Candrakiirtis refutation of Buddhist idealism

·期刊原文

Candrakiirti's refutation of Buddhist idealism

By Peter G. Fenner

Philosophy East and West

Volume 33, no.3 (July 1983) P.251-261

(C) by the University of Hawaii Press

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P.251

In the seventh-century Buddhist tract
Madhymakaavataara(1) (Introduction to the Middle
Way; hereafter cited as MA) Candrakiirti establishes
the Maadhyamika system of thought by refuting the
tenets of various Buddhist and non-Buddhist
philosophies. In the course of these refutations he
criticizes the Vij~naanavaada or Idealist school of
Buddhism.(2) This article reconstructs the critique
and is offered as an Asian contribution to the
philosophy of perception.

The style of argumentation in the critique
differs from the contemporary discussion in the
theory of perception, mainly because of the
nonexistence of a scientific world-view in ancient
India and a general deprecation of naive realism.
The points, for example, that idealism contravenes
the physiological basis for perception as argued for
by causal theorists and the implausibility of
physical objects being erratically discontinuous
through time, are raised obliquely rather than as
central foci of discussion. For the most part the
arguments draw on consequences that hold for an
idealism (even more rank than Berkeley's) in which
the mind is upheld as the sole reality to the point
where sets of appearances are intrinsic to the
existence of consciousness.

Though the arguments may have no immediate
relevance to the contemporary discussion of
perception, they do evidence a different approach to
idealism and give us some insight into a
centuries-old Indian preoccupation with the
philosophy of perception. Though the style of
argumentation differs from contemporary Western
discourse it shows a philosophical rigor in its own
way, nonetheless, and on this count alone should be
of some interest.

The central issue in the critique is the
Vij~naanavaada thesis that dependent (paratantra)
phenomena (really) exist.(3) The Vij~naanavaada
support that thesis with the doctrines of the (real)
existence of consciousness, the nonexternality of
sense objects, the heuristic device of potentials
(`sakti) as the cause of sense experience; and
apperception. It is these doctrines that
Candrakiirti criticizes.

According to Vij~naanavaadins all objects of
knowledge have three natures: an imaginary
(parikalpita), dependent (paratantra), and perfected
or fully established (parini.spanna) nature.(4) The
imaginary nature arises through the force of mental
imputation, the principal one being a mental
construction which bifurcates subjects from objects.
People are thought to fabricate a division between
themselves and the world, such that the two appear
to be really distinct. As mere imputations, though,
the Vij~naanavaadins hold that the imaginary or
dualistic nature of experience is quite unreal.
Dependent natures form the bases on which or within
which occurs the bifurcation of experience. They are
defined intensionally as that which arises in
dependence on others, that is, literally
"other-powered" (paratantra; gzan-dba^n). The
absence of bifurcation or duality in

P.252

experience is the perfected nature of phenomena.
According to Vij~naanavaadins, yogins achieve
liberation by ceasing to impute imaginary qualities,
especially that of duality. In so doing they realize
that the perceiver and its objects of perception are
not different entities or substances (dravya). That
realization knows the perfected nature.

Dependent and perfected natures have a true
existence (satyasiddha), the latter because they are
known independently of mental constructions and
hence veridically, and the former because they both
arise dependently and form the basis for perfected
natures. That is to say, dependent natures are what
may be known either dualistically or
nondualistically. As the basis of perception, their
non-existence would preclude the possibility of the
existence of perfected natures. For Maadhyamikas, on
the other hand, the (intrinsic) existence of
dependent natures precludes the possibility of
liberation as it runs counter to their idea of
emptiness (`suunyataa) in which all phenomena lack
an intrinsic existence (svabhaava) . The
Vij~naanavaada then, is concerned to establish the
existence of dependent phenomena where the
Maadhyamikas wish to refute their true existence. In
his critique Candrakiirti focuses particularly on
refuting the (true) existence of consciousness, for
all dependent phenomena on the Vij~naanavaada
account are essentially the same entity as
consciousness. Hence the refutation of the (true)
existence of consciousness is a refutation of the
true existence of dependent phenomena.

The procedure in the MA is to refute, in serial
order, the nonexternality of sense objects, the
explanatory device of seeds or potentials of
experience, and apperception.

