Analysis in Theravaada Buddhism

·期刊原文

Analysis in Theravaada Buddhism

By Donald W. Mitchell

Volume 21, no. 1(1971)

Philosophy East and West

p.23-31

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P23

I

In his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume observes

that "When I enter most intimately into what I call

myself, I always stumble on some particular

perception or other.... I never can catch myself at

any time without a perception; and never can observe

anything but the perception."(1) Hume's observation

is made at the beginning of his inquiry into the

question of selfhood and, when taken in the context

of his thought in general, it has far-reaching

effects. Given these "particular perceptions," the

question immediately arises as to what it is that

integrates them into that entity we refer to as a

self. And when this question is asked in the context

of Hume's thought in general, it becomes extremely

problematic. A traditional answer to this question

might be that these perceptions, like qualities, all

inhere in some substantial subject. Hume's position,

however, is that any type of substance is simply an

idea derived from reflection; it is not an

"impression of sensation." We know only particular

qualities; any "substance" we posit in which these

qualities would inhere is simply a mental construct.

From this Hume concludes that "We have therefore no

idea of substances distinct from that of a

collection of particular qualities, nor have we any

other meaning when we either talk or reason

concerning it."(2)

If perceptions do not inhere in some substantial

subject it would seem that the integrating factor of

selfhood must lie in some relation between the

perceptions. Hume, however, rejects both the

relation of identity and the relation of cause and

effect. He rejects the former because it seems

self-contradictory.(3) To claim that some x is

identical to some y is to say that x and y are the

same and yet two. The relation of identity involves

a pair, but a pair implies differences, not

identity. Hume's rejection of identity is not as

consequential, though, as his rejection of any

necessary cause and effect relation, for this means

that "All events seem entirely loose and

separate."(4) In other words, while we do observe

that one event follows another, we can never observe

any necessary connection between them: "When we look

around us toward external objects and consider the

operations of causes, we are never able, in a single

instance, to discover any power or necessary

connection, any quality which binds the effect to

the cause and renders the one an infallible

consequence of the other. We only find that one does

actually, in fact, follow the other."(5) Given this

position, Hume feels that he can only conclude that

the self is "a bundle or

--------------------

Donald W. Mitchell is a graduate student in

philosophy at the University of Hawaii.

1 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A.

Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), I.

iv. 6 (p. 252).

2 Ibid., I. i. 6 (p. 16).

3 Ibid., I. iv. 2 (pp. 187-218).

4 David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human

Understanding, ed. C. W. Hendel (New York: Liberal

Arts Press, 1955), p. 85.

5 Ibid., p. 74.

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collection of different perceptions, which succeed

each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are

in a perpetual flux and movement.... They are the

successive perceptions only that constitute the

mind."(6)

From the foregoing comments on Hume's analysis

of substance and relations, it can be seen that the

central argument against such a Humean concept of

the self is based on the fact that such "loose and

separate" perceptions, which are not "owned" by

anything, are not intelligibly connected--that is,

the relation between the constituents of Hume's

"bundles" has not been adequately illuminated. Hume

himself was well aware of this problem, and in fact

he confesses in the appendix of his Treatise that

"there are two principles which I cannot render

consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either

one of them, viz., that all our distinct perceptions

are distinct existences, and that the mind never

perceives any real connection among distinct

existences."(7)

The problem of reconciling these two claims is

still with us today. For, as A. J. Ayer points out,

since Hume many empiricists have held this view of

the self in one form or another, but have never been

able to show adequately what it is that integrates

and orders such a Humean "bundle" of perceptions.(8)

What I wish to show in this paper is first that

there is a similar position concerning the analysis

of the self into discrete moments of perception in

Theravaada Buddhism;(9) and second, that while the

Western concern with such a Humean analysis of the

self has been basically epistemological in an

empirical context, the Buddhist position has been

maintained on a religious level that stresses the

psychological and ethical. It is psychological in

that there is a concern not only for perception, but

also for the emotional response to perception and

the psychological state of mind to which these two

factors give rise. It is ethical in that these

psychological states of mind, or dhammas (Sanskrit:

dharmas), are further analyzed and then classified

in an attempt to show a certain path to the

purification of one's consciousness. And it is

basically religious in that the classification of

psychological states in an ethical hierarchy makes

transparent the "path" one must follow to reach the

ultimate religious goal of Theravaada Buddhism;

namely, the transcendental state of nibbaana

(Sanskrit: nirvaa.na). I will conclude by putting

forward a possible response that Theravaada might

give to the above-mentioned criticism of the Humean

position. In doing so I will refer to Ayer's

statement of the criticism because I believe it

touches the central problem with the Theravaada

position: that is, the problem that arises

--------

6 Hume, Treatise, I. iv. 6 (pp. 252-253).

7 Ibid., appendix (p. 636).

8 A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge (Baltimore:

Penguin Books, 1956), pp. 192, 198-199.

