B-SERIES TEMPORAL ORDER IN DOGENS THEORY OF TIME

·期刊原文

B-SERIES TEMPORAL ORDER IN DOGEN'S THEORY OF TIME

By Dirck Vorenkamp

Philosophy East and West

Volume 45, Number 3

1995 July

P.387-408

(C) by University of Hawaii Press

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

P.387

J.M.E. McTaggart's controversial argument against
the reality of time has prompted many
counterarguments since it was first published in
1908. Richard Gale says that the responses to
McTaggart are in agreement with either the so-called
"A," "B," or "Either/or" theories of time.(1) Each
of these theories is based on the idea that time is
either "dynamic" or "static" (and only dynamic or
static). If this is true, then as a group they
exhaust all possible ways to conceive of time, and
any theory of time must include elements of one or
more of the three responses to McTaggart.

Given the arguments above, and the fact that
Dogen also wrote about the nature of time, one is
led to the question, "Do Dogen's views of time fall
anywhere within the "A-theory, " "B-theory," or
"Either/or-theory" responses to McTaggart"? Because
the question is too broad, as stated, for a work of
this length, I propose to examine Dogen's teachings
in light of the "B-theory" response to McTaggart.

This essay will show that Dogen's views on time
do contain elements of each of the four main tenets
of the B-theory. Furthermore, in pointing out these
aspects of his thought, we will find that the
assumption of consistency that has characterized
modern interpretations of Dogen's view of time
requires reevaluation. In order to show why this is
true, we will briefly examine McTaggart's original
argument, and then summarize each of the four main
tenets of the B-theory while asking whether or not
Dogen's theory of time reflects similar ideas.

The term "B-theory" is defined according to the
synopsis of the B-theorist's positions provided by
Richard Gale.(2) The details of that definition will
follow shortly. As for the phrase "Dogen's theory of
time," it is defined as those teachings found in the
Shobogenzo that deal with the concepts of uji, hoi,
and/or nikon. Each of these three terms will in turn
be defined before they are used to support a
conclusion.(3)

McTaggart's Argument

In order to understand the B-theory, it is
necessary to summarize McTaggart's original
argument. First published in 1908, McTaggart's work
argues that time is unreal.(4) The argument starts
by establishing two basic aspects of time. The first
aspect is associated with the dynamic flux called
time's passage, and with our tensed ways of both
conceiving and speaking of time. According to this
way of viewing time, things are said to exist in the
future, then become present, and finally enter the
past. It is this mode of time wherein the future and
past are said to differ ontologically. McTaggart
calls this aspect of time the A-series.(5)

P.388

Yet, time also seems to have a static order or
structure. Even if events do pass from future to
present to past, they do so with an order that never
seems to change. That order is the relationship
between "earlier than" and "later than."(6) The
"earlier than/later than" relationship is tenseless,
for the statement that an event is earlier than
another is not dependent upon the particular
temporal frame of reference from which it issues.
Here, the emphasis is on time as a set of relative
relationships. Such relations, if they could be
viewed from a position outside time, would present a
pattern of things and times laid out like a mosaic.
Even though Crunbaum holds that such a pattern does
not necessarily constitute the hypostatization of
time, it is nevertheless fixed as regards the
temporal relationships between the individual
components.(7) McTaggart called this the
B-series.(8)

The issue at the heart of McTaggart's work is
how these two ways of conceiving of time can be
related to one another. McTaggart first states that
events cannot undergo changes in their B-relations.
Dogen's birth is earlier than mine, and that is a
tenseless fact that will not change. Accordingly,
the only changes that an event can undergo are
A-series changes in which the event changes from
future to present to past.(9)

McTaggart then argues for the unreality of the
A-series based upon the notion that, assuming there
are no first or last events in the series, then
every event must simultaneously share the mutually
incompatible attributes of future, present, and
past.(10) For example, in the year 1980, the year
1981 was the present-future. Such a state is
contradictory and, therefore, according to
McTaggart, unreal.

To claim, however, that any event has only one
of these attributes at a given time and
successively, that is, that an event X was future,
is present, and will be past, invokes an infinite
regress. According to McTaggart, such a statement
means that at a past time, event X was future, and
at a future time it will be past.(11) It is true
that the first contradiction has been explained
away, but only by creating a second-level temporal
order within which the first order must exist. The
statements that event X is, was, or will be some
particular tense itself relies upon a tense for
comprehension. Assuming that the goal is to prevent
incompatible tense overlaps, then the second order
itself must be related to a "higher"-level order
just as the first is related to the second. At no
point are we freed from this necessity, and so the
regress is infinite.(12) McTaggart therefore
concludes that the tenses are logically incompatible
and that the A-series is unreal.

Since McTaggart holds that "real time" needs
both the A-series and B-series to exist, he
concludes that "real time" must be nonexistent. This
conclusion rests upon the notion that A-relations
are more basic than B-relations because (1) all
B-relations can be reduced to A-series relations
with no loss of meaning, and (2) the same is not
true in reverse. Once

P.389

McTaggart has demonstrated that the A-series is
unreal, then it follows that the B-series is unreal,
and so, too, "real time" itself.(13)

As previously stated, philosophers have taken
three approaches to answer McTaggart. The so-called
B-theory is one such answer. Richard Gale states
that there are four basic tenets that constitute the
B-theory.(14) They are:

(1) The A-series is reducible to the B-series
with no loss of meaning.
(2) The passage of time, or "temporal becoming"
is psychological since it necessarily
involves a B-relation to a perceiving
subject.
(3) All events are equally real; hence the
B-series is objective.
(4) Change is understandable in terms of
B-relations alone.

While analyzing these statements according to
the summary that Gale has provided, we can ask
whether these tenets, or parts of of them, are found
anywhere in Dogen's view of time.

The First Tenet of B-theory and Dogen's View of
Language

Concerning the first tenet, B-theorists claim
that the tenses past, present, and future do not
refer to ontological times, but are actually
relative to events and/or event expressions for
their meaning.(15) The terms "is past, " "is
present," and "is future" are actually "tenseless
two-place predicates" that take as their ground some
event or expression.(16) For example, the phrase "is
past"--as in "1980 is past"--actually means "1980 is
past at some other time." It is correct, then, for
me to say in 1988 that "1980 is past," but the same
sentence is false in 1978. Hence, argue B-theorists,
the futurity, presentness, or pastness of an event
is not an ontological fact, but only an expression
of that event's relationship to another event or
expression. That two-place relationship is a
tenseless truth that holds for all times and frames
of reference from which it might be uttered.
Regardless, for example, of the year in which I make
the statement, it is, and always will be true that
1980 is past at 1988. In light of this, B-theorists
say that B-statements are more fundamental than
A-statements and that all A-statements can be
"reduced" without loss of meaning to B-statements.

