Buddha nature and the concept of person

·期刊原文

Buddha nature and the concept of person

By Sallie B. King

Philosophy East and West

Volume 39, no. 2

April 1989, P.151-170

(C) by University of Hawaii Press

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P.151

Buddhism has a profound and thoroughly developed set
of teachings on human being. One might well argue
that the question of human being is the question par
excellence with which the Buddhist tradition as a
whole struggles. According to the traditional
account, for example, the point of departure for the
Buddha's own search, discoveries, and teachings was
the dilemma of the human condition. Moreover, vast
numbers of Buddhist texts speak out of or address
human experience as such, consciously focusing upon
it as the source of both question and answer.
Nonetheless, many questions a modern Westerner asks
as a matter of course about human being are not
directly addressed in the Buddhist texts. There are
of course important reasons for this. Our concept of
and assumptions about human individuality are
profoundly different from Buddhist views of the
same. Our two worlds of discourse about the value
and meaning of finite bodily existence, the course
of history, the meaning of suffering, and the nature
of possible human greatness are set up on entirely
different foundations. Thus, for a contemporary
Westerner to ask the question "What is a person?
What is a human being?" of a Buddhist text is to set
oneself up to receive an answer that does not
satisfy the intent of the question. Yet, while
Buddhist views and assumptions differ so markedly
from our own, Buddhist texts reveal in their own way
a preoccupation with the human condition as intent
as that of our own hyperindividualistic,
anthropocentric culture.

With such a shared fixation, it is inevitable
that persons on both sides of the cultural
boundaries will attempt to gain light from the other
side on this subject, despite the incommensurability
of each other's questions and answers. The present
essay is one such attempt: not an East-West
comparison, but an effort to address a Buddhist text
from the perspective of cross-cultural philosophy
(still, despite the name, a thoroughly Western
enterprise). Herein I will engage in dialogue the
Buddha Nature Treatise (Chinese: Fo Hsing Lun(a);
hereafter, BNT), a text representative of the Buddha
nature tradition that contains an extensive
discussion of the concept of Buddha nature, a
crucial component, if not the most crucial
component, of the East Asian Buddhist concept of
human being. I will attempt to wrest from the text
answers to two categories of questions--its view of
the ontological nature of human being and its view
of the existential status of human beings. In the
course of the discussion I will ask such questions
as: What roles do individuality and freedom play in
the view of human being portrayed in this text? What
value, if any, does an individual human personality
possess? Is there anything of value in human
history? Clearly, the text itself does not speak in
these terms; these are the questions of a
twentieth-century, philosophically inclined
American. In order to bridge the cultural gap, I
will first give a summary account of the

P.152

text's concept of Buddha nature in its own terms and
in its own format. Then, acknowledging that the text
itself neither speaks this language nor shares my
concerns, I will put my questions to the text and
attempt to extract from the text its implications
for the subject of my concern. In other words, I
cannot claim that the author of the BNT does make
the statements I will give as responses to my
questions about human being, but I do claim that
these views are implicit in and follow from the
statements he does make about Buddha nature.
Granting that human freedom requires us to expect
the unexpected, nonetheless, I believe that if the
author of the BNT were here today and could engage
in dialogue with me, as long as my interlocutor
remained consistent, something close to the views I
will articulate in the course of this essay would
emerge.

EXEGESIS OF THE BUDDHA NATURE TREATISE'S CONCEPT OF
BUDDHA NATURE

The Fo Hsing Lun is attributed to Vasubandhu
(T'ien-ch'in(b), fourth century) and translated into
Chinese by Paramaartha (Chen-ti(c),sixth century).(1)
Only the Chinese translation is extant; neither a
Tibetan translation nor a Sanskrit original
survives. While it is not suspected that the text
might be a purely Chinese original, as it contains
an extensive refutation of several non-Buddhist
Indian philosophical schools, there is a
considerable degree of doubt as to whether
Vasubandhu actually wrote the text. Takasaki and
Hattori, for example, are convinced that the text
was not translated, but actually written, by
Paramaartha, on the basis of his knowledge of the
Ratnagotravibhaaga.(2) I tend to agree with this
view, although it cannot be regarded as definitive.
The BNT does share much of its text with the
Ratnagotravibhaaga, but also contains extensive
other material which is of keen interest in its own
right. It is largely this latter material, unique to
the BNT, that is the source of this article.

We should also note in passing that there are
other difficulties concerning our text. The
circumstances of the text's composition, translation
(if it was translated), and transmission are all
very little known. There is no record of the date
and place of translation on the manuscript. Ui dates
the text between 557 and 569, and Takemura places it
at approximately 558.(3) The text is four chuan(d)
in length.

The subject of the entire BNT is the concept of
Buddha nature. We shall begin with a summary of the
concept of Buddha nature as presented in the BNT in
its own terminology. With that in place, we shall
proceed to probe this material from the perspective
of cross-cultural philosophy.

The author begins defensively with three points
intended to ward off incorrect interpretations of
his views. (1) It is incorrect to say either that
Buddha nature exists or does not exist. though it is
correct to say that Buddha nature aboriginally
exists (pen yu(e)), as long as this is understood as
an affirmation of each person's ability to realize
Buddhahood and not as a kind of existence

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which can stand in contrast to nonexistence. (2)
Buddha nature is not an own-nature; an own-nature
cannot be found where a phenomenon, such as a
person, is in process. The idea of an own-nature is
therefore to be discredited and thoroughly
distinguished from the notion of Buddha nature. (3)
Emptiness is not merely a matter of negation;
supreme truth does not merely negate worldly truth.
The contents of emptiness or supreme truth cannot be
so limited as to be exhausted by functioning in a
destructive manner; there must also be a positive
revelation in emptiness. Therefore, since emptiness
is not exclusively negative, it need not conflict
with a Buddha nature which, though not an
own-nature, is affirmed as existing aboriginally.(4)

Our author then proceeds to discuss Buddha
nature in a constructive fashion, explaining it in
terms of three other concepts: the three "causes,''
the trisvabhaava, and tathaagatagarbha. Let us take
these in turn. The three Buddha nature "causes" are
three aspects of Buddha nature in its function as
cause of the attainment of Buddhahood. The three are
given as the cause of attainability, the prayoga
cause, and the complete fulfillment cause. They are
discussed as follows.

The cause of attainability is the Thusness
revealed by the dual emptiness [of persons and
things]. Because of this emptiness, one 'can attain'
bodhicitta, prayoga, and so forth, up to the
dharmakaaya at the end of the Path. That is why this
cause is called 'can attain'.

