Buddhism and cognitivism: A postmodern appraisal

·期刊原文

Buddhism and cognitivism: A postmodern appraisal

by John Pickering

Asian Philosophy

vol. 5 No.1 May.1995, Pp.23-38

Copyright of Asian Philosophy

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ABSTRACT Cognitivism, presently the major paradigm of psychology,
presents a scientific account of mental life. Buddhism also presents
an account of mental life, but one which is integral with its wider
ethical and transcendental concerns. The postmodern appraisal of
science provides a framework within which these two accounts may be
compared without inheriting many of the assumed oppositions between
science and religion. It is concluded that cognitivism and Buddhism
will have complementary roles in the development of a more pluralist
psychological science. In this development it will be necessary to
address what values are implicit in science.

Introduction

Buddhism qua religion, and psychology qua science might be expected to have
little in common. Religion is framed as assertions of transcendental truth
and depends for its authority on shared faith in revelation. It is thus and
to that extent absolute and final. Science on the other hand is framed as
theories of material truth whose authority rests on the degree to which
they can withstand disproof. It is thus and to that extent relative and
provisional. Science deals in public and explicit facts while religion
deals with private and tacit beliefs. While science is taken to be
value-neutral natural philosophy, religion transmits and recasts a system
of values. Accordingly, while religion can be relatively unconcerned about
the ordinary world, science, secure in its unique authority, takes no more
account of religion than of any other system of culturally relative myth.
It seems, then, that any significant interaction between the two is
unlikely.

In the postmodern era, this caricature of the modernist divide between
science and religion has far less force. A shift is taking place towards a
more pluralist arena within which due weight is given to other cultural
discourses which recognise the subjectivity of the human condition, as well
as objectivist science. Such a move, at the turn of the present century,
echoes the pluralist stance of William James who, at the turn of the last,
found no difficulty in pursuing psychology as the science of mental life
while at the same time addressing the varieties of religious experience.

There are at least two reasons why the assumed opposition of science and
religion can be set aside when Buddhism and scientific psychology are
considered. First, Buddhism is not a religion in the same sense as the
Abrahamic religions to which the modernist division of science and religion
applies most directly. It is especially inappropriate to identify Buddhism
with faith, revelation, an immortal soul and a personified Creator. There
is neither a Creator nor soul in Buddhism and, inasmuch as anything like
faith or revelation is concerned, it is the confidence that certain
teachings provide the means to know important facts of human existence.
Since these teachings must be personally explored and tested, Buddhism is
also a practice, a systematic mental culture which has been developed by
investigation rather than fixed by faith in revelation. It is in this sense
that Buddhist and scientific psychology can be placed in relation and
compared.

Second, psychology is not a science. Not, that is, in the modern positivist
sense, because of the essential subjectivity of its central phenomenon,
consciousness. Despite the enigmas of contemporary physics, modernist
science continues to assume that its subject matter is independent of the
human mind. It is this that makes it possible to believe that a positivist
programme can be pursued. Of course, the mind can be treated as if it were
a material object. Indeed, most psychological studies are objective in the
conventional sense, and for most of its history psychology has marginalised
phenomenology as part of a positivist programme.

But this is to study the vehicle of mental life rather than the thing
itself. To deal with the mind appropriately means that psychology needs to
be fundamentally rather than incidentally concerned with consciousness. But
consciousness, the principal and unique justification for the existence of
psychology itself, is essentially a phenomenological matter, which means
that it cannot stand as a science in the modernist sense. If psychology
abandons consciousness then it will be crucially incomplete. If it does
not, then it perforce becomes a special case within positive science.

Scientific psychology presently takes cognitivism as its principal
paradigm, replacing the behaviourism that dominated the discipline up to
the late 1950s. In what follows, 'cognitivism' will be used as a collective
term for what are variously referred to as: the information processing
approach, functionalism, cognitive psychology, cognitive science, the
cognitive approach and a variety of other related terms. Cognitivism seeks
a unified, formal theory of the rational component of psychological
functions such as language, perception, memory and thought. The principal
means to develop this formal theory is to describe the operation of the
brain in computational terms. This is not just a metaphor. The brain is not
studied 'as if' it were carrying out some sort of computation. Instead, it
is assumed that what the brain does can be formalised in terms of
computational theory.

It is this effort after a unified formal theory that shows the degree to
which cognitivism inherits the positivist programme of modernist science.
The effort is to perfect, through a programme of theory development,
computer simulation and empirical investigation, a unified, formal and
mechanistic account of a particular level of mental life, that is, of
rational cognitive processing. Once developed, this account will help to
understand how other aspects of mental life, including intentionality, the
emotions and subjectivity, are produced and supported by this level. This
programme has been highly productive during the second half of this century
and presently cognitivism exerts a great influence over most of psychology
and over related disciplines.

Happily, unlike behaviourism, cognitivism does not reject consciousness.
This, over the past decade or so, has made its way back towards the top of
the psychological agenda. It would thus seem an appropriate time to
consider the interaction that might be possible with Buddhism, where
consciousness has been the focus of investigation for some 25 centuries. We
shall start by identifying some Buddhist sources and specifying in more
detail the aspects of cognitivism with which they might be compared.

Buddhist Texts and Cognitivism

Although Buddhism and cognitivism are situated within different cultural
and metaphysical frameworks, both deal with the workings of the mind, the
mind-body relationship and the nature of human action. Perhaps most
significantly here, both present systematic systems of psychological
enquiry. Accordingly, some attempt to bring the two into relation can be
made so long as there is proper regard for what may and may not be
compared.

The sources that have been used here are mostly early Buddhist texts. The
developments of later periods has not obscured their fundamentally
psychological nature. However, Buddhism addresses the transcendental
context of the human condition and cannot be treated as if it were a
Western scientific theory; there is no such thing as Buddhist psychology
apart from Buddhism in toto. The psychological teachings of Buddhism must
also be considered together with the practices of mental culture within
which these teachings are comprehensible. Even so, the psychological
content of early Buddhism is patent and deals with everyday cognitive
processes such as perception, attention and feeling. This is what will here
be called Buddhist psychology and which will be compared to cognitivism.
[1]

In Western terms, Buddhism presents a rough approximation of a
phenomenological psychology founded on process metaphysics. Human mental
life is portrayed as caught up in samsara, or the cycle of conditioned and
illusory existence. The interplay of physical and mental causes is set out
in the doctrine of dependent origination which describes the arising and
the sustaining of the ego: a centre of awareness, affect, sensation,
discriminative awareness, thinking, volition, action and consciousness. The
real nature of samsara is obscured by ignorance, craving and frustration
which distort psychological processes and lead to actions that, unless
skilfully managed, entangle human beings more deeply in the cycle of
conditioned existence. The result is that experience of the human condition
is primarily one of dissatisfaction. The cure is to understand that the
psycho-physical processes underlying the flow of human experience are not
psychological absolutes, but skills that may be improved. Thus the purpose
and character of Buddhist psychology is fundamentally therapeutic, the
objective being to become more skilled in managing human mental life and to
promote more satisfactory living.