9 In this paper, I will be using "Theravaada" to

refer to the Theravaadin tradition as one of the

Eighteen Abhidhamma Schools and not as referring

to the whole of the Southern Buddhist

tradition--which would also include other

Abhidhamma schools such as Sarvaastivaada and

Sautraantika.

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when one rejects the existence of any soul or

permanent substance behind man's consciousness;

namely, the problem of a continuing self-identity.

II

Theravaada Buddhism states that "there is no actor

apart from action, no percipient apart from

perception. In other words, there is no conscious

subject behind consciousness.... Mind is simply the

consciousness of an object."(10) Or in the words of

the most famous Paali scholar and commentator,

Buddhaghosa (fifth century A.D.): "There is grief

but none suffering from grief, there is no doer but

there is action, there is quietude but none being

quieted, there is the path but none going along the

path."(11)

Thus, at first sight, it seems that the

Theravaada position resembles that of Hume. Going

beyond the Humean analysis, however, Theravaada

posits that the perceptual moments of consciousness

can also be analyzed, which results in the "89

dhammas," or the most basic psychological moments of

consciousness that the Theravaada philosopher could

envision. I have called these dhammas psychological

because they include both the "perceptual moment"

and its emotive accompaniment. For example, one

dhamma in the realm of sensuality is "consciousness

by way of sight accompanied by hedonic indifference

(upekkha)."(12) One should note here that such an

analysis of consciousness into these dhammas will

throw light on the three major truths of the

Buddhist religion: namely, that there is no self

(anattaa) but only a constant flow of these

impermanent states (anicca), and that any attempt to

"cling" to these transient moments brings suffering

(dukkha). It was with these truths in mind that the

Theravaada philosopher began the task of analyzing

these dhammas and then ordering them into an ethical

hierarchy; that is, a hierarchy that begins with

"impure" psychological states of mind and ends with

pure states, thus giving the Buddhist monk a "path

of purification" (visuddhimagga) that would lead him

to the religious goal of nibbaana.

In the purification process one can distinguish

three developments. The first of these stresses the

development from unwholesome psychological moments

which carry bad kamma (Sanskrit: karma) to those

moments which carry no kamma. This development goes

through four stages. The first stage

(akusalavi~n~naa.na) contains those dhammas which

are considered to be unwholesome or those which are

not conducive to the attainment of nibbaana. These

dhammas are characterized as immoral (akusala), for

they are accompanied either by hate (dosa), greed

(lobha), or ignorance (moha), which are considered

to be the

-----------------------------

10 S. Z. Aung, "An Introductory Essay, " in

Anuruddha, Compendium of Philosophy, ed. Mrs.

Rhys Davids (London: Luzac & Co. for the Pali

Text Society, 1963), p. 7.

11 N. Dutt, Early Monastic Buddhism (Calcutta:

Calcutta Oriental Press, 1941), p. 264.

12 Anuruddha, Compendium of Philosophy

(Abhidhammatthasangaha), p. 83.

P26

three basic evils (hetus) of existence.(13) These

dhammas are also totally bound up with sensuality

(kaama). An example of a dhamma in this stage is

"Voiltional consciousness, accompanied by grief and

connected with hate."(l4) The next stage

(kusalavi~n~naa.na) contains wholesome dhammas and

begins to rise above sensuality and the three evils.

An example would be "consciousness accompanied by

touch accompanied by joy."(15) The third stage

(vipaaka) is not only wholesome but brings good

effects or kamma. In Theravaada, however, as in much

of Eastern thought, it is deemed better to avoid all

acts which bring any kamma--good or bad. The reason

for this is that kamma (good or bad) brings about

rebirth; that is, actions which have any effects

bring with them the possibility of further rebirth

where these effects will be worked out. Thus the

final stage in this first development is called

kiriyaa or consciousness having no effects (kamma).

The second development is a "rooting out" of the

three basic evils (hetus). As mentioned above, these

are hate, greed, and ignorance. The highest state of

consciousness attainable, according to Theravaada,

is nibbaana, which is often referred to as ultimate

knowledge and blissful nonattachment. From this it

is obvious that ignorance would be considered an

evil since it is the opposite of knowledge; however,

the reason for choosing greed and hate may not be so

easily seen. The reason is that greed is a desire to

"possess" an object and therefore is considered an

attachment. Hate, on the other hand, is a desire to

"be rid" of an object and thus is also considered an

attachment. Attachment, then, has a twofold nature.

