritual development, and is not
formulating yet another d.r.sti. Shotaro Iida makes
this point quite clearly:

Bhaavaviveka grades ultimate reality into two kinds,
i.e., supremundane-ultimate-reality and
mundane-ultimate-reality. The former has no
attributes (nirlak.sana) and is inexpressible.
However, the words and deeds of the aarya, who had
some experience of paramaartha, differ from those of
the: worldlings. This is the meaning of
`p.r.stha-labdha' (=paryaaya-paramaartha). In other
words, the words and deeds of the aarya based on
ultimate reality should be pure and true knowledge
of the world (thathya-samvrtti-jnnaana).(23)

Despite Iida's unfortunate translation of
paryaaya-paramaartha as `mundane-ultimate-reality',
his point is well taken. Even Murti, who exhibits a
strong bias for the Prasa^ngika as the only true
representative of Naagaarjuna's teachings, agrees
that Bhaavaviveka was trying to rescue Buddha's
words from the relentless negation of the
Prasa^ngikas: "In his Madhyamakaartha Sa^ngraha, he
accords to the Absolute of Hiinayaana and heretical
systems the status of paryaaya paramaartha. This
makes him out as a liberal-minded Maadhyamika unlike
Candrakiirti."(24)

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We feel that this attempt by Bhaavaviveka is a
well-taken one. Certainly there is a difference, as
Iida suggests, between the words of the sage and the
words of the common man. Whereas the latter may be
said to be d.r.sti, or mere construction, the latter
have aided devotees in liberation. If such is the
case, of what need is their negation? Would it not
somehow be more true to speak about
sarvadharma'suunyataa than to make ontic-ontological
claims about the existence of dharmas? The
difference is that of karma (bondage-producing
activity) and Buddhakarma (spontaneous openness).
Bhaavaviveka's criterion for differentiating between
the two types of words, or paryaaya-paramaartha and
samv.rtti, is simply causal efficacy
(kriyaa-kaara-saamarthya) .(25) When Candrakiirti
goes so far as to claim that only Maadhyamikas could
attain nirva.naa, his position smacks of dogmatism
rather than dialectic.(26)

Bhaavaviveka, on the other hand, wants to affirm
logically the veneration due to the aarya of another
school. As dKon.mchog.'jigs.med.dbang.mo. writes:
"When the 'sravaka and the pratyekabuddha are
arhats, they integrate (themselves) by entering the
path of the Mahaayaana, because they (=a school)
maintain the culmination in the one ultimate vehicle
(conducive to enlightenment) ."(27) For the
Svaatantrikas, then, the idea of ekayaana means that
nirvaa.na is possible regardless of school or
formulations; for the Prasa^ngikas, this high ideal
is reduced to the dogmatic insistence upon the
realization of 'suunyataa as the absolutely
necessary condition for the attainment of
nirvaa.na.(28)

The Prasa^ngikas got into trouble because of the
thoroughgoingness of their negation. Although the
Svaatantrikas would agree with them that in the long
run negation must become absolute (that is, without
offering a counter thesis) , as Bhaavaviveka's
aparyaaya-paramaartha-satya and Candrakiirti's
paramaarthasatya are both beyond any specification,
Bhaavaviveka's category of paryaayaparamaartha
rescues him from the charges of nihilism, which the
critics of Maadhyamaka launch. The problem for the
Prasa^ngikas (who, by definition of the
Svaatantrikas, are those who absolutize the
prasa^nga methodology) is that consistent
application of the prasa^nga to sa.mv.rtti leads to
the denial of sa.mv.rtti. If, as Naagaarjuna tells
us in MMK, XXIV, 10, sa.mv.rtti is our only way of
expressing paramaartha, then are we not left at a
loss in which we must negate even paramaartha?
Although the Prasa^ngika would respond that we are
negating