Even from such a condensed account, it is clear that Buddhism presents many
sharp contrasts with cognitivism. While these place limits on integration
between the two, they are no bar to quite detailed comparison. Broadly
speaking, the more productive comparisons have not attempted to assimilate
Eastern to Western views or vice versa but rather to place the two within a
more inclusive context. [2]

This integrative stance is in line with the postmodern appraisal of science
in general and with psychological science in particular. [3] A postmodern,
pluralist psychology can reduce the assumed opposition between cognitivism
qua science and Buddhism qua religion. Instead, it becomes possible to
explore their similarities and contrasts as a means to creating a more
complete and developed science of the mind. Accordingly, the next section
examines some ways in which cognitivism and Buddhism might interact.

Models of Interaction

Comparing Buddhism with cognitivism may be to make some sort of category
error, in which case no significant interaction is to be expected. This
null case inherits the assumed incompatibility of Buddhism and cognitivism
from the modernist separation of scientific realism from religious
transcendentalism. There is a prima facie case for the null model in, for
instance, the clear methodological contrasts. The methodological stance of
cognitivism is public and obective theory development. Buddhist practices
are essentially individualistic, phenomenological and based on historically
grounded teachings. Practices that might be represented in Buddhism as
verification might, from a scientific point of view, be seen as
indoctrination.

Given these and many other differences we could simply conclude that there
can be no significant interaction. This may in time turn out to be the
case, but as a way of proceeding, or not proceeding, it has little to
recommend it. It is becoming clear that many assumed barriers to
interaction result from a projective distortion of Buddhist thought which
overemphasises transcendence and obscures its empirical content.

The postmodern turn also encourages a move away from the null model. Recent
discussions reveal that cognitivism is an eclectic arena in which different
approaches to the mind may be brought into relation with one another. More
broadly, it is now clear that science is more intimately embedded within a
wider framework of cultural influences than was previously thought. Science
is a type of collective cultural perception, rather than an isolated
logical edifice. More specifically, Whiteheadian organicism is explicitly
cited as a more appropriate philosophical base for a postmodern science.
Process metaphysics is clearly more appropriate to organic sciences like
biology and psychology and opens the door to a more detailed interaction
with Buddhism. Partly as a result of these shifts in the view of science in
general and of cognitivism in particular, there has been a recent upsurge
of dialogue between Buddhism and scientists, including cognitive
scientists. [4]

The null model is unproductive and perpetuates the assumed incompatibility
between religious and scientific accounts of the human phenomenon. This
historically imposed difficulty need not hinder more productive models
which assume that significant interaction is possible. Once more specific
issues are considered, for example the role of consciousness and the
relationship between cognition and affect, the possibilities for
interaction expand.

A more productive model of interaction might be to take Buddhism and
cognitivism as offering complementary perspectives on the mind. Where one
treats the mind as an external object the other treats it as something to
be known through subjective experience; one emphasises individual
investigation while the other adopts the collective consensual style of
modernist science and so on. Complementarity may be appropriate in studies
of meditation and other altered states of consciousness, where Buddhism
offers techniques to create altered states of consciousness while the West
has technological means to study them. Here, Buddhism has a rich vocabulary
while the West has powerful means to operationalise that vocabulary. [5]

Jung found in Buddhism a significant complement to those elements of
psychoanalysis, religion and science from which he synthesised his own
views and practice. He was, however, cautious on how far this synthesis
might go. His view was that the over-rationality of Western scientism has
created a collective psychic need for the mystical and transcendental
elements supposed to be the essential characteristic of Buddhism. This
makes it difficult for Buddhism to be appraised in the West without
projective distortion. Thus Jung, while supporting the comparison of
psychoanalysis and Zen, suggested that such work would be limited by deeply
rooted differences in the cultural and psycho-historical contexts of the
two subjects. [6]

Another alternative to the null model is to propose that Buddhism and
cognitivism will be found to resemble each other in some respects, even if
theoretical grounds for this will be difficult to discover. Naturally, some
degree of resemblance is to be expected. Equally, however, since the
metaphysical basis and methods of the two systems are so different, it may
not be possible to decide whether this resemblance is superficial or
otherwise. Resemblances are easily identified, but explanations are more
difficult to find. There are, for example, numerous studies of the
resemblance between early Buddhist practices for behaviour change and
contemporary Western psychotherapeutic techniques, especially behaviour
therapy. Nonetheless it is unclear just how far this resemblance can be
accounted for theoretically. [7]

Of course, where therapeutic aims are to be fulfilled, resemblances may be
accepted on pragmatic grounds. For instance, the similarity between
Rational Emotive Therapy and therapeutic techniques based on Buddhist
practices is clear, but is simply acknowledged without being analysed in
any detail. Resemblances have also been identified in behaviour
modification and psychoanalysis. It is no accident that these cases concern
therapy. The essence of Buddhist psychology is therapeutic and significant
correspondences with Western psychotherapeutic theory and practice are thus
not so surprising, given their pragmatic character. What is perhaps more
surprising is that the basis for these correspondences are often relatively
precise objectives concerning changes in cognitive function. [8]

However, progress beyond resemblance may be possible in respect of
cognitivism given that it is underpinned by a more explicit theory. Perhaps
the strongest alternative to the null case would be the claim that it is
possible to put Buddhism and cognitivism into precise correspondence,
despite apparent differences. Furthermore, Buddhism has had little or no
recourse to physiology or to relatively technical matters such as
information theory or formal linguistics. Also apart from these obvious
differences there are less obvious but not less significant ones. For
example, cognitivist methods are for the empirical development of a theory.
Buddhist practices of mental culture are not for development of a theory
but for its experiential verification and use. Buddhism changes slowly and,
in as much as it transmits fundamental teachings, may even be said not to
change at all. By contrast cognitivism, like any science, changes
incessantly. Buddhism relies heavily on the experiences of exceptionally
trained individuals, while cognitivism relies on objective data, often
averaged over groups of ordinary people. Although many studies of Buddhism
and Western psychology have appeared, all are cautious about precise
correspondence between, say, specific psychological structures or the
timing of mental events. [9]

For the moment, the expectation of precise correspondence is not realistic.
A mixture of resemblance and complementarily covers the present situation.
It may be possible to move closer to a correspondence position in future.
The questions is: how might this move be made? The next section examines
how Buddhism might influence the development of cognitivism.

