Bhaaviveka and the early Maadhyamika theories of language

·期刊原文

Bhaaviveka and the early Maadhyamika theories of language

By Malcolm D. Eckel

Philosophy East and West

28:3 July 1978 p. 323-337

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

p. 323

In the last fifty years, Western interpreters of
Maadhyamika Buddhist philosophy have worked
diligently to devise a philosophical vocabulary in
which the insights and techniques of the Maadhyamika,
dialecticians can be accurately and intelligibly
expressed to Western readers.(1) This is not an easy
task, but it has sometimes been done quite
effectively.(2) Even in the most successful studies,
however, one element is often conspicuously lacking.
Scholars have compared the work of early Maadhyamika
philosophers with similar work in the West, but they
have been reluctant for various reasons to compare
the early Maadhyamika philosophers with each
other.(3) This, of course, has led to a certain
admirable simplicity in the results of their
comparison, but it has sacrificed a degree of
sophistication and philosophical accuracy that would
enrich their results. In this article I would like to
redress the balance in one small area by considering
the development of the theory or theories of language
in the works of Naagaarjuna, Bhaavaviveka, and
Candrakiirti. By so doing, I hope to demonstrate that
a sure way to promote conceptual accuracy in the
comparative enterprise is to understand how
individual philosophers in the Maadhyamika tradition
chose to develop and differentiate themselves from
the work of their predecessors.

The comparison of early Maadhyamika philosophers
with each other has been hindered in recent years by
the relative scarcity of major texts translated into
Western languages. We are fortunate to have
translations of the basic works of Naagaarjuna and
Candrakiirti, but we only have fragments of the works
of other authors like Buddhapaalita and Bhaavaviveka,
and original Tibetan works on Maadhyamika philosophy
are almost unknown in Western languages.(4) This
imbalance has led, perhaps inevitably, to the notion
that early Maadhyamika philosophy was considerably
more homogeneous than it actually was. What is
necessary now to expand our understanding of this
school is greater familiarity with the lesser known
authors, like Bhaavaviveka, and with the great
Tibetan scholars like Tso^n-kha-pa, who wrestled in
their own works with the diversity of the early
philosophy. Such familiarity would show that the
homogeneity of the early tradition is merely
apparent. In fact, Bhaavaviveka distinguished himself
quite sharply from the earlier tradition on certain
points, and Candrakiirti, in turn, distinguished
himself from Bhaavaviveka. Tso^n-kha-pa and his
successors recognized this and, in their own efforts
to harmonize the differences, gave a very useful
account of the ways in which the two disagreed.

Theories of language play an important part in
the Maadhyamika philosophy of the early period, not
primarily because the individual philosophers were
interested in constructing a positive semantic
theory, although that interest did impinge somewhat
on the works of Bhaavaviveka and Candrakiirti, but
----------------------
Malcolm D. Eckel is Instructor, Religion
Department, Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio.
Philosophy East and West 28, no. 3, July 1978.
reserved.

p. 334

because the disputes between Maadhyamika and rival
Indian schools were often, at bottom, cast in terms
of disagreements over the use of language. This is
perhaps a natural consequence of the Maadhyamika
critical method. Maadhyamika philosophers were
interested more in devising a critical scheme for
removing their opponents' misconceptions than they
were in building their own positive theory. In the
absence of shared metaphysical assumptions, their
criticism often took the form of objections to
certain uses of language. The Maadhyamika account of
language is thus useful, in the first case, as a
mirror of the relationship between Maadhyamika
philosophers and their Indian opponents, but its
importance is not limited just to this. The account
of language is also closely related to a central
Maadhyamika notion, the two levels of truth.
Maadhyamika philosophers recognized this as a
distinction between a level of nonconceptual,
ultimate truth (paramaartha) and a level of truth
that lay within the domain of concepts and words
(vyavahaara). The two were distinct, but the second
was understood to function in some way as a vehicle
for the first.(5) The account of language given by
any particular Maadhyamika philosopher necessarily
affected his notion both of the exact nature of the
distinction between the two truths and of the way one
served indirectly to express the other. An
understanding of the development of Maadhyamika
accounts of language is thus useful to us in a number
of ways, both in describing the Maadhyamika response
to other Indian schools and in following internal
differences on certain fundamental points. It also
has the advantage, as will be evident later, of
sharply delineating basic differences between
Bhaavaviveka and Candrakiirti.

Naagaarjuna laid the groundwork for later
Maadhyamika accounts of language in the second
century A.D., at a time when Indian philosophers were
becoming conscious in a rudimentary way of the need
to formulate rules for debate between opposing
philosophical schools. Sanskrit was being used
increasingly as a tool for learned discourse, and the
Hindu logicians were attempting to develop a theory
of semantics and syllogistic reasoning on which
philosophical argument could be based. Naagaarjuna's
position in this philosophical environment was
necessarily rather ambiguous. He was committed, as a
Sanskrit dialectician, to the process of discussion
and debate facilitated by the developments in Hindu
logic, but he could not, as a Buddhist, accept the
ontology on which the theories were based. In
particular, he could not accept the notion advanced
by the Hindu logicians that the meaning of a term was
the substantial entity to which it referred. He
appeared, in fact, to assert exactly the opposite,
namely, that all things are empty of substantial
reality, and terms which refer to such things are
equally empty of reality, since there is no real
substance to which they refer. In the terminology of
the Sanskrit philosophical schools this was expressed
in the following words: "Nothing at all possesses
intrinsic nature" (sarve.saa.m bhaavaanaa.m
sarvatra na vidyate svabhaava.h).(6) For Naagaarjuna
this quasi-assertion posed a basic problem concerning
the function of language. The problem is simply this:
if all things are empty (`suunya) of intrinsic nature

p. 325

(svabhaava), then terms that refer to them are
similarly empty. In the semantic theory of the Hindu
logicians, an empty term, that is, one with no
reference, is meaningless. So to say "all things are
empty of intrinsic nature" is to say that all terms
are meaningless, including those in the assertion
itself. The assertion is thus useless as a means of
argument.