REFUTING THE NONEXTERNALITY OF SENSE OBJECTS

The MA begins its critique with a summary statement
(6.45-47) of the Vij~naanavaada world-view according
to which the yogin who has attained insight
perceives all of reality to be nothing but
consciousness (vij~naana) and sees that the subject
(graaha) and object (graahya) are in substance the
same for the object is nonmaterial. Dependent
phenomena are cited as the cause (hetu) for the
perception of imaginaries such as the externality of
appearance yet are defined by three qualities;
namely, that they (6.47 cd) "arise without external
objects, exist, and (are) naturally not an object of
elaboration'' (prapa~nca). The Vij~naanavaada also
introduce (6.46) the idea of a source consciousness
(aalaya-vij~naana) as a repository containing the
seeds from which arise consciousness and
appearances. In an analogical description it is said
to function in the way that the movement of wind
(the seeds or potentials) on the ocean (the mind
base) gives rise to waves (consciousness and its
objects).

The Maadhyamikas begin their critique (6.48) by
asking the Vij~naanavaada for supporting evidence.
They undercut a Vij~naanavaada response though by
raising the case of dreams themselves, and then
pointing out unwanted consequences.

P.253

The Vij~naanavaada hold that dreams evidence the
true existence of consciousness and the merely
apparent externality of objects in the so-called
waking state.

Taking the first point, they argue that
consciousness truly exists because it can produce
dream images, thoughts, and so on and hold them for
subsequent recall in the waking state. The
capacities for production, containment, and
continuity through time would not be possible, they
argue, if consciousness did not truly exist. The
Maadhyamika object that if the phenomenon of recall
or memory is their criterion of existence then
external objects are likewise real for they also are
perceived and subsequently recalled in the waking
state. This, though, runs counter to the
Vij~naanavaada thesis that external phenomena are
merely imaginary.

The Vij~naanavaada then change tack (6.50) and
proffer what is a standard idealist argument for the
nonexternality of objects based on phenomenological
similarities between the dream and waking states.
They point out especially that dream objects produce
affective responses in just the same way that
external objects do. The phenomenological
similarities between the two states leads them to
conclude that waking objects likewise have no
external reality. The Maadhyamikas in response
(6.51-53) offer a physiological basis for
discriminating between the two states. Their
Buddhist explanation is that during veridical waking
perception all six consciousnesses (that is, a
mental and five sensory ones) , and their
corresponding powers (indriya) are active and make
contact with their respective objects whereas in
dreams only the mind-consciousness (manovij~naana)
operates and the sense organs and other
consciousnesses are inactive.

Changing tack again the Vij~naanavaada leave the
example of dreams and introduce (6.54) the situation
in which a consciousness receives its visual
impressions through an eye organ stricken by a
disease (timira) such as opthalmia, which causes
hairlines to appear in front of the eyes. This is
functionally equivalent to the stock Western example
of afterimages. They reason that the perceived
reality of the hairs and consciousness of them by
the person afflicted with the disease evidences the
real existence of consciousness. If it were not
real, the appearance of hairlines and hallucinations
generally could not be presented to consciousness.
Hence, the example shows the real existence of
consciousness and the fictitious or illusory nature
of sense objects. In responding to this example the
Maadhyamikas point to a consequence of consciousness
being real in the realist sense of being
self-existent. Candrakiirti writes (6.55). "If the
mind exists (yet) the objects of knowledge do not,
then as the eye and its object, the hairs, are
patently related, (people) without the disease would
also have hairlines (appearing) to (their) mind. As
this is not (the case), therefore (the mind) does
not exist." The argument here is that if a mind
perceiving objects that have no external referents
truly or intrinsically exists then those illusory
objects will also appear to all other minds. Hence,
in the case preceding, hairlines would appear

P.254

to a healthy visual sense faculty just as they do to
the diseased one. The reason seated in the argument
is that a consciousness perceiving hairlines must
have hairlines present for it to be a real
consciousness of hairlines. If the hairlines are not
present there is no real "consciousness of
hairlines.'' But, the Maadhyamikas reason, if the
consciousness is real in your sense, the hairlines
are necessarily and intrinsically related to the
consciousness in which case conditions such as the
mere presence or absence of a visual defect is
irrelevant and so the hairlines would appear to any
consciousnesses having the same focus as the one to
which hairlines appear. In other words, all
consciousnesses looking in the same direction, or at
the same object, would perceive the visual
distortion.(5)