Buddhism and the Development of Cognitivism

Cognitivism, like any science, is in a constant state of development.
Specific, peripheral issues turn over rapidly, while more general, central
topics such as memory, perception and reasoning remain comparatively
stable. Although subject to more measured development, these central
topics, along with a distinctive methodology, maintain cognitivism's
persistent identity. The lively activity of peripheral topics combined with
longer-term movements of the central ones gives the development of the
whole an amoeba-like character. While movement of the central issues to
some extent generates the activity in more peripheral ones, the peripheral
topics are more reactive to the wider intellectual milieu, and transmit
directive influences back to the centre. These influences include the image
of science on which cognitivism models itself. This image is changing. The
modernist unitary discipline, dominated by reduction and Cartesian
mechanism is giving way to a postmodern pluralist discourse in which
reduction is balanced by emergence and mechanism is tempered with
Whiteheadian organicism. [10]

Following the amoeba analogy, the development of cognitivism can be said to
be the result of a complex of internal and external forces or indicators.
It thus may be asked how Buddhism might play a role as either an internal
or external indicator. As an internal indicator Buddhism might, in
conjunction with contemporary research, be involved in the generation and
testing of theoretical alternatives. As an external indicator Buddhism
might contribute to the general direction of research and to the
development of a more pluralist methodology. Illustrations of both these
roles can be found.

an Internal Indicator

An example of how Buddhism might act as an internal indicator is provided
by the issue concerning the relationship of cognition and emotion. Until
quite recently this question has been regarded as something that would have
to be left until the cognitive bedrock of mental life had been located. As
a recent historian of cognitivism puts it, there has been: " . . . the
deliberate decision to de-emphasise certain factors which . . . would
unnecessarily complicate the cognitive scientific enterprise. These include
the influence of emotions . . . " [11]

Cognitivism marginalises emotion as one of a number of factors that are
somehow outside cognition proper, that is, not necessary parts of it but
rather optional adjuncts to it. To consider these factors at the same time
would be to obscure the rational foundations of cognition. Implicit in this
approach is an ordering of objectives. First, some understanding of basic
cognitive mechanisms must be achieved; this is why a formal computational
theory has been one of cognitivism's major objectives. After this, it is
assumed, it will be possible to show how these mechanisms underpin other
aspects of mental life, including, eventually, awareness and feelings. It
is not that emotion is irrelevant, nor that it is a false category of
mental life, rather it is that emotion is taken to be necessarily
subsequent to basic cognitive mechanisms such as recognition, memory and
judgement and these, therefore, must be understood first. The
phenomenological world and its emotional accompaniment must wait its turn.

Cognitivism's treatment of emotion is predominantly concerned with its
rational precursors and how it functions as an adjunct to processes such as
attention, decision making or memory. A clear position on this issue is
taken by Lazarus who suggests that cognitive interpretation is necessarily
and always involved in emotional responses and that, as he puts it,
"cognitive appraisal (of meaning or significance) underlies and is an
integral feature of all emotional states". [12]

However, a number of objections have been raised against this view, from
the very earliest periods of modern psychology and in more recent times,
both from within cognitivism specifically and also from other perspectives,
such as psychoanalytic theories of development. [13] Even those taking a
cognitivist line occasionally consider emotion as a deus ex machina to be
invoked when pure rationality runs into difficulties. For example, the
problem cognitivism has in accounting, mechanistically, for the ceteris
paribus reasoning that is the hallmark of natural intelligence has led to
the suggestion that emotions are involved in selecting between competing
objects of attention or lines of inference. Likewise, cognitivists who have
considered creative thought, often recognise that it is guided more by
emotions and aesthetics than by reason and logic. [14] Here, emotion is
necessarily bound up in cognitive processes as they occur, not as something
that emerges as a post hoe byproduct. Thus, in sharp distinction to the
position of Lazarus, Zajonc offers substantial support for the view that
cognition is not the necessary precursor to all emotional reactions. [15]

These positions on the relationship between emotion and cognition are clear
and distinct. On the one hand emotion is taken to be involved in cognitive
processes in such a way that cognitive evaluation is taken to be a
necessary precondition for emotional experience. On the other, questions of
order or precedence have relatively little meaning. Buddhism has a
discriminative position on this issue, but before turning to this, it is
first worth considering another theoretical dichotomy, this time concerning
conscious awareness.

Mandler contrasts two positions on the cognitive determinants of conscious
experience. One, which he labels the identity view, takes consciousness to
be an unprocessed reflection of autonomous cognitive operations. This
position derives from theories which identify conscious experience with the
input to the currently most dominant of a large number of independent,
competing cognitive subsystems. This suggests that consciousness is post
hoc, and that the workings of cognitive mechanisms autonomously determines
the phenomenological flow. This recalls Thomas Huxley's comment that
consciousness was as causally significant to the workings of the mind as
the steam-whistle was to the progress of a steam locomotive. Such views of
conscious experience portray it bobbing in the wake of self-determining
cognitive mechanisms. [16]

By contrast, a second view, which Mandler labels the constructivist
position, presents consciousness itself as the autonomous element and the
origin of freely chosen adaptive action. Under this view, most conscious
states " . . . are constructed out of . . . preconscious structures in
response to the requirements of the moment . . . phenomenal experience is a
construction . . . " that is, a form of narration under personal control.
This view takes consciousness to be part of human agency which composes
other cognitive products into a phenomenological flow according to need.
This is more in line with what folk psychology takes consciousness to be,
the point of emergence of a flow of autonomous, self-directed action. [17]

Of course, autonomy is a difficult matter. Consciousness, like cognition in
general, is context bound both in the immediate sense of the internal and
external conditions supporting it and in the longer-term sense of the
cultural patterns which influence it. Thus, while the contents of awareness
may be autonomous to some extent, they nonetheless necessarily reflect the
possibilities for action afforded by perceptual input, as has been
emphasised by phenomenological psychology. [18]

We now have two illustrations where Buddhism may help to decide between
theoretical alternatives. In the first case, the question is whether
cognition is emotion's only begetter or whether, following Pascal, we
accept that emotion can have equally important precognitive roots. In the
second case the question is whether conscious experience is a passive
record of prior cognitive events or whether it is a form of narrative whose
moment-to-moment structure is subject to tacit needs and socio-cultural
beliefs.