The prayoga cause is called bodhicitta. With
this mind, one can attain the thirty-seven limbs of
enlightenment,(5) the ten stages (da`sabhuumi) of
the bodhisattva, the ten perfections (paaramitaa),
the auxiliary aids to practice, and, at the end of
the Path, the dharmakaaya. This is called the
prayoga cause.

The complete fulfillment cause is prayoga. With
this prayoga, one attains complete fulfillment of
both the cause and the fruit [of Buddha nature]. By
fulfillment of the cause is meant virtuous and wise
action. Fulfillment of the fruit is constituted by
the three virtues of wisdom, the cutting-off of
delusion, and loving-kindness.

Of these three causes, the essential nature of
the first is unconditioned Thusness. The essential
nature of the latter two causes is conditioned
resolution and action. (794a)

According to this passage, Buddha nature should
be understood as three kinds of cause. These three,
however, all stem from the first cause, the cause
whose nature makes possible the attainment of
Buddhahood and whose essential character is
unconditioned Thusness. This constitutes the text's
first direct statement as to what the Buddha nature
is: Thusness actuating one's efforts to attain
Buddhahood. As the description of the three causes
proceeds, we can see that this initial urge towards
the self-realization of the Buddha nature is the
basis which progressively develops into bodhicitta,
prayoga, and fulfillment, in turn. The latter two
causes, which are based in the first, are simply
constituted by various aspects of Buddhist practice,
or "conditioned resolution and action."

The author next moves on to a discussion of the
three natures, that is, the

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trisvabhaava of Yogaacaara theory: the
discriminating nature, parikalpita svabhaava
(fen-pieh hsing(f)); the relative nature, paratantra
svabhaava (i-t'a hsing(g)): and the true nature,
parini.spanna svabhaava (chen-shih hsing(h)). He
first defines the general meaning of each term:

The discriminating nature is established on the
basis of the use of the language of provisional
speech. If there were no such terms, then the
discriminating nature would not come into being.
Therefore vou should know that this nature is merely
a matter of verbal expression; in reality it has no
essence and no marks. This is what is called the
discriminating nature.

The relative nature is the principle (tao-li(i))
which manifests as the twelve-fold chain of
conditioned origination (Pratiityasamutpaada) .
Because it serves as a basis (i-chih(j) )for the
discriminating nature, it is established as the
relative (i-t'a(k)) nature.

The true nature is the Thusness (chen-ju(l)) of
all things. It is the nondiscriminating wisdom realm
of the wise. For the sake of purifying the [first]
two natures, realizing the third [that is,
liberation], and cultivating all virtues, the true
nature is established. (794b)

Despite this quite orthodox initial presentation
of the trisvabhaava, the author of the BNT expresses
the view that ultimately the three natures reduce to
two. After discussing each of the three natures in
turn, the text continues:

The relative nature is of two kinds: pure and
impure. The impure relative nature comes into being
on the basis of discrimination. The pure relative
nature comes into being on the basis of Thusness.
(794c)(6)

This scheme functionally supplants the standard
tripartite scheme of the trisvabhaava. According to
this analysis, the relative nature, or conditioned
origination, is the only reality. Insofar as one
experiences it in the mode of discrimination, the
discriminating nature is operative; insofar as one
experiences Thusness, the true nature is operative.
In this way, we can see that the Buddha nature,
which is constituted by all three natures, is
represented in a nondistorted fashion by the pure
relative nature, or, what is equivalent, the true
nature. The Buddha nature, then, qua parini.spanna
svabhaava, is known by its functions: purification
of the other two natures, liberation, and the
cultivation of all virtues. Its nature is equated
with Thusness: the reality of things as they are and
knowledge of that reality.

The final component of the Buddha nature is the
tathaagatagarbha (ju-lai-tsang(m)), which is itself,
of course, a close synonym of Buddha nature. It is
stated in the following quotation and repeated many
times in this text that all sentient beings "are"
the tathaagatagarbha in the sense that they are all
beings whose true nature is Buddhahood. The author
stresses the point that the tathaagatagarbha in the
causal stage of the person who has not yet begun to
practice Buddhism is identical with the
tathaagatagarbha in the fruition stage of the
Buddha. The tathaagatagarbha in the causal stage is
concealed from the individual, but it is in no way
diminshed. An analysis of the three component terms
of the compound tathaagatagarbha is given, two of
which are of interest

P.155

to us here. The garbha of tathaagatagarbha is
represented as constituted by three categories.
'Garbha' (tsang(n)) has three meanings. The first
shows the incomparability of the true realm (cheng
ching(o)), since apart from this realm of the
Thusness of Thusness (ju-ju ching(p)), there is no
other realm which surpasses it. The second shows the
incomparability of the true practice (chen
hsing(q)). since there is no other superior wisdom
which may surpass this wisdom (chih(r)). The third
makes manifest the incomparability of the true fruit
[of practice], since there is no fruit which
surpasses this one. This is why we speak of
incomparability. Since this fruit encompasses (neng
she tsang(s)) all sentient beings, we say that
sentient beings are (wei(t)) the tathaagatagarbha.
(796a)

The first component of the garbha is the realm
of the Thusness of Thusness, or all of reality truly
experienced. The second component is Buddhist
practice, which is equated with wisdom. Finally, the
third item is the fruit of practice, namely,
realization of the Buddha nature together with its
virtues.

The analysis of the tathaa (ju(u) ) of
tathaagatagarbha (ju-lai-tsang(m) ) is also
instructive for our purposes.

All sentient beings are (shih(v) ) the
tathaagatagarbha. There are two meanings of 'Thus'
(ju(u) in ju-lai-tsang(m) ) . The first is the
knowledge of the Thusness of Thusness (ju-ju
chih(w)), and the second is the realm of the
Thusness of Thusness (ju-ju ching(x)). Since the
two stand together, we speak of the Thusness of
Thusness (ju-ju(y)).(795c)

We will return below to the significance of the
special concept of the Thusness of Thusness given
here. For now, the point is to recognize that
Thusness is here represented as the essential nature
of the tathaagatagarhha. This exegesis of tathaa,
when combined with that of garhha, produces a notion
of tathaagatagarbha which parallels the explanation
of Buddha nature as three causes. In each, Buddha
nature or tathaagatagarbha is portrayed as in
essence Thusness, while Thusness is given as
inherently linked with Buddhist practice. When we
combine these passages, we get the following. The
essential nature of tathaagatagarbha and of Buddha
nature is Thusness. Thusness is the ground of the
possibility of our (successfully) practicing
Buddhism. The ultimate outcome of Buddhist practice,
of course, is realization of the goal of Buddhism,
or the fruit of practice. Buddha nature and
tathaagatagarbha, then, as Thusness are reality and
the correct apprehension of reality; as portrayed in
this tripartite scheme, they are the foundation of
the possibility of practice in Thusness, the doing
of the practice itself, and the successful
fulfillment of that practice. Much the same
conclusion resulted from the analysis of the
trisvabhaava.