This analysis and subsequent ones are typically
Maadhyamic. Though the Maadhyamika itself is a
"middle path" their analytical procedure is to
rigidly designate their objects of refutation and
resolve their opponents theses into either
affirmations or denials. That is, they assume there
are no half measures or median positions. Their own
path is a middle one in the sense that it is
nonextremist for it neither affirms nor denies
existences. In this preceding case, consciousness
either exists or it does not. If it does not, the
Vij~naanavaadins violate their tenet of the
existence of consciousness. If it exists in any way
other than as a nominality it truly or intrinsically
exists, in which case its existence is quite
independent of attendant circumstances, other
conditions, causes, or objects. Hence if a
particular consciousness truly exists it exists
independently of, and unmodified by, factors such as
the quality of sense organs.

THE FAILURE OF MENTAL POTENTIALS TO ACCOUNT FOR
SENSORY EXPERIENCES

To give a causal account for sense experience and
its vicissitudes and variations, and to avoid
consequences such as the foregoing one pointed out
by the Maadhyamikas, the Vij~naanavaada introduce
the explanatory device of mental potentials
(blo-nus, mati-`sakti? ) located in a source
consciousness (aalayavij~naana). As the potentials
within a source consciousness ripen serially they
give rise to a continuum of consciousness and the
appearance of sense objects to consciousness. The
potentials account fully for the arising of sense
experience, therefore, there is no need to posit
external objects as a cause or necessary condition
Instanciating a visual consciousness Candrakiirti
states the Vij~naanavaada thesis (6.62-63) thus:

The birth of a visual consciousness is produced
immediately and wholly from what is its own
potential. This potential which is the support of
its own consciousness is perceived as the formed
organ called "the eye". Knowledge which arises from a
(sense-) organ, (e.g.) an appearance of blue, etc.
arises from its own seed (sa-bon, biija) without an
external object. From not understanding (this)
people accept that the mind (sees) external objects.

The differences between the experiences of
individuals is explained in terms of continua of
source consciousnesses containing different sets and
orderings of

P.255

potentials. When potentials ripen they produce
differences in experience that are qualitatively
commensurate with the differences between
potentials.

The preceding dilemma is thus resolved (6.56
a-c) by saying that the individual who has the
sensation of hairlines in front of his/her eyes has
potentials within his/her source consciousness that
fructify as the appearance of hairlines whereas the
individual without diseased eyes has no such
potentials. (The very concept of diseased and
healthy organs is likewise just a matter of
different patterns of consistency within sets of
potentials.)

The Maadhyamikas are unhappy with this notion of
potentials, at least when proffered as the sole
cause of sensory experience. Their refutation notes
first (6.56d) that instincts, on the
Vij~naanavaada's account. are in need of some proof
and then proceeds (6.57-61) to refute their real
existence. The refutation is based on rejecting the
existence of potentials as causes of past (6.59-61),
present (6.57a) , or future(6.57b-8)
consciousnesses.(6) The arguments are these:

1. A potential cannot be a cause for a presently
existing consciousness because causes must precede
their effects. If the two were simultaneous, cause
and effect would be indistinguishable from each
other and hence the same, in which case potentials
would not be potentials for they could not act as
the cause of consciousness. Hence present potentials
are nonexistent and consciousness must be self-born.

2. The potential for a future consciousness is
nonexistent because the potential as a cause must
make contact with its effect, the consciousness. If
there is no contact the two cannot function as cause
and effect. The future consciousness, though, is
nonexistent and therefore the potential also. (If
the potential were existing then contact with its
effect would require that the consciousness also
existed in which case it would be a present rather
than a future consciousness.) Moreover (6.57cd), a
future consciousness cannot exist because
distinguishables (vi`se.sa.na) (that is. a future
consciousness) exist in dependence on their having
characteristics or distinctions (vi`se.sya) and a
future consciousness is as yet uncharacterized.
Hence, the positing of potentials for an
uncharacterized consciousness is on a par with
talking about the children of a barren woman. A
final point made by Candrakiirti (6.58cd) is that
the Vij~naanavaadins have their reasoning with
respect to true or self-existence quite inverted.
For the Vij~naanavaada, dependent phenomena truly
exist, whereas the Maadhyamikas hold that things
established through dependence on each other
(pan-tshun-don-la brten-pa), such as potentials and
consciousness, are (ultimately) nonexistent
(grub-min-~nid). Hence, from the same data. they
draw a conclusion that is diametrically opposite.