With respect to the first case, Buddhism holds that although cognitive
evaluation and recognition are precursors to emotion in certain cases, it
is also clear that in a more significant sense, emotion is taken to be
precognitive. Buddhist sources emphasise that emotion is a necessary
accompaniment to all stages of the mind's workings. More importantly again,
is the first result of sensory contact with the world. The emotional tone
of all sensory and mental experience is the motor of mental life and the
flow of human experience. The first consequence of sensory contact is said
not to be sensation, recognition or awareness or any other cognitive
activity but an emotional reaction. This supports a view of emotion as
implicit in any psychological process; emotion and cognition are
necessarily interlinked. This casts doubt on the marginalisation of emotion
on grounds of methodological hygiene. Emotion is primary, not secondary; as
Langer claims: "Feeling ... is the mark of mentality". Donaldson too, in
discussing the limitations of cognitivism's treatment of emotion, argues
for more attention to Buddhist views. [19]

Turning to the second case, it is clear that Buddhism draws something like
the distinction between the identity and constructivist positions on
consciousness. While biophysical activity is recognised as a necessary
enabling condition for mental experience, a fundamental Buddhist principle
is that conscious awareness is structured according to values, views and
needs, much as the constructivist position maintains. Indeed, since the
flow of consciousness experienced is thus liable to be distorted by craving
and attachment this can become a source of error and suffering. Buddhist
practice aims to free consciousness from these distorting influences so
that, as the following quotation from the Suttas states: "In the seen there
will just be the seen, in the heard, just the heard; in the sensed, just
the sensed and in the cognised, just the cognised". [20]

Buddhist teaching and practice have as their aim the more skilled
management of consciousness and a lessening of emotionally distorted
reactions to promote psychological insight and growth. In line with the
constructivist position, Buddhist psychology implies that, rather than
being a passive record of cognitive mechanisms, the contents of
consciousness are actively fashioned. Conscious experience is a construct
not a trace.

To summarise, Buddhism promotes the image of emotion as a parallel
accompaniment to cognition rather than a product of cognitive
discrimination. It also promotes the image of consciousness as the active
component in the construction of mental states and not the passive, post
hoc trace of autonomous mental mechanisms. Thus we have two illustrations
of Buddhism having a position on theoretical alternatives within
cognitivism, that is, acting as an internal indicator.

Buddhism as an External Indicator

Given the postmodern context in which psychology will develop, Buddhism may
also act as an external indicator in a number of ways. One example is the
rebalancing between reductionism and holism. Cognitivism, following the
model of positivist science, generally favours the former. Complex mental
effects are to be understood by reduction to simpler causes such as
neurological or information processing mechanisms. The reason being that
were the mind to be addressed from the holist perspective, its component
parts would be obscured. Only a thorough knowledge of these supposed
components will do for a proper science of the mind; adopting cognitivism
as the unified theory of psychology will avoid the discipline degenerating
into mere relativistic phenomena collection. [21]

But reductionism has consequences. Not only are cognitive processes to be
decomposed, hampering proper phenomenological engagement with them, but
also cognition must be isolated from other aspects of mental life such as
affect and volition. Such an approach is only justifiable if it is accepted
that cognitivism model itself on those sciences where analytic reductionism
has proved effective. But, as is proposed here, the subject matter of
psychology is unique in a way that rules out taking other sciences as a
model in this way. Therefore, this justification for analytic reductionism
fails.

Following the postmodern turn, a more even balance is being sought between
reduction and holism, particularly in the biological sciences. Reduction on
its own cannot disclose the nature of organic systems, and it is clear that
the mind is intimately bound up in such systems. The fragmented human image
created by modernist science has long been resisted by some psychologists
and there are indications that cognitivism is approaching a time of
fundamental change and re-assessment. Over the last two decades there have
been calls for psychological research to be recontextualised in a framework
of human motives. For example, even though most research on cognition and
emotion is still heavily biased towards the primacy of cognition, there are
now moves towards treating cognition and emotion together. While there are
signs of change such as these, the position is still significantly short of
the Buddhist view of emotion and cognition as inextricably entwined at the
heart of the human psyche. It should be noted, however, that this view has
in fact been a clear if minor thread in Western psychological thinking,
with roots stretching back through Spinoza and Vico. [22]

There are also signs that Buddhism is indirectly contributing to a shift in
the balance between reduction and holism within cognitivism itself. The
search for formal laws of rational mental life has lead to the
decontextualisation of cognition. Recent critiques advocating a more
naturalistic, phenomenal approach are apt to cite Buddhist thinkers and
philosophers who were influenced by Buddhism. [23] In the postmodern era,
psychology is moving towards a holist, contextualised view of mental life.
Experience and its biophysical vehicle are seen as different aspects of one
system with mutually evolved parts. Such a view resembles the doctrine of
dependent origination and is in line with developments within Western
science more generally. [24]

Buddhism advances a non-dual view of mind and brain and of the necessary
integration of cognition with the emotions and the will. As a consequence,
it rarely treats cognition in isolation since it does not operate in
isolation. To do otherwise would be to create boundaries where none exist.
The doctrine of dependent origination holds that the flow of experience is
bound up with the activity of the body and the mind in a dynamic cycle of
interacting causes. The emergent and self-maintaining structures produced
by this cycle participate in what Whitehead has called the 'creative
advance of nature'. Since there is such an affinity between process
metaphysics and Buddhism, it is not surprising that Buddhist psychology
emphasises that cognition, emotion and the will participate together in
this creative advance. The purpose of this emphasis on the continuity and
interdependence of psycho-physical causality is to increase awareness of
the cycles of causation, both mental and physical, within which the mind
arises and is sustained.