According to Gale, B-theorists use two primary
methods of reducing A-statements to B-statements.
The first is the so-called psychological reduction,
and this will be considered shortly. The second is
the linguistic reduction.(17)

The linguistic reduction claims that statements
asserting an event's tense are relative to the
speaker since they necessarily indicate and rely
upon the speaker's temporal relationship to the
reported event.(18) Such statements are said to be
"token-reflexive" because the statement "1980 is
past" actually means "1980 is past relative to this
utterance (token)." An important point to notice in
the modified (i.e., "reduced") statement is that it
makes no mention of the current temporal status of
the token-

P.390

reflexive. That is why B-theorists claim that the
reduced statement is timelessly, or tenselessly,
true and freely repeatable.(19) B-theorists who use
this method claim that the sole purpose of A-series
statements is to express a B-series relation between
the expressed event and the utterance (token).(20)
Does Dogen ever utilize a similar reduction?

Certainly Ddgen never spoke of "reduced A-series
relations." But, did he "reduce" events to
linguistic expressions in order to recognize
language itself as a "reflexive" vehicle referring
to uji?(21) When we examine Dogen's statements about
the nature of language and words, a type of implicit
token-reflexive argument is apparent.

First, on the nature of words, Dogen had this
to say:

If the Buddha's speech is shallow, turning the
flower must also be shallow. If the Buddha's
speech is only letters and sounds, that is not
the words of learning the Buddha Dharma.
Although it is known that speech is letters and
sounds, it is not known that to the Buddha it is
not just letters and sounds.(22)

... if it [enlightenment] is not speech, you
cannot realize the Buddha's progress....
Therefore, when speech is manifested, that
itself is the Buddha's progress.(23)

The Dharma-nature spoken of by Baso is the
Dharma-nature speaking the Dharma-nature.(24)

and also:

The capability to suggest that beings who do not
leave the Dharma-nature are not the
Dharma-nature may even accomplish something. It
is three or four new levels of Dharma-nature.
Speaking, answering, using, and acting as if it
is not the Dharma-nature must be the
Dharma-nature.(25)

What we see in all these quotations is that
Dogen does not just conceive of language as merely a
verbal representation of some other feature of
reality. Language is not purely symbolic of what we
think and perceive and hence has some separate
existence from these thoughts and perceptions. For
Dogen, language has another level of meaning.

At the secondary level, words are nothing except
what they express. As Dogen said, even "the nature
of things spoken of by Baso is the nature of things
spoken of by the nature of things." Dogen emphasizes
the importance of speech and words because he
understands them as the Buddha-nature itself.(26)
Accordingly, the dualism that characterizes our
general notions of the relationship between
expression events and the expressed event is absent
in his view--as he states above, "there are no mere
words with the Buddha." If it is appropriate to
apply this expanded definition to the term
"reduction," then Dogen can be said to claim that
all reality is "token-reflexive."

Note, though, that this claim does not entail
the assertion that Dogen is giving special status to
linguistic expressions. In fact, quite the contrary

P.391

is true. The point is that linguistic expressions
are no more nor less privileged than any other
aspect of being-time.(27) Given the
interrelationships between dharma-positions as
elements of being-time (which will be discussed
shortly), Dogen's insistence on including language
as a form of expression of the Buddha-nature is in
fact an affirmation of the token-reflexive nature of
that Buddha-nature.

Furthermore, since Dogen's concept of uji
clearly intertwines being and time, we can conclude
that this type of "token-reflexivity" means not
just that the past and future as concepts are
relative to a particular statement, but that tensed
and nontensed locutions are token-reflexive, because
the phrase itself must, in a sense, be the times to
which it refers. In other words, the expression
event's expression of past or future is exactly
where these tenses (i.e., past and future) are
found. The statement "1980 is past" exists at the
moment it is uttered, and in that statement must lie
the referenced event (i.e., "1980"), not merely as a
referent, but as a factual (i.e., actually existing
now) component of the event.

Of course this sounds fantastical to anyone
acquainted with modern Western language theory. But
Dogen's thought is grounded in the concept of
`suunyataa and specifically in the Hua-yen school's
elaboration of it.(28) Since linguistic expressions
are neither more nor less important than other
phenomena, there is, then, an interdependent
relationship between words and what they signify
precisely because both are expressions of the
Buddha-nature.

If, in Dogen's view, words are in fact what they
signify, then we can certainly say that not only are
A-series statements reducible to B-series statements
with no loss of meaning, but the act of the
reduction itself adds meaning to the "token" because
the token itself is then also seen as the
symbolized.

The Second Tenet of B-theory and Dogen's View of
Temporal Becoming

The second element of B-theory is that temporal
becoming is subjective. According to Gale,
B-theorists use one of two different methods to
argue for an a priori subjective present in the
A-series. The first is the token-reflexive argument,
which we have just covered. The second method is the
egocentric-particular analysis, which attempts to
show the mind-dependence of A-determinations.(29)

According to B-theorists, the tenses are
relative to the perception of some subject in much
the same way that they are token-reflexive. In
defining or understanding what is past, present, or
future, we must draw a reference to a mental event.
For example, in explaining what is past, we will
typically refer to a memory; for the present, a
sense datum; for the future, an expectation or
anticipation. In each case the tense, or that object
which supposedly is tensed, is relative to a mental
event. It follows, say B-theorists, that because the
tenses are psychological, then so,

P.392

too, is temporal becoming.(30) Is there anything
similar to this in Dogen's thought?

