Buddhist functionalism--instrumentality reaffirmed

·期刊原文

Buddhist functionalism--instrumentality reaffirmed

by David, Scott

Asian Philosophy

Vol. 5 No. 2 Oct. 1995 , Pp.127-149

Copyright by Asian Philosophy

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ABSTRACT This article seeks to determine if Buddhism can best be
understood as primarily a functionalist tradition. In pursuing this,
some analogies arise with various Western strands--particularly James'
'pragmatism', Dewey's 'instrumentalism', Braithwaite's 'empiricism',
Wittgenstein's 'language games', and process thinkers like Hartshorne
and Jacobson. Within the Buddhist setting, the traditional Theravada
framework of sila (ethics/precepts), samadhi (meditation) and panna
(wisdom) are examined, together with Theravada rituals. Despite some
'correspondence' approaches with regard to truth claim statements,
e.g. vipassana 'insight' and Abhidharma analysis, a more profound
functionalism seems present. This is even more clear with the
Mahayana. Apart from the basic and explicit Mahayana underpinning of
upaya, the Madhyamika, Tantras and Ch'an (Zen) schools are clearly
functionalist. Moreover, despite initially seeming more 'absolutist'
in their positions, other strands like the Pure Land and Nichiren
faith traditions, and Dharmakfrti's Vijnanavada epistemology can also
be tied into this functionalist setting.

Buddhism suffers from a danger, the danger of philosophy! Such a statement
seems at first sight ridiculous. After all, one only has to look at the
Abhidharma strand in the Theravada to see rigorous analysis; or within the
Mahayana at the Madhyamika to encounter dialectics, or Dharmakirti to see
epistemological positions and 'proofs'. However, the thesis of this study
is to suggest that if one sees Buddhism as 'just' a system of metaphysical
abstraction and logic, then one has missed the boat, or to use a
traditional Buddhist metaphor the raft! What is proposed is to look at
Buddhism's manifestation of a profoundly functional, i.e. instrumental,
disposition.

However, some complex methodological issues are raised. Instrumentalism and
functionalism are Western philosophical terms, replete with Western
philosophical associations; indeed, philosophy itself is a Western term.
Can such Western frameworks be properly and meaningfully used with
reference to Buddhism, which has its own particular Asian cultural nuances,
developments, assumptions and wider associations? Cross-cultural comparison
of ideas and beliefs can be prone to misleading simplicity through ignoring
such differing internal frames of reference and associations. However, in
today's 'global village', questions of comparative philosophy and belief
systems are inevitably emerging. Buddhism has anyway already expanded out
from India and adapted across a whole range of Asian cultures, most notably
in entering China. Moreover, within its early expansion, Buddhism had also
come up against and had to explain itself within Hellenic norms in
northwestern India, Bactria and Alexandria in the 3rd century BCE. [1] A
Buddhist adaptation in the West should then be possible, and with it the
possibility of assessing it in the light of Western terms and values, as
well as vice versa. Moreover Western Buddhists are now arising, able to use
both Western philosophical and Buddhist terms meaningfully and
authentically within their own respective parameters. [2] Indeed by
attempting a Western assessment of Buddhism, 'core basic Buddhist themes
should thereby be highlighted.

In such a setting of caution yet speculation, the use of the term
'profound' is deliberate, as deep 'spiritual' transformative concerns do
seem to underpin this marked Buddhist disposition. [3] To argue that
Buddhism is profoundly functionalist or instrumental in character, is
admittedly a philosophical-sounding evaluation but it takes Buddhism away
from two extremes; one, the extreme of rarefied abstract metaphysical
speculation; second, the extreme of rigid credalism and dogmatics. In
short, echoing a popular Buddhist term, rather a 'Middle Path'.

Before proceeding, the terms 'instrumentalism' and 'functionalism' need
some clarification. This is not quite related to the argument conducted by
Hoffman over how far Buddhism is, or is not, a form of empiricism. [4]
Southwold does use the term instrumentalism in his study of Sri Lankan
Buddhism, but perhaps in an overly theoretical sociological way. [5] A
clearer sense of the term 'instrumentalism' comes with the US philosopher
and educationalist John Dewey (1859-1952), who developed the pragmatism of
William James. For Dewey, ideas and concepts are instruments functioning in
experienced situations and determining future consequences. Ideas are plans
of actions or instruments that arise in response to a problem, and serve
their purposes by solving the problem. Propositions are thus to be regarded
as a means in a 'process' of enquiry; it is not so much that they should be
judged as true or false but rather they should be assessed in terms of
being effective or ineffective. Ideas and practice work together as
instruments: ideas relate experiences, and are in turn tested by
experience. [6] Here then, we shall use the term as indicating that the
'issue' under study (Buddhism) is understood by its adherents to have the
(primary) function (hence the term functionalism) of being an instrument
for bringing about certain other esteemed changes, of an experiential
nature.

Another term to clarify is 'Buddhism'. Is it a supposed central core (a
basic shared Buddhism), is it a supposed earlier form (Theravada), is it a
supposed more developed higher form (Mahayana), is it a supposed more
truthful form (e.g. particular sectarian claims), or does functionalism
provide a way through these seemingly rival truth claims? Theravada and
Mahayana forms of Buddhism will be considered in turn, with particular
reference to instrumentalist nuances, through using 'internal' Buddhist
testimony and appropriate outside comparisons.

(A) Theray,da Buddhism

Here, four basic lines of reference will be followed, namely: Theravada
Buddhism's own traditional three-fold enumeration of itself as involving
(1) ethics (sila), (2) meditation (samadhi) and (3) wisdom (panna),
together with a further section on (4) Theravada rituals and scripture.

(1) Sila

At first sight a paradoxical situation emerges with regard to ethics.
Buddhism has long had a traditional listing of ethical norms, the precepts
(silas), within which were the five general precepts (pancha-silas)--to
abstain from killing, stealing, sensuous misconduct, lying and clouding
intoxicants. In addition there are five further precepts bearing on the
conduct of monks and nuns, e.g. not eating after midday, avoiding dance and
other frivolous entertainment, abstaining from perfumes, refraining from
sleeping in high comfortable beds and not handling money. A normative ideal
seems able to be immediately established for Buddhism. However, a paradox
arises, as we also encounter comments by scholars like Harvey that 'having
no real "oughts", Buddhist ethics . . .' [7] Instrumentalism perhaps
provides a key for resolving this seeming paradox, shown in looking at
general approaches, together with some traditional and topical ethical
issues.

Two important points can immediately be made. One is that sila (virtue) is
the first of the three characterisations of the Buddhist path
(sila-samadhi-panna); with its specific manifestations (right actions,
etc.) being part of the wider eightfold Path, directly identified as the
'means' (Fourth Noble Truth) towards gaining the 'end'-enlightenment or
Nirvana (Third Noble Truth). This suggests a role for ethics that is not so
much static 'oughts', but rather is a dynamic procession. Second, is the
Anguttara Nikaya assertion "good conduct leads gradually up to the summit
[for] one state just causes another state to swell, one state just causes
the fulfilment of another state, for the sake of going from the not beyond
to the beyond", with sila fostering freedom from remorse, inner states of
gladness, joy, meditative calm (samatha), insight (vipassana) and
liberation. [8] Such a causal relationship explains why Sangharakshita
judges that "sila is prescribed for the worldling, not as an end in itself
but as the means of weakening the unwholesome states of mind from which
wrong speech and wrong bodily action proceeds". [9] Behind all this is a
further significant consideration, for, to quote Harvey, "in Buddhism,
moral virtue is the foundation of the spiritual path, though a fixed
attachment to ethical precepts and vows is seen as a hindering 'fetter'"
[10] Sensitivity on dangers of attachment is particularly central across
Buddhism.

Specific ethical issues seem coloured by concern with effectiveness,
practicality and instrumentality. This is why Premasiri cautions that "in
making moral choices in such dilemmatic situations, one cannot abide by any
hard and fast rules. One needs to take into account the total situation,
motives and other moral factors, and then make one's choice with a full
sense of responsibility."[11] Nevertheless Buddhism has very clear cut
traditional stances. For example the First Precept injunction against
killing has generally resulted in an aversion to abortion and abhorrence
towards (often female) infanticide. Yet there is a subtle and important
caution over rigid totalistic mechanistic application of surface precepts.
Saddhatissa puts this particularly well, with respect to the seemingly
straightforward issue of alcoholic drink, the focus of the Fifth Precept:

The matter of drinking is only briefly alluded to in the Buddhist
texts, the causes being of far greater import . . . The Precepts were
never ends in themselves, confined to the mundane life but were the
essential preliminaries, as also the permanent accompaniments, to
attaining to the Highest State . . . the Lalitavistara describes the
Buddha as 'the great remover of darts (galya)'. The 'darts' consisted
in the following: lust (raga), hatred (dosa), delusion (moha), pride
(mana), false views (ditthi), grief (soka) and indecision
(kathamakatha). They are the equivalent of the Fetters binding one to
the rounds of rebirth. [12]

Here the key would seem to be that it is not so much drink in itself that
is flawed, but rather that in practice it can often be the instrument or
channel through which underlying lust, hatred, delusion, pride and grief
emerge. Drink then actually becomes a secondary issue underneath the
primary issues of those flawed consequences. It is not so much that
Buddhism rejects alcohol itself, but rather it is even more (or ultimately)
concerned with chopping off possible underlying negative roots and
consequences. In the precept against 'clouding intoxicants' it would seem
that it is the (instrumentalist) adjective/quality of 'clouding' that is
the ultimate problem rather than the noun/object of 'drink' in itself. This
sort of perspective would seem to also operate for the other (more?) basic
precepts against killing, stealing, sensuous misconduct and lying.