Critiques of modern psychology and its reductionist assumptions often note
the weakness of its account of psycho-physical continuity and the negative
image of the human condition it promotes. [25] Postmodern psychology will
be postcognitive psychology; a pluralist discourse in which cognitivism
will participate with other traditions to create a more complete science of
the mind. It is in this spirit that it has been suggested here that
Buddhism may interact with cognitivism and thus play a role in the
development of postmodern psychology. The final section of this paper looks
briefly at one issue that this role may raise, which is the moral dimension
of scientific psychology.

Consequences of Interaction

The interactions discussed here suggest Buddhism may interact with
cognitivism as a kind of metatheory. However, given the diversity of
Buddhism on the one hand and the volatility of cognitivism on the other, it
is unrealistic to expect to reach any final state which resolves the
incompatibilities and confirms the similarities between them. Rather,
continuing efforts can be made to seek in Buddhism both internal and
external indicators for the development of a postmodern science of the
mind.

The postmodern turn has seen a critical re-assessment of science. Instead
of the uniquely powerful investigation of nature, the idea is now about
that science is but one of many culturally supported knowledge systems.
Philosophers propose a range of views of science as an epistemological
craft or practice with its own culture and fashions. Science is no longer
privileged, scientific theories and the methods generated by them are not
absolute and cumulative. They are provisional and subject to radical
revision; not just in the Popperian sense of disproof, but in the deeper
sense of being metaphors for a reality that cannot be directly known. [26]

Science has meaning within a particular condition of culture. This
hermeneutic stance is perhaps more true for psychological science, given
the essential subjectivity of its subject, than it is for the biological or
physical sciences. Even highly formalised cognitivist theories, such as
those of Marr and Nishihara on early visual processing, are probably beyond
the reach of objective disproof. They may, nevertheless, be productive when
placed within a larger interpretive framework. [27]

Generally speaking, philosophers of cognitivism have dealt with the
plausibility of its findings and their implications for classic issues in
the philosophy of mind. They have been less concerned with the effects of
its efforts to adopt the methods and assumptions of positivist science. One
of these effects is a tendency to develop elaborate theories of isolated
parts of the mind while at the same time downplaying the nature of the
whole. As one critical observer has put it: "modern psychology ... remains
a system of observations and hypotheses, already compromised in advance by
the fact that those who practice it are ignorant of the profounder nature
of the phenomena they set out to study". [28]

Now cognitivists might respond that rather than being ignorant of the
mind's profounder nature, they merely have realistic aims. Furthermore,
reductive methodology can be justified because of its success in other
sciences. Accordingly, psychology seeks to isolate and formalise a
particular level of mental life rather than to examine the mind in toto and
in a more naturalistic grain.

But this is to import into psychology what Whitehead called 'the fallacy of
misplaced concreteness' and to suppose that scientific explanation must
necessarily be in terms of formal descriptions of atomistic particulars set
in a static framework. As Whitehead put it, nature cannot be held still in
order to be observed. Doing so obscures aspects of nature carried by
patterns of organic relations, and the mind is just such an aspect. While
reductionism is effective for disclosing the vehicle for these patterns, it
is of strictly limited use in understanding how they participate in the
activity of the whole. Such parts as reductionism discloses need to be
contextualised in a framework or image of how the whole system acts. Within
such a framework the physical, biological and psychological dynamics of the
natural order are understood as parts of a mutually evolved system of
organic relations. There is no need to search within this system for a
particular level of organisation with privileged causal status.
Cognitivism's computational theory or the fundamental material grain of
reality that was the grail of classical physics are chimerical objectives
for science, since they correspond to nothing in reality.

Postmodern science is revising the place of the human phenomenon within the
natural order. The eclipse of modernist science has created a productive
metaphysical vacuum. Within it is growing the image of the mind as bound up
with intrinsically self-organising patterns of biological and physical
order. The human phenomenon is increasingly a focus in areas of science as
diverse as cosmology and chemistry. Both Heidegger's analysis of
technology's impact on human experience of the environment and Bergson's
views on the experience of time are being re-examined, in respect of their
implications for epistemology and psychology. Most importantly,
Whiteheadian process philosophy is recognised as particularly appropriate
for describing the mutually evolved network of organic causation within
which mental life arises and is sustained. Appreciating this network more
fully will provide a framework within which the restrictive dichotomy
between monism and dualism can be replaced by a mutualist view. [29]

The mutualist view is that mind, brain and the patterns of activity which
link them are supported within a web of mutually evolved organic relations.
Although evolution is not an issue in many forms of Buddhism, this
mutualist view has a great deal in common with the process metaphysics that
is compatible with all forms. Accordingly, interaction with Buddhism could
promote a broader organic contextualisation of cognitivism. It is
significant in this context to note that recent critiques of cognitivism
have objected to the neglect of the biological context of cognition. [30]

As well as any theoretical changes that interaction between Buddhism and
cognitivism would entail, it would also raise the issue of the moral
dimension of psychological science. As Bohm has put it: "A postmodern
science should not separate matter and consciousness and should not
therefore, separate facts, meaning and value." [31]

Presently, a common view is that science only deals with epistemic values.
If moral or ethical values do become attached to science, they are side
effects of its influence on human concerns. Ethical, utilitarian and other
non-epistemic values are secondary and contingently rather than necessarily
attached to science. It is the uses to which science and technology are put
that have moral consequences; thereby, and only thereby, does science enter
the moral arena. Cognitivism, inheriting this positivist model of science,
thus implicitly takes itself to be the rational and systematic acquisition
of intrinsically value-free knowledge.

This view has, however, recently come under critical scrutiny. Part of the
postmodern reappraisal of psychological science is the recognition that
science inherently participates in the wider realm of culturally defined
value. More deeply, the suggestion has been made that science taps a value
system preceding that of human culture and one that is necessarily related
to ethical and moral issues in ways that Buddhism has emphasised. [32]

While the value dimension of cognitivism is contingent rather than
necessary, the value dimension of Buddhism is necessary rather than
contingent. Buddhism's concern with value arises from the doctrine of
dependent origination and the place it gives to human action within the
natural order. Human action is intrinsically value-laden by virtue of
necessary cause and effect relationships that impose no qualitative break
between physical, psychological and ethical matters. All action has a moral
content over and above that stemming from any human code. Putting it
broadly, there is no right and wrong but rather action and its
consequences. Accordingly, Buddhist psychological insight is inherently
value laden. It is in this sense that interaction between cognitivism,
supposedly a value-free science, with Buddhism, an intrinsically
value-laden practice, will raise moral questions.