CANDRAKIIRTI'S SYSTEMATIZATION
SATYA
|
|-------------------------------------|
Paramaartha Sa.mv.rtti
(unspeakable |
absolute truth) |---------------------|
loka-sa.mv.rtti aloka-sa.mv.rtti
(real empirical (unreal empirical
truth) truth)

from Maadhyamakaavataara

P.259

BHAAVAVIVEKA'S SYSTEMATIZATION

SATYA
|
|-------------------------------------|
Paramaartha Sa.mv.rtti
|------------------| |--------------|
Paryaaya- Aparyaaya- Mithyaa- Tathya-
paramaartha paramaartha Sa.mv.rtti sa.mv.rtti
(speakable (unspeakable |
ultimate truth) ultimate truth) |----------|
| Sakalpa- Akalpa-
|-------------------| mithyaa- mithyaa-
Jatiparyaaya- Janmarodha- samv.rtti samv.rtti
vastu-paramaartha paramaartha
from Maadhyamaarthasa^ngraha

only views (d.r.sti) and remaining nobly silent
about reality, are we still not in the dilemma of
having no way of teaching?

This type of debate was carried on between
Naagaarjuna and Harivarman, the founder of the
Satyasiddhi school, who agreed that concepts cannot
adequately express reality but who taught that
nirvaa.na is cessation. C. D. C. Priestley
recapitulates:

Harivarman evidently thinks that the prasa^nga
of the nihilist [sic] leads him to a denial of
conventional truth; and as Harivarman and
Naagaarjuna both realize, conventional truth cannot
consistently be denied, since the denial itself must
have at least conventional existence. The prasa^nga,
then, seems to be too wholesale in its effect:
although it certainly can put an end to the
depredations of heterodoxy, it is liable to devour
also the domestic concepts of Buddhism which it was
meant to protect. Naagaarjuna is of course not
unaware of this danger; his Vigrahavyaavartanii
contains a detailed reply to what is essentially
Harivarman's objection. But even if Harivarman had
seen and accepted Naagaarjuna's defense, he would
still have been obliged to reject the prasa^nga. For
in trying to maintain simultaneously the reality of
cessation and the reality of non-existence, he
involves himself; as we have seen, in precisely the
kind of inconsistencies that the prasa^nga is
designed to expose.(29)

It was for Bhaavaviveka to come and rescue the
Maadhyamaka from the dead end of overzealously
applied negation, to logico-linguistically
detranscendentalize paramaartha into the realm of
the speakable. His methodology of doing so was
syllogistic argumentation, which he largely adopted
from Dignaaga with some important revisions.

V. SYLLOGISM

According to Dignaaga, syllogism is inference for
others. It is not a source of knowledge in the
classic sense of perception (as distinct from
recognition) and inference. As Th. Stcherbatsky
recounts: "When an inference is communi-

P.260

cated to another person, it then is repeated in his
head, and only in this metaphorical sense can it be
called an inference. Syllogism is the cause which
produces an inference in the mind of the hearer. Its
definition is, therefore, the following one--'A
syllogism consists in communicating the Three
Aspects of the Logical Mark to others'."(30) The
Three Aspects are: minor premise (pak.sadharmatva);
major premise (anvaya); and the counterposition of
the major premise.(31) Or, as expressed by
Dharmottara: Communicating the three aspects of the
logical mark, that is, (the logical mark appears
here also in) three aspects which are called
(respectively) direct concomitance (or major premise
expressed positively) [anvaya], its contraposition
(or the same premise expressed negatively)
[vyatireka], and (the minor premise of) the fact of
the presence of that mark in the subject (of the
inference, that is, the fact that the subject of the
inference is characterized by the logical mark)
[pak.sa-dharmatva]."(32)

Karl Potter expresses the syllogistic paradigm
thus:

Hypothesis. That mountain (is) fire-possessing (pak.sa)
Reason: (Because) that mountain (is) smoke-possessing (hetu)
Examples: (a) (as in) kitchen (sa-pak.sa)
(b) (unlike) lake (vi-pak.sa)(33)

The variant syllogistic formulations and
controversies between the Buddhists and Naiyaayikas
have been fully treated by Stcherbatsky,(34) so we
will confine our discussion to the adaptations made
by Bhaavaviveka from this standard form offered by
Potter.