In speaking of passage, to think the place [of
passage] is outside the mind, and that the
dharmas that can pass, pass to the east past a
hundred thousand worlds over a hundred thousand
eons, that is not devoting yourself only to the
study of the Buddha Way.(31)

The three heads and eight arms [i.e., the state
of unenlightenment] pass as my being-time.
Although it seems to be "there," it is Now
(nikon).(32)

... every being in the whole world, while being
lined up, is an individual time. Because they
are being-time, they are my being-time.(33)

One must study that if there is not now the
passage of my utmost exertion, then there is not
the manifestation or passage of one dharma or
one thing.(34)

In each of the quotations above, Dogen is
clearly making a statement concerning the relativity
of time and passage to the individual subject. In
the case of B-theorists, their contention is clear:
in stating that temporal becoming is subjective,
B-theorists mean that it is relative to, a product
of, the individual mind and is not an objective
feature of the cosmos. Although we see that similar
statements can be found in the Shobogenzo, the
matter is not that simple. In many places Dogen
speaks of time's passage without making reference to
a subject. For example:

You should learn that passage occurs without
anything external. For example, spring's passage
is necessarily that which passes through
spring.(35)

Uji has the virtue of passage. It passes from
today to tomorrow, it passes from today to
yesterday, it passes from yesterday to
today.(36)

On the face of it, these passages indicate that
Dogen also sees temporal becoming as an objective
feature of reality unrelated to the subject. But is
this the whole story? Two interrelated questions
need to be answered before we can decide whether or
not "subjective" temporal becoming exists in his
thought. First, what does "subjective" mean? And
secondly, what is the nature of the temporal
interaction between subject and object? To answer
these questions, it is first necessary to know what
Dogen meant by dharma-positions.

Dharma-positions designate the spatial and
temporal characteristics of a particular, discrete
aspect of uji.(37) Uji itself is a four-dimensional
matrix of the three spatial dimensions and time.
Each particular phenomenon is a four-dimensional
point of space-time and constitutes a unique
thing-time distinct from all other thing-times
(i.e., dharma-positions). For example, a partial
description of the dharma-position that is a rock in
the garden might include the fact that it is round,
about the size of a baseball, gray, located next to
the fence, and that it is all these things at a
particular time. The time of the rock is not defined
by

P.393

the movement of the hands of a clock, but by the
spatial characteristics that describe it. Dogen
calls these particularized, discrete parts of uji,
"dharma-positions."

Now, if dharma-positions are four-dimensional,
and if, as Dogen indicates, they do move relative to
one another, then their movement must take place
within a second-level temporal order. As J.J.C.
Smart has indicated, by definition, space-time
entities (i.e., four-dimensional phenomena) must
merely exist "en bloc" as a thing defined as having
such and such characteristics at such and such a
time."(38) These are, by definition, tenseless
statements, and the concept of change is not a
factor. But the definition of movement involves
change (or at least the perception of change) in
both position and time. In the case of
four-dimensional phenomena such as Dogen's
dharma-positions, since the definition of any
particular thing's position already includes time,
then movement must be defined as "something occupies
spacetime-1 at ? -1, and spacetime-2 at ?-2." The
question mark indicates that some other temporal
order is required to account for change.

Now we are in a position to answer our two
earlier questions by simply asking," Is there such a
second level temporal order in Dogen's views, and if
so, how does that affect the interaction between
dharma-positions?"

You should not understand that time only flies
past. You should not learn that flying past is
time's only ability. If time were [only] given
to flying past, it would have to have gaps.(39)

Dogen states that to conceive of time as only a
progression of discrete instants is erroneous. He
demonstrates this by pointing out that a linear
progression of radically discrete temporal instants
is experientially inconsistent.(40) The problem is
that if time passes us by, then when does the future
become the present and then the past? In other
words, when does the present moment suddenly cease
to be that moment and become a past moment?

Central to this issue is a "present now."
Everyone intuitively knows what time is, but
according to Dogen no one can adequately explain it
according to a progression of radically discrete
temporal instants. Attempting to do so leaves us with
a time that "flies by," and which has "gaps" that
cannot be experientially verified. For Dogen, the
view that time only "flies by" is deficient because
it fails to recognize the relationship of the past
and present to the nikon.

The now (konji) under consideration is
everyone's [each person's] Now (nikon). Even if
I make myself think of tens of thousands of
pasts, futures, and presents, they are now
(konji), they are the Now (nikon). Everyone's
destiny necessarily exists now (konji).(41)

For Dogen, the nikon is that aspect of uji that
is ever present and

P.394

mediating between the other tenses. In fact, as he
has stated, the future and past exist within the
matrix of the nikon. For example, the notion of time
as a linear ontological continuum would hold that
Dogen himself is in the past, while the year 2000 is
entirely unconnected and in the future. But as we
have seen above, the nikon is used to create a
two-place relationship that makes it appropriate to
say that Dogen's existence is what-Now-is-no-longer,
while the year 2000 is what-Now-is-not-yet. The
concepts of past and future take their meaning from
the relative relationship to that Now (nikon).
Consequently, the future actually exists, mediated
by the nikon, as the Now-not-yet; the present exists
as the Now-present; and the past exists as the
Now-no-longer.(42) This can be clearly seen in the
passage below, where Dogen discusses the
interrelationship of the tenses.

It is said, the past life has already perished,
the future has not yet come, and the present
does not stay. The past is not necessarily
already perished, the future is not necessarily
not-yet-come, the present is not necessarily
not-staying. If you learn the qualities
not-staying, not-yet-come, and already perished
as past, future, and present, you must certainly
grasp the reason the not-yet-come is past,
present, and future.(43)

First, with regard to the present, Dogen says
that it is not necessarily "not-staying." The
present is not just a fleeting instant forever
passing us by and always gone as we try to "catch
it." Similarly, the future and past are not just the
"not-yet-come" and "already perished." Instead, all
these tenses have further dimensions of meaning
derived from the function of the nikon as the Now
common to each. Accordingly, tensed events (i.e.,
dharma-positions) can be viewed as always existing
in two-place relationships that take the "Now"
(nikon) as the relative temporal frame of reference
from which a B-series, "earlier than/later than"
structure is generated. The only difference with the
token-reflexive argument discussed above is that
these statements each take the nikon as one of their
two parts.

But isn't this just another way of expressing a
contradiction in terms? Doesn't this in essence only
say that the past, for example, is the "present
past," and, as McTaggart stated, isn't the "present
past" contradictory? In Dogen's case, I think the
only correct answer is yes and no. To understand
why, and determine whether temporal passage is
"subjective," we have to take a look at where Dogen
locates the nikon.

