Buddhist Theories of Causation -- Commentary

·期刊原文

Buddhist Theories of Causation -- Commentary

By Donald W. Mitchell

Philosophy East & West

V. 25 (1975), pp. 101-106

Copyright 1975 by University of Hawaii Press

Hawaii, USA

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p. 101

As I see it, the main concern of Gómez' article is with the compatibility of two different kinds of statements made in the Nikaayas that relate to the question of "man's capacity to freely choose and by his own effort, be able to escape from the realm of conditioning..." [1] The first kind of statements would be called "common-sense-usage statements" made by the Buddha, where he denies any strict determinism between act and fruit (for example, his acceptance of the influence of environmental circumstances and intention). The second kind of statements could be called "depth-level-analytic statements," which are also related to the free-will question In this later case, Gómez centers his attention on two examples -- one directly and the other indirectly He refers directly to statements concerning dependent origination (pratiityasamutpaada) that take the form "if this is, then that comes to be," and indirectly to statements concerning the anattaa doctrine. [2] Specifically Gómez is concerned that the weak sense of determination implied by the first type or statement conflicts with the statement of dependent-origination in the form sighted above, and also that the element of free will implied by the first type of statements would necessitate the positing of some "agent" or "controlling power" beyond the causal system which would in turn conflict with the anattaa doctrine.

I would like to respond to both of these concerns. First, in terms of the compatibility of weak determinism and dependent origination, as Gómez points out, throughout the Nikaayas the Buddha constantly warns of an overly strict and perhaps even logically fallacious interpretation of dependent-origination. For example, the Buddha says it is false that "a man must reap according to his deeds," but true that "the reward a man reaps accords with his deeds." [3] In other words, if there is a reward then there are proper deeds which brought it about. But to say there are proper deeds therefore there is a reward is to commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent (R PD, PD, ∴ R.). A proper deed is a necessary condition for karmic reward but not a sufficient condition. Another example in terms of the twelve spokes of dependent origination would be that while it is true, as the Buddha points out, that upon the cessation of sensation there is a cessation of craving, it does not logically follow that for the cessation of craving there must be no sensation. Sense contact need not result in craving -- for if it did we might be forced to say that the only good Buddhist is a dead Buddhist.

Given these logical considerations it would seem that the Buddha intended the karmic dependence implied by his doctrine of dependent origination to involve karmic influence rather than karmic determination. That is, the karmic dependence is one of influence rather than compulsion." [4] Indeed, the degree of influence is often said to vary from the minor conditioning power of dream-acts to the major conditioning power of deeds directly stemming from hate and

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greed. Thus the universal application of the principle of dependent origination can be upheld, given that one's actions are conditioned by past volitions which as active mental tendencies have "jelled" into karmic influences (sa.mskaaras). On the other hand, since these influences are not compelling, the extreme of complete determinism is avoided. The doctrine of dependent origination is then compatible with weak determinism.

However, this brings us to Gómez' second concern, that is, given that the karmic influence is not compelling, what is it that controls the influence? Does not the concept of man controlling his choices involve the positing of a deliberating agent who makes choices between alternatives from a free vantage point outside the causal nexus -- an agent who chooses to follow the karmic influence to compel him or to override its influence? Indeed to speak of free-will at this common-usage level is to speak of choices and such language seems logically to entail the common-sense-usage notion of an agent. What in fact we ordinarily mean by an action freely willed is that an agent had freely chosen to perform that action. An action freely performed without an agent who had freely chosen to perform that action would seem, to borrow an example from a recent article by Charlene McDermott, like a "catless grin": "Well, I've often seen a cat without a grin," thought Alice, "but a grin without a cat! It's the most curious thing I ever saw in all my life." [5] So on the common-sense level of experience I too can say that I have seen some agents not performing free acts but I have never observed a free act not performed by some agent.

Thus far I am in sympathy with this problem raised by Gómez. However, it would seem that the Buddhist could, and in a certain sense did, [6] respond to the concern in the following way: "We have never denied that there are human beings who act and make choices in the world anymore than we have denied that there are chariots. What we do claim is that if you analyze this common-sense-usage notion of agent at a deeper level of experience you will not find a permanent substantial self or soul. Just as if you analyze a chariot you will only find the parts that make it up, so if you analyze an agent you will only find the thoughts, perceptions, reflections, volitions, memories, etc., that make it up. And each of these factors can be categorized within the five skandhas." Here we encounter a kind of precursor to the Two Truths distinction of later Buddhism. On the conventional or common-sense level of experience one speaks of actors and actions. However, at a deeper and more profound level of experience one can speak only of the dynamic acting process itself. It is with regard to this later level of experience that statements are made by the Buddha concerning the nonexistence of a self (anattaa). To show that it is possible to give an account for the common-sense-usage notion of the self (in this case as agent) that is compatible with the depth-level-analytic notions associated with this anattaa theory was the project of the Abhidharma philosophers. That is, they had to explain the various aspects of human life that we all ordinarily experience (for example, memory and judgment formation) without positing the ultimate