In a separate part of the text, the author
further elucidates the BNT's concept of Buddha
nature by attaching to it the concept of
aa`srayaparaav.rtti (chuan-i(z)). The author of the
BNT introduces the aa`srayaparaav.rtti into his
discussion by describing it as the supreme purity
which is revealed when all limitations on the
understanding have been removed; it is the "purity
of the original nature'' (pen hsing(aa)), that is,
the Buddha nature (801b).

P.156

The central point of the BNT's exposition of
aa`srayaparaav.rtti is that it represents Buddhist
practice. This is expressed in four senses. (1) As
the "productive basis" it is the basis of the
Buddhist Path, a synonym for Buddhist practice. The
term "basis'' (aa`sraya, Chinese i(ab)) does not
refer here to a substantive basis, but to the basis
or foundation of a particular form of action,
Buddhist practice. (2) AA`srayaparaav.rtti as the
destructive basis accounts for the negative aspect
of Buddhist practice, the extinction of defilements.
In accordance with tathaagatagarbha thought, the
text states that the extinction of defilements is
constituted by the realization of their ultimate
unreality. (3) The third characteristic, the "fruit
of well-matured contemplation, " represents the
positive aspect of Buddhist practice: practice as
the realization of Buddhist truths. This
characteristic, which represents the heart of
Buddhist practice as such in all of its stages,
emphasizes the Path of Buddhism and Buddhist
practice as inherently positive: one attains
profound and extensive reverence for and knowledge
of Thusness. We should note in passing that the
negative aspect of overcoming delusion is so far
deemphasized that it is said that actually no such
thing is done, while the positive aspect is
emphasized to the extent that it is identified with
Buddhist practice as such. (4) Finally, the
aa`srayaparaav.rtti represents the culmination of
Buddhist practice in the supreme realization of
ineffable Thusness. In this way, the four
characteristics represent aa`srayaparaav.rtti as
Buddhist practice from its beginnings to its
culmination (801).

QUESTIONS FROM A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTTVE

Thus far we have worked through a substantive
discussion of the Buddha nature, an analysis of it
as "cause" and of its synonyms. Being familiar with
all this, we now need to take the difficult step of
relating this material to a concept of the person.
First, let me specify that I am using the word
"person" as an equivalent of "human being,'' or
"human individual." Thus what I seek in the text is
a systematic account of its philosophical
anthropology.(7) This raises an important
preliminary issue. Insofar as I am seeking to
discover what the text has to say about the nature
of human being, there is, at first glance, a
somewhat poor fit with the concept of Buddha nature.
The bottom-line statement in the Buddha nature
textual tradition is: "all sentient beings (sattva,
Chinese chung-sheng(ac) ) possess the Buddha
nature.'' Entailed by the Buddha nature concept in
particular and the Buddhist perspective in general
is the view that human beings as a class belong in
the larger world of sentient existents, and should
not be singled out as special or unique and thus
deserving to be regarded as a class unto ourselves.
This is a very important and well-known point in
Buddhist thought. Human beings are not a separate
class, distinct from animals, gods, and so forth.

On the other hand, Buddhism has always
recognized that there is a unique feature of the
human condition which, while it does not put us in
an entirely

P.157

separate class, does make the human race special
with respect to Buddhist soteriology. This special
feature is the fact that we are capable of
understanding our condition and responding in such a
way as to alter radically the parameters of our
existence. This may account for the fact that in the
BNT, the text repeatedly speaks in terms of the
three categories of ordinary persons (fan fu(ad)),
bodhisattvas or sages (p'u sa(ae) or sheng jen(af)),
and buddhas (fo(ag)) (see, for example, 806b). Thus,
in the mind of our author too, it is necessary to
single out human beings (or at least anthropomorphic
beings) in order to speak of our condition and our
potential. Since the text does repeatedly use this
framework for its analysis, there is no great gap
between its perspective and my question, "What is a
(human) person?"

The purpose of the present section of this
article is to step back from the immersion in
technical Buddhist terminology which dominated our
discussion of the Buddha nature and to ask questions
of that material from the perspective of
cross-cultural philosophy. With the basic data now
available in the language and from the perspective
of the BNT, we now want to ask in our language and
from our perspective such questions as: What is a
human being, a person? What roles do individuality
and freedom play in this concept? What value, if
any, does an individual human personality possess?

What is a person, according to the Buddha Nature
Treatise? There are two dimensions to this question,
an existential dimension and an
ontologicalmetaphysical dimension. (8) To discover
what a person is according to the latter dimension
requires of us that we clarify what it means to say
that a person "exists." What is the nature of this
existence? What is the meaning of the word "person"
in the phrase "personal existence"? To ask what a
person is in an existential sense is to ask what
behaviors--in the broad sense of all physical and
psychological acts--are characteristic or
paradigmatic for human persons. How would we
characterize the essence of human character? What
possibilities intrinsically belong to human beings
and in what way are these possibilities actualized?
Of course, since the text does not pose these
questions in this way, it also does not answer them
in an explicit manner. What follows is my own
interpretation of the implications of the textual
material for these questions posed from outside, by
a person who lives in a culture dominated by another
world view.

A. The Ontological-Metaphysical Dimension

It is amply clear that, like other forms of
Buddhism, the Buddha nature thought of the BNT is a
form of process philosophy. There are no entities of
any sort recognized in the text; there is no-thing
which simply "is." Moreover, the process philosophy
of the BNT expresses the author's most basic
concerns, namely, to promote Buddhist practice and
to explain philosophically the human transformation
engendered by that practice.

There are two main points to the BNT's
understanding of the ontological

P.158

nature of a human person: first, a person is not an
entity of any kind, but consists of actions; and
second, a person does not exist in contradistinction
to a world, but is correctly conceived as
inseparable from that world. We will begin with the
first point.

When I say that the author of the BNT speaks of
the ontological nature of a human being as a series
of acts, I mean that he identifies the person with a
particular series of physical and psychological acts
and indicates that this is the entirety of the
person; there is no entity which performs the acts.
This, of course, is the classic Buddhist position
from very early times.