A. K. Warder states Bhaavaviveka's syllogism as
follows:

Ultimately (at the level of ultimate truth) the
synthesized phenomena are empty (of any own-nature),
because of their conditioned origination (middle
term), as things illusorily created (example: that
is, works of art, paintings, clay models and the
like do not have the real nature of the things they
represent--women, elephants and so on). At the
concealing level, on the other hand, the phenomena
commonly accepted may be admitted. We do not
contradict the experience of the world but say that
ultimately the phenomena of the experience are not
real.(35)

Iida represents the argument as follows:

Hypothesis:Earth, etc. (is) not own-being-possessing (pak.sa)
from the standpoint of ultimate reality
Reason: (Because) earth, etc. (is) (hetu)
(a) manufacture-possessing
(b) cause-possessing
Example: (like) knowledge. (sa-pak.sa)(36)

We at once notice some striking departures from
Potter's formulation. In the first place, we note
the accretion of "from the standpoint of ultimate
reality"

P.261

to the hypothesis, as we find in all of his
syllogisms. This is because, as Kajiyama writes,
"His logic is logic of paramaartha, which criticizes
the ground of logic of the practical world, viz.,
the laws of identity, contradiction, excluded
middle, causality, etc., and the criticism has been
done through the peculiarities of his syllogistic
form."(37) Unlike the Prasa^ngikas who criticize
from the internal inconsistency of the opponent's
argument, Bhaavaviveka criticizes by offering his
own hypothesis from the standpoint of ultimate
reality. Kajiyama claims that the Prasa^ngikas miss
the essence of the contradiction when they restrict
themselves to internal criticism; that the real
contradiction lies in the relationship of sa.mv.rtti
to paramaartha, and that this is the true meaning of
absolute negation. He writes:

When we argue the transcendental contradiction
arises not from logic itself, but from the disparity
between absoluteness and the ground of logic. The
transcendentality of the paramaartha is nothing but
the contradictory relation of the paramaartha and
the samv.rtti. If this is granted, cannot we speak
of the absolute reality through the logic of
contradictions? The contradiction is not merely
illogicality but the unique method which can reduce
to the absolute reality our world, which is the
human logicalization of the Absolute. Naagaarjuna
and the Prasa^ngikas can be accused for their
negating logicality without strictly showing the
real contradiction. It is not efficient to condemn
logic merely standing on transcendence of the
paramaartha. For Bhaavaviveka to use the logic of
contradiction in the place where samv.rtti and the
paramaartha meet together is methodological
completion of the absolute negation of the
Maadhyamaka philosophy. Bhaavaviveka did not wildly
fit in logical tendency of the age, but he did,
observing the traditional method, the same exertion
in the Maadhyamaka theory as Dignaaga did in the
Vijnnaanavaada.(38)

We quote this passage with the reservation that
paramaartha is understood as logico-linguistically
transcendental to sa.mv.rtti in the Parasa^ngika
school.

The fundamental contradiction of which Kajiyama
speaks is not mere illogicality on the part of the
opponent but must be absolute negation, in the sense
of our modality of being in the world. Thus
Bhaavaviveka seeks to restore teachings of other
Buddhist schools as paryaaya-paramaartha, the
meeting point of paramaartha and sa.mv.rtti, and his
only method of establishing the fundamental
(absolute) contradiction is by means of his
syllogism.

We also notice in comparing Bhaavaviveka's
formulation of the syllogism with Potter's standard
form that Bhaavaviveka has a negative hypothesis.
Since Bhaavaviveka has unearthed the fundamental
contradiction, any negation which begins on the
level of sa.mv.rtti must proceed to the level of
paramaartha. For the same reason, his syllogism
lacks the vi-pak.sa (negative example) component:
his negation is absolute, and, therefore, he cannot
offer a contradictory example. Although, following
Potter's formulation, we can offer the negative
example of the lake which is not fire-possessing, we
cannot offer any vi-pak.sa for Bhaavaviveka's
transcendental syllogism, which is not
not-own-being-possessing without invalidating the
entire syllogism. After all, the syllogism must
conform to experience, and because Bhaavaviveka
begins with a negative hypothesis

P.262

from the standpoint of ultimate reality which he
intends to demonstrate, employing vi-pak.sa in this
case would be absurdity.

In conclusion of this discussion of
Bhaavaviveka's syllogism, we may say that his
category of paryaaya-paramaartha served two
purposes: (1) it rescued early Buddhist teachings
from the counterproductive negation, which in an
important sense is inconsistent; and (2) it pointed
to the fundamental contradiction of paramaartha and
samv.rtti, which is not the accident of illogicality
(as with the Prasa^ngikas) , but logically
demonstrates the emptiness of d.r.sti inductively.
In this specific sense, it may be said, as so many
scholars have, that Bhaavaviveka sought to `prove'
'suunyataa logically.