It is either a pulling of an object toward oneself

(greed) or pushing it away (hate) . Thus all

attachment can be characterized as derivative from

the basic evils of hate and greed. Therefore, as one

moves toward nibbaana, one's consciousness is

purified by the progressive disappearance of hate,

greed, and ignorance.

Finally, there is a development form lowly

concern with mundane sensuality and desires (kaama)

to a higher concern for achieving the suprammundane

state (lokuttara) which opens into nibbaana. Here,

as in the first development, there are four stages.

The lowest stage, containing dhammas with the three

evils (sahetuka) that are concerned with sensual

pleasures and desires, is called the "realm of

sensuality" (kaamaloka). The second stage is the

"realm of form" (ruupaloka) and consists of fifteen

meditations in which the above-mentioned "evils"

(hetus) of hate, greed, and ignorance are absent

(ahetuka).

In order to clarify these first two realms it

might be useful to compare the Theravaada move from

the sensual to the formal with Plato's distinction

be-

----------------

13 "Hetu" literally translated means "cause" and

refers to the fact that these three "evils" are

the cause of future rebirths.

14 Anuruddha, p. 83.

15 Ibid.,p. 85.

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tween the world of material objects and the world of

ideas. For Plato our perception of objects which

participate in the forms does not give us a clear

and distinct knowledge of reality. For, as our

knowing is mediated by the senses, we do not see

things as they really are. Our senses perceive the

object only indirectly, like shadows on the wall of

a cave. However, besides interfering with knowledge,

the senses also hinder us from obtaining the "Good."

That is, they give rise to sensual desires and other

emotions which hinder the pure intellectual

contemplation of the Good. It is the quest for such

pure intellectual contemplation that leads Plato to

the world of ideas--or the pure forms of the

material objects. These forms are intuited directly

by the intellect and therefore the emotions and

ignorance given rise to by the senses are avoided.

This same mode of thought is found in the

Theravaada distinctions between the realm of

sensuality and the realm of form. The former realm

is characterized by ignorance and emotions

(basically greed and hate) which arise through the

working of the senses. One obtains the latter realm

by extreme "concentration" (samaadhi) which, as for

Plato, does not make use of the senses; one directly

intuits the forms, which are characterized as the

"subtle residuum" of matter.(16) The only dhammas in

this realm of form are the fifteen meditations

(jhaana) which make no use of the senses.

Here, however, the similarity between Plato and

Theravaada ends. For Plato's inquiry stops with the

world of ideas, as it has given him the metaphysical

explanatory power he needed to structure his theory

of knowledge and morality. In its religious quest

for an absolutely pure state of consciousness

Theravaada posits two more realms (lokas). First is

the "realm of the formless" (aruupaloka), where even

the "subtle residuum" or form is left behind. Here

the dhammas consist of concentrating on formless

objects of thought--for example, space (aakaa'sa)

and consciousness (vi~n~naa.na). Finally one enters

the supramundane realm (lokuttara) where there are

only eight dhammas: the four "paths" (maggas) to

sainthood and the four "fruits" (phalas) that arise

from following these paths. The final path leads

directly to Theravaada sainthood (arhat) and the

realization of nibbaana.

Thus it can be seen that the Theravaada

philosopher has analyzed man's psychological states

of mind into an ethical hierarchy that leads to his

ultimate religious goal: nibbaana. In summary, this

path of purification starts with unwholesome sensual

states of consciousness characterized by greed,

hate, and ignorance, and progresses to higher states

of wholesome intellection of the forms and the

formless ground of existence, thus bringing good

kamma and in the end enabling man to escape rebirth

entirely by escaping all kamma--good

---------------------

16 Ibid., p. 12.

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or bad. The progress thus far has been in "mundane

consciousness" (lokiya), but has been purified to

the extent that there is a passage to the "pure

consciousness" (ariya) where one begins the four

paths to sainthood and nibbaana.