The following examples will give the reader an
idea of the way in which the BNT conveys this
perspective. I can do no more than give a handful of
examples: if one were to read the BNT itself, one
would find that this perspective pervades virtually
every line of the text. Moreover, the text does not
struggle towards this position as towards a
conclusion, but speaks out of this perspective as a
starting point.

First example: above, Buddha nature as "cause"
was explained as Thusness actuating human effort to
attain Buddhahood. As human beings, then, our
essential character is found in this deep-seated
urge, whose character is clearly verbal, or active,
rather than entitative. This is ontologically
significant, since we possess this character by
virtue of our participation in reality. This reality
of Thusness itself, from which we are not separate,
expresses itself in an active, nonentitative
fashion.

Second example: the true nature, as another term
descriptive of Buddha nature and hence of human
being, is explained in terms of three kinds of
action: purification (of the deluded and relative
natures), liberation, and the cultivation of the
Buddhist virtues. It is not a thing, but these acts.

Third example: the second component of
tathaagatagarbha is given as Buddhist practice,
which is equated with wisdom. Note here that since
wisdom is employed as interchangeable with Buddhist
practice, it cannot be interpreted as representing
any kind of static or substantial basis of
subjectivity (such as a pure mind or self). Practice
is a kind of doing, and wisdom is a particular
practice--acting or doing wisely.

Fourth example: aa`srayaparaav.rtti is defined
as Buddhist ractice. As such, it is consistently
portrayed as being of an active character. Any idea
that the "transformation of the basis" refers in
some literal sense to the transformation of a
substantive thing must be rejected in the light of
this direct identification of aa`srayaparaav.rtti
with the doing of Buddhist practice. "Buddhist
practice" here does not mean any set rituals,
meditations, or ethical observances, but rather the
process of the self-transformation of the individual
progressing from a self-centered and ignorant mode
of being-behaving to the selfless, awakened, and
compassionate mode of a Buddha. The "transformation
of the basis," then, means the transformation of the
person.

In this text, then, aa`srayaparaav.rtti is best
interpreted as: (l)the radical trans-

P.159

formation of the person; (2) Buddhist practice; (3)
the transformation of the person's relationship to
the Buddha nature. AA`srayaparaav.rtti demonstrates
that the affirmation of the Buddha nature is an
affirmation of every person's ability radically to
transform him- or herself. The Buddha nature, then,
is not that which lives the Buddhist life; it is the
active, verbal doing or living of the life.

Fifth and final example: the text identifies the
Buddha nature with the four gu.napaaramitaa, or
supreme perfections, one of which is
aatmapaaramitaa, perfection of self. While this sort
of language makes the Buddha nature sound like an
entity par excellence, the text removes the
possibility of such an understanding by explaining
aatmapaaramitaa as the active realization of the
emptiness of all things; in other words, it simply
gives the name aatmapaaramitaa to experiential
praj~naapaaramitaa.

All the heterodox perceive and grasp a self within
the five skandhas. Overturning that attachment to
self as vacuous and cultivating praj~naapaaramitaa,
one realizes the supreme not-self which is identical
to the self-paaramitaa (wo p'o-lo-mi(ah)). This is
the fruit [of the practice of praj~naapaaramitaa].
(798c)(9)

The second important theme concerning the
ontological nature of the preson is the view that a
person does not exist in any way separate from a
world. The perspective of the BNT is plainly opposed
to any such subject-object split. In the BNT,
personal being, is always continuous with the being
of a world. The trisvabhaava are three ways
(actually two, according to the author's
interpretation) in which the person experiences what
is given (the world), and in which what is given
(the world) presents itself to the person. In fact,
even this way of speaking fails to do justice to the
continuity between person and world. A person is a
series of events which, in the language of
subjectivity, are called experiences. But
experiene, in fact, is not a matter of pure
subjectivity. Experience is always "experience of"
something. Experience is ordinarily conceived as the
point of contact between a subject and an object.
But in the BNT these two are portrayed as a single,
primitive given, unified in itself, and only
divisible upon secondary analysis. Ontologically.
then, a person is this primitive given: an
experiential world or a personal world.

The inseparability of subject and world is
conveyed rather nicely in the following passage,
mentioned above.

All sentient beings are (shih(v) ) the
tathaagatagarbha (ju-lai-tsang(m)). There are two
meanings of 'Thus' (ju(u) in ju-lai-tsang(m)). The
first is the knowledge of the Thusness of Thusness
(ju-ju chih(w)) and the second is the realm of the
Thusness of Thusness (ju-ju ching(x)). Since the two
stand together, we speak of the Thusness of Thusness
(ju-ju(y)). (795c)

While the exposition offered in this passage is
circular, its meaning is nonetheless clear. The
author unpacks the meaning of Thusness (the single
ju(u)) by identifying it as the sum of two elements:
the knowledge of the Thusness

P.160

of Thusness and the realm of the Thusness of
Thusness. The term translated here as "knowledge"
(chih(r)), is a standard term for the subjective,
while "realm" (ching(ai)) is a standard term for the
objective. Ordinarily the chih is the cognizer and
the ching the cognized. In the case of the knowledge
of the Thusness of Thusness (ju-ju chih(w) and the
realm of the Thusness of Thusness (ju-ju ching(x)),
the former is the knowing which accords with the
principle of Thusness, and the latter is the known
which accords with that principle. Since, the author
says, the two "stand together," the term Thusness as
ju-ju(y) is coined to embrace them simultaneously.
As such it represents the unity of their mutuality.
All of this--the ju-ju(y) Thusness of Thusness with
both its subjective and objective constituents--is
given in explanation of the single "Thus'' of
tathaagatagarbha (the ju(u) of ju-lai-tsang(m)). We
could not ask for a more direct statement of
subject-object unity in Thusness.

In a section devoted to the elucidation of the
Middle Path, the author of the BNT provides an
example which is intended to discredit the practice
of "discriminating the grasper and the grasped and
taking them really to exist." In other words, the
intention here is to discredit the idea of discrete
subjects and objects.

Discriminating grasper and grasped and taking
them really to exist: in the suutra, the Buddha
uses a magician as an illustration to draw us away
from these two extremes.(10) "Kaa`syapa, it is like
a magician who conjures magical images. The tigers
which he makes turn around and devour the magician.
Kaa`syapa, when bhik.sus whose method of
contemplation is like this contemplate an object,
what appears [to them] is merely empty. Hence, there
is nothing to the 'real' and no reality to the
false."