There is a clue in the quotation above: "The now
under consideration is each person's nikon." In
another section of "Uji," Dogen reinforces this
notion:

If time is not the aspect of coming and going,
[then] the time of the mountain top is
being-time's nikon. If time maintains the aspect
of coming and going, [then] being-time's nikon
is in the self.(44)

P.395

Two points in this passage are particularly
important here. Dogen says: (1) if time is not
dynamic, then any given time is the nikon of uji,
and (2) if time is dynamic, then nikon is in the
self. Here the nikon is performing a twofold
function that allows Dogen to speak of both
two-place temporal relations and time's passage. In
the first case, Dogen states that where passage is
not present, then time is all nikon (i.e., uji's
nikon) . Uji can then be thought of as a
four-dimensional mosaic in which the temporal
relationships between the individual
dharma-positions are "earlier than" and "later than"
(i.e., B-series relations). In this sense, because
the cosmos is given en bloc as right-Now, as nikon,
change is not a factor, and McTaggart's objection
about tense overlaps does not apply.

But, as Dogen states, there is also a sense in
which time is dynamic, and in that case, the nikon
is "in the self." We can recall two other passages
from "Uji" that state:

In speaking of passage, to think the place [of
passage] is outside the mind, and that the
dharmas that can pass, pass to the east, past a
hundred thousand worlds over a hundred thousand
eons, that is not devoting yourself only to the
study of the Buddha Way.(45)

and also:

The three heads and eight arms pass as my
being-time. Although it seems to be "there," it
is the nikon.(46)

When passage is the feature of uji evident to
the subject (i.e., any particular dharma-position),
then the nikon seats itself in, and is specific to,
that particular dharma-position. In performing this
role, nikon can be understood as the required
second-level temporal order needed for passage,
given that dharma-positions are in themselves four-
dimensional space-time points.

When the nikon is performing this second role,
Dogen is presenting a view of temporal becoming that
in one sense is similar to the B-theorists. Time's
passage is "subjective" precisely because it is
relative to the nikon seated in all
dharma-positions. Of course, here, "subject" means
only an arbitrarily chosen frame of reference, that
is, any dharma-position then acting as the
"subjective seat" of the nikon. This helps explain
the apparent incongruence between those sections
that speak of passage as relative to an individual
and those, like the one about springtime's passage,
where there is no mention of an individual. In both
cases, however, we might say that a "subject" is
present since any dharma-position can seat the
nikon.

This second role of the nikon, however, also
creates problems in the form of an infinite regress.
If the "objective" dharma-positions constitute
four-dimensional phenomena passing through the
"subjective seat" of the nikon, then that
"subjective seat" must be a five-dimensional phe-

P.396

nomenon. That five-dimensional dharma-position can
then in turn only pass relative to a six-dimensional
dharma-position. At no point does the regress end,
and McTaggart's objection would seem to apply.

In spite of this problem, however, we can
conclude that while passage is not purely
"psychological" in the sense of the B-theorists, the
Shobogenzo does contain evidence to support the idea
that it is "subjective" (i.e., relative to any given
dharma-position acting as the seat of the nikon).
And in the case of either a static or dynamic
relationship between events (i.e.,
dharma-positions), Dogen does speak of the generated
temporal relationship as the two-place "earlier
than" and "later than."

The Third Tenet of B-theory and Dogen's Dynamic Uji

The third tenet of B-theory states that "all events
are equally real, hence the B-series is objective."
Gale states that the objective nature of the B-series
is a logical entailment of the subjective nature of
temporal becoming (i.e., B-theorist tenet number
2) .(47) Of course, the implication is that if
temporal becoming is "only" subjective, then the
"real" or objective temporal relationship must be
only the B-series.

As we have seen, there are places in the
Shobogenzo where Dogen speaks of the passage of
dharma-positions as occurring in "my" nikon, and in
"my" uji. But the notion of passage also occurs in
situations notable for their lack of a sentient
subject (e.g., "springtime passes through
springtime") . Hence, the subjective nature of
beomcing for Dogen is not a statement about the
"merely" psychological nature of passage, but an
affirmation of the dynamic nature of all reality. For
Dogen, since the nikon can and does seat itself in
any and all dharma-positions, it is in the dynamic
interaction of these dharma-positions that subject
and object come to define on another. And so, it is
precisely the "subjective" nature of becoming as
relative to the nikon that constitutes a kind of
objective, two-place, temporal relationship.

But, the logical entailment of this conclusion
is that Dogen has affirmed both an A-series (the
change of events in respect to tense, i.e., temporal
becoming) and a B-series. As we will see below, it
is correct to wonder about the logical compatibility
of these two ideas.

The Fourth Tenet of B-theory and Dogen's Discrete
Dharma-positions

The fourth tenet of B-theory states that change
is understandable in terms of B-relations alone.
According to Gale, this means accounting for two
types of change.(48) The first concerns changes "in"
time.

As Gale states, "What we mean by the change of a
thing in time is a sequence of successive events all
regarded as states of one thing."(49) When reality
is viewed as a four-dimensional mosaic, we note that
the same substance has different qualities at
different times. Dogen seems to speak of this idea
in the following passage.

P.397

Firewood becomes ashes, and ashes cannot return
to firewood. However, you should not understand
that ashes are after and that firewood is
before. You should know that firewood dwells in
the dharma-position of firewood, and has before
and after. Although firewood has before and
after, before and after are disconnected. Ash is
in the dharma-position of ash, and has before
and after.(50)

Dogen starts by saying that there is a temporal
progression from firewood to ashes. Obviously the
concept of dharma-positions includes different
qualitative states of things that we believe are one
and the same object. Because these causally related
dharma-positions present us with a temporally
seamless picture of change "in" time, we commonly
say firewood "becomes" ashes. Of course, this should
not be construed to mean that Dogen is affirming the
idea of changes "in" an enduring substance. His
point is simply that spatiotemporally proximate, yet
discrete dharma-positions provide a continuity to
experience. In this limited sense, Dogen does affirm
changes "in" time.