Naagaarjuna formulated this problem for himself
in the first part of the Vigrahavyaavartani. Here an
objector says: [Vs. 1] If nothing at all possesses an
intrinsic nature, then your statement [that nothing
possesses an intrinsic nature] itself possesses no
intrinsic nature, and it cannot refute intrinsic
nature.(7) [Vs. 9] If there is no intrinsic nature.
then even the word "no intrinsic nature"
(ni.hsvabhaava) is impossible, because there can be
no word without an object [to which it refers] (naama
hi nirvastuka.m naasti).(8) In the second part of the
work, Naagaarjuna formulates his reply largely in
terms of examples.

[Commentary on verse 223 You have not understood
the emptiness of things. ...lf things existed by
virtue of their own intrinsic nature. they would
exist even without causes and conditions. But they do
not. Therefore they have no intrinsic nature, and
they are called empty. Similarly, because it is
dependently produced, my statement has no intrinsic
nature, and because it has no intrinsic nature, it is
reasonable to call it empty. Now, things like a cart,
a pot, or a cloth, though they are empty of intrinsic
nature because they are dependently produced, serve
their various functions. For example, they carry
wood, grass, or dirt, they contain honey, water, or
milk, or they protect from cold, wind, or heat.
Similarly, my statement serves to establish the fact
that things have no intrinsic nature, even though,
because it is dependently produced, it has no
intrinsic nature.(9)

Naagaarjuna shows a number of the important
characteristics of his method in these passages. The
first point to note is that he works out his own
account of words and their function primarily in
response to the challenge of a Hindu logician, who
wants to force him to say more than he is willing to
say. The response he gives is largely negative. He
refused to be pushed by the logician into admitting
that either his words or the things to which they
refer exist by virtue of their intrinsic nature
(svabhaava). The second point has to do with the way
words actually function, even though they are empty
of intrinsic nature. In fact, Naagaarjuna does not
present a positive theory of language to account for
the effectiveness of his sentence: he simply makes an
appeal to conventional usage, His words admittedly
have no intrinsic nature, but they work
conventionally as well as does a cart. The cart, when
we examine it, has no nature which we can designate
as its "cartness," but it still manages to carry out
its function effectively. We cannot actually say that
Naagaarjuna presents a coherent theory in these
lines. In his appeal to ordinary usage, however,
Naagaarjuna suggests the direction in which some
future Maadhyamika philosopher might go in developing
a theory based on pure convention.

p. 326

If this were all Naagaarjuna had to say about his
philosophical statements, our problem would be
greatly simplified; but Naagaarjuna recognized that
the statement "All things are empty of intrinsic
nature" contains an added element of complexity. It
purports to convey a general truth about the nature
of things: all entities, without exception, are empty
of intrinsic nature. If the statement functions this
way, however, it raises a number of new difficulties.
We might ask, in particular, whether the truth
conveyed in this statement has, in Naagaarjuna's
terminology, an intrinsic nature. If it does, it
renders the statement itself false. If it does not,
it is not clear what the statement is meant to convey
or how it is meant to convey it. Naagaarjuna actually
poses this question for himself in a somewhat
different form. He asks whether the statement "All
things are empty of intrinsic nature" asserts
anything, and if not, what it is understood to do.
His explanation is the following:

[Vs. 29] If I made any assertion (pratij~naa), I
would be in error. But I make no assertion, thus I am
not in error,

[Commentary] If I made any assertion, then the
error you describe would be mine. But I make no
assertion. How can there be any assertion when all
things are empty, completely at peace and isolated by
nature.(10)

[Vs. 63] I do not negate anything, nor is there
anything to be negated. Therefore you slander me when
you say that I negate something. [Commentary] If I
negated something, what you say would be correct. But
I do not negate anything at all, for there is nothing
to be negated. Therefore, when all things are empty
and there are no negation and thing to be negated,
your statement is slanderous.

[Vs. 64] You may say that something that does not
exist can be negated without words. But in this case
[in our statement] speech simply makes known that it
does not exist; it does not negate it.

[Commentary] You may say, "Something that does
not exist can be negated without words; then what
point is there in your statement that all things lack
intrinsic nature?" We reply that our statement that
all things lack intrinsic nature does not cause all
things to have no intrinsic nature; it simply makes
known that things lack intrinsic nature. For example,
when Devadatta is not in the house, someone might
say, "Devadatta is in the house." Someone else might
then say to him, "He is not." That statement does not
create Devadatta's absence in the house, but only
makes known his absence in the house. Similarly, the
statement, "Things have no intrinsic nature." does
not create the absence of intrinsic nature; it only
makes known the absence of intrinsic nature.(11)

Naagaarjuna makes it quite clear here that his
statement should not be understood either as an
assertion (pratij~naa) or negation of any positive
entity. When pressed to give a positive account of
the function of his words, he again appeals to a
conventional example to show that, while they do not
assert anything, they still have significant effect.