How then can one escape the extremes [of grasped
and grasper] and by relying on the manovij~naana
(i-shih(aj))(11) create consciousness-only wisdom?
Consciousness-only wisdom (wei-shih chih(ak)) is the
wisdom [constituted by the understanding that] all
sense data [gu.na] lack an essence. When this
consciousness-only wisdom is perfected, it turns
around and extinguishes its own root, namely,
manovij~naana. How is this? Since the sense data
lack essence, manovij~naana is not produced. With
the manovij~naana not produced, consciousness-only
wisdom self-destructs. Manovij~naana is like the
magician; consciousness-only wisdom is like the
magical tiger. Since manovij~naana produces
consciousness-only wisdom, when the contemplation of
consciousness-only is perfected it can turn and
destroy manovij~naana. Why? Because sense data lack
being (wu(al)). Thus manovij~naana is not produced,
just as in the example the magical tiger turns and
devours the magician. As AAryadeva (T'i-p'o(am))
says in verse,

Throughout the three realms,(12) the origin of manovij~naana
Is always to be found in sense data.
When one perceives that sense data have no essence
Seeds of existence are naturally extinguished. (809b-c)

This example demonstrates the text's assertion
of the nonduality of the grasped "object" and the
grasping "mind.'' The argument adheres closely to
Yogaacaara doctrine. Yogaacaara agrees with
Madhyamika that all sense data are inherently
unreal, that is, lacking in any nature of, their
own, and that a

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Buddhist should practice in order to realize this.
The peculiarly Yogaacaara point is that sense data
are unreal since they are produced by the mind. It
is crucial to realize, though, that the mind
likewise is produced by the sense data. If there
were no sense data "objects," there would be no
cognizing of sense data and hence, immediately, no
cognizer qua separate self.

Thus we rely on the manovij~naana, or ordinary
consciousness, to produce so-called
"consciousness-only wisdom, " the knowledge that
sense data or phenomena lack essence, and hence
ultimately lack reality. In other words, starting
from the stage of ordinary consciousness in which
the practitioner finds him- or herself, as a
skillful means one engages in unspecified meditative
practices which enable one to see the nonexistence
of essences in phenomenal reality. Once one has done
that, however, this new awareness which one has
engendered possesses the power to turn on that which
produced it, ordinary consciousness, and destroy it.
Why? Consciousness-only wisdom sees there are no
object-things "out there.'' In effect, it directs
manovij~naana to see this. With no objects from
which to separate itself, manovij~naana, in turn,
becomes incapable of discriminating itself as a
separate thing with its own selfcontained
essence-identity, In other words, if there are no
objects, there can be no subject, the existence of
each is completely dependent upon the existence of
the other. Thus manovij~naana, as a sense of a
separately existing self, is destroyed. Once this
happens, though, the so-called "consciousness-only
wisdom" self-destructs. Why? First, it was simply a
skillful means for the purpose of undoing the
self-delusion of manovij~naana. Second, its
existence was derived from manovij~naana; the latter
produced it.

What, then, is the nature and status of the
subject in this theory? It is clear that with sense
data as its cause, the manovij~naana consists
totally in cognizing activity. That is: no sense
data, no cognizing; no cognizing, no cognizer. The
cognizing, then, is the cognizer; in other words,
there is no entity-cognizer here, only acts of
cognizing which produce an illusory sense of self.
As for "consciousness-only wisdom,'' it is plain
that this is far from an ultimate in this text. It
is no more than a skillful means which
self-destructs once its task is accomplished.
Moreover. the very words "consciousness-only" (which
are the words the text uses) are misleading as used
in the BNT. Though the phrase is appropriate
inasmuch as the sense data "objects" lack an
independent essence and hence are unreal, or do not
exist, the real teaching of this passage is that the
cognizer and the cognized, subject and object, are
interrelated even to the extent of being mutually
dependent. They arise and disappear together. Hence,
"consciousness-only" does not mean simply
"consciousness-yes, objects--no" (and certainly not
"mind--yes, matter--no"), but rather it implies
"cognition only" or "cognizing only," with both
"consciousness" qua mind and sense data qua objects
of consciousness negated.

As an illustration of the ontological status of
a human person, this example

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indicates several things. (1) It manifests the
nonduality of cognizer and cognized, or subject and
object. It does not reduce objects to an ultimate
subjective base, but asserts the absolute
dependence, relativity, and ultimate unreality of
both. (2) It demonstrates the active nature of the
person; there is no "mind" here, but certain kinds
of cognitions and wisdom. (3) The practical
consequences of "consciousness-only wisdom" consist
in the elimination of delusion. Thus, as an
illustration of Buddha nature, we see again in this
example an emphasis on the teaching that Buddha
nature means the practice (or engagement in the
activity) of becoming Buddha. This activity, again,
is what a person is.

B. The Existential Dimension

Let us now take up the question of human personhood
in the existential dimension. A little reflection
will quickly reveal that in the view of the BNT's
author, one cannot speak of the human character or
of paradigmatic human behavior as such without one
preliminary point. Existentially human beings are of
two basic types: deluded and enlightened. Once one
has divided humanity (in which category I include
the BNT's three divisions of ordinary beings, sages,
and Buddhas) into these two camps, one can then
proceed to make meaningful statements about
characteristic human behaviors.

As evidence of this, recall the author's
treatment of the classic Yogaacaara concept of the
trisvabhaava, the three "natures" which, as we have
seen, represent three ways in which persons perceive
worlds and worlds present themselves to persons. In
working through these three natures, our author
divided the middle nature, paratantra, into two
subcategories, an impure and a pure paratantra. The
former was identifiable with the nature of delusion,
parikalpita, while the latter was identified with
the pure parini.spanna. In this way he transformed
the tripartite trisvabhaava theory into a theory
which divided humanity into two categories.

The characteristic which assigns persons to one
or the other category is so-called purity and
impurity, or delusion and enlightenment. Our author
has in mind a model of human being in which deluded
beings transform themselves into enlightened beings
upon the pivot of aa`srayaparaav.rtti, which we
earlier translated as "the transformation of the
person." but which we can now translate as
"conversion, "(13) in the sense that it is the
aa`srayaparaav.rtti which converts the person from a
deluded being into an awakened being. Thus we have
two categories of person, before and after
aa`srayaparaav.rtti.