VI. CONFRONTATION AT BSAM. YAS

The great debates held at the monastery of bSam.yas.
(792-794 C.E.) between representatives of the Indian
and Chinese Buddhist traditions are well-known to
scholars as shaping the form that Buddhism was to
take in Tibet. We intend to demonstrate that these
debates were held between representatives of the
Svaatantrika and Prasa^ngika schools, the former the
Indian aacaarya, and the latter, the Chinese. After
demonstrating this by consulting Tibetan historical
records, we shall review some of the issues at
point, showing the practical application of
Bhaavaviveka's principles. A word about the
continuity between the Svaatantrikas and the
Tantrikas will also be added.

Most scholars assume that the Chinese debater
was of the Ch'an (Zen) school, probably due to the
popularity of that sect in some regions of China
during the eighth century. The bSam.yas. debates did
take place about one hundred years after the death
of Hui-neng, during the rise of his Southern School
of Ch'an.(39)

This historical coincidence has misled such scholars
as Warder into saying:

In due course he (Kamala'siila) was invited to
Tibet, whose Buddhists had become divided, in fact
because simultaneously with the missions of Indian
Buddhists there the Chinese Buddhists of the Dhyaana
(Ch'an, Zen) school were spreading their own version
of the Buddhist teaching.(40)

and caused Robinson to remark:

A Chinese Ch'an master named Mahaayaana came to the
court and made many converts. A debate was held
before the king in 794 or thereabouts, in which
'Saantarak.sita's school vigorously attacked the
Ch'an faction and succeeded in getting the king to
banish the Chinese. Despite continual intercourse
with the Chinese, Tibetan Buddhism has ever since
been based on that of India.(41)

Both Robinson and Warder are wrong, probably due
to their lack of familiarity with Tibetan historical
materials. The contestants in the debate were
Kamala'siila, disciple of 'Saantirak.sita, the
founder of the Yogaacaara-SvaatantrikaMadhyamaka,
and an anonymous representative of the "Chinese
Fa-shang Mahaayaana" school.(42) "Fa-shang" is the
Taoist term for monk, literally "home-

P.263

leaver"; "Mahaayaana" is not the name of the
debater, but a designation of his general
philosophic stance. Bu.ston. is no more specific
about this individual than that.

However if we see what else Bu.ston. has to say
about this "Chinese Fa-shang Mahaayaana" school, we
might be able to deduce their identity. All he says
about their beliefs is that "These favored
nihilistic views and did not exert themselves in the
practice of virtue."(43) We also know that their
numbers had been increasing among the Tibetan court.
It is rather unlikely that a Tibetan chronicler
would refer to the Ch'an school as nihilistic; this
epithet had generally been reserved in Buddhist
literature as a perjorative against the Maadhyamaka.
In fact, this charge was often levelled against the
Maadhyamaka by the Sarvaastivaadins, who had long
before this time established themselves in Central
Asia and had been exerting influence in Tibet.
However, since 'Saantirak.sita and Kamala'siila were
also Maadhyamikas, and Bu.ston.'s text is
unreservedly laudatory of them, it is logical that
this term would only be used against their
Maadhyamaka rivals, the Prasa^ngikas.

Fortunately, Bu.ston. gives us more information
than this. We also tells us that the "Chinese
Fa-shang Mahaayaana" were specialists in two texts:
the Shes.rab.kyi.pha.rol.tu.phyin.pa.stong.phrag.pa.
('Satasahasrikasuutra) and the bSam.gtan.nyal.ba`i.
`khor.lo (Dhyaana-svapna-cakra).(44) While we have
found no reference to this second text elsewhere in
Tibetan annals (possibly it was composed by the
Chinese themselves), the former praj~naapaaramitaa
work is repeatedly attributed to Naagaarjuna
himself, (45) making it a Maadhyamaka text.