Wider surrounding traditional ethical issues also illustrate similar
instrumentalist concerns. In larger social terms, a significant early
Buddhist stance was to reject the caste system (in its hereditary rigid
sense), which had a practical result of potentially opening up
Enlightenment to all. Here there may be philosophical analogies with a
utilitarian Benthamite outlook of 'the greatest good for the greatest
number'. Giving (dana) has traditionally been for Buddhism a primary
ethical activity. While this can be tied into being a tangible support by
the laity towards the monastic sangha, we could note the practical training
result of lowering egotistic attachment, though doing it for narrow karmic
benefit could cloud this.

In a traditional yet also modern vein, how does Buddhism see the family?
Again one encounters a surface situation, underpinned with more fundamental
potential 'purposes'. For Premasiri "the family is considered a unit within
which the layman can have his basic spiritual training, by converting his
self-centred urge for pleasure seeking into a responsible and dutiful care
for their children. Parents in their self sacrificing care for their
children, sublimate the sexual urge in the more wholesome relationships of
parental love". [13] We might say that this is idealism or monk's theory
rather than how families actually operate in Buddhist communities. Perhaps,
but nevertheless from a 'normative' point of view Premasiri's choice of the
term 'training' seems highly functionalist, i.e. the family as an
instrument bringing about more significant central changes in the
individual. Analogous situations seem apparent in the more specific areas
of marriage forms, sexuality and family planning, where Rita Gross has
presented historical variations of outward form coupled with a consistency
over inner instrumentalist criteria. [14]

Another ethical area is work. One immediate and traditional sign of
Buddhism's practical engagement in this issue is that Right Livelihood
forms one of the links in the Noble Eightfold Path, i.e. it is part of
training, part of that route towards transformation. From it arose the
normative Buddhist stance against livelihood in weapons, animals, flesh,
intoxicants and poisons. Here some attention has been paid to the
elaboration of Buddhist economics in recent years. Alexandrin pointed out
that "Buddhist economics can be defined as that type of economics which
stem from or keeps continuing the experience of enlightenment or that which
provides a ground which sustains or contributes to enlightenment."[15] Thus
he makes the subtle but important instrumentalist point that "economics was
meant to be both ethical and useful". [16]. This echoes the point to be
made later on about the Buddhist dharma being both truthful and useful, but
with the useful aspect perhaps being crucial. Schumacher's short study
Buddhist Economics brings out more precise manifestations of this:

The Buddhist point of view takes the function of work to be at least
three-fold: to give a man the chance to utilise and develop his
faculties; to enable him to overcome his ego-centredness by joining
with other people in a common task; and to bring forth the goods and
services needed for a becoming existence. [17]

Here the crucial feature picked up by Schumacher is that work enables
faculties to be utilised and developed, that it enables one to 'overcome
ego-centredness', thereby undercutting trsna-driven egotistic clinging
greed. Schumacher's own use of the word 'function' highlights this
instrumentalist Buddhist approach towards ethics. Functionalist nuances can
be discerned in Buddhist stances towards the important modem environmental
challenge. Buddhism declared itself a Middle Path (e.g. between materialism
and asceticism, world attachment and world rejection) of practice and
attitudes, based on non-grasping. Abuse of the environment in fact reflects
and further generates negative attitudes of greed, grasping and ignorance,
consequently further hindering spiritual advancement. Conversely,
appropriate environmental action could be an effective instrument to
manifest and deepen spiritual development and combat negative attitudes.
[18]

Another traditional, yet topical and revealing matter arises with violence.
This can be pursued with Premasiri's perception that "Buddhism's opposition
to violence stems from the analysis that violence is psychologically rooted
in dosa (hatred) . . . a dispositional trait that is conditioned by
malicious behaviour and, in turn, determines the way human beings behave.
It is the fundamental cause of a whole cycle of violence from which
individuals and society find it impossible to escape. Therefore no matter
what the intended merits of a projected social order . . . if it is
established by violence, it will have to be perpetuated by violence, for
dosa can only beget dosa. Social change through non-violence is the only
realistic path to a stable social order . . . The propensity to violence is
addictive and causally forges a chain of reciprocal links." [19] Here,
Premasiri sees 'realism' as a key consideration, i.e. violence becoming an
instrument for further violence. Since dosa, its psychological root, is one
of the three basic defilements (klesas) blocking human development and full
realisation, the ethical stance taken is crucially governed by wider deep
instrumental concerns.

In this whole area of ethical action, Premasiri fittingly sums up the role
played by these real underlying psychological forces in what he considers
'the consequentialist ethic of Buddhism' which 'attempts to give directions
to people who are disillusioned with the false promises of greed (lobha),
hatred (dosa), and ignorance (moha), and to enable them, by the use of
untapped resources to make discoveries of lasting happiness in their own
moral experience.' [20] There is an overall sense of ethics 'enabling' one
to tap into resources, development and experience--very much an
instrumentalist ethic, ethics as a means for changing the individual. As
shall be seen in the conclusion, this has some analogies with Braithwaite's
emphasis on the 'use' to which ethics are put; nevertheless a Kantian
critique would state that an instrumentalist ethic is a contradiction in
terms, as what is good is good in itself, rather than in terms of
consequences.

Morality is strong in a normative sense, but is also seen for very
pragmatic practical reasons as needing to be grounded with other dimensions
of Buddhism, notably meditation (samadhi). Thus a subtle point emerges,
namely that ethics does not just exist with other elements of the Eightfold
Path, and does not just lead to other elements; but that it is also
intertwined with other features, in a self-corrective interdependent
transformative mode. Modem Theravada figures like Saddhatissa consequently
have interesting, intertwining and ultimately practical considerations on
this. In responding to the Dhammapada's opening words "Mind precedes all
things; all things have mind foremost, are mind-made", for him, "here we
have the key to Buddhist ethics, and in fact to the whole teaching, for
Buddhism is essentially a 'mind culture'. Any improvement or retrograde
step must occur initially in the mind of the person concerned whether it
proceeds to external manifestations immediately or at a later date, so that
the importance of being aware of [i.e. mindfulness] and of controlling,
one's thoughts is continually stressed."[21] Premasiri similarly considers
that for Buddhism, 'the highest end is the total elimination of lobha
(lust, greed), dosa (hatred), and moha (delusion). When the Buddha is
requested to state what in his opinion is moral evil, he mentions these 3
psychological dispositions. Any mental trait that hinders clarity of the
mind and mental composure, and which becomes an impediment to Nibbana
[Nirvana], is considered evil.'[22] Again we have an instrumental
perspective. Ethics is important in itself and for others, but ultimately
for importance seems, because of serving, or functioning, a means to deeper
and more profound liberating ends.

A Buddhist 'mean' (or Middle Path) emerges. Ethics or meditation on their
own could slip into one sided extremism and so, crucially, ultimate
ineffectiveness. Saddhatissa considers "the placing of the Moralities
[silas] as the first section of the Buddha's teaching is not incidental but
is essential if the student is to proceed with the 'mind culture' which is
the core of Buddhism. The Buddhist scriptures give frequent warnings
regarding the extreme danger of attempting to experience states of mental
concentration without thorough grounding in the practice of the Moralities.
Any teachings . . . which do not insist on practice of the moralities
before embarking on exercises in mental concentration are fraught with
disaster and are to be utterly condemned. At the same time, if the
Moralities are to be kept to increasing degrees, then cultivation of
samadhi and panna [prajna] are essential." [23] Such practical talk on
roles and dangers leads to the next section.

(2) Samadhi

By its nature meditation is a clearly instrumentalist general religious
phenomenon, dealing with deeper experiential dimensions. Buddhism perhaps
shows both a subtle and heightened instrumentalist awareness towards the
'role' of meditation. After all, the very centre of Buddhism is the claim
that Sakyamuni achieved enlightenment, thereby becoming a Buddha, following
his meditation under the bodhi tree, when various jhana levels were
achieved with insight subsequently (i.e. consequently) arising. This is
maintained in Buddhism through "the basic function of the meditation . . .
. [as] a device for achieving samadhi". [24] In a more subtle sense there
is, as just seen, the practical consideration that meditation without
ethical grounding could be extremely dangerous.

Further signs of a controlled instrumentalist Buddhist sensitivity towards
meditation lies in the large number of samatha 'calm' techniques.
Buddhaghosa goes into great detail on this, pinpointing 40 distinct
meditation loci in the classical Theravada text, the Visuddhi Magga, where
there is explicit talk of the 'benefits' of samatha meditation. [25] The
foci are the 10 kasinas ('devices') based on various colours, elements,
space and light; the 10 asubha ('repulsive things') like bodily
decomposition, etc, the 10 sati ('recollections') on themes like the
Buddha, dharma, sangha, morality, death, respiration, peace of Nirvana. The
four brahma-vihara ('sublime abodes') focus on loving kindness, compassion,
sympathetic joy or equanimity; while the four ayatana ('formless states')
point to infinite space, infinite consciousness, nothingness, neither
perception nor non-perception. Two foci could be on loathsomeness of food
or analysis of the body. Such meditation exercises have a very practical
functional organisation, being aimed at particular types of people, to
bring out particular appropriate corrective effects, as follows in Table 1.
[26] This framework is also related to suitability for achieving various
different jhana meditation levels. A further traditional practical
consideration is indicated through the guiding mentor role of the
kalyanamitta 'good friend', crucial in directing the trainee towards the
appropriate meditation exercise, fostering its proper instrumental
potential for transformation, i.e. Nirvana, Enlightenment.