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existence of a soul or self. Indeed the question of an action without an agent is akin to the questions that were often addressed by the Buddhists concerning thought without a thinker, or perception without a perceiver. An evaluation of the success or failure of this broader project is, of course, beyond the scope of what Gómez is attempting to do in his article. However, it should be evident by now that the problem is more pronounced in the case Gómez is considering since the language of the free-will question seems to logically entail hidden essentialist presuppositions. Free will entails an element of choice where an agent chooses to act in a certain manner after deliberating over two or more alternatives.

Turning now to Streng's article, near the beginning he suggests "...that besides analyzing particular propositions on causality in terms of what they signify and their logical consistency with each other ... it is important to analyze the instrumental value of the statements on causality for the Buddhist religious goal of eliminating suffering." [7] At another point Streng says that we must recognize "'nonattachment' as the purpose of the discussion on causality rather than simply an intellectual clarity based on common usage or naive realistic conventions regarding causality. [8] While this may be true, one should not underplay the importance Buddhists placed on intellectual clarity and internal consistency. I am sure this was not the intention of Streng, however, it seems to me that one should not separate these two concerns from one another; that is, the Buddhists in their discussions of causality had to consider both the soteriological effect of their statements and their intellectual defensibility. Indeed much of Abhidharma and later Buddhist philosophy is taken up with this latter project. While theory must be conducive to religious practice, religious concerns must be theoretically substantive.

While I respect Streng's approach, I would like to balance it somewhat by looking at the other side of the coin. For example, if we approached the early Buddhist analysis of causality in terms of intellectual clarity, we would find that many of their attempts to substantiate their views led to modifications of Abhidharma philosophy and even inspired new developments in later Buddhist thought. A case in point would be the Abhidharma problem of making their theory of causation compatible with their theory of momentariness that is, if each element of existence (dharma) exists for only a single moment, how could they be causally related in a sequential order? For if at moment one there is a dharma "a" and at moment two there is a dharma "b," and "a" only existed at moment one and "b" at moment two, how could any causal relation exist between them? If some dharma "c" was put between "a" and "b" as a causal force to fill the gap (a solution suggested by the Sarvaastivaadin praati theory), the problem is renewed between "a" and "c" on the one hand and "c" and "b" on the other -- a process that leads to an infinite regress. A case could be made that some of the later Abhidharma theories were advanced with this kind of philosophical problem in mind (for example: the Theravaadin

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concept of subliminal consciousness (bhavaa^nga) and the Sautraantika concept of representational perception and seed (biija) theory) and that these ideas laid the groundwork for later Yogaacaara philosophy. In other words, while an important intentionality behind Buddhist thought concerning causality was the furtherance of religious goals, as Streng maintains, intellectual clarity and internal consistency were also important factors in the formation of new Buddhist ideas that actually supported and propagated those goals. Both of these considerations must be taken into account to get a complete picture of the development of Buddhist theories.

Farther along in his article, Streng stresses the role of mental discrimination in the notion of causality (specifically dependent origination) and the subjective involvement along with views and expectations that such a role involves. In support of this Buddhist position outlined by Streng, I would like to mention a theory from modern high-energy physics. In a recent article in the American Journal of Physics entitled "Bootstrap and Buddhism," University of London physicist Fritjof Capra compares Nobel physicist Geoffrey Chew's "bootstrap" theory of high-energy physics to the concept of dependent origination. [9] The bootstrap theory is quite involved and my commentary is not the place for its presentation. Let it suffice to say that it denies the classical Western attempt to reduce nature to fundamental basic building-blocks. It posits that nature is an "extremely complex dynamical mechanism" which is "self-determining." In terms of high energy subatomic particles (that is, hadrons); "each particle ... helps generate other particles which in turn generate it. The whole set of hadrons generates itself this way, or 'pulls itself up by its bootstraps,' which is the origin of the model's name." [10] Each hadron is a "dynamical composite structure" that is totally dependent on other hadrons which arise codependent with it -- none being more fundamental than the other. Chew calls this "cosmic democracy" (as against the "cosmic aristocracy" of the building-block model). Further, given the relativity theory, Capra points out that "a single hadron (particle) can be said to contain all the other hadrons and at the same time to be part of each of them." [11] This, of course, is something very similar to the Avata.msaka interpretation of dependent origination and shows that today in modern physics one need not be enlightened to say something that is seemingly unintelligible.