Thus the primary texts of the "Chinese Fa-shang
Mahaayaana" were Maadhyamaka, leading us to conclude
that the debater himself was a Maadhyamika. It is
quite clear that the Chinese version of Maadhyamaka
was Prasa^ngika and not Svaatantrika. The founder of
this Chinese school, which they called San-lun (The
Three Treatise School), was Kumarajivaa (344-413
C.E.), who lived a century before the formulation of
the Svaatantrika by Bhaavaviveka. Their beliefs are
described by Junjiro Takakusu thus: "The truth can
be attained only by negation or refutation of wrong
views within and without Buddhism and of errors of
both the Great and Small Vehicles....
Refutation--and refutation only--can lead to
ultimate truth."(46) and by Wing-Tsit Chan thus:

To this school, refutation of all erroneous views is
essential for and indeed identical with the
elucidation of right views. But when a right view is
held in place of a wrong one, the right view itself
becomes one-sided and has to be refuted. It is only
through this dialectic process that Emptiness can be
arrived at, which alone is free from names and
character and is `inexplicable in speech and
unrealizable in thought'. The specific method in
this dialectic process is Naagaarjuna's Middle Path
of Eightfold Negations....(47)

Quite obviously these are clearly Prasa^ngika
positions and not Svaatantrika, as it is a central
theme of Bhaavaviveka that one call establish
paramaartha by

P.264

positive argumentation since the fundamental
contradiction is not the accident of illogicality,
but the relation of paramaartha to samv.rtti. For
these reasons we conclude that Kamala'siila's
opponent at bSam.yas. was a Prasa^ngika.

The issues in conflict between Kamala'siila and
this anonymous Chinese Prasa^ngika were
fundamentally two: the negativistic attitude of the
Prasa^ngika and his insistence upon a sudden, rather
than a gradual, path to enlightenment. Kamala'siila
skillfully argued that the negation of sa.mv.rtti
must, consistently speaking, lead to a negation of
paramaartha, or a nihilism of sorts. Offering a
counterposition, he claimed that one realizes the
nonsubstantiality of dharmas (sarvadharma'suunyata)
by positive application of logic and intellect. This
encounter is recorded by Bu.ston. as follows:

Then the Fa-shang spoke: If one commits virtuous or
sinful deeds, one comes to blissful or to evil
births (respectively). In such a way the deliverance
from sa.msaara is impossible, and there will always
be impediments to the attainment of Buddhahood. (The
virtuous and sinful deeds) are just like white and
black clouds which alike obscure the sky. But he who
has no thoughts and inclinations at all can be fully
delivered from phenomenal life. The absence of any
thought, search, or investigation brings about the
non-perception (mi.dmigs.pa.; anupalambha) of the
reality of separate entities. In such a manner one
can attain Buddhahood at once, like a Bodhisattva
who has attained the tenth stage.

To this Kamalasiila himself answered as follows:
Thou sayest that one ought not to think about
anything whatsoever. But this means the negation (or
rejection) of highest analytic wisdom (shes.rab.;
prajnnaa) likewise. Now as the latter represents the
foundation of the divine wisdom of a saint, the
rejection of it necessarily leads to the negation of
this sublime transcendental wisdom. If analytic
wisdom is absent, what meditator can come to abide
in a state where there is no constructive thought?
If one has no thought concerning any of the elements
of existence (chos.; dharmas) and does not direct
the mind upon them, this does not mean that one can
cease to remember all that one has experienced and
to think of it. If I think: `I must not recall in my
mind any element of existence', such a thought will
itself be an intense recollection and activity of
the mind. If the mere absence of (consciousness and)
recollection is regarded as sufficient, it follows
that in a swoon or at the time of intoxication one
comes to the state where there is no constructive
thought. Now, (in reality) without correct analysis
there is no means of attaining the liberation from
constructive thought. If we merely cease to reflect
and have no discrimination, how can we come to the
cognition of the non-substantiality, it is
impossible to remove the obscurations. Therefore,
the incorrect representation can be cast away only
by means of the correct analytic wisdom. For this
reason, it is not proper to say that one does not
reflect, when in reality it is the reverse. Without
recollection and correct activity of the mind, how
can one come to remember the place of former
residence and attain omniscience? But the yogin who
reflects over an object of correct analytic wisdom,
cognizes all the external and internal elements in
the present, past, and future as non-substantial,
has all thought-constructions pacified within him,
and rejects all evil doctrines. On this foundation
he becomes skillful in expedience and is the
manifestation of highest wisdom.(48)