The account of the function of language presented
in these passages is, of course only a small part of
Naagaarjuna's philosophy, but it can serve to call
attention to some of the basic features of his
method. First, we have noted that he proceeds only in
response to claims made by his opponents, and he

p. 327

refuses to be drawn by their arguments into making
positive assertions. In particular, he refuses to
accept the notion that the statement "All things are
empty of intrinsic nature" functions as an assertion
of any positive entity. Second, on the positive side,
he argues from conventional usage that the refusal to
accept either the intrinsic nature or the assertive
value of the statement in no way impairs its ability
to function effectively. His words do not assert
anything, but they do make known the absence of
intrinsic nature. In this way, Naagaarjuna drew the
outline of a Maadhyamika account of the function of
language. We will see that his successors had great
difficulty staying within its limits.

In the four centuries that intervened between
Naagaarjuna (circa 150 A.D.) and the next Maadhyamika
philosopher we will consider, Bhaavaviveka (500-570
A.D.) , Indian philosophy underwent a remarkable
expansion. The basic texts of the Hindu schools were
settled and provided with commentaries, and the
earlier dominance of Maadhyamika among the Mahayana
Buddhist schools came to be challenged by a school of
Buddhist idealists and logicians. In the face of this
widening doctrinal diversity, Bhaavaviveka seems to
have been by temperament and training particularly
prey to the attraction of other philosophical
opinions. He was apparently a brahman and retained a
fondness for the diversity of brahmanical learning,
from alchemy and palmistry to Advaita Vedaanta, long
after his conversion to Buddhism and the
philosophical method of Naagaarjuna.(12) A basic
motivating impulse in his philosophy, in fact, seems
to be the need he felt to reestablish Maadhyamika
philosophy in a form that would allow room for the
variety of conventional learning. Apart from matters
of temperament, however, there were good logical
reasons to reassess Naagaarjuna's handling of some
basic questions. The rules of logical debate recorded
in the Nyaaya-suutras seem to have evolved after
Naagaarjuna and partly in response to his methods.
This seems particularly evident in the definition of
an unacceptable form of reasoning known as vita.n.daa
or "cavilling." Nyaaya-suutra 1.2.3 defines this as
"that [sophistry (jaati) ] which lacks the
establishment of a counter-position."(13)
Naagaarjuna, as we have seen, avoided making a
positive assertion of anything and did not seem to be
concerned that this would violate the rules of
debate. Bhaavaviveka, on the other hand, makes a
conscious effort in at least two places in his work
to meet the objection that he is guilty of vita.n.daa
and show that it does not apply.(14) In chapter 3 of
the Tarkajvaalaa, for instance, he raises it as an
objection.

[Objection:] Because you do not establish your
own position (svapak.sa) , but only refute your
opponent's position (parapak.sa), are you not guilty
of vita.n.daa? [Reply:] Our position is "emptiness of
intrinsic nature" (svabhaava-`suunyataa); since this
is the nature of things, we are not guilty of
vita.n.daa.(15)

Bhaavaviveka manages to deal with the objection
but only at serious cost to the integrity of
Naagaarjuna's method. He is now willing to admit
something Naagarjuna fought hard to resist: he
accepts "emptiness of intrinsic nature" as

p. 328

a positive philosophical assertion. This change has
formidable significance for the development of the
Maadhyamika accounts of language. Bhaavaviveka's
reasons for making this move deserve careful
scrutiny.

Before we consider Bhaavaviveka's reasons,
however, we need to look again at another aspect of
Naagaarjuna's argument. We saw earlier that
Naagaarjuna took some pains to account for the way
the words of the sentence "All things are empty of
intrinsic nature" could express a significant truth
about the nature of things, even though the words
themselves were empty and the truth was not the
object of an assertion. Those familiar with
Maadhyamika philosophy will recognize this
distinction as the verbal form of the distinction
between two levels of truth. Naagaarjuna says more
about this distinction in his commentary on verse 28
of the Vigrahavyaavartani.

We do not say, "All things are empty," without
resorting to conventional truth (vyavahaara-satya) or
by rejecting conventional truth. For it is impossible
to teach the Dharma without recourse to conventional
truth. As we said [in the Maadhyamakakaarikaas]:
"Ultimate truth (paramaartha) cannot be taught
without resorting to conventional expressions
(vyavahaara) ; nirvana cannot be reached without
recourse to ultimate truth."(16)

The distinction between ultimate and conventional
truth has many implications for Naagaarjuna,
particularly in the realm of practical behavior (as
might be inferred from the conventional orientation
of a work like Naagaarjuna's Ratnaavali).(17) But in
the philosophical works, like his Vigrahavyaavartani,
Naagaarjuna develops the distinction in only a
limited way. We might understand ultimate and
conventional truth here simply as two sides of the
same verbal strategy. Ultimate truth (paramartha)
might be understood as that which the statement "All
things are empty," acting as a verbal expedient, is
meant to convey; but we must remember, of course,
that Naagaarjuna resisted any formulation that would
turn ultimate truth into the object of a positive
assertion. This account of the relation between
ultimate and conventional truth is simple and seems
to stay close to Naagaarjuna's didactic intent, which
was to call attention to the inadequacies and
misconceptions hidden in conventional expressions and
use them as a vehicle to realize the emptiness of
things. Bhaavaviveka took a somewhat more complicated
view of the matter.