The other avenue for Theravada meditation was vipassana ('insight'), which
might seem to indicate direct and absolute Truths being perceivable,
analysis of truth in its own terms, and not just in terms of its
effectiveness. But it can be argued that vipassana still reveals an
instrumentalist orientation, for from insight came various consequences,
i.e. cutting the cycle of rebirth, cutting away of trsna, clinging desire,
and the attainment of Nirvana. Moreover it was not so much insight into
static truth, but rather insight into 'processes', in particular anicca
('impermanence, change') and paticcasamuppada ('conditioned arising').

(3) Panna

Within Buddhism's traditional description of itself, panna ('wisdom') was a
third strand, which raises the complex yet important issue of the role of
truth in Buddhism. Buddhism has put forth particular formulations of
truths, e.g. the three universal 'marks' of existence (anicca, anatta,
dukkha), the four Noble Truths (on dukkha), Conditioned Arising, etc. Here
we approach what may seem to be straight doctrine, metaphysics and
philosophy. However, the question then arises for analysis of Buddhism (as
also for Western philosophy) of what is meant conceptually by the term
'truth'. When saying that something is true in Buddhism, does it mean (a)
that it is factually true, (b) that it is figuratively or symbolically true
so that its value is utilitarian and heuristic, or (c) that it is
relatively true within a particular world view, language game or wider
conceptual scheme. Such positions echo the Western philosophical categories
of (a) 'correspondence', (b) 'pragmatic utility' and (c) 'coherence'. [27]
All three positions arise in various Buddhist settings, such as Abhidharma
'correspondence' vis-a-vis the reality of dharmas. However, position (b)
seems more often and centrally perceivable, with Buddhism showing a certain
caution over absolute metaphysical speculation, and instrumental
considerations seemingly central.

One sign of this was with an interesting episode when the Buddha was asked
'what is the Truth (Dhamma)?' Instead of replying with standard set
Buddhist formulations he took this approach:

Of whatsoever teachings thou can assure thyself thus: 'Those doctrines
conduce to passions not dispassions: to bondage, not to detachment: to
increase of (worldly) gains, not to decrease of them; to covetousness,
not to frugality: to discontent, and not content: to company, not
solitude: to sluggishness, not energy: to delight in evil, not delight
in good'--of such teachings thou may with certainty affirm 'This is
not the Dhamma, this is not the Discipline. This is not the Master's
Message'. But of whatsoever teachings thou can assure thyself . . .
[as above, but opposite]--of such teachings thou may with certainty
affirm 'This is the Dhamma'. [28]

What stands out here is the explicit functionalist listing of traits of
character, through which one can recognise the Truth; thereby emphasising
that wisdom points to actual transformation, rather than ontological
definitions. Verbal formulations are not then in themselves the crucial
factor, it is whether they are resulting in, or being the instrument of
particular changes. In this vein we then have the Pali Canon's famous Raft
metaphor. [29] The whole point of the analogy is that it pinpoints the
function of Buddhist teachings (the raft) as being effective, that they are
there to bring movement, or transformation, with the other side, Nirvana,
being reached. The raft is still a means rather than the end, the raft not
carried on one's head (not clung to) on reaching the other shore.

Equally interesting is the Buddha saying, "Bhikkus, of what I have known I
have only told you a little", which led into the famous 'unanswered
questions', classical metaphysical questions concerning creation and the
afterlife, which the Buddha refused to answer. To explain why he did not
answer them the Buddha then used the 'Poisoned Arrow' analogy. Here a
person hit by a poisoned arrow should not spend (i.e. waste) time on vague
speculation about whence it had come, the motives of the person shooting
the arrow, etc. Instead they should do the one immediate practical thing
which would change their situation, namely take action--pull the arrow out!
In a similar way those classic metaphysical questions were ultimately
distractions, for one should instead do something about the here and now.
As the Buddha said of those 'unanswered questions':

Why, Malunkyaputta, has this not been explained by me? It is because
it is not connected with the goal, is not fundamental to the
brahma-cariya 'holy life', and does not conduce to turning away from,
nor to dispassion, stopping, calming, superknowledge, awakening, nor
to Nibbana. Therefore it has not been explained by me. [30]

For Jayatilleke this stance identified the Buddha as a 'Pragmatist', with a
criterion for dismissing questions "if they were not relevant to the
central problems of religion". [31] The Buddha's continuation, on exactly
the same funcfionalist grounds, was "then, what has been explained by me,
Malunkyaputa? . . . anguish (dukkha) . . . the arising of dukkha . . . the
stopping of dukkha . . . the course leading to the stopping of dukkha has
been explained by me because it is connected with the goal, etc." [32]
Traditional metaphysical speculation about the past and future was not
practically effective, whereas the Fourth of the Four Noble Truths (the
eight-fold Path) was effective. Ultimately truths were only useful if they
were instrumental in bringing about the necessary transformational changes,
themselves centred on cutting trsnd ('craving, desire').

Here reference should be made to Abhayarajakumara Sutta[33]. Jayatilleke,
whose work Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge remains an important point of
reference, found this sutta of particular epistemological interest. The
sutta gives three sets of considerations governing the Buddha's statements,
i.e. statements that were true (bhutam, taccha.m), or false (abhutam,
ataccham), those that were useful (atthasamhitam) or useless
(anatthasamhitam) and those that were pleasant (paresam piya manapa) or
unpleasant (paresam appiya amanapa).

Eight possible variations or combinations emerge. With regard to
pleasantness, Buddhist wisdom may be pleasant or unpleasant--that just
reflects what is appropriate to the situation. With regard to truth and
utility, instrumental effectiveness for Buddhist purposes seems implicitly
paramount. On the one hand "the dhamma was useful for salvation and its
value (though not its truthfulness) lay in its utility. It ceases to have
value, though it does not cease to be true, when one has achieved one's
purpose with its help by attaining salvation." [34] Buddhist wisdom was
itself true (factually), but this was a secondary feature, with its primary
feature one of being useful. It was this that made it part of the dhamma.
On the one hand, a statement could be useless without being false. A
mundane example is that the Caspian Sea has a certain depth and area, but
while that is true it is not particularly useful for Buddhism in helping
one achieve or realise Enlightenment. Such a 'fact' is not an example of
Buddhist 'wisdom'. Conversely the benefits accruing from meditation or
ethical application, from a Buddhist perspective are both true (can be
experienced) but above all useful. In such settings, can Buddhist wisdom be
untrue yet still useful? This line of thought does not really appear in the
Pali Canon, but reappears with the Mahayana.

An interesting nuance is that Buddhism, while presenting teachings in
doctrinal scriptural formulation, shows wariness about ultimately depending
on such material. This is brought out in the famous Kalamas episode, where
the Buddha was asked to adjudicate between different claims by varied
teachers of the day, both in terms of actual content, but also in terms of
approaches or methodological stances for resolving questions of truth. The
Buddha's response was distinctive:

Kalamas, do not be misled by reports, or tradition, or hearsay. Be not
misled by the proficiency in the collections of religious texts, nor
by mere logic or inference, nor after considering reasons, nor after
reflection on and approval of some theory, nor because it fits
becoming, nor out of respect for a recluse. [35]

Here, traditional props of religious formulations (scripture and teachers)
are undercut, as indeed is much of formal philosophy. Instead, the Kalamas
were advised "when you know for yourselves that these things are
unprofitable, these things are blameworthy, these things are censured by
the intelligent, these things, when performed and undertaken, conduce to
loss and sorrow, then indeed do you reject them."[36] This talk of
'unprofitability' and 'conduce' has a practical, functionalist ring to it,
and it echoes Dewey's stance that ideas must always be tested by
experiment.

All this means that although there is the traditional formula of taking
refuge (saranam) in the Buddha, Dharma and Sangha, such refuge is perhaps
more a question of practical confidence rather than any faith. As the
popular Dhammapada summed up "only a man himself can be the master of
himself: who else from outside could be his master?", for "it is you who
must make the effort; the Tathagatas only show the way."[37] This reasserts
the instrumentalist role of Buddhist doctrines as being to generate
transformation of the individual, so that the individual then will truly
know for themselves, based on their own consequent experiential
verification. Jayatilleke has this in mind when considering Buddhist saddha
(faith, belief) in truth statements as being to "provisionally accept a
proposition for the purpose of [experientially] verifying its truth."[38]
Elements of 'correspondence' are here, but 'Truth' in an abstract sense has
become a spur to deeper experiential development, with the specific initial
formulation being more a means than an end.

(4) Theravada ritual and scripture

One interesting point made in this area is a stylistic one raised by
Sangharakshita, in connection with the 'Dialogues' of the Buddha being
"richly embellished with similes, metaphors and parables . . . This is not
just a literary device, or empty rhetorical flourish, but an integral part
of the Buddha's teaching method. It represents an attempt to communicate
his vision of reality, not merely in abstract and conceptual terms, but by
means of concrete images, appealing not to the understanding alone, but to
the total psyche, including those unconscious but powerfully operative
forces that are hardly to be reached in any other way."[39] Talk of
concrete images, the total psyche, and of powerful operative forces, takes
this material away from just being theoretical exposition. They are there
to operate, instrumentally speaking, to bring about response and change in
the audience. All religious literature is of course, or tries to be,
effective in terms of its intended audience, yet there seems a more
explicit awareness and use of this in Buddhism.

Popular literature maintains this anchoring, as in the Jataka tales on the
former lives of the Buddha. Certainly they can be read as mythological
tales, providing popular grass roots stories to entertain the laity.
However, Ling noted a more serious, extremely practical, side to this, that
"the Buddhist . . . says in effect: 'If that is what you believe, and if
that is how you see this life, then let us start there!' And he proceeds to
use this initial position as the taking off point for an approach to the
eternal Dharrna. Almost always he makes use of popular stories and legends
. . . They cannot be said to form anything more than a threshold to
Buddhist belief; but it is a wide threshold and offers plenty of scope for
all. Buddhism has in this matter, I believe, displayed considerable
wisdom." [40] The wisdom would seem to lie in the practical grounding and
usefullness of such material.