The second type of change is called changes "of"
time. Changes "of" time are changes in an event's
status as future, present, and past. This type of
change is found in Dogen's writings, where he speaks
of time as if it were constituted of a progression
of discrete dharma-positions. The firewood-to-ashes
section above is a good example--and some others
include:

Prior thought, succeeding thought, thoughts do
not wait for each other. Prior dharma,
succeeding dharma, dharmas do not oppose each
other.(51)

To tell the main point, every being in the whole
world, while being lined up, is an individual
time.(52)

and the section seen earlier,

Uji has the virtue of passage. It passes from
today to tomorrow, it passes from today to
yesterday, it passes from yesterday to
today.(53)

Sections like these suggest a recurrent temporal
passage. There is a sense in which dharma-positions
are unrelated; they do not "wait" for each other.
When one time is here, the time "before" is no
longer here, the time "after" is not yet here, and
in combination they can be thought of as being
"lined up" like a series. In any case, the idea is
of discrete temporal moments succeeding one another
in a "linear" fashion as they flow from the future,
through the present, and into the past. In this
sense, we can say that change is nothing but a
change "of" an event's temporal status as it
"proceeds" through the three times.

A problem that arises here, though, is how one
reconciles the idea of changes "of" time with the
notion of two-place relations between disconnected
dharma-positions. The difference between ash and
firewood is obvious. But, just for the sake of
argument, what about the difference

P.398

between burning firewood at time-1 and burning
firewood at time-2? The difference between time-i and
time-2 can be as small a temporal span as we care to
make it. To be consistent with Dogen, we have to say
that each of these two times is also an independent
dharma-position with before and after. But these
correlated dharma-positions will not in themselves
account for the experienced sense of continuity in
the passage of time. When and how does time-1 stop
being the time present and time-2 "become" the time
present? It is true, as Dogen stated, that we do not
experience "gaps" in time's passage.

Of course, one might reasonably object to this
by saying that if there were gaps between
dharma-positions, we could never know it. In such a
case (assuming an Abhidharmic-type succession of
instants whose flashings are all precisely
coordinated with simultaneous flashings of instants
of consciousness), their existence is not merely
unknown, but completely unknowable, and we, as Dogen
has pointed out, experience only continuity in
time's passage. Yet the original problem still
remains because Dogen has, in fact, differentiated
between different, discrete dharma-positions. In
other words, he has said we do know that the various
dharma-positions are different. So, again, we have
to ask how the experience of continuity is related
to discrete, two-place dharma-positions?

Several Dogen interpreters have suggested that
the nikon plays an important role in this
regard.(54) At first thought, and in light of what
we have said above, this seems a plausible answer.
When discussing the second tenet of B-theory, we saw
how B-theorists attempt to reduce the notion of
passage to a bipartite relationship dependent upon a
token. We also saw how Dogen's nikon can be
interpreted as performing the function of such a
"token." Depending upon its placement, the nikon
both (1) mediates between the tenses as uji's nikon
and (2) allows for the passage of dharma-positions
through "my" Now. But, even though the nikon is
common to both views, we must not confuse the two.
As soon as the notion of nikon as a temporal
referent for the past and the future was introduced,
we stopped speaking of passage and started speaking
only in terms of two-place relations. But, when
Dogen spoke of the nikon of the self, that nikon
performs an entirely different function. By seating
itself in any particular dharma-position (i.e., the
"subject"), it allows for a passage through that
dharma-position's experiential Now. This is change
in respect to tense (i.e., an A-series passage).

The fact that these types of A-series notions
not only exist in Dogen's thought but are frequently
found alongside B-theory views is problematic in
light of the fact that Western philosophers consider
the two views logically incompatible.(55) Since
Dogen clearly considers A-series passage as
essential to his view of time, the A-theory phrases
(and the use of the randomly seated nikon) would
seem to mitigate against the B-theory views we have
also found. But is this the case?

P.399

First we should note that descriptively pointing
out these apparently contradictory positions is not
equivalent to assigning priority to either. Nor does
the fact of uncovering an apparent contradiction
weaken the validity of the descriptive evidence for
the existence of the problem. Nevertheless, this
obviously does not answer the question, and we are
still left wondering about the consistency of
Dogen's theory of time.

The fact that the two very different types of
assertions often occur in close proximity to one
another (e.g., the firewood-to-ashes passage)
suggests that Dogen had some sort of congruent whole
in mind when he uttered them. This is certainly the
position of most interpreters of Dogen. If we make
the reasonable assumptions that Dogen's statements
on time are consistent with one another, and
probably reflect the influence of his own
intellectual tradition, then several options are
available in our attempt to explain the problem.

The first option would involve the claim that
these apparently contradictory statements simply
reflect an application of Naagaarjuna's well-known
tetralemma. Advocates of this view could assert that
since the contradictions are a skillful application
of conventional-level truths, the problem is
apparent only. Unfortunately this option suffers
from textual and philosophical problems that render
it untenable.

First, it is not obvious that Dogen had such a
hermeneutic (i.e., a fourfold negative dialectic) in
mind in the specific case of his discussions on
time. For example, while it is certainly true that
Dogen utilized such a dialectic in his discussion of
koans, reading the "Uji" fascicle as a whole in
light of an assumed tetralemma structure does not
give ready evidence that it reflects a consistent,
widespread use of such a device. In fact, the only
clear-cut case of the presence of the tetralemma in
the "Uji" fascicle occurs in one koan cited toward
the end of the piece. But even there, Dogen's
explanation of the koan does not reflect an
application of the tetralemma.(56)

Secondly, even if we still insist on
hermeneutically applying the tetralemma, the
conclusion of inconsistency still follows--but for
different reasons. It would take us too far afield
to discuss them in detail here, but suffice it to
say that Naagaarjuna's use of the tetralemma is
ultimately grounded in an inherently normative, a
priori two-truths structure. That fact alone renders
assertions based on it contradictory according to
nonnormative criteria of validity.(57)

Another possible option is to explain away the
passages containing temporal discreteness by relying
on other passages that express Hua-yen notions of
interpenetration. Earlier it was stated that Dogen's
thaught is grounded in Hua-yen thought. If that is
true, then it is reasonable to view these statements
in a similar light. To do so would entail asserting
that the passage of discrete dharma-positions and
the idea of two-place rela-

P.400

tions are related in a manner similar to Hua-yen
teachings on the interrelationship of li and shih.
But this option, too, is ultimately untenable.

The pertinent question in this case is not
whether Dogen's discussions of time are based on
Hua-yen notions--we have already assumed that they
are (see note 28 below), instead, it concerns
whether an application of Hua-yen notions of
interpenetration can logically resolve the
incongruencies between A-theory and B-theory
phrases. The answer, in short, is no.