3. Finally, a consciousness cannot arise as the
fructifying potential (nus-smi^n) of a potency
already ceased (`gag-pa) for this view produces the
consequences inhering in the situation of "birth
from other."(7) The continuum of production (from a
potential to a consciousness) within a mind-stream
would be discontinuous and thus incapable of acting
as causes and effects. In other words, the

P.256

continuum's parts would be displaced from each other
and so fail to be parts within the one continuum. As
different moments (k.sa.na) within the stream they
would be intrinsically different from each other and
therefore unrelated. Because they are unrelated they
could not be said to be members of the one continuum
(sa^mtaana). Candrakiirti gives the example (6.61)
of two of consciousness' qualities, love and
agression, which, if intrinsically individuated from
each other, cannot be part of one continuum.

The consequences are that all would seemingly
give rise to all. (A potential within any "one''
continuum, for example, would be no more likely to
ripen in that continuum than in any other.) The
conclusion for Candrakiirti is that these three
temporal analyses disprove the Vij~naanavaada thesis
that potentials are the sole cause of sense
consciousnesses.

COUNTEREXAMPLES

After a restatement of the Vij~naanavaada theses
(6.62-64) about potentials and the nonexternality of
sense objects (quoted in part earlier) Candrakiirti
resumes his refutation by supplying two
counterexamples to their view. The Maadhyamikas
contend (6.65) that if the Vij~naanavaadas are
right, that objects appear to a mind-consciousness
just as in a dream where there is no active sense
organ, then blind people should see sense objects
when they are awake just as they do while asleep and
dreaming. The Vij~naanavaada are not in a position
to object (6.66ab), saying that blind people are
unaware of sense objects while awake because the
mind consciousness is deactivated in the waking
state, for on their own account potentials not sense
organs are responsible for sense perception. As such
there is no necessary connection between sense
organs and a mental consciousness (nor even the need
of organs for mental perceptions of objects) and the
activation or deactivation of the sense organs (if
there is such a process) is quite irrelevant to the
functioning of a mental consciousness. Consequently,
the activity or inactivity of a mind-consciousness
is quite independent of whether a person is asleep
and dreaming or awake. If the mind-consciousness of
a blind person were to become inactive once he/she
was perceived to wake, and similarly become active
once he:she went to sleep, it would be merely
coincidental. On the Vij~naanavaada thesis, then,
there is nothing to stop blind people from having
sensory experiences, qualitatively comparable to
those had while dreaming, when they are awake.
Candrakiirti concludes (6.68) that Vij~naanavaadins
typically fail to respond to the Maadhyamika's
analyses, being content to merely uncritically,
restate their theses.

The second counterexample is intended to refute
the true existence of consciousness and is based on
a yogic phenomenon known to the Vij~naanavaadins
(6.69) in which yogins achieve a collectedness
(samaadhi) or concentration on a visualized image of
skeletons. The purpose of the meditation (6.70b) is
to develop a mind of aversion (a`subha) to worldly
affairs. For the Vij~naanavaada, the efficacy of
such a meditation in producing a detached
consciousness is evidence for the true existence of
consciousness. The Maadhyamikas' objection is

P.257

the same as that raised in the earlier example of
hairlines appearing to a distorted visual
consciousness. If the yogin's consciousness of
skeletons truly exists it is quite independent of
such causes and conditions as instructions from a
guru, the development of concentration, etc.. and,
therefore, will appear to any mind directed
(bol-gtad) toward where the yogin is facing. This is
fallacious though, and, therefore, the mind does not
really exist.