1. Before "conversion, " then, we have the
"impure" or deluded existential mode of human being.
What characterizes human being in this mode? In
whichever existential mode a person finds him- or
herself, a human being is always identifiable with
Buddha nature. The significance of this for the
deluded person is twofold. There is the universally
valid promise of eventual Buddha-

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hood. More interesting for present purposes are the
implications of the doctrine of Buddha nature for a
theory of human nature. If the Buddha nature is the
essential nature of a human being, then there is, on
this level and in this context, a universal sameness
shared by humanity at the core of our identity. We
are all intrinsically enlightened and compassionate
beings, and not just in potential but always and
already in present reality, although all appearances
and self-knowledge may be to the contrary while in
the deluded existential mode. To the extent that
this hidden reality is not yet manifest, though, the
sameness which it implies is all the greater. We can
speak of it only as wisdom and compassion and cannot
specify its character further; active manifestation
is required for that.

On the other hand, what does distinguish us one
from another is our individual karma and kle`sa, the
past history and defilements which together are
responsible for the creation and constitution of our
bodies as well as what we, from a very different
perspective, call our various personalities. To the
extent that a person exists in the deluded
existential mode, that person's individual character
traits, beliefs, habits, tendencies, values,
mannerisms, and so forth simply are kle`sa. They are
all based upon a fundamentally deluded or warped
perspective of oneself and reality and could not
exist as they are without that foundation. They
also, from the perspective of Buddha nature thought,
are unreal and ultimately nonexistent. The text
tells us many times that the kle`sa have no basis in
reality.

We therefore have a situation in which persons
in the deluded existential mode can only be
differentiated one from another by virtue of the
kle`sa which constitute their personalities and have
constructed their bodies, but the kle`sa themselves
are unreal and therefore cannot serve as any real
basis of differentiation. The kle`sa, therefore,
have no value in constituting a person's identity.
In the existential mode of delusion, then, a person
can truthfully be identified with the universally
identical Buddha nature but cannot truthfully be
identified with the distinctive kle`sa which
constitute that person's individuality.

The implications of this are as follows. Within
the purview of Buddha nature thought, the person in
the deluded existential mode is ahistorical and
lacking in individuality. History and individuality
are comprised by the kle`sa which constitute a
person's personality; since these are simply
negligible, so are history and individuality as
pertaining to persons in the deluded existential
mode. Second, autonomy and freedom are largely,
though not entirely, negligible for the deluded
person. Most of the deluded person's actions are
driven by karma and as such identifiable with the
realm of kle`sa and utterly lacking in real freedom.
However, there is one important exception to this
statement. Buddha nature is Thusness impelling one
towards Buddhahood. The drive to spiritual freedom
impelled by the Buddha nature is an act of authentic
freedom. Buddha nature and Thusness, having nothing
to do with

P.164

the realm of karma and kle`sa, can serve as the
basis of acts of real freedom. Hence, to the extent
that one acts in such a way as to free oneself of
karma and kle`sa, one's act is free. To the extent
that one's actions are the product of past karma and
kle`sa, those actions are not free. By definition,
though, the deluded person has not yet undergone
"conversion." Such a person will therefore be
largely defined by unfree acts.

In sum, as presented in the BNT, the person
(human being) in the deluded existential mode is not
a person as we ordinarily use the term in the
popular Western sense. There is no real
historicality or individuality accruing to the
"person" and precious little freedom, What we
consider to be the basis of individual personhood is
written off as unreal. What is real is the universal
sameness of Buddha nature; in this sameness,
individual personhood, as we ordinarily use the
term, cannot be found, Thus, before "conversion" and
while in the existential mode of delusion, a person
is not a person.

2. What, then, of the person after "conversion,"
the "pure" or enlightened person? Again we must
begin by stating that the person is the Buddha
nature. Thus, also in the existential mode of
enlightenment there apparently is this degree of
universal sameness. But how far, in this mode, does
this sameness extend? The fact that we are all the
Buddha nature means that we are all characterized by
clear seeing and altruistic behavior. But persons in
the enlightened existential mode, unlike persons in
the deluded mode, have made this Buddha nature
manifest in real acts of clarity and altruism. This
manifestation in action, therefore, brings the
Buddha nature into the realm of particularity and
individuality. No two acts of clarity or of
compassion are alike. Hence, once the Buddha nature
moves into the realm of manifestation, it is no
longer appropriate to speak of universal sameness,
since the Buddha nature is no more than those
particular acts of clarity and altruism and no
entity of any kind.

In other words, the person is the Buddha nature
as manifest in particular actions and only as
manifest in those actions. Thus, history and
individuality, which were lacking in the deluded
existential mode, enter the constitution of the
person now, in the enlightened existential mode. The
particular behaviors, mannerisms, and even the
personality of the person now possess reality and
value. Moreover, the actions of the person now
possess complete autonomy and freedom. What the
person does (physically, psychologically) has no
relation to the world of karma and kle`sa, but is
entirely a spontaneous manifestation of the always
free Buddha nature. The person, then, is really and
fully a person at this stage, after "conversion" and
upon entry into the enlightened existential mode.

We must emphasize this remarkable point:
"conversion" and enlightened behavior not only do
not rob a person of individuality, but in fact
constitute its very possibility for the first time.
Compare this with the classic position

P.165

of the Hindu Upani.sads, in which, upon
enlightenment, the person loses whatever
individuality he or she had by merging into the
Oneness of Brahman-AAtman, "as when rivers flowing
towards the ocean find there final peace, their name
and form disappear, and people speak only of the
ocean."(14) The position of Buddha nature thought is
the precise converse of this. Buddhist practice
constitutes the possibility for discovering and
actualizing individuality for the first time. One
becomes a person upon enlightenment. One gains
freedom. The history which one constructs with one's
particular actions is a real thing.

This, in the end, is the result of the position
epitomized in the Buddha Nature Treatise's line
which states that Buddha nature is manifest in
Thusness; one realizes it.

Attachments are not real; therefore they are called
vacuous. If one gives rise to these attachments,
true wisdom will not arise. When one does away with
these attachments, then we speak of Buddha nature.
Buddha nature is the Thusness (chen-ju(l)) revealed
(hsien(an)) by the dual emptiness of person and
things.... If one does not speak of Buddha nature,
then one does not understand emptiness. (787b)

In the view of the BNT, Buddhist practice gains one
something, and that something is reality: one finds
reality in oneself and in one's world. And this
reality possesses absolute value. Just as the logic
of Buddha nature thought compelled the author
ultimately to speak of an aatmapaaramitaa in which
the negativity of anaatman and `suunyataa was
simultaneously inverted and fulfilled, so here the
negativity of the karma and kle`sa-based realm of
historty and individuality is inverted and
transformed into a realm in which history and
individuality are real and valuable. Here, though,
unlike the anaatmanaatmapaaramitaa inversion, the
history and personhood which one creates are
something new. AAtmapaaramitaa is simply the
completely adequate undersranding of anaatman. The
free acts of a real individual creating him- or
herself, moment by moment, are the construction of a
historical world which never before existed, even in
potential.