Without straying too far from the topic at hand,
the reason is that Hua-yen explanations of temporal
interpenetration struggle with the experiential fact
of temporal asymmetry.(58) Any assertion of a
relative and interdependent relationship between A-
and B-theory views in a Hua-yen context would have
to be predicated upon first establishing a
bidirectional, symmetrical relationship between
anterior and posterior temporal events. Because of
temporal asymmetry (i.e., time always "flows" toward
the future), it is the effect-to-cause aspect of
that bidirectional relationship that causes the
problems. Fa-tsang struggles unsuccessfully with
this very issue in sections of his Wu-chiao
chang.(59) The Hua-yen failure on this count means
that ultimately it cannot adequately reconcile the
A- and B-theory views.

A third possible option would involve explaining
away the passages expressing notions of two-place
relations by means of the passage of discrete
dharma-positions (i.e., negating Hua-yen notions of
mutual interpenetration and nonobstruction).(60) To
do this one must assign greater significance to the
sections on discrete dharma-positions rather than to
those on two-place relations. But this option
suffers from at least two problems.

First, there is not only no evidence suggesting
Dogen had such a position in mind, but in fact
plenty of evidence indicating that he was not trying
to subordinate either view (i.e., A- or B-theory) to
the other. Secondly, this option has the added
disadvantage of raising serious questions about the
larger issue of the internal consistency of the
whole Shobogenzo (see note 28 for further
discussion).

In light of the problems with each of the three
alternatives above, we must be open to a fourth
option: the real problem on this issue may simply
lie with our assumption of consistency. Simply put,
Western philosophical views concerning the
incompatibility of the A- and B-theories may be
correct even within the context of traditional
Buddhist philosophy, and Dogen is therefore offering
us an inconsistent philosophy of time.

In any case, what may be most significant here
is the existence of the problem itself. In this
fact, Dogen shares the problem with B-theorists.
Many A-theorists have accused B-theorists of
positing a theory that cannot adequately account for
the differences between B-series related

P.401

temporal phenomena and the manner in which we
experience time's passage.(61)

Conclusion

We have seen that there are elements of B-theory
thought in Dogen's views about time: he viewed
Reality as "token-reflexive," time's passage as
subjective (i.e., relative to dharma-positions), and
events as existing in objectively real, two-place
relationships with one another.(62) Finally, he
analyzed change as relating to qualitatively
different states of a thing.

But there are also important areas of divergence
between the B-theorists and Dogen. In claiming that
the tenses of expressed events are relative to the
expression, Dogen does not conclude that the past
and future are simply linguistic conventions. In
fact, quite the contrary is true: because they are
linguistic conventions, they cannot simply be
symbols but must be the symbolized itself. In
addition, the idea that temporal becoming is
"subjective" does not mean that Dogen dismissed it
as only "psychological." Instead, through the
mediation of the nikon, temporal becoming is a
notion that stands side by side with the idea of
two-place relations between dharma-positions.

In outlining some of the B-theory elements in
Dogen's philosophy of time, we also discovered a
fundamental incongruency that calls into question
the consistency of his views. The problem concerns
the relationship of dharma-positions as discrete
space-time phenomena and the experience of passage
as a smooth and continuous "flow." Dogen's notion of
nikon allows for dynamic interaction between
dharma-positions but not without entailing the
apparently inconsistent notion of tense overlaps. In
addition, although the nikon has a function within
(1)time as a set of two-place relations, and (2)
time as the passage from the future to the past, it
does not reconcile the two. Since it is clear that
two-place temporal relations hold between
four-dimensional phenomena, temporal becoming
continues to be an issue without an adequate answer.

NOTES

This article is dedicated to Alfonso Verdu.

1 - Richard M. Gale, ed., The Philosophy of Time: A
Collection of Essays (Garden City, New York:
Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 70-77. The explanation
of McTaggart's position and the summary of
B-theory are both based on, and draw heavily
from, Gale's explanation.

2 - Ibid.

P.402

3 - I do not claim that these are the only
definitions of these terms. The definitions are
stipulative and function only to establish some
working parameters for the study. The intent in
formulating categories through the use of
stipulative definitions before the start of the
study is to create a question that is verifiable
or falsifiable according to available historical
records. As Robert Baird has shown, this
provides the basic framework for a nonnormative
answer to a historical question. See Robert D.
Baird, Category Formation and the History of
Religions (The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton and
Co., 1971). I am grateful to Robert N. Minor,
Professor of Religion at the University of
Kansas, for his suggestions on ways to use
Baird's method.

4 -J.M.E. McTaggart, "The Unreality of Time," in
Philosophical Studies, ed. S. V. Keeling
(London: Edward Arnold and Co., 1934), pp.
110-131.

5 - Ibid., pp. 110-111, and also Gale, Philosophy of
Time, p. 67.

6 - Ibid.

7 - Adolf Grunbaum, "The Status of Temporal
Becoming," in Gale, Philosophy of Time, p. 322.

8 - McTaggart, "Unreality of Time," p. 111; also
Gale, Philosophy of Time, p. 67.

9 - McTaggart, "Unreality of Time," pp. 113-116, and
Gale, Philosophy of Time, p. 67.

10 - McTaggart, "Unreality of Time," pp. 123-126,
and Gale, Philosophy of Time, p. 68.

11 - Ibid.

12 - Ibid.

13 - McTaggart, "Unreality of Time," p. 126, and
Gale, Philosophy of Time, p. 67.

14 - Gale, Philosophy of Time, pp. 70-77.

15 - Ibid., pp. 70-71.

16 - Ibid.

17 - Ibid.

18 - Ibid., pp. 72-73.

19 - Ibid.

20 - Ibid.

21 - Hee-Jin Kim, "The Reason of Words and Letters:
Dogen and Koan

P.403

Language," in Dogen Studies, ed. William R.
LaFleur (Honolulu: Kuroda Institute/University
of Hawaii Press, 1985), pp. 54-82.

22 - Dogen, Shobogenzo, "Mitsugo." This is my
translation from Nihon shiso taikei, vols. 12
and 13, ed. Terada Toru and Mizuno Yaoko
(Tokyo: Iwanami, 1972) ; hereafter "Dogen."
"Mitsugo" is from vol. 12, p. 57.

23 - Dogen, "Bukkojoji," vol. 12, pp. 300-301.

24 - Dogen, "Hossho," vol. 13, p. 84.