III

A. J. Ayer states that if being a person consists

only of discrete perceptual experiences, then there

is no logical relation between these experiences;

that is, where does one find a force to keep one's

experiences together in an ordered manner? How do

we maintain any self-identity? What is it that

relates my experiences so that I maintain a certain

identity throughout my life? Ayer feels that "some

continuity of memory is necessary...."(17) That is,

given a series of experiences, we must thread them

together by assuming that they are all related

either actively or passively with memory. However,

this can only be so if "every detail of every

experience is subsequently recollected."(18) For in

the series of experiences all preceding experiences

must be recollected totally in the later experiences

if they are to be related by memory. But this would

mean that every experience is related to previous

memories, so the question is, What is this relation

of accompaniment between memories? Thus Ayer

concludes that memory is not sufficient and whatever

the relating power might be, "nothing more

illuminating can be said [of it] than that it is the

relation that holds between experiences when they

are constituents of the same consciousness.(19)

A similar analysis of memory is made in

Theravaada and it leads to a similar conclusion. For

it is said that with memory "each expired state

[experience] renders service (upakaara) to the next.

In other words, each, on passing away, gives up the

whole of its energy (paccaya-satti) to its

successor. Each successor, therefore, has all the

potentialities of its predecessors, and more. [All

this] takes part in a memory-process."(20) However,

for this to be true, Theravaada saw the need to

place it in a greater matrix of relation (paccaya);

that is, there is need for a force to direct this

memory process in a certain direction. This is

necessary if Theravaada wants to claim that one can

give up the normal directions in life and follow the

above-analyzed "path of purification." But where

Ayer claims that nothing can be said of such a

relation except that it holds in general for

consciousness, Theravaada attempts the following

analysis.

For Theravaada the world does not consist of

objects that are substantial,

-------------

17 Ayer, pp. 198-199.

18 Ibid.,p. 195.

19 Ibid., P.199.

20 Aung, p.42.

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"static" entities, but rather all objects are

considered to be "events" or "processes." When

Theravaada speaks of being (bhava) it conceives of

it as an active process. Therefore when discrete

dhammas are posited, one should not take these to be

static existences. Each dhamma should be considered

an event, not a "solid" sense-datum. Theravaada

further analyzes these "events" (i.e., the dhammas)

into three phases. First is the "genesis" (uppaada)

where the formal structure and material content of

the former moment give rise to the present moment.

That is, every moment of consciousness (dhamma) is

dependent on the preceding moment, from which it

receives both material content and formal influence.

These two elements received from the preceding

moment give rise to the "ordering of thought"

(cittaniyaama) and the particular direction (viithi)

that the present moment takes.

All this can be changed, however, in the second

stage of the event, which is called the

"development" (.thiti). Here the present moment is

no longer influenced by the past but by external and

internal forces. More specifically, the development

of the dhammas is conditioned by the external

circumstances (paccaya) in which it takes place, and

by the internal volition (cetanaa) as it both

focuses on, and reacts to, these circumstances. Both

of these conditioning factors produce "determined

effects" (sa^mkhaaras) in this development stage.

(Here sa^mkhaaras refers to the conditioned or

determined effect of will and circumstance in the

moments of consciousness, and does not have the

connotation that it does in Hindu philosophy--which

I will discuss later.)

In these two stages we can distinguish two

aspects: first, the passive side of consciousness

(upapattibhava) as shaped and ordered by the past

in the stage of genesis; and second, the active side

(kammabhava) as the determining of the stage of

development by will (cetanaa) and circumstances

(paccaya). It is in the third stage of "dissolution"

(bha^nga) that the resultant of these factors

(sa^mkhaaras) gives rise to, and transfers all its

power to, the next moment.

From this analysis one can see that, for

Theravaada, the perceptions are ultimately only

moments in a "flow of consciousness." Thus each

perception is a process that arises from the

preceding perception, develops, and passes on its

effects to the next perception. It is the "life

continuum" (bhava^nga) at the base of this flow of

consciousness that, for Theravaada, allows us to be

regarded as subjectively continuous, and supplies

the continuing process required for connection of

the above-mentioned perce ptions.(21)

This process is considered to be the functioning

of the dhammas and takes place on the subliminal

level. However, the process of consciousness can be

analyzed not only in terms of dhammas but also in

terms of what are called in Theravaada the eight

moments of apperception: (1) disturbance of the

stream of consciousness; (2) attention is averted;

(3) sensation arises; (4) contact

------------------

21 Anuruddha, pp. 265-266.

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arises; (5) feeling arises; (6) perception arises;

(7) volitional reaction; (8) reflection until again

lost in stream of consciousness.(22)

Further, a third analysis can be made in terms

of kamma which at the level of subliminal

consciousness is considered to be the ethical force

that relates perceptions. Kamma literally means

"deed" or "action" and refers to the "law of deed"

(Kamma) which states that moral deeds carry

consequences--"as you sow, so will you reap." In

much of Indian philosophy (e.g., Yoga and Vedaanta

Kamma is used to denote that one's actions produce

"impressions" (sa^mskaaras) in the actor which then

function as determinates to his future action.