Buddhism does not distinguish ethical and physical domains in the same way
as Kant's distinction between physical laws and moral precepts. It may be
for this reason that Buddhism often features in current discussions of
environmental impact of technocractic culture. [33] This impact has to do
with running counter to patterns of organic causality that presently lie
outside the understanding of science and technology. These patterns include
the causal links of mind and body which Buddhism maintains it is possible
to understand more fully by the training of awareness. This is one of the
reasons why Buddhist psychology does not exist as a separate discipline: "
. . . the nature of psychological phenomena cannot be completely separated
from the underlying concept of reality in Buddhism--questions about the
structure of the universe and the nature of man . . . relate to physical
and moral as well as psychological phenomena". [34] The doctrine of
dependent origination gathers mind, action and material reality within a
single system. In this respect, Buddhist views will make a distinctive
contribution to the debate on the values implicit in cognitivism and in
science more generally.

Conclusions

This paper has emphasised how Buddhism may contribute to the development of
postmodern psychology. It is clear, however, that influences will move in
both directions, which may be to the advantage of Buddhism. Many Buddhist
traditions rely so heavily on exceptional individuals that they tend to
become arcane and authoritarian. This exerts an unhelpful selective
influence on those who would take an interest in Buddhism. It discourages
those who value the libertarian and humanitarian provenance of scientific
culture and attracts those who seek, often uncritically, an alternative to
an uncongenial scientific view. Informed interaction with cognitivism may
serve to make Buddhism seem less esoteric to those who would otherwise
reject it.

There is also the possibility that new and useful additions to Buddhist
thought will occur. Cognitivism is, for example, more informed about the
biophysical nature of the brain and offers a more innovative, open
methodology for investigating the mind. Cognitivism, like any science, is
in a permanent state of change while Buddhism is stable by comparison.
While cognitivism evolves rapidly through the conjectures and refutations
of the scientific method, Buddhist teachings and practices change slowly,
grounded as they are in a vastly more extended historical perspective.
Buddhism, aiming to promote more skilful living, is practised as well as
studied. Cognitivism, a supposedly value-free inquiry into psychological
reality, is studied rather than practised. Buddhism has the purpose of
helping those who practise it to lead a more satisfactory life.
Practitioners of cognitivism, by contrast, aim to add to knowledge of the
mind qua object and do not expect to change much in the process. For
cognitivism the theory changes while the cognitivist remains the same; for
Buddhism, the reverse is the case.

In the postmodern condition, even such major differences are no barrier to
exploring the many points of similarity which, apart from being productive,
may also be desirable. Science has replaced religion as the modernist world
view. In the process it has impoverished the image of the human condition
within the natural order. The Enlightenment may, have removed a morass of
repressive dogma, but a lot of security and comprehensibility of the world
went with it. Instead of being special and valuable, the human condition is
now merely an accidental and possibly perverse complication in a universe
which in reality merely comprises what Whitehead called the "meaningless
hurrying of indifferent matter". Such a change cannot occur without
psychological consequences. Enlightenment in the Buddhist sense is rather
different. Bringing these two senses of enlightenment together in a
postmodern science of the mind will help to replace human consciousness
within the natural order.

NOTES

[1] For an appreciation of the psychological content of Buddhism, see
THOULESS, R. (1940) Riddel Memorial Lectures (Oxford, Oxford University
Press) p. 47. For more extended treatments, see JOHANSSON, R. (1979) The
Dynamic Psychology of early Buddhism (London, Curzon Press); KALUPAHANA, D.
(1987) The Principles of Buddhist Psychology (Albany, NY, SUNY Press); and
GUENTHER, H. (1989) From Reductionism to Creativity (London, Shambala).

[2] JUNG, C. G. (1943) The psychology of eastern meditation, in: Collected
Works (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press) 1967. See also pp. 24-29
of Jung's preface to the revised edition of SUZUKI, D. T, FROMM, E. & DE
MARTINO, R. (Eds) (1970) Zen Buddhism & Psychoanalysis (New York, Harper &
Row).

[3] GRIFFIN, D. R. (Ed.) (1988) The Reenchantment of Science, Postmodern
Proposals (Albany, NY, State University of New York Press); GERGEN, K. J.
(1992) Towards a postmodern psychology, in: S. KVALE (Ed) Psychology and
Postmodernism (London, Sage).

[4] For recent discussions of cognitivism, see BROWN, G. (1990) Cognitive
science and its relation to Psychology, The Psychologist: Bulletin of the
British Psychological Society, 8, pp. 339-343; W. HIRST ted) (1988) The
Making of Cognitive Science: Essays in Horror of George Miller (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press); and MEYERING, T. C. (1989) Historical Roots of
Cognitive Science (Dordrecht, Kluwer). Among the clearest discussions of
science as a cultural practice are GRENE, M. (1987) Historical realism and
contextual objectivity: a developing perspective in the philosophy of
science, in: N.J. NERSESSIAN (Ed.) The Process of Science (Dordrecht,
Kluwer); and GRENE, M. (1987) Perception, interpretation in the sciences:
toward a new philosophy of science, in: Philosophy in its Variety: essays
in honour of Francois Bordet (Belfast, Queens University Press). For a
discussion of Whiteheadian organicism, see GRIFFIN, op. cit., note 3.
Recent work on science and Buddhism is illustrated by: WALLACE, B. (1989)
Choosing Reality (Boston, MA, Shambala); HAYWARD, J, (1987) Shifting
Worlds, Changing Minds (Boston,/MA, Shambala); HAYWARD, J. & VARELA, F.
(Eds) (1992) Gentle Bridges: Conversations with the Dalai Lama on the
Sciences of Mind (Boston, MA, Shambala); VARELA, F., THOMPSON, E. & ROSCH,
E. (1991) The Embodied Mind (Boston, MA, MIT Press); and DAVIES, M, (1990)
A Scientist Looks at Buddhism (Lewes, UK, The Book Guild).

[5] WEST, M. (Ed.) (1987) The Psychology of Meditation (Oxford, Oxford
University Press); and SCHAPIRO, D. H. & WALSH, R. N. (1984) Meditation:
Classic and Contemporary Perspectives (New York, Aldine) sections 2 & 3
especially.