3. We need now to consider the existential
status of the pivot between the two existential
modes of delusion and enlightenment, namely,
aa`srayaparaav.rtti or conversion. The status of
aa`srayaparaav.rtti is not worked out as fully in
the text as one would prefer, but in the end it
falls into the category of the existential mode of
enlightenment. AA`srayaparaav.rtti, it is said many
times, is "pure": it is the purity of the
dharmadhaatu, the purity of the Buddha nature. As
pure, it falls squarely on the side of
enlightenment. It is also, however, identified with
Buddhist practice: it is the basis of the Buddha
Way; the foundation of the extinction of delusion;
the fruition of practice as manifest in goodness.
reverence, and knowledge; and it is the attainment
of Thusness. In these respects, its nature might at
first seem to be one that is transitional between
delusion and purity, but that in fact is not the
case. When, as the text says,

P.166

one is "on the Way," aa`srayaparaav.rtti is the
cause. When one has "completed the Way," it is
called "fruit." Nonetheless, this
aa`srayaparaav.rtti must finally be understood as
belonging totally on the side of purity and
enlightenment, in short, of fruition. It is cause in
the same way that the Buddha nature is cause: it is
always fully complete with all its virtues intact.
It serves as cause of one's being. "on the Way," or,
in other words, as cause of the Buddha Way in the
sense that, like Buddha nature, it is the purity of
Thusness impelling one to practice Buddhism,
impelling one to seek freedom and the realization of
personhood. AA`srayaparaav.rtti is capable of
serving as a pivot between the two existential modes
precisely because it is purity in the act of causing
one to be on the Buddhist Path. Like hodhicitta,
which is also identified with the Buddha nature, it
can be a first act on the Buddhist Path. But even as
a first act, it is already completely pure; it is
purity that moves one to perform that first act of
stepping onto the Path, and the act itself is
constituted of purity.

There is in this notion that aa`srayaparaav.rtti
is identifiable both as purity and as Buddhist
practice an anticipation of Dogen's later concept of
Buddhist practice as realization, To be sure, this
idea is in no way developed in the BNT the way it is
in Dogen, but the germ of Dogen's view is latently
present here. In the BNT, aa`srayaparaav.rtti is
called "pure'' in its role both as cause and as
fruit. But, as we have seen, as cause it is already
in full possession of its character as fruit. We
have here, then, a notion in which every authentic
act of Buddhist practice is itself of the nature of
fruition, the nature of the end of the Path, of
purity or realization. A genuine act of Buddhist
practice, whether the first awakening of the desire
to practice, an advanced state of samaadhi, or the
dedication of oneself to the salvation of others in
perpetuity, is always a manifestation of Buddha
nature as such, which is always of the character of
full and complete clarity and altruism. Purity and
Buddhist practice, then, are alike. Thus
aa`srayaparaav.rtti while always of the nature of
purity and fruition, can nevertheless be identified
with Buddhist practice.

Now insofar as the crucial event which separates
the deluded existential mode from the enlightened
existential mode is the act of conversion,
aa`srayaparaav.rtti, this conversion itself must be
crucial to the concept of personhood embraced by the
BNT. This act of conversion which engenders real
personhood is in effect the foundation of
personhood. If there is any statement which can
apply to both modes of the existential dimension,
and thus epitomizes the existential nature of human
beings as such, it is that we are beings whose
nature it is to transform ourselves, to undergo
radical transformation at the very foundation of
personhood, namely, at the foundation of
act-genesis. The deluded existential mode is the
drive--however convoluted--towards that event, while
the enlightened existential mode is the dynamic
manifestation of that event, the ongoing
manifestation of free personhood.

P.167

A Final Question

A final, and important, question remains to us. When
we combine our insights on the existential and
ontological aspects of human personhood as suggested
by Buddha nature thought, one apparent inconsistency
remains. Buddha nature thought universally affiirms,
"all sentient beings possess the Buddha nature.''
If, though, as I have argued above, Buddha nature is
not an entity, but rather certain kinds of acts, and
if in the deluded existential mode such enlightened
acts by definition do not appear, what is the status
of Buddha nature for the person in delusion? If, in
short, Buddha nature is not an entity and if it is
not manifest in acts while one is deluded, in what
sense can it be said to be there at all for that
deluded person? It would seem that Buddha nature
could not be present under such conditions. Yet the
Buddha nature tradition specifically asserts that
the deluded also possess Buddha nature. How can this
be?

The beginning of an answer to this question is
the acknowledgment that in the deluded existential
mode Buddha nature is really just a promise. When,
from time to time, the deluded person acts freely
out of Buddha nature, then, in that act of
"purity,'' Buddha nature is fully manifest, fully
realized. Outside such moments, it is only a
promise. That this must be so can be seen when one
places Buddha nature thought in the larger context
of Buddhist philosophy. In Buddhism, "reality"
always means "experiential reality." To ascribe
reality to anything outside experience would
certainly violate the most basic Buddhist
principles. So to the extent that, in delusion,
Buddha nature is outside experiential reality (our
experiential reality is the concealing kle`sa), it
is not in any real way present. It is present only
as promise. In this light, we can look once again at
the passage quoted above from the BNT:

Attachments are not real; therefore they are called
vacuous. If one gives rise to these attachments,
true wisdom will not arise. When one does away with
these attachments, then we speak of Buddha nature.
(787b)

While the attachments are experientially present, we
do not speak of Buddha nature. Only when wisdom is
experientially present do we speak of it, or claim
it.

A parallel to this reading of the text is found
in Sung Bae Park's study of doctrinal and
patriarchal faith in Zen. He writes:

Whereas doctrinal faith is the commitment that "I
can become Buddha, " patriarchal faith is the
affirmation that "I am already Buddha.'' Therefore,
patriarchal faith is not to be regarded as a
''preliminary" to enlightenment, as is doctrinal
faith, but as equivalent to enlightenment itself. To
arouse patriarchal faith is to become instantly
enlightened.(15)

Thus, insofar as the patriarchal faith that "I am
already Buddha" is equivalent to the realization of
enlightenment, one cannot authentically affirm "I am

P.168

already Buddha" until one is enlightened, that is,
until one experientially knows one's Buddhahood.
This is the language of Zen, and the BNT does not
speak quite this way. I believe, though, that the
BNT's affirmation, "I, a deluded person, possess the
Buddha nature," must be understood to function
authentically only within the same limits. The
statement can only be made by a person who knows
experientially that it is true.