Sangharakshita also gives high effectiveness value to the role played by
such popular literature, for 'appropriating the entire wealth of ancient
Indian folklore . . . en bloc in their own rapidly growing
oral-cum-literary traditions as the simplest and most effective means of
propagating the truths of the Dharma among the common people . . . The
audience is simultaneously amused, instructed and inspired."[41] Popular
and loved background stories could thus be adopted, yet also adapted. In
doing so, Buddhist teachings (themselves a spur to action) could have a
bigger practical chance of local acceptance, through using 'the simplest
and most effective' means. Ling seems to have noticed a similar process
with respect to such Theravada literature, that "the important point to
notice is that although Buddhism has thus allowed an open frontier between
its own Dharma and animistic beliefs, this frontier has always been firmly
controlled from the Buddhist side. What may be seen to have happened in the
course of Buddhist history is not demythologising, but a Buddhist-inspired
remythologising of popular thought: a recasting and refilling of potent
psychological symbols as a result of the stimulus of Buddhist spiritual
experience." [42] Again, such a phenomenon is of course not restricted to
Buddhism; most religions have done this to a greater or lesser extent.

However, one could argue that Buddhism shows a distinctly more flexible
attitude in this area than most other traditions. Again we have this sense
of practical results being achieved through such literary developments,
using 'potent psychological symbols' following on from and in turn helping
to foster the 'Buddhist spiritual experience'.

A further manifestation of this instrumental grounding of scriptures lies
in related congregational chanting, where Sangharakshita asserts a strong
functional significance:

One might even argue that the texts were compiled in their present
form for the purpose of liturgical meditation, wherein the grave
rhythm of the chanting serves to calm and concentrate the mind, while
the recurrence, at regular intervals, of certain key words and
phrases, enables it to penetrate, with each repetition, ever deeper
into the truth which these formulae represent. [43]

Such talk of mnemonic value and meditative undertones indicates deeper
potential functions for rituals, serving and enabling deeper developments
and so indeed, though subtly, being instrumental.

(2) Mahayana Buddhism

The preceding details have been taken from Theravada Buddhism. This 'basic'
predisposition would, it can be argued, also operate for Mahayana Buddhism,
which retained Pali Canon (Sutta pitaka) type material within its own
canonical literature. Moreover, certain Mahayana features maintained and
highlighted this instrumental predisposition of Buddhism still further.

A particularly specific Mahayana development, seen in such popular early
classics as the Saddharma pundarika sutra (Lotus Sutra) was in upaya
('skilful means'). Pye quite rightly wrote a whole study on this important
Mahayana theme. [44] In a sense this is but the application of Pali Canon
teachings on the Buddha's teaching being 'effective' (kusala). The Mahayana
then picked up this theme, as illustrated in the famous Lotus Satra story
of the burning house, whereby various messages were given in order to get
the children in danger out of the burning house, itself a metaphor for the
raging fires of trsna. [45] The logic being that if the same full message
had been given to all, then not everyone would have taken the appropriate
action. Here teaching explicitly becomes a means rather than an end--the
instrumental means to bringing about progress and transformation. The Pali
Canon permutations (and an element of tension) surrounding teachings in
terms or truth/untruth, usefulness/uselessness, pleasantness/unpleasantness
have already been mentioned, with the Pali material presenting Buddhist
wisdom as being both true and also useful, with the implication being that
the crucial attribute was in its usefulness. With the Mahayana the
implications of this emerge even more strongly, as upaya above all is an
instrumental feature--whether the content is strictly true or not is
overridden by the use (direct/outcome) of the statement or action. Thus,
untruthful statements (or even ones immoral on the surface, as in some of
the stories about Zen and Tantric masters) could be justified in the short
term if they brought longer-term effective changes, as in the Burning House
story of the Lotus Sutra. This readiness to acknowledge the provisional and
instrumental character of teaching was maintained and disseminated in
further popular Mahayana classics like the Vimalakirti nirdega sutra, where
a layperson instructs Boddhisattvas and arahants in the true underlying
meaning of the Dharma, including upaya. [46] One immediate nuance of this
instrumentality, is the way in which the Lotus Sutra has the Boddhisattva
Avalokitesvara talking about taking a whole variety of forms (e.g.
traditional Hindu gods like Shiva, Vishnu, etc.) or descending into the
deepest recesses of hell, if that would pull someone a little bit further
along in their own progress.[47] With this perspective, a lot of the
details of distinctive Mahayana schools make sense, when treated not as
ultimate doctrines but as complementary practices, with the devotional Pure
Land and the meditation Ch'an/Zen traditions for example, able to be
reconciled on this plane of instrumentality. Such features echo the Pali
Canon criterion 'whatsoever leads to dispassion, peace, etc., that is the
dhamma'.

Another fundamental Mahayana theme emerged with the Prajnaparamita
('perfection of wisdom') literature, which became the foundation for
further Ch'an/Zen and Tibetan developments. Its ultimate conditioned or
sunyata ('empty') character of things was elaborated by Madhyamika figures
like Nagarjuna, who also employed ruthless dialectical negation.

Practical functionalist implications permeate the Prajnaparamita corpus.
Its earliest sutra, the Perfection of Wisdom in 8000 lines (Astasahasrika
Prajnaramita) talks not so much about Perfect Wisdom but 'training in
Perfect Wisdom.' [49] This is why it is the 'perfect wisdom that tames and
transforms', which implies dealing with negative blocks and fostering
positive change.[50] Revealingly, its chapter 16 section on 'Enlightenment
and Emptiness' immediately follows on from its section on 'Perfect Wisdom
and Skill in Means' and precedes the section 'Requisites of going forth to
Enlightenment'. Interestingly, and crucially, comes the caution that 'names
and signs are also sources of attachment.'[51] In this setting, verbal
formulations, i.e. truth statements, are to be treated with caution, since
"a Bodhisattva is not even trained in all-knowledge . . . because a
Bodhisattva trains himself in non-attachment to all dharmas", including
conceptual formulations [52]. Moreover, the Buddha is represented with the
popular, and rather functionalist phrase, as "the supreme physician who
accords [appropriate] medical treatment to the sickness of the world."[53]
A similar diagnostic remedial analogy on the role of sunyata, and on the
dangers of misconceiving it (as a theory, or as dogmatism) comes in the
later Kasyapa Parivarta (Ratnakuta) [54].

The Prajnnaparamita's most famous summation came in the influential Diamond
Sutra (Vajrachchedika-prajaparamita-sutra), with its warning that any
"object is a matter of linguistic convention, a verbal expression without
factual content. And yet the foolish common people have seized upon
it."[55] Doherty has a clear and persuasive instrumentalist sense of the
role of the Diamond Sutra, since "it underscores both its own status as a
discursive phenomenon and the contradictions involved in mistaking its
declarations for either literal or metaphorical truth. Decoding its own
procedures it enacts that detachment from codes which it seeks to induce in
the reader. Thus in presenting language as an instrument of deception it
seeks to unmask that deception and the motives which help to perpetuate it
through the kind of desire which attachment to language induces . . . if
language functions to structure homogeneous 'self' and a 'world', then the
Sutra functions to expose these two types of mental constructs as
contingent and arbitrary."[56]

Sunyata implications achieved full explicit force with Nagarjuna (2nd-3rd
century BCE), the leading light of the Madhyamika school. It would though
be a mistake to treat the M5dhyamika's sunyata emphasis as just the result
of abstract philosophical reasoning, as sunyata was both the result and
spur to experiential 'transformative' meditation insight.[57] A classic
presentation of Nagarjuna's stance comes in the Madhyamikakarika. He deals
with concepts in a double fashion, as 'the teachings of the dharma by the
various Buddhas is based on the two truths, the relative truth and the
absolute (supreme) truth.'[58] However, it should be remembered that the
absolute of the truth was not static 'correspondence', absolute ontological
objects or levels, but rather was the operation, or process, of emptiness.
Truth was in fact no-truth, to look back to the Diamond Sutra, and forward
into Zen formulations. Moreover, ultimately there was identity between the
two levels. In his Vyavaharasiddhi, Nagarjuna still acknowledged the
practical use of relative truth for "though all phenomena, such as mantras
etc, arise dependently and thus neither are existing nor non-existing, they
are none the less efficient. Likewise all interior and exterior phenomena
arise dependently, and though they are thus mere metaphorical concepts,
Buddha has formulated his dharmas with a specific practical purpose
(samdhaya)."[59] Nagarjuna indicates a functionalist process when he talks
in the Madhyamikakarika of "the real [i.e. instrumentalist] purpose of
sunyata." [60] This is echoed more recently by King and Patel. [61 ]

The practical purpose arising through the application of sunyata can be
more specifically pinpointed as breaking various trsna-driven egotistic
(negative) fetters and instead developing certain (positive)
characteristics. As Nagarjuna himself said 'by taking any standpoint
whatsoever one is attacked by the twisting snakes of passions. But those
whose mind has no standpoint are not caught.' [62] Thus, at the higher
level of truth (itself empty):

Grasping ceases to be where, internally and externally, (the ideas of)
individuality and self identity are destroyed. From the cessation of
grasping the cessation of birth also follows. There is moksha
(release) from the destructiveness of karmic defilements which are but
conceptualisation. These arise from the mere conceptual play
(prapanca) which are in turn banished in sunyata. [63]

This maintains traditional Buddhist features like anatta (no-soul),
liberation, the cycle of rebirth and the detrimental role of clinging,
grasping attachment, desire (trsna)--with trsna-driven false conceptions
and dualistic elaborations ceasing and being undercut by emptiness. In the
Sunyatasaptatikarika Nagarjuna advised 'karma has passions as its cause
(klesanitimittaka) . . . when one correctly understands that karma is empty
(sunya) because the truth is seen, karma does not arise.'[64] This is
because the passions (klesas), the cause of karma, have been cut through
the transformative power of the insight of emptiness. Or, as he says later,
"by seeing correctly that things are empty (sunya) one is not infatuated."
[65] Other testimony to this perception of sunyata's functionalist role in
cutting negative fetters can be seen, as for example the
Maha-pra-jnparamitag-sastra (traditionally attributed to Nagarjuna, but
only preserved in the Chinese translation from Kumarajiva), Candrakirti
(late 6th century CE), the early Chinese Middle Treatise, and the present
Dalai Lama. [66] Contemporary scholars like Streng and Ingram have also
noticed this. [67] Sunyata's effective soteriological efficacy gets us back
into basic Buddhist premises which state that (second of the Four Noble
Truths) the cause of duhkha 'frustration' is trsna, ignorant ego-driven
clinging attachments to objects--material and conceptual.