[6] See Jung's preface to SUZUKI, FROMM & DE MARTINO, op, cit., note 2.

[7] WOOLFOLK, R. L. & FRANKS, C. M. (1984) Meditation and Behaviour
Therapy, in: SCHAPIRO & WALSH, op. cit., note 5; DE SILVA, P. (1984)
Buddhism and behaviour modification, Behaviour Research and Theory, 22, pp.
661-678; DE SILVA, P. (1985) Early Buddhist and modern behavioural
strategies for the control of unwanted intrusive cognitions, Psychological
Record, 35, pp. 437-443; and DE SILVA, P. (1986) Buddhism and behaviour
change: implications for therapy, in: G. CLAXTON (Ed.) Beyond Therapy
(London, Wisdom).

[8] ELLIS, A. (1984) Meditation in rational emotive therapy, in: SCHAPIRO &
WALSH, op. cit., note 5; MIKULAS, W. L. (1981) Buddhism and behaviour
modification, Psychological Record, 28, pp. 59-67. SUZUKI et al. op. cit.,
note 2; DE SILVA op. cit., note 7; SMITH, L (1975) Meditation as
psychotherapy: a review of the literature, Psychological Bulletin, 82, pp.
558-564; KEEFE, T. (1978) Optimal functioning: the Eastern ideal in
psychotherapy, Journal of Contemporary Psychology, 10, pp. 16-24;
RAMASWAMI, S. & SHEIKH, A. (1989) Buddhist psychology: implications for
healing, in: A. SHEIKH & K. SHEIKH (Eds) Eastern and Western Approaches to
Healing (New York, Wiley); and MURASE, T. & JOHNSON, F. (1975) Maikan,
Morita and Western psychotherapy, in: G. PATTERSON (Ed.) Behaviour Change
(New York, NY, Aldine).

[9] GUENTHER, H. & KAWAMURA, L. (1975) Mind in Buddhist Psychology
(Emeryville, CA, Dharma Press); GUENTHER (1976) Philosophy and Psychology
in the Abhidhamma (London, Routledge); GUENTHER, op. cit., note 1;
NYANAPONIKA, T. (1976) Abhidhamma Studies: Researches in Buddhist
Psychology (Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society); and DELMONTE,
M. (1987) Meditation: contemporary theoretical approaches, in: WEST, op.
cit., note 5.

[10] BERMAN, M. (1981) The Re-enchantment of the World (Ithaca, NY, Cornell
University Press); and GRIFFIN op. cit., note 3.

[11] GARDNER, H. (1985) The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive
Revolution (New York, Basic Books) p. 6, For a specific critique of the
treatment of emotion by cognitivism, see KLINE, P. (1988) Psychology
Exposed (London, Routledge).

[12] For Lazarus' position on the primacy of cognitive evaluation in
emotion, see LAZARUS, R. (1982) Thoughts on the relationship of emotion and
cognition, American Psychologist, 37, pp. 1019-1024; and LAZARUS (1984) On
the primacy of cognition, American Psychologist, 39, pp. 124-129. On
emotion as a guide to attention, see SIMON, H. (1967) Motivational and
emotional controls on cognition, Psychological Review, 74, pp. 29-39. On
the relationship of emotion and planning, see OATLEY, K. & JOHNSON-LAIRD,
P. (1987) Towards a cognitive theory of emotions, Cognition and Emotion, 1,
pp. 29-50; and SLOMAN, A. (1987) Motives, mechanisms and emotions,
Cognition and Emotion, 1, pp. 217-233. A general discussion of emotion and
memory is given in chapter 15 of BADDLEY, A. (1990) Human Memory: Theory
and Practice (London, Erlbaum).

[13] For example, at the outset of experimental psychology, Wundt proposed
that psychophysics must necessarily deal with the emotional content of
sensation in order that a full phenomenological picture be drawn. See
WUNDT, W. (1907) Outlines of Psychology (Leipzig, Engleman). More recent
works have emphasised that the study of cognition cannot neglect emotion.
See IZARD, C. (1977) Human Emotions (New York, Plenum Press); MANDLER, G.
(1975) Mind and Emotion (New York, Wiley); and MANDLER (1984) Mind and
Body: The Psychology of Emotion and Stress (New York, Norton). On the
tendency to separate emotion from cognition in developmental psychology,
see DONALDSON, M. (1992) Human Minds: An Exploration (London, Penguin)
especially ch 12 & 13. Also see URWIN, C. (1989) Linking emotion and
thinking in infant development: a psychoanalytic perspective, in: A. SLATER
& G. BREMNER (Eds) Infant Development (Hillsdale, NJ, Erlbaum).

[14] DENNETT, D. (1984) Cognitive wheels: the frame problem of AI, in: C.
HOOKAWAY (Ed.) Minds, Machines and Evolution (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press); and DE SOUSA, R. (1979) The rationality of the emotions,
Canadian Philosophical Review, 18, pp. 41-63. For the emotional dimensions
of creativity see KOESTLER, A. (1959) The Sleepwalkers: A History of Man's
Changing Vision of the Universe (New York, Macmillan); SHEPARD (1978) The
externalisation of mental images and the Act of Creation, in: B. S.
RANDHAWA & W. E. COFFMAN (Eds) Visual Learning, Thinking and Communication
(New York, Academic Press).

[15] ZAJONC, R. (1980) Feeling and thinking: preferences need no
inferences, American Psychologist, 39, pp. 151-175; and ZAJONC, R. (1984)
On the primacy of affect, American Psychologist, 39, pp. 117-123.

[16] MANDLER Mind and Emotion, note 13 op. cit., pp. 55-60.

[17] Ibid., p. 57.

[18] MERLEAU-PONTY, M. (1962) The Phenomenology of Perception (London,
Routledge), For a wider view on the contextualisation of conscious
experience, see VELMANS, M. (1990) Consciousness, brain and the physical
world, Philosophical Psychology, 3, pp. 77-99.

[19] For discussions of the place of emotion in Buddhist psychological
thought, see GUENTHER, Philosophy and Psychology, op. cit., note 9, p. 8;
and ch 2 of DE SILVA, P.M. (1979) An Introduction to Buddhist Psychology
(London, Macmillan). For a Whiteheadian, Western position on the primacy of
feeling see ch 1 of LANGER, S. K. (1988) Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling,
abridged by G. Van Den Heuvel (Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University
Press). For Donaldson's comparison of Western and Buddhist perspectives on
emotion see DONALDSON op. cit., note 13, ch 12 and 13.