These statements take us close to the solution
of our problem. While in the deluded existential
mode, Buddha nature is present as promise in two
senses, which must be distinguished. First, of
course, there is the promise of future Buddhahood
affirmed for all. Second, and more imporrant for the
present question, there is the promise that Buddha
nature is present to the deluded person now in the
sense that it can and will appear in its fullness
and purity now if only the deluded person will open
his or her eyes and see it. Thus, to say that Buddha
nature is present "only" as a promise while in the
deluded existential mode is not to negate that it
is, in fact, present and real at all times and in
all conditions. But it is up to the deluded person
to see that reality, to "realize" the reality of the
Buddha nature for him- or herself now, in the
present moment.

In this context, we should recall that in the
BNT the Buddha nature is consistently identified
with Buddhist practice. Thus, all appearance of
contradiction or inconsistency is removed when we
think of Buddha nature as equivalent to the Buddhist
practice of those still enmired in the existential
dimension of delusion. Thus, Buddha nature can be
present now, in its fullness and purity, even though
it is not an entity of any kind and even though one
is enmired in the condition of delusion insofar as
it is manifest in acts of practice, or, in other
words, insofar as, and no farther than, one's
actions bring that Buddha nature into the world of
experiential reality.

CONCLUSION

The present essay is an exercise in cross-cultural
philosophy and, moreover, a demonstration of the
fact that cross-cultural philosophy is today a
Western enterprise. I have taken an ancient Chinese
Buddhist text. attempted to explain it in its own
terms, and then lifted it whole and dropped it into
the world of Western philosophical inquiry. What has
emerged from this process is something new:
something that is neither a Chinese Buddhist
artifact, nor something that fits entirely
comfortably into contemporary Western philosophy.

The views expressed above on the concept of
person, and especially on the existential aspects of
this concept, are only implicit in the text from
which I have derived them, but they are there in
potential; they can be deduced and made explicit
when the relevant questions are applied. They follow
directly from the textual material and are
consistent with the general philosophical
perspective of East Asian Mahaayaana Buddhism. I
suggest that many Buddhist

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(and other Asian) texts should be searched, as I
have searched the BNT, with the questions which a
modern Westerner cannot help asking help in hand,
rather than tucked away. To approach a text with
questions derived from a variety of perspectives
(including culturally alien views) is to offer that
text the opportunity to unfold its potential. To be
sure, something new is created in this process,
which should not be confused with the original text
itself, but without this process, the text is
relegated to past history.

NOTES

1. The author wishes to thank Professor Leon
Hurvitz for checking the Chinese translations and
making a number of important suggestions for
improvement. Any remaining errors are of course mine
alone.

2. Takasaki Jikido(ao) , "Structure of the
Anuttaraa`srayasuutra (Wu Sbang I Ching(ap) ), "
Indogaku Bukkyogaku kenkyuu 8 (March 1960): 35 (his
citation of Hattori).

3. Ui Hakuju(aq), Hoshoron kenkyuu(ar) (Tokyo.
Iwanami Shoten), 1960, p. 366. Takemura Shoho(as),
Busshoron kenkyuu(at) (Tokyo: Hyakkaengan, 1978. p.
6.

4. Fo Hsing Lun(a) , in Tarsho shinshuu
daizokyo(au) 31, no. 1610: 787-794. Future
references to the Buddha Nature Treatise will be
given parenthetically in the text of the article.
The author gratefully acknowledges the support of
the National Endowment for the Humanities, in the
form of a 1985 Summer stipend, which furthered her
research on the Buddha Nature Treatise, resulting in
the present article as well as a future book-length
study of the same subject.

5. The four subjects of contemplation, the four
kinds of right effort, the four steps to super
powers, the five spiritual faculties and their five
associated powers, the seven levels of bodhi
(wisdom) , and the eight constituents of the
Eightfold Noble Path.

6. As will be explained below, the Thusness of
Thusness represents, in this text, the mutuality of
the subjective and objective facets of Thusness.

7. In other words, this section of the article
is an inquiry into what would formerly have been
called the text's "concept of man.'' With the
discovery that the term "man" is a false generic,
this phrase is no longer appropriate. Unfortunately,
no phrase has yet been found to serve as an adequate
replacement, although "philosophical anthropology"
probably comes closest in meaning. In what follows.
in place of the question "What is man?'' I will ask.
"What is a person?"

8. For the idea of these two dimensions I am
indebted to Joaquin Perez-Remon. Self and Non-Self
in Early Buddhism, Reason and Religion. no. 22 (The
Hague: Mouton, 1980).

9. For a more detailed discussion of this
passage as well as further elaboration of the
nonentivative, active quality of the Buddha nature,
see Sallie King, "The Buddha Nature: True Self as
Action.'' Relipious Studies 20 (June 1984): 255-267.

10. The author refers to the text as Pao ting
ching(av), but it should be Pao chi ching(aw).
(Takemura Shoho(as), Busshoron kenkyuu(at) (Tokyo:
Hyakkaengan, 1978): 157.

11. The sixth consciousness of Yogaacaara
thought, which is responsible for discriminating
between "self' and "not-self."

12. The realms of desire, form, and the
formless.

13. I take this translation from Aramaki
Noritoshi's paper presented at the U.S. -Japan
Conference on Japanese Buddhism, Madison, Wisconsin,
in 1985. I do not wish to convey any sense of a
Christian conversion experience by my use of this
term; however, I do intend the connotation of a
fundamentally life-altering experience, a
connotation which is present in the Chinese use of
the term.

14. Juan Mascaro, trans., The Upanishads
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1965),
Pra`sna Upani.sad, p. 74.

15. Sung Bae park, Buddhist Faith and Sudden
Enlightenment (Albany: SUNY Press, 1983), p. 19.

a 佛性论 aa 本性
b 天亲 ab 依
c 真谛 ac 众生
d 卷 ad 凡夫
e 本有 ae 菩萨
f 分别性 af 圣人
g 依他性 ag 佛
h 真实性 ah 我波罗蜜
i 道理 ai 境
j 依止 aj 意识
k 依他 ak 唯识智
l 真如 al 无
m 如来藏 am 提婆
n 藏 an 显
o 正境 ao 高崎直道
p 如如境 ap (佛性)无上依经
q 正行 aq 宇井伯寿
r 智 ar 宝性论研究
s 能摄藏 as 武邑尚邦
t 为 at 佛性论研究
u 如 au 大正新修大藏经
v 是 av 宝顶经
w 如如智 aw 宝积经
x 如如境
y 如如
z 转依