As we have seen, Bhaavaviveka was inclined
temperamentally to include a large variety of
contemporary views and practices into `his
Maadhyamika system; he also wanted to make room for
the possibility of positive philosophical assertions.
Both these goals would have been hard to realize if
he had closely followed Naagaarjuna's method, with
its concentration on conventional truth only as a
vehicle for the expression of ultimate truth.
Bhaavaviveka needed a new form of interpretation, and
he found it in a new grammatical analysis of the term
paramaartha, "ultimate truth." He interpreted
paramaartha not as ultimate truth itself but as
knowledge of ultimate truth.(18) In is way he was
able to change paramaartha from the content of
teaching, which Naagaarjuna

p. 329

discussed purely in linguistic terms, to a realm of
experience that could be severed from vyavahaara,
conventional truth. Paramaartha and vyavahaara could
thus be separated into two realms of existence, each
of which had practices and doctrines appropriate only
to it. The two were still connected, but less in the
lingustic way that Naagaarjuna outlined in the
Vigrahavyaavartanii than in a temporal and causal
way, representing a slow progression from one level
to another along the stages of the bodhisattva path.
Bhaavaviveka explains this process in the third
chapter of the Tarkajvaalaa.

[Vss. 10-11] Ultimate wisdom effects the complete
negation of the network of conceptual thought and is
motionless moving in the clear sky of ultimate truth
(tattva), which is peaceful, directly experienced,
without concepts or letters, and free from unity and
diversity.

[Vss. 12-13] It is impossible to mount the pinnacle
of the palace of truth without the ladder of
conventional truth. For this reason, the mind,
isolated in conventional truth, should become clear
about the particular and general characteristics of
things.(19)

Bhaavaviveka did not consider the process of
climbing through conventional truth to be either easy
or quick, as he says in his commentary on these
verses. "It is impossible to climb this palace
suddenly. For without ascending the ladder of
conventional knowledge for seven countless eons, the
completion of the perfections, powers, and
super-knowledges is impossible."(20) Progress along
the path could be quite leisurely and there was much
time along the way to enjoy the subtleties of the
conventional world.(21)

By separating paramaartha and vyavahaara into two
different realms of experience in this way, linked
only by a gradual progress along the path to
perfection, Bhaavaviveka succeeded in the first part
of his program. He created a realm of experience in
which he could concentrate on the subjects of the
conventional world that caught his interest, without
having to worry at every moment about applying
Naagaarjuna's critique. That part of the Maadhyamika
method belonged to the realm of ultimate truth and
could be postponed indefinitely while one considered
problems in the mundane realm. Bhaavaviveka's
fascination with this realm had important
consequences for historians of Indian philosophy; his
diligence in collecting the details of other
philosophical systems provided important evidence for
the development of some of the Indian schools.(22)
But what was the cost of this rehabilitation of
conventional truth? Naagaarjuna achieved great power
and simplicity in his philosophical method by
treating every question rigorously, as if it were an
ultimate question. In doing this he showed that there
were no areas of existence that were not subject to
the corrosive effect of his critique. By separating a
particular realm in which this critique, for
practical purposes, did not apply, Bhaavaviveka
appears to have damaged the unity of Naagaarjuna's
method and engaged in a subtle absolutizing process
in which conventional truths are again established in
their own right, The full consequences of this
process will not be seen until

p. 330

we consider the efforts by Tso^n-kha-pa and
Candrakiirti to explore its im- plications, but at
least one problem will be apparent when we examine
Bh~vavi-veka's treatment of his second philosophical
concern, the fashioning of positive philosophical
assertions.

We saw earlier that Bhaavaviveka was troubled by
the accusation that he, as a Maadhyamika philosopher,
was guilty of vita.n.daa. Now that we have seen
Bhaavaviveka's method for separating the two levels
of truth, we are in a position to examine the
justification for his peculiar response to this
charge. As we saw, Bhaavaviveka responded by saying
that he, in fact, did maintain a positive position of
his own, namely, the emptiness of all things. In the
scheme of Bhaavaviveka's separation of the two levels
of truth, this claim would be quite reasonable if
confined only to the first level; for it was on the
conventional level that Bhaavaviveka permitted
himself the liberty of investigation into the maze of
worldly knowledge. The difficulty is, however, that
Bhaavaviveka eventually must bring himself, as a
Maadhyamika philosopher, to discuss ultimate truth.
This presents him with a dilemma. Does he continue to
make his positive assertions into the realm of
ultimate, nonconceptual knowledge, or does he confine
his assertions to the conventional realm and again
risk the charge of being guilty of vita.n.daa--this
time on the matters of greatest importance to his
philosophical school? If we look in both of
Bhaavaviveka's major works, the Tarkajvaalaa and
Praj~naapradiipa, we find that he takes a rather
ambivalent position on this question.

In the Praj~naapradiipa, he was writing a
commentary on Naagaarjuna's root text, and this fact
alone seems to have restrained Bhaavaviveka in his
treatment of assertions at the ultimate level. The
particular passage of interest on this point is the
commentary on verse 18: 9 in which Naagaarjuna
purports to give a "definition" of ultimate truth.
Bhaavaviveka uses this as an opportunity to deal
again with the question of vita.n.daa.

[Objection:] If you think that ultimate truth
(tattva) can be realized by completely rejecting the
intrinsic nature of things which others conceptually
construct, then you must state a definition of it.
Otherwise you are refuting someone's position without
establishing your own; and that is vita.n.daa.

[Reply:] If the definition of ultimate truth can
be expressed, it should be expressed. But it is not
an object to be expressed (abhidheya). However, in
order to give confidence to those who are just
beginning, the following is said in terms of
conceptual, discriminative knowledge.