25 - Ibid., p. 85.

26 - Kim, for example, has pointed out that Dogen
uses the term dotoku to signify the importance
of words themselves. See Kim, "Reason of Words
and Letters," p. 67. See also Hee-Jin Kim,
Dogen Kigen--Mystical Realist (Tucson, Arizona:
University of Arizona Press, 1975), esp. chap.
3.

27 - Kim has argued that Dogen is careful not to
exclude linguistic expressions from expressions
of the Buddha-nature. Note that there is no
fundamental disagreement in our positions. My
claim here is not that linguistic expressions
are privileged in any way, only that Dogen
views them, just as any other phenomenon, as
expressions of the Buddha-nature. See Kim,
Dogen Kigen, chap. 3, esp. pp. 103 ff.

28 - Note also that Candrakiirti defines sa^mv.rti
three ways in chapter 24, verse 8, of his
Prasannapadaa. According to Nagao, the third
definition refers to "conventional terminology,
manner of speaking, name." See Gadjin M. Nagao,
Maadhyamika and Yogaacaara, trans. Leslie S.
Kawamura (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), pp. 14-15.

Here I am, of course, assuming that Dogen's
thought is grounded in Hua-yen thought. This
position has been questioned, however, based on
the fact that Dogen does not quote the Hua-yen
ching directly, does not refer to the school
itself in his discussions of time and being,
criticizes the Hua-yen master Tsung-mi, and
makes extensive use of other, non-Hua-yen
texts. But, setting aside these objections for
the moment, the claim that his thought is
grounded in Hua-yen thought is much less
problematic than the alternative--namely, that
it isn't grounded in Hua-yen thought. But why?

Assuming for the moment (1) that the
reasonable (and historically
verifiable/falsifiable) assumption that Dogen's
thought owes an intellectual debt to past
Buddhist thought, (2) that some acknowledgment
of that influence is necessary in order to be
able to make sense out of otherwise incongruent
assertions, and (3) that the two options (i.e.,
Hua-yen or not Hua-yen) are mutually exclusive,

P.404

then I note that asserting a grounding in
Hua-yen Buddhism allows for a consistency of
thought in the Shobogenzo on issues (including
time--other problems mentioned aside) that
cannot be found if we utilize the other claim.
The alternative position (i.e., not grounded in
Hua-yen thought) is not able to make such a
claim, given the nature of many of the
seemingly contradictory statements in the
Shobogenzo.

Since an assumption of consistency
underlies both possible interpretations, the
important question is, which of the
alternatives yields a more consistent coherence
to the text? The Hua-yen assumption has the
benefit of being able to explain those items
which would otherwise be irreconcilable (e.g.,
Sarvaastivaada-type notions of spatial and
temporal discreteness with Hua-yen-like notions
of spatial/temporal interpenetration), while
the other option (including the attempt to read
a Naagaarjunian tetralemma into Dogen's
discussions of time) will not be as successful
in this regard. This is particularly true for
the "Uji" fascicle, which is difficult if not
impossible to interpret consistently without
assuming the Hua-yen view. This probably
explains why many interpreters, myself
included, read Dogen in that light. To take any
other view requires the interpreter to explain
how such glaring inconsistencies are
reasonable. If we make the reasonable
assumption that Dogen wasn't offering us a
completely chaotic and incongruent view, then
the alternative view becomes very difficult to
maintain.

The next question, then, is, does any of
the evidence in the text necessitate against
this interpretation. The answer is no--even
that evidence pointed out above. The objections
above are predicated upon the assumption that
Dogen (1) would have made more reference to the
Hua-yen ching and the Hua-yen school if in fact
his thought was grounded in that school's
doctrine, and (2) he would not have made
reference to the texts/doctrines that he
did--perhaps even in the manner that he did--if
his thought is grounded in Hua-yen. Clearly,
though, neither assumption is necessarily valid
and both do not therefore constitute necessary
or sufficient grounds for rejecting the Hua-yen
reading. They certainly may give us pause in
the historical sense--but, upon reevaluation,
as above, there are good reasons to reject the
alternative.

There is, however, another possibility that
must be addressed. A reviewer of this article
has noted that the issue may not be either/or
in nature, but simply a question of extent. The
reviewer suggests that the consistency of the
"Uji" fascicle, for example, is not dependent
on whether or not it utilizes Hua-yen views,
but rather where and how it utilizes them. This
is certainly reasonable and requires further
investigation. But, while the exact details of
how

P.405

and where these views apply exceed the scope of
this essay, we should note that accepting this
view does not change the validity of the
assumption regarding Hua-yen as a basis for
understanding Dogen's views.

29 - Gale, Philosophy of Time, pp. 73-74.

30 - Ibid. For the purposes of this essay, I take
the term "temporal becoming" as synonymous with
the notion of time's "passage," "change, "
"flow," etc.

31 - Dogen, "Uji", vol. 12, p. 260.

32 - Ibid., p. 258.

33 - Ibid.

34 - Ibid., pp. 259-260.

35 - Ibid., p. 260.

36 - Ibid., p. 258.

37 - See, for example, the "Uji" and "Genjokoan"
chapters.

38 - J.J.C. Smart, "Spatializing Time," in Gale,
Philososphy of Time, p. 164.

39 - Dogen, "Uji," vol. 12, p. 258. Other scholars
(e.g., Abe and Kim) have interpreted the term
'gap' in the sense of a separation between the
event and the 'self'. There is no fundamental
disagreement, though, between my reading here
and their interpretatidn. Given agreement on
the idea that Dogen's dharma-positions refer to
particularized segments of being-time
(ontological/spatial and temporal in nature),
then it is not a matter of one view being
correct while the other is incorrect. They are
not mutually exclusive.

40 - The experiential issue being referred to here
is our conscious experience of the passage of
time as a smooth, seamless continuum without
fragmented breaks, or gaps. For example, see
the next sentence (not cited) of the passage
mentioned above.

41 - Dogen, "Daigo," vol. 12, p. 123.

42 - I am deeply indebted to Alfonso Verdu,
Professor of Philosophy at the University of
Kansas, for his many insights and discussions
on time and Zen Buddhism. He graciously let me
have a copy of his unpublished article, "Zen
and Time." While neither the article nor our
discussions were specifically concerned with
B-theory views of time, they did suggest to me
the possibility of a study using this approach.
The terms "now-not-yet," "now-present," and
"now-no-longer" are developed by Verdu in the
"Zen and Time" article. I

P.406

have utilized the terminology here as proper to
Dogen's views on time and the B-theory elements
in his teachings.