In its no-self theory (anattaa) Buddhism rejects

any permanent substance which would carry

impressions of past deeds. Therefore the problem

arises as to how kamma, as the effect of one's

deeds, can modify one's subsequent character and

fortunes if there is no substantial self in which it

can inhere. The answer to this problem was alluded

to in the above analysis of the threefold process of

the dhamma moment (i.e., genesis, development, and

dissolution). In that analysis, the process of kamma

is implied when the will (cetanaa) and external

circumstances (paccaya) bring about a conditional

effect (sa^mkhaara) in the development of a certain

moment of consciousness (dhamma) which will then be

transferred to the next moment. Will and

circumstances are the germs of kamma, and the

effects of such kamma influence the future

"direction" of the flow of consciousness.

In this way, then, we can visualize the working

of kamma in the dhammas. However, it must be kept in

mind that these dhammas are moments in the flow of

consciousness. To use a Buddhist metaphor, when the

wheel of life is analyzed as a static entity the

spokes (dhammas) are apparent. But when the wheel is

turning in the regular life process, the spokes are

not seen. This life process is called in Theravaada

"dependent origination" (pa.ticcasamuppaada) and

refers to the belief that every moment (dhamma) in

the life process "depends" on the preceding moment

and "originates" the next. This process extends

through the moments, where kamma arises, and is

referred to as the process of kamma. Therefore, the

dhammas are parts of this process of kamma (i,e.,

dependent origination) and, insofar as they

themselves are processes, give rise to particular

instances of kamma which are passed on, through

dependent origination, into the future.

It is through analyses such as these that

Theravaada explains the relation which holds between

experiences and that allows for order and continuity

in a conception of the self as a stream of

perceptions. At the bottom of all such analyses lies

the claim that selfhood is found in the stream of

consciousness, which can be analyzed into discrete

perceptions for a certain ethical and reli-

-------------------

22 Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India (London:

George Alien & Unwin, 1962), p.186

P31

gious purpose. While Hume analyzes the self into

"loose and separate" perceptions between which he

cannot find any relation, Theravaada analyzes the

self, as a stream of consciousness, into dynamic

segments of this process. Thus the problem of

relation does not arise in Theravaada in the way it

does for Hume. Let me give an example of how this is

so in terms of the "sense-data" theory of

perception.

A question that has been raised about this type

of theory, which, like Hume, distinguishes discrete

sense perceptions or sense-data, is that there seems

to be no guide for distingushing where one

perception ends and another begins. For example,

does one sense-datum include a tree only? Or does it

include the bird in the tree? Or does it also

include the flowers below, and the children playing

around it? Or are these all distinct sense-data in

themselves? There seems to be no general rule to

delimit a moment of perception. Theravaada would

respond that this problem shows that there is a

stream of consciousness which moves from one thing

to another in a continuous process of perception,

and that any analysis would only distinguish

segments of this stream of consciousness, and not

independent perceptions or sense-data.

Theravaada feels that such a position is

justified because the analysis of the stream of

consciousness into dhammas is for a specific

purpose. For Theravaada analysis is guided by the

quest for an ethical purification of consciousness.

That is, while Theravaada does maintain that there

are discrete moments of consciousness (dhammas), it

does so only for the purpose of making transparent a

certain path for ethical purification. The viewing

of Theravaada analysis within its religious context

and as posited for the specific purpose of

liberation cannot be stressed enough. An example of

this intent can be seen in the following text from

the Mahaavagga: "Perceiving this, [the nonexistence

of the self] O priests, the learned and noble

disciple conceives an aversion.... And in conceiving

this aversion he becomes divested of passion, and by

the absence of passion he becomes free...."(23) In

the Sarvaastivaada text, the Vij~naanakaaya, this

intent is even more clear: "Even if your pudgala

(self) exists, he is not useful for salvation...

because there is no use for him, therefore the

pudgala does not exist."(24)

Finally, from this it can be seen that analysis

for Theravaada is a normative enterprise which is

guided by the religious quest for which it is

intended. So, when one notes that the Theravaada

concept of the self is similar to Hume's position,

one must qualify this observation in the light of

the ends they were attempting to achieve by their

analyses. Hume's analysis sought an epistemological

end while the analysis of theravaada is made in an

attempt to show the path to a purely religious goal.

It is in light of such a difference in ends that

Theravaada analysis manifests its uniqueness

-------------------

23 H. C. Warren, Buddhism in Translation (New York:

Atheneum, 1963), p.147.

24 Conze, p.129.