[Vs. 18: 9] Not caused by anything else,
peaceful, not expressed by verbal diversity,
non-conceptual, not diverse in meaning--this is the
definition of ultimate truth (tattva).

[Commentary] Since it is non-conceptual, it is
not expressed by verbal diversity. Since it not
expressed by verbal diversity, it is in the sphere of
non-conceptual knowledge. Since it is in the sphere
of non-conceptual knowledge, it is not known by means
of anything else. Words do not apply to something
that is not known by means of anything else. For this
reason, the nature of ultimate truth completely
surpasses words. It cannot be an object to be
expressed, but the statement which negates both the
intrinsic nature and the specific character-

p. 331

istics of all things can make known the nature of
ultimate truth. It [the statement] is produced by a
superimposition of syllables which conform to the
nonconceptual knowledge produced by the method of
non-production. Therefore, since ultimate truth.
which is actually directly known (svasamvedya), is
taught here in an expedient way way
(upaaya-dvaare.na) , we do, in fact, express a
definition of ultimate truth. Thus we are not
guilty of vita.n.daa, and your criticism does not
apply.(23)

Here, with some equivocation, Bhaavaviveka
manages to stay close to Naagaarjuna. He admits that
ultimate truth (tattva) cannot be directly expressed,
but he says that one can, as an expedient, appear to
give a definition of it. This, in his opinion, is
enough to rebut the charge of vita.n.daa.

In the third chapter of the Tarkajvaalaa, where
he lays out his own independent philosophical
position, Bhaavaviveka allows himself more liberty
with Naagaarjuna's method. In this chapter he
formulates some of the more characteristic elements
of his own technique by considering a series of
objections to a syllogism of the type
(svarantra-anuma~na) for which his school of
Maadhyamika Svaatantrika is named. The example he
uses is a syllogism denying the intrinsic nature of
the gross elements. We can formulate the syllogism in
four steps:

(1) earth, and so on.
(2) do not have the intrinsic nature of elements,
from the point of view of ultimate truth
(paramaarthata.h),
(3) because they are produced,
(4) like consciousness.

Steps 1 and 2 constitute the assertion
(pratij~na) which Bhaavaviveka uses to deal with the
accusation that he is guilty of vita.n.da. Step 2,
however, raises another difficult question. As the
syllogism is formulated in this example, the con-
clusion belongs not to the realm of conventional
truth, where words and concepts are appropriate,
but to the realm of ultimate truth. How, then, can
Bhaavaviveka allow himself to carry on conceptual
thought in the ultimate realm? He deals with this
problem in the following surprising way:

[Objection: ] Paramaartha transcends all
[conceptual] thought. and a negation of the intrinsic
nature of things is in the domain of language. For
this reason your negation fails.

[Reply:] Paramaartha occurs in two forms. One of
them is free from volition, transcendent, pure, and
free from verbal diversity. The other is volitional,
accords with the accumulation of knowledge and merit,
clear, and possessed of the verbal diversity known as
"worldly knowledge."24

Bhaavaviveka's interpretation of the word
paramaartha allows him to do something that he did
not permit himself with the word tattva in the
passage just quoted from the Praj~naapradiipa. He
interprets paramaartha as a compound meaning
"knowledge of ultimate truth." This allowed him
earlier to separate it from the experience of
conventional truth; here it allows him to separate it
into two different levels of experience of the same
thing. One level is free from verbal diversity; the
other is not. In this way, Bhaavaviveka can maintain

p. 332

that, while ultimate truth (tattva) is one, the
knowledge of ultimate truth (paramaartha) is not. The
resulting distinction in levels of experience allows
him to carry on positive philosophical activity at
the "ultimate" level without being concerned about
the fact that such activity involves words and
concepts. Bhaavaviveka's analysis of the word
paramaartha is thus a powerful tool in allowing him
to carry out his philosophical program. He can
maintain nominal adherence to the written text of
Naagaarjuna's Kaarikaas and still permit himself to
make positive philosophical assertions up to and
within the realm of ultimate truth.

Bhaavaviveka can claim a certain amount of
success in adapting Naagaarjuna's method to the
requirements of his own philosophical milieu. He gave
up Naagaarjuna's prohibition against positive
assertions, but he might well claim that this was a
minor sacrifice made to keep the rest of
Naagaarjuna's critique intact. A more damaging charge
against Bhaavaviveka. however, might be that he
violated the serious and fundamental prohibition
against attributing intrinsic nature either to the
words of a statement or to the things to which they
refer. Bhaavaviveka did not discuss this point
explicitly in either the Tarkajvaalaa or the
Praj~naapradiipa on anything other than the ultimate
level; perhaps he was not aware that it would be an
issue. In any case, it is sufficient for our purposes
in tracing the development of the early theories of
language to know that a substantial portion of the
Maadhyamika tradition did consider Bhaavaviveka
guilty of this more serious charge. Candrakiirti and
Tso^n-kha-pa both felt that, by establishing
conventional truth as an independent realm,
Bhaavaviveka had violated the most fundamental point
of Naagaarjuna's method -- he had refuted intrinsic
nature on the ultimate level, only to let it back
into his account of language on the conventional
level.