Kamala'siila is presenting here, couched in terms
related to religious practices, many of the same
ideas which Bhaavaviveka presented three centuries
earlier. His is affirming paryaaya-paramaartha
against the Prasa^ngika negation. He asks us to
arrive at the cognition of the nonsubstantiality of
dharmas by means of

P.265

discrimination, much as Bhaavaviveka arrives at
paramaartha syllogistically, rather than by casting
away logic, which is the negation of sa.mv.rtti by
means of unearthing internal inconsistency
(prasa^nga methodology). He likens his opponent's
negation to a swoon or intoxication and relies upon
analysis based on offering countertheses. He also
points to the fundamental contradiction rather than
being satisfied with the accidental contradiction of
the illogicality of the opponent: "...the incorrect
representation can be cast away only by means of
correct analytic wisdom. For this reason, it is not
proper to say that one does not reflect, when in
reality it is the reverse."(49)

VII. A WORD ON THE CONTINUITY FROM SVAATANTRIKA TO
TANTRA

The effects of this debate on the shape of Buddhism
in Tibet were more profound than many imagine.
'Saantirak.sita, who instructed Kamala'siila for
this debate, also recommended to the king that Guru
Padmasambhaava from UU.rgyen. (Uddayaana; Swat
Valley) be invited to Tibet. Padmasambhaava, of
course, was the great Tantric master who was largely
responsible for the popularization of Buddhism in
Tibet and was held in special reverence by the
oldest of the four Tibetan lineages (the
rNying.ma.pa.).

We offer that the link between the Svaatantrikas
and the Tantrikas is more than historical. One of
the fundamental principles of the tantras is that
one should use the means of sa^msaara for the
attainment of nirvaa.na. We are reminded here of
Bhaavaviveka's contention that we can use the
language of the relative to denote the ultimate,
following from MMK, XXIV, 10. It seems that the
Prasa^ngikas could not allow for this, contenting
themselves with demonstrating that paramaartha is
beyond all logico-linguistic construction. Thus a
Tantrika saying that we can use the means of
sa^msaara to attain nirvaa.na is but a jump from
Bhaavaviveka saying that we can use the language of
sa.mv.rtti to express paramaartha.
NOTES
1. Buddhist Thought in India (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan, 1967), p. 239.
2. A Survey of Buddhism (Bangalore: Indian
Institute of World Culture, 1966), p.346.
3. A Survey of Buddhism, p.348.
4. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London:
George Allen & Unwin,1960), p. 132n.
5. "Bhaavaviveka, "(Brussels: Melanges Chinois et
Bouddhiques, 2, July, 1933, pp. 60-69). p.66. My
translation. This error is understandable, since
the dominant dGe.lugs.pa. lineage accepts the
Prasa^ngika standpoint. However, at the time of
these debates, this school was not in existence.
The earlier lineages were, and still are,
inclined toward the Svaatantrikas.
6. The Buddhist Conception of Nirvana(Varanasi:
Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1968) , p.67.
Stcherbatsky's error here needs no further
comment.
7. "Some Logical Aspects of Naagaarjuna's System,"
Philosophy East and West(5, no.4,January, 1957,
pp. 291-308), p. 292.
8. Poussin, "Bhaavaviveka," p.65.
9. Emptiness: a Study in Religious Meaning
(Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon, 1967), p. 36n.
10. Poussin, "Bhaavaviveka," p. 66.