This theory is interesting for two reasons relevant to Streng's paper. First is the obvious similarity between bootstrap and dependent origination. This similarity is especially evident in the bootstrap claim that the qualities and characteristics of each particle are determined by its relation to all other particles, none of which is more fundamental than or independent from the others, and that the existence of each particle is defined by its coarising with all other particles. The second interesting point, as Capra points out, is that in the West since the Greek age we have been subjectively involved in viewing causality in an atomistic framework to the point that many modem physicists

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are reluctant to accept the bootstrap model because it calls into question the views and expectations to which they are culturally very attached. This is not to say that the bootstrap model is valid -- it has yet to be proven. However, what is happening in modern physics does seem to support Streng's contention that "the existential formation of concepts about causality is itself a 'causal process'" and that one should be aware of such a subjective involvement and the cultural inertia it entails. [12]

Finally at the end of the article, Streng points out that a failure to realize the mental dependence of phenomenal distinctions and the mutual determination of subject and object through their coarising tends to crystallize a belief in self-existent entities. This in turn reinforces the sense of "I-ness." An obvious question at this point concerns the degree to which the phenomenal world thus crystallized is a product of vikalpa (false discrimination) -- is the world of subjects and objects just a false illusory appearance? This of course involves questions concerning the interpretation of such doctrine as the Two Truths and Mind-only -- which take us beyond the scope of this conference. However, Streng concludes his paper by pointing out various psychological expressions that arise from the reinforcement of the subject-object dichotomy. All three expressions sighted are extremely negative: a kind of solipsist who posits his self as fundamental and the world as nothing, a kind of "godist" who sees his self as nothing and a "god-object" as fundamental, and a kind of gross materialist who sees his self as nothing and objects as real potentials to "fill" his emptiness.

Against these bleak alternatives, Buddhism claims that neither subject nor object is fundamental. Neither exists apart from each other (that is, both are empty of svabhaava) and both depend on each other for their reality. The realization of this position is said to loosen attachment to such illusory anxiety-filled views as those just mentioned: that is, the realization that all views are constructed from false distinctions based on the subject-object dichotomy and that through them we can never define the true nature of life leads to the Buddhist ideal of nonattachment. While this alternative may seem very attractive against the other bleak examples given by Streng, these latter non-Buddhist alternatives are not at all exhaustive. Indeed they look something like psychological straw men; one must be careful not to compare the ideal of one system of thought to the bad practices of another system of thought. One must compare ideals with ideals.

Let me conclude, then, by giving a more healthy alternative that might stand up better to the Buddhist position. Borrowing from Martin Buber, one might claim that both the subject and the object are real and unique (svasvabhaava) and that the quality of a truly human life is inherent in their relation. While Streng gives examples of I-it relations based on ego manipulation, there is also the possibility of I-thou relations. One can affirm the fundamental reality of one's self and the other in a valuable relation where the individual uniqueness

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and creativity of each is not lost but comes together in an authentic manner that does not deny the own-being of each. Finally from this alternative, there are correct views, namely, those which improve the quality of phenomenal life in allowing for a development of the uniqueness and creativity of real individuals and the depth and authenticity of real relations. It is to this kind of alternative, not the three straw men of solipsism, godism, and gross materialism, that the Buddhist must address himself if he wants his position to be taken seriously by Western man.

NOTES
1. Luis Gómez, "Some Aspects of the Free-will Question in the Nikaayas," herein.

2. Ibid.

3. A^nguttara Nikaaya III, 99.

4. See Shwe Zan Aung, trans., Abhidhammattha-sangaha (London: Paali Text Society, 1963), pp. 43-44.

5. A. Charlene S. McDermott, "Asa^nga's Defense of Aalayavij~naana," Journal of Indian Philosophy 2 (1973): 171. Quoted from Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland.

6. Milindapa~nha, 25:1.

7. Frederick J. Streng, "Reflections on the Attention Given to Mental Construction in the Indian Buddhist Analysis of Causality," herein.

8. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

9. Fritjof Capra, "Bootstrap and Buddhism," American Journal of Physics 42, (Jan., l974): 15-19.

10. Ibid., p. 18.

11. Ibid., p. 18.

12. Streng, herein.