In sorting out Candrakiirti's arguments against
Bhaavaviveka's view of language, we are critically
dependent on Tso^n-kha-pa's analysis of the issues
between them. In the key passage in the
Prasannapadaa, where he attacks the use of
svalak.sa.na or "intrinsic identity" on the
conventional level, Candrakiirti fails to identify
his opponent. This has led Western interpreters to
the quite reasonable supposition that the opponent
Candrakiirti had in mind was not Bhaavaviveka, who
does not explicitly develop svalak.sa.na as a
substratum for his use of language, but the Buddhist
logicians who do.(25) In the Legs-b`sad-s~ni^n-po,
however, Tso^n-kha-pa argues on the basis of certain
passages in the Praj~naapradiipa that Bhaavaviveka
made a tacit assumption of svalak.sa.na on the
conventional leve1.(26) Candrakiirti actually attacks
the common idea that language requires a realistic
basis in the world to function effectively. It would
not be unreasonable to assume that the argument is
meant to oppose any Buddhist who thinks he can
analyze language on a conventional level and find any
more substantial reality behind it than he does at
the ultimate level. That way of thinking is normally
associated in Buddhist philosophy with schools like
the Vaibhaa.sikas or logicians who attempted in
varying degrees

p. 333

to give a realistic account of language, but
Bhaavaviveka evidently slipped into this pattern as
well when he distinguished so sharply between the two
levels of truth. On the ultimate level, he maintained
the emptiness of all things --although, as we have
seen, he still permitted himself some freedom in
making ultimate assertions--but on the conventional
level he allowed language to function in the manner
accepted by the other schools. Tso^n-kha-pa explains
how widespread he thought this pattern to be.

What way of thinking assumes that things are
established by intrinsic nature (svalak.sana)? First,
let us speak of the method of the philosophers. In an
expression like, "Ths person performed an action and
experienced the result," they investigate the meaning
of the term "person" (pudgala) by asking whether this
person is the same as his aggregates (skandhas) or
different. In either case, whether he is the same or
different, they can establish the person as the
accumulator of karma, and so forth. If he cannot be
established as either one, then they are not content
with "person" as a mere term. In ths way, when the
person is established by an investigation into that
to which the term refers, the person is established
by intrinsic identity. All Buddhist philosophers from
Vaibhaa.sikas to Svaatantrikas hold this view.(27)

The issue between Candrakiirti and Bhaavaviveka,
then, as Tso^n-kha-pa sees it, is whether it is
necessary to reintroduce an element of semantic
realism into the conventional realm to anchor the use
of language. Candrakiirti contends that this is
impossible.

The argument between Candrakiirti and the
semantic realists, among whom Tso^n-kha-pa includes
Bhaavaviveka, hinges on whether it is acceptable in
conventional usage to make statements involving a
svalak.sa.na or "intrinsic identity" underlying the
ordinary use of language. Candrakiirti starts by
having the opponent cite examples in an attempt to
claim conventional justification for statements of
this sort. The opponent says that a statement of the
form, "Hardness is the intrinsic identity of earth,"
is acceptable, even though the intrinsic identity is
identical with the earth, because similar expressions
are part of conventional usage. For example, one can
say, "the body of a statue" or "the head of Raahu,"
when the body is no different from the statue, and
Raahu, a demon who has no body, is no different from
his head. Candrakiirti puts the opponent's argument
this way:

Even so, even though there is no qualifier
(vi`se.sa.na) apart from the body and head [which are
qualified] in the cases, "body of a statue" or "head
of Raahu," there is still a relationship of qualifier
and qualified. Similarly, we can say "intrinsic
identity of earth" even though there is no earth
apart from its intrinsic identity.

Candrakiirti replies:

This is not so, because the cases are not
similar. When the words "body" and "head" normally
occur in grammatical connection with companion
entities like "hand" or "mind," the thought produced
on the basis of the words "body"

p. 334

and "head" alone carries an expectation of the
companion entities in the form, "Whose body?" and
"Whose head?" Then it is reasonable for someone else,
who wants to rule out a connection with a qualifier,
to deny such an expectation by using the qualifiers
"statue" and "Raahu" in a conventional way. But when
earth is impossible apart from hardness, a
relationship of qualifier and qualified is
impossible.... Furthermore, the terms "statue" and
"Raahu," which are the qualifiers, actually exist as
part of conventional usage, and are accepted without
analysis, as in the conventional designation
"person." Therefore your example is incorrect.(28)

There are actually two arguments here, one of
which is somewhat stronger than the other.
Candrakiirti says first that it is acceptable to
qualify one word with a word that refers to the same
thing only when there is some possibility of doubt
about the fact that they are identical. There can be
no doubt, however, that the intrinsic identity is the
same as the earth; they are the same by definition.
To say "intrinsic identity of earth," then, is to
violate conventional usage by using the two terms in
a grammatical connection that is appropriate only if
there is the possibility that they refer to different
things. The second argument is stronger. In this
Candrakiirti says simply that "intrinsic identity"
itself is an unacceptable term. It is a technical
term masquerading as an ordinary word, and it is thus
unacceptable as part of conventional usage in any
grammatical connection at all.

Candrakiirti's argument is most interesting,
perhaps, when he gives his own account of the way
language functions on the conventional level. He
insists, as Naagaarjuna did, that he does not attempt
to destroy the structure of ordinary language, as a
semantic realist might suppose, but only to
reestablish language on the proper grounds, that is,
on pure convention. Candrakiirti outlines this theory
in a reply to the further objection that, if his
argument is correct, the expression "head of Raahu"
can actually be no more acceptable than "intrinsic
identity of earth," since, in both cases, when the
objects referred are analyzed, they are found to be
identical. His reply is that the matter of
"analysis" (vicaara) is precisely what distinguishes
ultimate from conventional truth. Conventional truth
is only established unanalytically. When conventional
terms are examined to find their true reference, they
are no longer used conventionally. He explains this
in the following passage:

[Objection:] The examples are correct, because only
the body [of the statue] and the head [of Raahu] are
actually cognized, since no other entities exist
apart from them.