[20] For source and context, see DE SILVA, op. cit., note 19, p. 23; See
also GUENTHER, Philosophy and Psychology, op. cit., note 9, p. 185.

[21] ANDERSON, J. (1983)The Architecture of Cognition (Cambridge, MA,
Harvard University Press) ch 1.

[22] For a Whiteheadian perspective on biology, see HO, M-W. & FOX, S. W.
(Eds) (1988) Evolutionary Processes and Metaphors (Chichester, Wiley); HO,
M-W. (1993) Rainbow and the Worm: The Physics of Organisms (Singapore,
World Scientific Publication Company); and GOODWIN, B. (1989) Organisms and
minds as dynamic forms, Leonardo, 22, pp. 27-31. For a physicalist
perspective on the place of mind in nature, see the concluding chapters of
PRIGOGINE, I. & STENGERS, I. (1984) Order Out of Chaos (London, Fontana).
For a recent assessment of the need to re-place the study of cognition in a
framework of human motives, see ch 4 of HARRE, R., CLARKE, D. & DE CARLO,
N. (1985) Motives and Mechanisms (London, Methuen); also HARRE, R. (1993)
Rules, roles and rhetoric, The Psychologist, the Journal of the British
Psychological Society, January. On the Vichian perspective of mind and
emotion, see PICKERING, J. & ATTRIDGE, S. (1990) Metaphors and monsters:
children's story telling, Journal of the Teaching of English, 24.

[23] On the need for a naturalistic setting for psychological research, see
NEISSER, U. (1982) Memory Observed (San Francisco, CA, Freeman). On
Heidegger and other Buddhist influences on Western psychological thinking,
see DREYFUS, S. & DREYFUS, H. (1990) Towards a reconciliation of
phenomenology and AI, in: PARTRIDGE, D. & WILKS, Y.(Eds) The Foundations of
Artificial Intelligence: a sourcebook (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press). WINOGRAD, T. & FLORES, F. (1987) Understanding Computers and
Cognition (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley); BOOKCHIN, M. (1988) Towards a
philosophy of nature--the bases for an ecological ethics, in: M. TOBIAS
(Ed.) Deep Ecology (San Marcos, CA, Avant Books); HAYWARD, op. cit., note
4, p. 61; and GUENTHER, op. cit., p. 180.

[24] For Western mutualist views on the mind-brain relationship, see ch 6
of SPERRY, R. (1985) Science and Moral Priority (New York, Praeger);
SPERRY, R. (1986) The new mentalist paradigm and ultimate concern,
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 29, pp. 413-422; PRIBRAM, K. (1987)
Bergson and the brain: a bio-logical analysis of certain intuitions, in A.
PAPANICOLAOU & P. GUNTER (Eds) Bergson and Modern Thought (London,
Harwood); BOHM, D. (1985) Unfolding Meaning (London, Routledge); BOHM
(1988) Postmodern science and a postmodern world, in: GRIFFIN, op. cit.,
note 3; BOHM (1990) A new theory of the relationship between mind and
matter, Philosophical Psychology, 3, pp. 271-286; HAYWARD op. cit., note 4;
and WALLACE, op. cit., note 4.

[25] LYCAN, W. G. (1987) Consciousness (Boston, MA, MIT) ch 4 and 5.

[26] For science as craft, see GRENE (1987) op. cit., note 4. On the
distinction between epistemological and ethical value, see MACINTYRE, A.
(1985) Relativism. Power and Philosophy, Presidential address Eastern
Division, American Philosophical Association, December 1984, published in
The Proceedings and Addresses of the American Psychological Association,
59, pp. 5-22. For a discussion of metaphors in philosophy and science see
RORTY, R. (1980) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford, Blackwell).

[27] SENT, G. (1986) Hermeneutics and the analysis of complex biological
systems, in: Evolution at a Crossroads (Bolton, MA, MIT) p. 224.

[28] SCHUON, H. (1989) In the Tracks of Buddhism (London, Unwin), p. 46.

[29] Accessible treatments of the significance of the human phenomenon in
the natural order are WALD, G. (1984) Life and mind in the universe,
International Journal of Quantum Chemistry, 11, pp. 1-15; and GREENSTEIN,
G. (1988) The Symbiotic Universe (New York, Morrow). On Heidegger and
technology, see HEIDDEGER, M. (1977) The question concerning Technology &
other essays (New York, Harper and Row); ZIMMERMAN, M. E. (1981) Beyond
'humanism': Heidegger's understanding of technology, in: T. SHEEHAN (Ed.)
Heidegger: The Man and The Thinker (Chicago, Precedent Publishing). Recent
treatments of Bergson and modern thought are in PAPANICOLAOU & GUNTER, op.
cit., note 24. Writings in this area by Wold, Whitehead and Bergson are in
ch 2 of J. PICKERING & M. SKINNER (Eds) (1990) From Sentience to Symbols:
Readings on Consciousness (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf).

[30] EDELMAN, G. (1992) Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the
Mind (London, Penguin) see especially Mind without biology: a critical
postscript; MATURANA, H. & VARELA, F. (1992) The Tree of Knowledge: The
Biological Roots of Human Understanding (London, Shambala). A particularly
clear example of Heidegger's influence on cognitivism is WINOGRAD & FLORES,
op. cit., note 23.

[31] This quotation is from BOHM, D., Postmodern Science, op. cit., note
24. Bohm's article is reprinted in section 6 of JENCKS, C. (1992) The
Postmodern Reader (London, Academy Editions) where the quotation is on p.
385; the other articles in section 6 are also of interest.

[32] That science taps a natural value system is part of what has become
known as 'deep ecology', see NAESS, A. (1985) Ecosophy, in: W. DEVALL & G.
SESSIONS (Eds) Deep Ecology: living as if nature matured (Salt Lake City,
UT, Peregrine Smith Books). For a critical assessment of deep ecology, see
BOOKCHIN, op. cit., note 23.

[33] Heidegger is central here, see TOBIAS, op. cit., note 23; HEIDDEGER,
op. cit., note 29; and ZIMMERMAN, op. cit., note 29.

[34] DE SILVA, op. cit., note 19, ch 1.

By JOHN PICKERING

John Picketing, Psychology Department, Warwick University, Coventry CV4
7AL, UK.