Trsna-driven egotistic grasping could manifest itself around language
itself, with sunyata able to challenge this through its deconstructionist
dynamics. Jiju Kennet, a modern Western Soto Zen Roshi, accordingly
reorientates Nagarjuna and sunyata away from metaphysical abstraction. For
her 'the purpose being religious rather than metaphysical, these words were
written for the purpose of freeing energetic intellects from mental blocks
which they set up of themselves to bar their path to spiritual
understanding.' [68] What she does is to highlight the
functionalist/instrumentalist nature of Nagarjuna's thrust, redirecting
speculation onto applied training. Robinson's study of early Madhyamika
brings such language implications of sunyata to the fore:

Emptiness characterises every term in the system of expressional
truths . . . Verbal thoughts and expression are 'constructed' or
'imagined' (vikalpyate). They express only metaphorically, and there
is no such thing as a literal statement . . . Once this is granted the
functional value of language is admitted by the Madhyamika. [69]

His use of the term 'functional' is interesting. It evokes both this whole
article's thrust, and has striking overlaps with Wittgenstein's 'language
game' and crucial 'use' of language, which from a Buddhist perspective form
a very serious and profound game. [70] Analogous comments on the
provisional use (and misuse) of language have come from Sangharakshita,
since 'the dialectic of Nagarjuna, by exposing the contradictions inherent
in the Buddhist doctrines themselves when taken literally, serves as a
reminder of the supremely important fact that these doctrines, constituting
the conceptual formulations of Wisdom, possessed not absolute but only
relative validity, and were not ends in themselves but only means to an
end. By shattering the hard shell of literalism in which Buddhism was then
imprisoned, Nagarjuna not only saved it from suffocation and probable death
but also gave it room for future development.'[71] Sangharakshita here
reasserts the functionalist role of teachings, as a raft or conventional
methods, rather than as fixed absolute ontological Truth statements which
could become the source of subtle attachments.

In such a functionalist framework, sunyata should also be able to be seen
as inculcating particular Buddhist virtues, as indeed suggested by
Shantideva in the 7th-8th century:

He who maintains the doctrine of Emptiness is not allured by the
things of the world, because they have no basis. He is not excited by
gain or dejected by loss. Fame does not dazzle him and infamy does not
attract him. Scorn does not repel him, praise does not attract him.
Pleasure does not please him, pain does not trouble him. He who is not
allured by the things of the world knows Emptiness, and one who
maintains the doctrine of Emptiness has neither likes nor dislikes.
[72]

Here what is being referred to is not just the danger of trsna, but also
inculcating the core Buddhist upeksa ('equanimity'). Sunyata is itself not
a positive 'thing', replete with the dangers of being grasped and clung
onto, rather it was seen as being able to generate positive transformations
in the trainee. In a modem setting Sangharakshita has also similarly noted
sunyata's dynamic implications:

The remembrance of emptiness, far from decreasing one's own powers of
spiritual activity, increases it enormously. It becomes easy,
effortless, spontaneous, full of joy. Because the obstacle to
activity, which is the [egotistical trsna-driven] self has been
removed. The activity of the self is not really activity at all, and
is always frustrated. The activity of emptiness is true activity and
is never frustrated. The activity of emptiness is compassion. [73]

Sunyata ('emptiness') then becomes a lever not just to undercut clinging
attachments but also to generate appropriate detached compassion.

At this point Mahayana Buddhism reasserts the whole point of doctrines not
just existing in themselves but as having a purpose. This is well suggested
with Santina's talk of provisional devices of 'discoursive soteriology'
which are "validated merely by their effectiveness in producing the
soteriological change which is wanted. The devices of discoursive
sotetiology are illusory no doubt, but that does not prevent them from
exercising their intended function."[74]. From a pragmatic point of view it
could be said that Nagarjuna's ruthless dialectical negation, if carried
through, was a perfect mechanism for short-circuiting traditional (but
potentially diversionary) abstract metaphysical speculation. Actual
practice could be reinstated, along with meditation and realisation, rather
than discussion and argument about doctrines.

Madhyamika insights can be clearly recognised in the Ch'an/Zen tradition.
[75] Huang Po (d. 850 CE), an early Ch'an master considered that sunyata
could counteract conceptual clinging attachments, since "with the merest
desire to attach yourselves to this or that, a mental symbol, is so formed,
such symbols in turn, giving rise to all those sacred writings which lead
you back to undergo the various kinds of rebirth. So let your symbolic
conception be that of a void, for then . . . . "[76] Traditional Buddhist
formulations, "such as Enlightenment, the Absolute, Reality, etc." were
"mere concepts for helping us through samsara." [77] As for language
itself, clear functionalist views come in Engo's comment in the Hekiganroku
that "every word and phrase is a means, for the moment, of leading students
to realisation." [78] Zen Buddhism can be readily seen as profoundly,
overtly and primarily functionalist in character; with its koans, behaviour
patterns and discourses of masters fluid and above all aiming at awakening
the potential of the trainee by whatever formulation, or indeed
non-formulation, was appropriate for that particular situation.

An interesting, and revealing situation emerges if we consider the main
rival to the Mdhyamaka, namely the Vijnanavadin ('idealism') school,
subject to Madhyamaka criticism for appearing to slip into Absolutist
frameworks. However, the Lankavatara Sutra, a central Vijanavadin text,
counsels the higher state of training "where all means of logical proof are
not seized upon, where there is no seizing upon the real truth but a
disregard for it, as being a likely cause of infatuation." [79] This
suggests a practical (i.e. instrumentalist) readiness actually to downplay
the potential absolute status of their formulations. Admittedly,
epistemological concerns and claims arise in Dhar-makirti's Pramanasiddhi.
[80] We may though be able to argue that his seemingly absolute
epistemology still reveals functionalist concerns, with him talking about
"the path to freedom from [samsaric] existence, because through
accustomating it as the direct antidote to self-grasping one eliminates
all faults and attains a completely transformed state."[81] Moreover, there
is deliberate highlighting of the medical analogy, itself related to upaya,
since like the physician, "in order to save generations of beings from
their disease of passions with which they are ill, I teach people with my
doctrines, knowing the power of their senses."[82]

Indeed in a citta-mattra ('mind-only') setting, all truth statements (e.g.
like the Four Noble Truths, or the Vijnanavadin's own particular
alaya-vijnana ('storehouse consciousness') framework) themselves are
products of the mind (manas). The mind might be a central junction point of
reference but all truth claim statements would still fall into the
compounded realm of language. They might be more or less factually true,
but they were inherently conditioned by their existence in and mediated
through the realm of form, as filtered through the mind. They might be able
to point towards the highest truth, but that truth was itself beyond
description. Within the Vijnanavada framework, knowledge consisted of
parikalpita 'constructed/imagined' illusions about the material world, the
subtler paratantra ('other-dependent') awareness of the flow of underlying
dharmas, etc., and the parinispanna ('absolutely accomplished') knowledge
which was characterised by thusness (tathata) and sunyata ('emptiness'),
i.e. an absolute setting of Truth that was a non-setting as otherwise it
could become the focus for clinging. With the mind as the central junction
point or filter, doing something about the mind becomes a clear practical
imperative generated from the epistemological framework. Vijnanavadin
metaphysics are thereby translated into Yogacara mind discipline, i.e.
meditation. All this would give a functionalist thrust to Jackson's own
introductory comment to the Dharmakirti's Pramanasiddhi to "accept as
axiomatic that Buddhist works are written for the purpose of assisting
their readers to attain enlightenment."[83]

Other 'positive' sounding Mahayana concepts can be considered for their
degree of functionalism. In King's analysis of the language appearing in
connection with tathagatagarbha (Buddha-nature), she argues, "it is not a
matter of substantialist monism", for "the decision to say that the Buddha
nature exists aboriginally appears to be a pragmatic one; this is the
statement that will most encourage practice. Yet it is also quite clear
that this does not mean that Buddha nature 'exists' in the normal sense;
aboriginal existence has nothing to do with either being or non-being. Why?
Because it has to do with a person's actions or practice of the Buddha way,
which is not essentially ontological, and because it has to do with change
or transformation, with what appears 'Thus', which is never thing like but
always in flux [anicca]. The ontology of flux is related to the soteriology
of practice . . . Hence to say that the Buddha nature (aboriginally)
'exists' is the very opposite of giving it a substantial or thinglike
character. Rather it is to encourage practice, to indicate the primacy of
practice."[84] Consequently she considers 'positive' and 'negative'
language to be "often soteriological, rather than strictly philosophical,
in intent."[85] Yet again, the soteriology boils down to its appropriate
and crucially functionalist dynamics, in reducing attachments.