P.266

11. "Bhaavaviveka and the Prasa^ngika School, "
(Nava-Nalanda-Mahavihara Research Publication,
vol. 1, n.d.), p. 291.
12. dKon.mchod.'jigs.med.dbang.po., Grub.pa'i.mtha.
rnam.par.bzhag.pa.rin.po.che'i.phrang.ba.(in S.
Iida, "An Introduction to Svaatantrika-Maadhyamika,"
Ph.D.diss., University of Wisconsin, 1968), fasc.
22b-23a: de.la.dbyas.na. /rnal.'byor.spyod.pa'i.
dbu.ma.rang.rgyud.pa.dang. /mdo.sde.spyod.pa'i.dbu.
ma.rang.rgyud.pa.gnyis. /phya.don.gas.mi.len.zhing. /
rang.rig.khas.len.pa'i dbu.ma.pa.de.po'i.mtshan.nyin.
mtshan.na.gzhi.ni./slob.dpon.zhi.ba.'tzho.bu./...
rang.rig.khas.mi.len.zhing. /phyi.don.rgng.gi.
mtshan.nyid.kis.grub.pa.khas.len.pa'i.mtshan.nyid./
mtshan.gzhi. ni./slob.dpon.leg.Idan.`byed.lta.bya./
sgra.bshad.kyang.yod.de./gzhi'i.rnam.bzhang.sems.
can.pa.dang.mthun.par.khs.len.pas.na.rnal.'byor.
spyod.pa.dang./ mdo.sde.pa.Itar.rdul.phra.rab.
bsags.pa'i.phya.rol.gyi.don.khas.len.pa.mdo.sde.
spyod.pa'i.dbya.ma.pa.shes.brjod.do // Vide also
Khai.dub.,Stong.thun.bskal.bzang.mig. 'byed.,
Tsang ed., fasc. 37a sq.
14. Poussin, "Bhaavaviveka," p.67.
15. Naagaarjuna, Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa, trans. K.
K. Inada, (Tokyo: Hokuseido, 1970), XXIV, 9-10.
16. Kajiyama, "Bhaavaviveka and the Prasa^ngika
School," p.299.
17. Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice
(Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1971), p.125.
18. Kajiyama, "Bhaavaviveka and the Prasa^ngika
School," p.306.
19. Vide Bhaavaviveka, Maadhyamaarthasa^ngraha, and
confer Candrakiirti, Maadhyamakaavat a.
20. See charts, p. 259.
21. Kajiyama, "Bhaavaviveka and the Prasa^ngika
School," p.300.
22. See A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism (Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), pp. 474 sq., and
Sangharakshita, A Survey, of Buddhism, p. 347.
23. S. Iida, "An Introduction to Svaatantrika-
Maadhyamaka," Ph.D.dissertation University of
Wisconsin, 1968, p.244, fn. 16.
24. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p.98.
25. See Iida. "An Introduction." p. 257.
26. Candrakiirti, Maadhyamikakaarika-V.rtii, pp.
351-3: tad ayam aacaa yo yathaivamvidhe vi.saye
naacaarya-mataanuvarti tathaa pratiipaadita^m
Madhyamakaavataare `duura^ngamaayaa^m tu
dhiyaadhika ityatreti na punas tad duu.sa.ne
yatha aasthiiyate. Quoted in Murti, The Central
Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 96, n. 3.
27. dKon.mchog.`jigs.med.dbang.mo., op cit., fasc.
25a: nyam.dang.dgra.bcam.pa.yin.na. theg.cen(sic,
schould read chen.) lam.du.`jug.pas.khyab.ste. /
mthar.thug.theg.pa.gcig.tu.grub.par.'dod.pa'i.
phyir.//
28. See Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism,
p.96.
29. "Emptiness in the `Satyasiddhi'," Journal of
Indian Philosophy (vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 30-37),
pp. 36--37.
30. Buddhist Logic (Leningrad: Biblioteca Buddhica,
1932). 1, p.275.
31. Buddhist Logic, 2, p.109).
32. Nyaaya-Bindu, 41.3, in Buddhist Logic, 2 pp.
109-110
33. Iida, "An Introduction," p. 246, n. 26.
34. Buddhist Logic, 1, 275-319; 2, 109-253.
35. Warder, Indian Buddhism, p. 475. From
Bhaavaviveka's Karalaratna.
36. Following Iida, "An Introduction," p. 246n.
37. Kajiyama, "Bhaavaviveka and the Prasa^ngika
School," p.305.
38. Kajiyama, "Bhaavaviveka and the Prasa^ngika
School," p.300.
39. See Kenneth Ch'en, Buddhism in China (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp.
355-357.
40. Warder, Indian Buddhism, p. 477.
41. R. H. Robinson, The Buddhist Religion (Belmont,
Calif.: Dickenson, 1970), p. 110.
42. Bu.ston., Chos.`byung. (trans. E. Obermiller
[Heidelberg: Materialien zur Kunde des
Buddhismus, 1931]), fasc. 142a.
43. Bu.ston., Chos.`byung., fasc. 142a.
44. Bu.ston., Chos.`byung., fasc. 142b.
45. See Bu.ston., Chos.`byung., fasc. 22a, fasc.
11a, and fasc. 131a.