Note that the point made in this section of
the essay does not lead to the conclusion that
Dogen was a determinist. Within the context of
Dogen's thought, stating that a B-series future
is what is "now-not-yet" entails nothing
further than the conclusion that what will be
(no determinism implied or intended) stands in
a two-place temporal relation to the present
Now. Nevertheless, as we will see, this issue
is an important one for another reason.
B-theorists have been accused of "statizing"
time in a way that is experientially
inconsistent. Dogen certainly does not
"statize" time, but, as shown, those passages
which do speak of time's "flow" do so in an
A-theory manner. While those A-theory-type
passages do not challenge the descriptive
conclusion that B-theory views also exist in
the Shobogenzo, they do raise the issue of
whether or not Dogen's views are internally
consistent.

43 - Dogen, "Juki," vol. 12, p. 273.

44 - Dogen, "Uji," vol. 12, pp. 257-258.

45 - Ibid., p. 260.

46 - Ibid., p. 258.

47 - Gale, Philosophy of Time, p. 74.

48 - Ibid., pp. 74-75.

49 - Ibid., p. 75.

50 - Dogen, "Genjokoan," vol. 12, p. 36.

51 - Dogen, "Kaiinsammai," vol. 12, p. 141.

52 - Dogen, "Uji," vol. 12, p. 258.

53 - Ibid.

54 - For example, see Francis Cook, Hee-Jin Kim,
Steven Heine, and Joan Stambaugh. Also, compare
the following passages: (items in brackets are
my additions):

The processive nature of realization consists
in the fact that the at-one-ness or immediate
experience must be repeated over and over as
each new event occurs.... However, according to
him, the actual realization is timeless each
time it occurs. (F. Cook, "Enlightenment in
Dogen's Zen," JIABS 6 [1]: 25)

Whether it be firewood or ash, birth or death,
the winter or the spring--each has its own
dharma-position which is absolutely discrete
and discontinuous. Each has its "before" and
"after, " but is cut off from those
dharma-situations "preceding" and "following"
[B-series relations in an

P.407

A-series progression from future to past].
(Hee-jin Kim, "Existence/Time as the Way of
Ascesis," Eastern Buddhist 11 [2]: 54-55)

There are other examples as well, and I do not
mean to imply here that the two scholars above
have misinterpreted Dogen. In fact, the
opposite is probably the case. The problem lies
with Dogen's view of time itself.

55 - Gale, Philosophy of Time, p. 69.

56 - See Dogen, pp. 261-262. I quickly want to add,
though, that this is not to claim that Dogen
was not aware of, or did not employ, the
tetralemma--only that it is not evident in the
discussions of time used as a basis for the
inquiry.

One possible objection to this observation,
noted by a reviewer, is that Dogen may have
used a form of tetralemma filtered through the
koan tradition of Chinese Ch'an Buddhism. As
mentioned above, there is no disagreement on
the point that there are koan in the Shobogenzo
that obviously reflect the tretralemma. The
point in dispute here would be the notion that,
somehow, the other sections of the text also
utilize it--only in a modified form that is
different from the one used by Naagaarjuna. I
do not want to take issue with the notion that
ideas can change over time, but we have to be
very careful about assertions such as these,
which can amount to claiming that Dogen used
Naagaarjuna's tretralemma, but it really is not
Nagarjuna's tetralemma. The process of modifying
such assertions can render them nonfalsifiable.

57 - The reason is that the use of such a tetralemma
ultimately must involve the assertion of a
proposition something like: "Dogen cannot be
said to hold either extreme as his
position...." But this is problematic because
the assertion itself is subject to some
criteria of validity. This is precisely the
point made by Naagaarjuna's opponent in the
Vigrahavyaavartanii (i.e., that in order to
assert that he had no position, Naagaarjuna had
to assert something and hence immediately
contradicted himself) . Praasanghikas have
attempted to defend him and themselves by
invoking both the notion of nonpresuppositional
negation and an a priori two-truths structure.
Those familiar with modern scholarship on
Naagaarjuna will know that there is an ongoing
debate concerning whether or not Naagaarjuna
and the Praasanghikas' answer is valid. I have
argued in detail elsewhere that it is in fact
inherently normative and hence cannot meet
non-normative, verifiable/falsifiable criteria
of validity. To defend Naagaarjuna's approach
on this point would involve one in attempting a
defense of the inherently normative two-truths
claim.

A further objection often raised by
defenders of the validity of this method is
that it is not appropriate to criticize
Buddhists for

P.408

their use of this device, because they had a
decidedly religious purpose in mind. While this
last point certainly necessitates a pause in
order to ensure that our conclusions are
historically valid, philosophically speaking it
is a red herring and has no impact on this
essay's conclusions. To grant Naagaarjuna (and
Dogen in this specific case) a kind of
intellectual "immunity" on these points because
they may have had a religious purpose in mind
is to abrogate our right to ask of them, "is
this reasonable," and expect that in answer we
will, in the secular academy at least, not rely
upon unfalsifiable/normative criteria of
validity. The issue, then, becomes whether the
Naagaarjunian tetralemma meets this criterion.
As mentioned above, I think the only answer is
no.

58 - See, for example, Fa-tsang's Wu-chiao chang; T.
45, pp. 486a, 490a-b, 504b, 505c, etc.

59 - Ibid.

60 - This amounts to asserting that Dogen holds that
the A-series is more fundamental than the
B-series. But note that the first choice
mentioned (i.e., using Hua-yen notions of
interpenetration) does not correspond to the
alternative of asserting that the B-series is
more fundamental.

61 - For example, see C. D. Broad's "Ostensible
Temporality," in Gale, Philosophy of Time, pp.
117-142.

62 - The conclusion here is not intended as a
criticism, but simply a comparison. I have no
interest in forcing Dogen to fit into the
categories of McTaggart and Gale. Whether or
not Dogen's agenda was different from that of
the two men whose thought has been used as a
basis for the comparison will not necessarily
affect the descriptive results of asking the
question "Are there any similarities? " It
certainly would, however, have to figure into
any discussion of why they are different or the
same--but these matters exceed the scope of
this essay.