What of the Mahayana strands of faith? Certainly the Nichiren Shoshu
tradition has blunt assertions over the truth of its statements concerning
the status of the Lotus Sutra and of Nichiren, embedded in the practices of
chanting the Namu-myoho-renge-ky6 ('Veneration to the Sutra of the Good
Law') and performing Gongyo (chanting of the Lotus Sutra chapter 2 and
chapter 16). The Nichiren tradition is controversial, particularly over
exclusivist claims like "Buddhahood can only be revealed by chanting
Namu-myoho-renge-kyo". [86] Yet the whole point of the chanting is that it
does function effectively, in generating 'conspicuous benefits' and
'inconspicuous benefits' for oneself, or others. It provides results. This
should not obscure the conceptual underpinning for the tradition, nor
should this obscure their strong ('correspondence') claims as to the
absolute truth of their statements, but it remains noticeable that Soka
Gakkai literature is also conspicuous in affirming and thus valuing this
results-efficacy criterion. [87] The efficacy of chanting the Lotus Sutra
chapters does not depend on knowing their formal meaning, as the very
action generates effects. One does not chant to understand the truth, but
to release its power.

To conclude this section finally we could consider another Buddhist path of
faith, the Pure Land tradition. There we would seem also to have absolute
truth statements, with full 'correspondence' frameworks of truth in the
shape both of Amitabha ('infinite light') Buddha and of his Pure Land, for
which total unconditional faith was prominent, with the 'original vow' and
success of Amida being truths independent of other humans' choices and
actions. Yet a closer look has such seeming Pure Land correspondence
becoming more subtle and, one could argue, ultimately functionalist. After
all the Amitayur dhyana sutra, replete with descriptions of both Amitabha
and the Pure Land, also explicitly acknowledges its own use there of
metaphors. [88] Traditionally, at the surface level, the very absolute
truth of the Amida's original vow and success in creating a Pure Land then
implies the functionalist efficacy of subsequent practices, i.e. the whole
point of the nembutsu recitation is not to state a doctrinal truth, but to
use it as the instrument to gain rebirth in the Pure Land. Amitabha Buddha
is true, but true as what? As Amitabha, a Sambhogakaya manifestation
(within the tri-kaya setting) of the Dharmakaya (beyond descriptions); as
Buddha, the same Buddha-nature that is also present and able to be awaken
in the devotee.

Subtle positions emerge from modem Pure Land figures. Hosen Seki is clear
enough on the ultimately provisional (though highly transformative) nature
of such traditional language.

Why did the Buddha speak of a land 'to the west?' Why a westward
country? One reason is again to do with concentration of the mind. If
the Buddha had said that the land is everywhere (which it is), then
our mind, already scattered and dispersed in its daily confusion,
could not concentrate its vision. 'Everywhere' pulls too hard at our
mental limitation. But when the Buddha says 'Western country', our
thought goes at one in that single direction. Of course many will
think that this Pure Land is really situated in the western quarter.
According to a person's capacity, he believes what he believes . . .
even though we are now truly in the Pure Land, human illusion prevents
us from seeing it so. Therefore Gautama Buddha couches this teaching
in terms of an immensely desirable country--an offer no one could find
unattractive [89]

This echoes the whole thrust of the Mahayana's upaya, with language
designed to have a 'practical' effect on the listener. The literal 'out
there' description of the Pure Land is a skilful means, rather than being a
fixed separate absolute. Similar subtlety comes over Amitabha.

We cannot measure the Infinite with our limited knowledge. This means
that the Infinite Light and Life is manifested as this Dharma
repository in order to be understandable to our limited intellect. So
this universal truth is presented to us in the form of an
understandable and acceptable myth; but the truth behind 'myth' makes
the myth truer by far than what we take for reality in our deluded
lives . . . the light of the Infinite penetrates every corner of
existence, and there is nothing that obstructs it. We are the Amida's
light today, tomorrow, and forever. [90]

Amitabha then has become a symbol, but a symbol of transforming depth both
in terms of role as a myth, and in terms of relating to the depths of the
individual. This stance has also been put forward with relation to Pure
Land dynamics by Sangharakshita. [91]

Another modern Pure Land figure, Takeuchi Yoshinori also seems to use the
Pure Land ultimately, but hugely importantly as a symbol or lever for
transformation here and now, as 'the symbolic world (in which all Buddhas
continually praise the name of Amida Buddha and guarantee the truth of that
name and birth in the Pure Land through its invocation) is discovered
directly underfoot of the present'. [92] Indeed for him the Pure Land as a
symbol seems both relative and absolute, through it being indeed a highly
effective symbol, as (in shades of Bultmann) he noted:

In connection with which the problem of human finitude of the human
world is taken up, lies the idea of a Paradise in the West. From my
standpoint (and it may be argued that hereby I myself am
demythologizing the meaning of the Pure Land in the West), this means
that we have to give ample consideration to what the symbol of a Pure
Land signifies . . . it becomes present in the present from the
future, in the form of an arrival from the transcendent yonder shore
to the hither shore of the present world . . . Accordingly I find the
symbol, of the Pure Land in the West exceedingly significant and
possessed of a meaning too weighty to be displaced or replaced by any
other symbol. [93]

Seeming absolute faith in the truth of Amitabha, in the Pure Land
framework, becomes a massive spur and instrumentally effective lever. If
faith works wonders in dissolving egotistic clinging, then (pragmatically
speaking) absolute faith in the truth of Amitgbha is needed todissolve such
fetters.

Conclusions

Here we come full circle. This article started by suggesting that Buddhism
suffers from the danger of philosophy, and of superficial cross-cultural
comparisons. In fact a more precise suggestion would be that Buddhism
suffers from the danger of particular types of philosophy. An interesting
Western figure to mention is Braithwaite, whose criticism of Russell's type
of correspondence/realism, and his own modification of logical positivism
have some resonance with Buddhism. Particularly evocative are
Braith-waite's argument for "allowing use as well as verifiability to be a
criterion for meaning". [94] Here Braithwaite explicitly acknowledges
Wittgenstein's 'language game' use-framework--with other related figures
influencing this functional/pragmatic epistemology being William James--and
Jung's 'subjective truth', i.e. what works for the individual. Braithwaite
argues for 'a connotative rather than an emotive theory' of ethics for the
individual, for "he is not asserting any proposition or necessarily
evincing any feeling of approval; he is subscribing to a policy of action",
at which points he quotes the functional-sounding New Testament passage "by
their fruits ye shall know them". [95] That he is sensitive enough to the
nature of spirituality is clear by his acknowledging "the resolution
proclaimed by a religious assertion may then be taken as referring to inner
life as well as to outward conduct". [96] A final nuance is Braith-waite's
flexible view on the role of sacred literature and of formulations, as he
asks "if the religious stories need not be believed, what function do they
fulfil in the complex state of mind and behaviour known as having a
religious belief? . . . . it is an empirical psychological fact that many
people find it easier to resolve upon and carry through a course of action
which is contrary to their natural inclinations if this policy is
associated in their minds with certain stories." [97] All this brings to
mind the operation and implications surrounding upaya, and of the
transformational experiential thrust of most Buddhist strands.

This study also comes full circle with Jacobson's pinpointing of Buddhism
in general, and Nagarjuna in particular, as manifesting very early process
philosophy. [98] Anicca, (dependent origination), as indeed Nagarjuna's
sunyata, focus the emphasis on the here and now, this moment, replete with
its dynamic movement. Jacobson contrasts process philosophy with absolutist
abstraction (the legacy of Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, Leibniz and Hegel),
the latter perspective having dominated Western thought down the centuries
and being seen by Jacobson as "the concentration camp of what can be
defined and formulated"! [99] He pinpoints three particular manifestations
of process philosophy. One was the full blown legacy of Buddhism and
Nagarjuna, second was the isolated classical Greek figure Heraclitus
(universal flux) and third were some modern US figures--in particular
Whitehead, Hartshorne, and Dewey (our initial 'nstrumentalist' reference
point). Within Jacobson's appreciation, two citations highlight some of
their philosophical critiques of traditional philosophy. First,
Hartshorne's awareness of 'the need to be free from theory. We have to
respond to situations always more complex than we can understand, and we
have to respond with more than understanding. Buddhist meditation has this
as its purpose. We might begin with the importance of nonconceptual,
nontheoretical apprehension of reality.' [100] Dewey also called for 'a
reconstruction in philosophy', in his 1920 lectures in Japan, where some of
the shared 'process' concerns with Buddhism seem to have emerged. [101]

Elsewhere from Dewey we hear "where egotism is not made the measure of
reality and value, we are citizens of a vast world beyond ourselves with
which a sufficiently experiential probing may give us a sense of unity".
[102] For Buddhism, since the root cause of dukkha, and the main obstacle
to realising Nirvana, is egotistical trsna, then anything that undercuts
trsna is to be used. It is precisely because of the important spiritual
significance given to the end (Enlightenment) that Buddhism by and large
takes an ultimately instrumentalist functional view of its own teachings
and practice. Far from devaluing these 'means', it thereby reaffirms their
actual practical use within the Buddhist training process. Functionalism
seems an appropriate key for better understanding the operational dynamics,
existentialist goal and epistemological criteria through which Buddhism
mostly operates.

NOTES

[1] SCOTT, D. (1985) Ashokan missionary expansion of Buddhism amongst the
Greeks, Religion, 15, pp. 131-141; idem. (1986) Buddhist attitudes to
Hellenism: a review of the issue, Studies in Religion, 15, pp. 433-41. The
Milindapanha 'Questions of Milinda' is one such example.