[Reply:] This is not the case; for such analysis is
not carried out in conventional usage, and without
such analysis, conventional entities exist. When the
aatman is analyzed as to whether it is different from
[or the same as] matter, etc., it is not possible.
But it does exist conventionally (loka-sa.mv.rtyaa)
with reference to the skandhas. The same is true of
Raahu and the statue: Thus the example is not
established. Likewise, in the case of earth, etc.,
after analysis, there is nothing to be qualified that
is different from hardness, etc. [which are the
qualifiers], and a qualifier without something to be
qualified is groundless. Even so, the masters have
maintained that they exist in mutual dependence

p. 335

(parasparaapek.saa siddhi.h) as purely conventional.
This must be accepted in just this way. Otherwise,
the conventional could not reasonably be
distinguished. It would become ultimate truth
(tattva), not conventional.(29)

The last few lines of this passage show what, in
Tso^n-kha-pa's view, was the real point of dispute
between Candrakiirti and Bhaavaviveka. On one level,
it is a dispute over language, but one does not have
to go far beneath the surface to find the troublesome
issue of two levels of truth. Candrakiirti argues
here that the attempt to establish an independent
conventional realm, in which it is possible to carry
out constructive philosophical reasoning, involves a
misunderstanding of the distinction between the two
levels. To give substantial reality to the
conventional level, even with the laudable intention
of promoting philosophical debate, was to transform
it into a false ultimate. It was also to
misunderstand the point of the discussion about
language. To Candrakiirti it was unnecessary to find
some substantial reality to which words could refer
to acquire their meaning. It was necessary only that
they be used the way they are. Whatever meaning they
had was acquired by a process of mutual dependence
(parasparaapek.saa siddhi), with one word depending
for its meaning on the network of those that were
used before it. In Candrakiirti's view, the move that
Bhaavaviveka made on the conventional level was the
one that led other Indian philosophers into trouble.
It was an attempt to make the technical terms of
philosophy into more than conceptual constructions.

The development of the different accounts of
language in early Maadhyamika philosophy is a
complicated process, involving steps over which
individual philosophers often strongly disagreed.
Rather than be deterred by this diversity, however,
we should accept it as a challenge to greater efforts
of understanding. There are still formidable problems
to be solved by both historians and comparativists.
The peculiar methods of Bhaavaviveka, for instance,
need much more thorough study before we can
accurately assess his relation to Candrakiirti and
the Praasa^ngika school that has so dominated Western
interpretations of Maadhyamika. Maadhyamika
philosophy was not monolithic. A greater historical
sophistication in understanding the differences
between philosophers is an essential element, not
only in understanding the philosophers themselves,
but in developing true conceptual precision in the
act of comparison.

NOTES

1. This article is the revised version of a paper
first presented at a workshop of the Society for
Asian and Comparative Philosophy of the American
Philosophical Association, Boston, December 28,
1976.
2. Two particularly useful examples of this kind of
study are: Jacques May, "La philosophie bouddhique
de la vacuite, " Studia Philosophica 18
(1958):123-137; Jan de Jong, "The Problem of the
Absolute in the Madhyamaka School." Journal of
Indian Philosophy 2 (1972): 1-6.

p. 336

3. My use of the phrase "early Maadhyamika" is, of
course, somewhat arbitrary. In this article, I
will use it to refer to the period in which the
major differences between competing subschools
were first formulated. This covers the period
from the time of Naagaarjuna in the second
century A.D. to Candrakiirti in the late sixth or
early seventh.

4. The bibliography of Western translations of the
works of Naagaarjuna and Candrakiirti is well
known and need not be recited here. The available
works of Buddhapaalita and Bhaavaviveka are
perhaps less well known. A partial translation of
chapter 2 of Buddhapaalita's commentary on
Naagaarjuna's Madhyamakakaarikaas is available
in, Musashi Tachikawa, "A Study of
Buddhapaalita's Muulamaadhyamakv.rtti, (1) ."
Bulletin of the Faculty of Letters of Nagoya
University 63 (1974) : 1-19. Chapter 1 of
Bhaavaviveka's Praj~naapradiipa is available in,
Yuichi Kajiyama, "Bhaavaviveka's
Praj~naapradiipa. (1. Kapitel) , " Wiener
Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud- und Ostasiens 7
(1963):37-62 and 8 (1964): 100-130. Portions of
Bhaavaviveka's Maadhyamakah.rydayakaarikaas
(verses) and Tarkajvaalaa (commentary) have been
translated in, V. V. Gokhale, "The Second Chapter
of Bhavya's Maadhyamakah.rdaya (Taking the Vow of
an Ascetic)," Indo-Iranian Journal 14 (1972):
40-45: V. V. Gokhale, "Masters of Buddhism Adore
the Brahman Through Nonadoration' (Bhavya,
Madhyamakah.rdaya, III)," Indo-lranian Journal 5
(1961-1962) : 271-275; V. V. Gokhale, "The
Vedaanta Philosophy Described by Bhavya in His
Madhyamakah.rdaya, " Indo-Iranian Journal 2
(1958): 165-180; Andre Bareau, "Trois traites sur
les sectes bouddhiques, He partie." Journal
Asiatique 244 (1950):167-199; Shotaro Iida, An
Introduction to Svaatantrika Maadhyamika,
University of Wisconsin Ph.D. dissertation (Ann
Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1968);
hereafter cited as Iida, dissertation.