[2] See BATCHELOR, S. (1994) The Awakening of the West (London, Aquarian)
for various examples. [3] Thus KALANSURIYA, A. (1979) Two modern Sinhalese
views of Nibbana, Religion, 9, pp. 1-12, argues against what he sees as
narrow ('empirical-philosophical') approaches; as does RAJAPAKSE, R. (1986)
Buddhism as religion and philosophy, Religious Studies, 16, pp. 51-55.

[4] HOFFMAN, F. (1982) The Buddhist empiricism thesis, Religious Studies,
18, pp. I51-158. He considers 'empiricism understood as a theory of
knowledge which holds that some or all knowledge or the materials of
knowledge is either derived from sense experience or is in some senses
dependent on sense experience'. In that setting he does not consider
Buddhism as a form of empiricism, which is true insofar as Buddhism claims
to go beyond the senses for insight. However Hoffman also approvingly used
Edwards' definition (Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 1967) of empiricism, the
'theory that experience rather than reason is the source of knowledge and
in this sense is opposed to rationalism' (p. 383). Buddhism would, however,
fit into this type of definition, given the centrality of experience in its
system. See also HOFFMAN, F (1985) Buddhist belief 'IN', Religious Studies,
21, pp. 381-387. Buddhism's experiential and experimental character is
perhaps lost sight of amidst Hoffman's unhappiness with the term
'empiricism'. Functionalism or instrumentalism may be more effective
alternative terms to use.

[5] SOUTHWOLD, M. (1983) Buddhism in life. The Anthropological study of
religion and the Sinhalese practice of Buddhism (Manchester, Manchester
University Press) p. 186: 'instrumental activity as action directed to
altering the state of the world, one's environment, as a means of altering
one's subjective state of experience, which it is taken to determine. The
strategy of ameliorating experience by such means I shall call the
"instrumental strategy". The system of assumptions, thoughts and
action--including the necessary basis of action in belief about facts of
which this strategy is part, I shall term "instrumentalism" '. This
sociological usage is distinguished from what he calls 'sapientism'.

[6] See QUINTON, A. (1977) Inquiry, thought and action: John Dewey's theory
of knowledge, in: R. PETERS (Ed.) John Dewey reconsidered (London,
Routledge & Kegan Paul) pp. 1-18, esp. 'Instrumentalism' pp. 9-14.

[7] HARVEY, P. (1992) An outline of Buddhism, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, p. 196.

[8] Anguttara Nikaya V.1-3 (I.189), trans. F. Woodward (1936) The Book of
the Gradual, Sayings (Anguttara-Nikaya), (London, Pali Text Society) Vol.
V, pp. 3-4.

[9] SANGHARAKSHITA, B. (1987) A Survey of Buddhism, (London, Tharpa) p.
167.

[10] HARVEY, op. cit., note 7, p. 196.

[11] PREMASIRI, P. (1989) Ethics of the Theravada Buddhist tradition, in:
CRAWFORD (Ed.) World Religions and Global Ethics, (New York, Paragon) p.
57.

[12] SADDHATISSA, H. (1970) Buddhist Ethics. Essence of Buddhism (London,
Allen & Unwin), pp. 110-14.

[13] PREMASIRI, op. cit., note 11, p. 59.

[14] GROSS, R. (1985) The householder and the world renunciant: two modes
of sexual expression in Buddhism, Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 22, p. 81.
'Buddhism has coexisted with monogamous, polygonous, polyandrous, and even
homosexual commitments but [crucially] judging each by the degree to which
it lessened egocentricity and advanced inner liberty. This same attitude
has meant that divorce, childbearing and contraception have not been
treated dogmatically but rather judged case by case . . . Generally,
Buddhism has favoured monogamy, responsible childbearing and child rearing,
and marriages. It has disapproved of divorce, irregular sexuality (for
example oral or anal intercourse), and homosexuality--but not rigidly or
without regard to intentions or special circumstances that might change the
evaluation'; cited in CARMODY, D. & CARMODY, J. (1988) How to live well:
Ethics in the World Religions, Wadsworth, Belmont, pp. 120-121.

[15] ALEXANDRIN, G. (1981) Buddhist economics, Eastern Buddhist, 21(1) pp.
36-37.

[16] Ibid., p. 52.

[17] SCHUMACHER, E. (1974) Buddhist economics, in: Small is Beautiful
(London, Abacus) p. 1. Cf. SIVARAKSA, S. (1992) Seeds of Peace. A Buddhist
Vision for Renewing Society, (Berkely, CA, Parallax Press) pp. 44-47 for
outer and inner correlation and balance.

[18] See BATCHELOR, M. (Ed.) (1992) Buddhism and Ecology (London, Cassell).

[19] PREMASIRI, op. cit., note 11, pp. 62-3.

[20] Ibid., p. 63.

[21] SADDHATISSA, H., op. cit., p. 28.

[22] PREMASIRI, op. cit., note 11, p. 43.

[23] SADDHAT1SSA, op. cit., note 21, p. 68.

[24] KING, W. (1980) Theravada Meditation (Pittsburgh, PA, Pennsylvania
State University) p. 31.

[25] BUDDHAGHOSA, (1976) Path of Purification (Visuddhi Magga), trans. B.
Nyanamoli (London, Shambala) esp. pp. 84-406 for elaborations on the
kasinas, pp. 406-408 for various benefits.

[26] Table from King, op. cit., note 24, p. 31; see pp. 31-34 for general
instrumentalist role of meditation (Nirvana), and the more specific
directioning. Kumarajiva's dhyana-samadhi treatise is another example of a
functionalist matching of temperaments for certain meditation exercises.
See CONZE, E. (1956) Buddhist Meditation (London, Unwin) pp. 11-13.

[27] Truth claims categories in Buddhism and in Western philosophy are
discussed in Is Enlightenment Possible? Dharmakirti and rGyal tshab rje on
Knowledge, Rebirth and Liberation, trans. and commentary by R. Jackson
(1993) (New York, Snow Lion) pp. 43-107.

[28] Vinaya 2.10, trans. Woodward 1973, London, Oxford University Press.
Some Sayings of the Buddha, p. 186. Also trans. I. Homer (1992) The Book of
the Discipline. Vol. V (Culavagga) (Oxford, Pali Text Society) p. 359.
Woodward's translation brings out the point a little more clearly perhaps.

[29] Majjhima-nikaya no 22, Alagaddupama sutta (= 1.130-142), trans. I.
Horner (1975) The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings (Majjhima-Nikaya)
(London, Pali Text Society) Vol. I, p. 173.

[30] Majjhima-nikaya no 63, Cula-Malunkya sutta, (= 1.4226-432), trans. I.
Homer, Vol. II, 97-101, p. 101.

[31] JAYATILLEKE, K. (1963) Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (London,
Allen and Unwin) pp. 470-471.

[32] Majjhima-nikaya no 63, Cula-Malunkya sutta, (= I.426-432), trans.
Horner, Vol. II, p. 101.

[33] Majjhima-nikaya no 58, Abhayarajakumara sutta, (= I.392-396), trans.
Horner, Vol. II, pp. 60-64, esp. pp. 62-63.

[34] JAYATILLEKE, op. cit., note 31, p. 358.

[35] Anguttara-nikaya 1.188, trans. F. Woodward (1936) The Book of the
Gradual Sayings (Anguttara-Nikaya) (London, Pali Text Society) Vol. I, pp.
171-72.

[36] Ibid., p. 172.

[37] The Dhammapada 12.4 (= verse 160), 20.4 (= verse 276) trans. J.
Mascero (1973) (London, Penguin) pp. 58,75. THERAN (1954) The Dhammapada
(London, Murray) is a useful literal version.

[38] JAYATILLEKE, op. cit., note 31, p. 391, with a wider discussion of
saddha pp. 383-400, including a secondary post-Buddha increase of
dogmatism, p. 400.

[39] SANGHARAKSHITA, (1985) Eternal Legacy. An introduction to the
Canonical literature of Buddhism (London, Tharpa) p. 34.

[40] LING, T. (1979) Buddha, Marx, and God (London, Macmillan) p. 44.

[41] SANGHARAKSHITA, op. cit., note 39, pp. 55,60.

[42] LING, op. cit., note 40, p. 44.

[43] SANGHARAKSHITA, op. cit., note 39, p. 29.

[44] PYE, M. (1978) Skilful Means (London, Duckworth).

[45] Lotus Sutra ch. 3, trans. B. Watson (1993) (New York, Columbia State
University) p. 56-71.

[46] The Vimalakirti nirdesa sutra, trans. C. Luk (1972) (London, Routledge
& Kegan Paul) ch. 2 on upaya.

[47] Lotus Sutra, ch. 25, trans. Watson, pp. 301-02.

[48] Submitted to Journal of Chinese Religions, current study.

[49] The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines, trans. Conze, E.
(1975) The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines and its Verse
Summary (Bolinas, CA. Four Seasons Foundation) text tr. pp. 83-300, ch.
II.5 (verses 42-44), p. 100.

[50] Ibid. ch. III. 1 (53), p. 104.

[51] Ibid., ch. VIII.2 (190), tr. p. 144.

[52] Ibid., ch. I.3 (16), pp. 88-89.

[53] Verses on the Perfection of Great Wisdom trans. Conze, 9-73, ch.
XXXII. 6, conclusion, p. 71.

[54] 'Of all theories, Kasyapa, Sunyat a is the antidote. Him I call the
incurable who mistakes Sunyata itself as a theory (drsti). It is as if a
drug, administered to cure a patient, were to remove all disorders, but
were itself to foul the stomach by remaining therein. Would you, Kasyapa,
consider the patient cured? . . . Likewise Kasyapa, Sunyata is the antidote
for all dogmatic views; but him I declare incurable who misapprehends
Sunyata itself as theory'. Cited in: T. MURTI (1972) The Central Philosophy
of Buddhism. A Study of the Madhyamika System (London, Unwin) p. 164.

[55] Trans. Conze (1973) The Short Prajnaparamita texts (London, Luzac) p.
138.

[56] DOHERTY, G. (1983) Form is emptiness. reading the Diamond Sutra,
Eastern Buddhist, 16(2), pp. 114-23.

[57] see STRENG, F. (1978) The process of ultimate transformation in
Nagarjuna's Madhyamika, Eastern Buddhist, 11(2), pp. 12-32. Conze comments
that 'emptiness is not a theory, it is a ladder . . . a severely practical
concept as a medicine the investigation of emptiness is the chief task of
Buddhist wisdom. Only systematic meditation can disclose its profundity'.
Conze, E. (1962) Buddhist thought in India (London, Allen and Unwin) p.
243. Nagarjuna's method and investigation of emptiness is only properly
performed by systematic meditation.

[58] Madhyamikakarika 24.8, trans. K. Inada (1970) Nagarjuna. A translation
of the Mulamadhyamikakarika (Tokyo, Hokuseido) p. 146.

[59] Fragment (contained in Santaraksita's Madhyamakalamkaravrtti), trans.
Lindtner (1987) Nagar-juna. Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of
Nagarjuna (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidas) p. 95.

[60] Madhyamikakarika 24.7, trans. p. 146.

[61] KING, S. (1991) Buddha Nature (Albany, NY, State University of New
York Press) p. 109. For King 'Madhyamakans use sunya to destroy all views;
they "sunyatize" sunyata to deconstruct the later, to be clear that sunyata
is not Truth nor a valid view about [it] .' Patel, in his consideration of
Nagarjuna's paradox of negation ('no proposition has its own intrinsic
thesis') argues that to see this as an 'argumentative/systematic'
(absolutist?) statement is missing the point. Instead he prefers to ask
'then what function does it serve?', since 'the functionality of a negative
statement centres around its efficacy in furthering Buddhist soteriology'.
PATEL, K. (1994) The paradox of negation in Nagarjuna's philosophy, Asian
philosophy, 4(1), pp. 17-32.

[62] Yuktisastika, trans. Lindtner, op. cit., note 59, pp. 103-119, verse
51 p. 117.

[63] Madhyamikakarika 18.4-5, trans. p. 114.

[64] Sunvatasaptati-karika 38-39, trans. Lindtner, op. cit., note 59, pp.
51-52.

[65] Sunvatasaptati-karika 65, trans. p. 65.

[66] Maha-prajnaparamita-sastra, 'craving is the root of clinging . . . if
one would seek to become free from suffering, he should first put an end to
trsna . . . words are [just] a means to get the meaning . . . so, in order
to destroy their clinging, it is taught that all things are really sunya .
. . if people cling even to impermanence and suffering, then the Buddha
would teach that even these are sunya, not ultimate.' Extensive extracts
and commentary in RAMANAN, K. (1966) Nargarjuna's Philosophy as Presented
in the Maha-prajnaparamita-sastra (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidas) verses 200a,
720b, 296c, 291b, trans. pp. 106-107, 183, 193;CANDRAKIRTI Commentary on
Nagarjuna's Guide to the Middle Way ('Emptiness is taught in order to lay
to calm all verbal differentiations, the net of concepts') in: P. WILLIAMS
(1990), Mahayana Buddhism (London, Routledge) p. 70; Middle Treatise,
regarding Nagarjuna's famous four-fold negation noted that 'it was declared
to demolish the four kinds of attachment.' See verses in ROBINSON, R.
(1967) Early Madhvamika in India and China (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidas) p.
56. The Dalai Lama discusses the 'imprint or benefit' of emptiness in
weakening forces like desire and hatred. GYATSO, T. (Dalai Lama) (1975) The
Key to the Middle way, in: The Buddhism of Tibet (New York, Harper & Row)
pp. 79-80.

[67] Streng earlier rejected the absolutist metaphysical nuances of Murti's
(Hindu-coloured?) treatment of sunyata, using an interesting phrase in a
letter dated 2 June 1977 to Jacobson: "the term 'emptiness' functions as
mental judo". Cited in JACOBSON, N. (1983) Buddhism and the contemporary
worm (Carbondale, IL, Southern Illinois University Press) p. 15. P. Ingram
believes 'the whole point of Nagarjuna's concept of Emptiness is that . . .
if we experience everything as empty of "own being", including our
philosophical doctrines, we cease clinging (upadana) to them'. INGRAM, P.
(1990) Buddhist shunyata and the Christian trinity: a response to Michael
von Bruck, in: R. CORLESS & P. KNITTER (Eds) Buddhist Emptiness and
Christian Trinity. Essays and Explorations (New York, Paulist Press) esp.
p. 71. This was in opposition to what Ingram calls the uncritical
absolutist interpretation of Bruck. See the essay by VON BRUCK, M. Buddhist
shunyata and the Christian trinity. The emerging holistic paradigm, in
ibid., pp. 44-66.

[68] KENNET, J. (1976) Zen is Eternal life (Emeryville, CA, Dharma) p. 19.

[69] ROBINSON, op. cit., note 66, p. 49.

[70] See GUDMUNSEN, C. (1977) Wittgenstein and Buddhism (London,
Macmillan).

[71] SANGHARAKSHITA (1987) A survey of Buddhism (London, Tharpa) p. 347.

[72] Dharmasangiti Sutra, Siksasamuccaya passage cited in DE BARY, W.
(1972) The Buddhist Tradition (New York, Vintage) p. 97.

[73] SANGHARAKSHITA (1982) Crossing the Stream (Glasgow, Windhorse) p. 208,
amid his section 'The Way of Emptiness' pp. 205-209.

[74] SANTINA, P. D. (1986) Madhyamika Schools in India (Delhi, Motilal
Banarsidas) p. 41; pp. 30-41 for more elaboration.

[75] See the interesting article by CHENG, H. (1979) Zen and San-lun
Madhyamika thought: exploring the theoretical foundation of Zen teaching
and practice, Religious Studies, 15, pp. 343363.

[76] The Wan Ling Record 46, trans. J. Blofeld, The Zen teachings of Huang
Po (London, Buddhist Society) pp. 122-123.

[77] Ibid. (4, tr. ibid.) p. 69.

[78] Hekiganroku case 3, trans. K. Seida, Two Zen Classics. Mumonkan and
Hekiganroku (New York, Weatherhill) p. 152.

[79] Lankavatara Sutra, trans. D. Suzuki (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul)
p. 74.

[80] Is Enlightenment Possible? op. cit., note 27.

[81] Ibid., p. 413, including the commentary by rGyal tshab rje.

[82] Ibid., p. 170.

[83] Ibid., p. 61.

[84] KING, op. cit., note 61, p. 112.

[85] Ibid., p. 113.

[86] UK Express, the Soka Gakkai official organ, March 1994, p. 9.

[87] CAUSTON, R. (1988) Nichiren Shoshu Buddhism. An Introduction (London,
Rider) pp. 123-129.

[88] Amitayur dhyana-sutra, trans. S. Beyer (1974) The Buddhist Experience:
Sources and interpretations (Encino CA., Dickenson) p. 117. Beyer's
translation replaces the older one in the Sacred Books of the East.

[89] SEKI, HOSEN trans. and commentary, (1973) Buddha tells of the
Infinite. The Amida Kyo (Tokyo, Japan Publications) pp. 15, 49.

[90] Ibid., pp. 39-40.

[91] Sangharakshita, op. cit., note 9, p. 379, the "realities are the same,
but in one case [Prajnaparamita (Wisdom)] they are indicated by means of
conceptual and in the other by means of imaginative symbols. Such a
transposition is obviously attended by very great advantages. While a
philosophy only titillates the rational surface of our being, poetry stirs
it to its depth. Because they engage the darkest and most deeply submerged
desires and urges of our personality the symbols of the Amitabha myth are
collectively able to orientate our whole being towards realisation."

[92] YOSHINORI, T. (1983) The Heart of Buddhism (New York, Crossroad) p.
141.

[93] Ibid., p. 135.

[94] BRAITHWAITE, R. An empiricist's view of the nature of religious belief
(the ninth Arthur Stanley Eddington Memorial Lecture, November 1955), in:
B. MITCHELL, (Ed.) (1971) The Philosophy of Religion (Oxford, Oxford
University Press) p. 72. My thanks to my colleague Arthur Giles for
pointing out this analogous overlap, and also for wider helpful comments.

[95] Ibid., p. 80.

[96] Ibid., p. 83.

[97] Ibid., p. 86.

[98] JACOBSON, N. (1988) The Heart of Buddhist Philosophy (Carbondale, IL,
Southern Illinois University Press) p. 9.

[99] Ibid., p. 46.

[100] HARTSHORNE., cited in ibid., p. 83.

[101] See AMES, V. (1982) Zen and American Thought (Honolulu, HI,
University of Hawaii Press) pp. 214-235, 'Dewey and Zen'.

[102] DEWEY, cited in Jacobson, op. cit., note 98, pp. 83-84.

TABLE I. Appropriate meditation exercises according to type
of person

Type of person Subject and themes

Devotional Buddha, dharma, sangha, sila,
benevolence, devas

Intellectual Calmness or peace, death
Repulsiveness of food, four
material elements

Passionate/sensual Body constituents
Corpse/cemetery

Angry/irritable Four sublime abodes
(brahma-vihara)

Dull and unstable Respiration

All types Ten basinas

All types (after
fourth jhana) Four formless objects
(ayatana)