5. See particularly Naagaarjuna's
Maadhyamakakaarikaas 24: 8-101 found in Louis de
la Vallee Poussin, ed., Muulamaadhyamakakaarikaas
(Madhyamaka Suutras) de Naagaarjuna avec la
Prasannapadaa Commentaire de Candrakiirti,
Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. 4 (St. Petersburg,
1913) , pp. 492-494; hereafter cited as
Prasannapadaa.

6. E. H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst, eds., "The
Vigrahavyaavartanii of Naagaarjuna with the
Author's Commentary, " Melanges chinois et
bouddhique 9 (1948-1952):108; hereafter cited as
Vigrahavyaavartani.
7. Vigrahavyaavartanii, p. 108 (translations are
mine unless otherwise noted).
8. Vigrahavyaavartanii, p. 115.
9. Vigrahavyaavartanii, p. 122.
10. Vigrahavyaavartanii, p. 127.
11. Vigrahavyaavartanii, pp. 145-147.
12. Iida, dissertation, p. 86.
13. Nyaaya-suutra 1.2.3: sa pratipak.sa-.sthaapanaa-
hino vita.n.daa. The text
of this suutra with commentaries can be found in
Anantalal Thakur, ed., Nyaayadar`sana of Gautama,
Mithila Institute Series, Ancient Text No. 20,
vol. 1 (Darbhanga, 1967), p. 628. There has been
disagreement over whether the Maadhyamikas were
actually accused of vita.n.daa. In a recent
article ("Maadhyamika et Vaita.n.dika," Journal
Asiatique 263 [1975]: 99-102) , Kamaleswar
Bhattacharya argues that Maadhyamikas were not
guilty of vita.n.daa according to the strict
definition of the term given by the Nyaaya
commentators. Uddyotakaara, for instance,
explains that vita.n.daa means the absence of
proof (sthaapanaa) of a counterposition rather
than absence of the counterposition itself. In
his replies to the accusation of vita.n.daa,
however, Bhaavaviveka does not differentiate
between sthaapanaa and pratipak.sa in the subtle
manner favored by the later commentators. He
thought the charge sufficiently applicable to his
Maadhyamika method to require serious refutation.
14. See notes 15 and 23 herein.
15. Tibetan text in Iida, dissertation, pp. 109-110
(translation mine unless otherwise noted).
16. Vigrahavyaavartani, p. 127.
17. Giuseppe Tucci, "The Ratnaavalii of Naagaarjuna,"
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, (1934).
18. Bhaavaviveka gives his grammatical analysis of
the term paramaartha in both the Tarkajvaalaa and
the Praj~naapradiipa. The appropriate passage
from the Tarkajvaalaa is available in Iida,
dissertation, pp. 101-102. The following is a
translation of a similar analysis from chapter 24
of the Praj~naapradiipa. "Paramaartha is the
'supreme object' [karmadhaaraya compound] because
it is both supreme (parama) and an object
(artha). Or it is the `object of the supreme'
[tatpuru.sa compound] because it is the object of
supreme, non-conceptual knowledge. It is defined
as `not realizable

p. 337

through anything else.' Because paramaartha is
true, it is `ultimate truth' (paramaartha-satya),
and it always, in every way, remains the same.
Non-conceptual knowledge, which possesses that as
its object by the method of having no object
(vi.sayaabhaavanayena) , is also paramaartha
because it is `that whose object is ultimate'
[bahuvriihi compound]." Tibetan text in Daisetz
T. Suzuki, ed., The Tibetan Tripitaka: Peking
Edition (Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research
Institute, 1957), vol. 95, p. 246 (folio Tsha
286a-b); hereafter cited as Peking Tripitaka.
19. Sanskrit text in Iida, dissertation, pp. 82-83.
20. Tibetan text in Iida, dissertation, p. 84.
21. As Bhavaviveka explains in the Tarkajvaalaa, these
subtleties included: "grammar (ak.sara`saastra),
palmistry (mudraa), alchemy (?), medical science
(cikitsaa) , arithmetic (ga.nanaa) , charms
(mantra) , spells (vidyaa) , etc." (Iida's
translation, dissertation, p. 86).
22. This is particularly true for Vedaanta, where
little other evidence is available from this
early period, and for the eighteen schools of
Nikaaya Buddhism. See V. V. Gokhale, "The
Vedaanta Philosophy Described by Bhavya in His
Madhyamakah.rdaya, " Indo-Iranian Journal 2
(1958): 165-180; Andre Bareau, "Trois traites sur
les sectes bouddhiques, IIe partie, " Journal
Asiatique 244 (1950):167-199.
23. Peking Tripitaka, vol. 95, p. 227 (folio Tsha
237a-b).
24. Tibetan text in Iida, dissertation, pp. 107-108.
25. Th. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist
Nirvaa.na (Leningrad, 1927), pp. 149-156.
26. Tso^n-kha-pa, Dra^n-^nes-legs-b`sad-s~ni^n-po
(Varanasi: Gelugpa Students' Welfare Committee,
1973). In all my observations about Tso^n-kha-pa,
I am indebted to Acarya T. T. Doboom Tulku, who
first read this text with me, and to Professor
Robert A. F. Thurman, who kindly made available
his unpublished translation.
27. Legs-b`sad-s~ni^n-po, p. 143.
28. Prasannapadaa, p. 66.
29. Prasannapadaa, p. 67.