This series of verses concludes (6,71 ab) with
the Maadhyamikas acknowledging what is the idealists
"argument of variability.'' Where Berkeley used the
example of a coin being perceived from various
angles Candrakiirti uses a somewhat dramatic
mythological image and talks of spirits (yi-dwags,
preta) perceiving water as though it was pus where
humans see the same as water. According to the
Vij~naanavaada the fact that a variety of different
perceptions can be had evidences the mental nature
of sense objects, and the fact that the perceptions
can satiate their respective subjects evidences the
true existence of the consciousnesses produced. In
reply the Maadhyamikas note the likeness of this
example to that of diseased sense faculties and
return the Vij~naanavaada to their earlier
refutation. A summary point (6.71cd) is that
knowables are not truly existent, and, therefore,
the mind which they produce is likewise unreal.

REFUTATION OF APPERCEPTION

In concluding his critique Candrakiirti (6.72)
questions the very knowability and hence existence
of dependent things (paratantra-bhaava) by arguing
that the subject-object distinction (and hence
cognizer-cognized also) is dissolved when the
Vij~naanavaada empty (sto^n-pa) the two of being
separate (and composed of different substances).

To obviate such a difficulty in their tenets the
Vij~naanavaada propose (6.73ab) that consciousness
can experience (anubhava) itself and cite the
phenomenon of memory (sm.rti) as evidence. They say
that all sense-consciousnesses are accompanied by a
function or capacity of consciousness that perceives
not the sense object but the sensory consciousness
itself. In its own right it is neither a mind
(citta), nor mental concomitant (caitta).(8) Nor is
it just a conceptual (kalpanaa) recognition of
perception. Without such an apperceptive faculty,
the Vij~naanavaada reason that memory or recall
would be impossible, for consciousness must be
nonreferentially aware of itself--in other words,
aware of itself independently of referents--to have
memories when the referents are past and finished.
If it were aware of itself only referentially then
the sense consciousness generated could not be
recalled in the absence of their referents (that is,
sense data or objects).

The Maadhvamikas reject the notion of
apperception (svasa^mvedanaa) and claim that recall
is quite explicable on the basis of a
nonself-reflexive mind-consciousness alone. They
argue (6.75ab) that the experience of objects itself
is a sufficient cause for a recollection. They note
(6.75d) that this also accords with the commonsense
view of recollection.

P.258

The Maadhyamikas' critique is two-pronged. Their
first point (6.74) is that apperception cannot be
considered a cause or necessary condition for the
arising of memory, as both of these, according to
the Vij~naanavaada, are truly existent, and,
therefore, unable to be causally related in the one
continuum. Moreover, (6.74d) in basing their thesis
on real "birth from another" they remove (`zoms) the
distinctions between raw experience and memories of
it, The second consequence (6.76) is the
contradiction thay in apperception the subject,
object, and perception become one and so fail in
fact to be subject, object, and so on. In other
words, if consciousness is the object of cognition
it is undistinguished from the cognizing
consciousness, and therefore not an object of
cognition. (Conversely, if consciousness does know
or perceive it must know an object as distinct from
itself, and cannot know itself.(9) ) Hence a
self-conscious cognition is unknown and thus
nonexistent. Consequently, the purported validation
of the existence of a dependent (paratantra)
consciousness via an apperceptive cognition is
ungrounded.

The various refutations involved in
Candrakiirti's critique of the Vij~naanavaada
coalesce in the common conclusion (6.77) that their
naturally (^no-ho) dependent phenomena do not exist.
They thereby (6.78) destroy all worldly notions and
are (6.79cd) imperfect with respect to the ultimate
and conventional levels of truth and so do not
obtain liberation.

NOTES

1. This study uses the Tibetan text with
Candrakiirti's autocommentary edited by Louis de la
Valle e Poussin, Madhyamakaavataara par Candrakiirti,
reprint (Osnabruck: Biblio Verlag, 1970) . The
relevant verses, 6.45-77 (Poussin's ed., pp.
135-173)are translated in an Appendix. Poussin's
partial translation of the MA, Madhyamakaavataara
Traduction d'apres la version tibertaine, Le Museon.
N.S. 8 (1907): 249-317; 11 (1910): 271-358: and 12
(1911) : 235-328 includes these verses and the
commentary (bhaa.sya), 11 (1910): 324-354.

2. The school also goes by the names Yogaacaara,
Cittamaatra, and Vij~naapti-maatra. The adjectival
qualifier-maatra, tib. tsam(-du) denotes exclusion,
hence the only--or merely-mind school. There is some
controversy among contemporary scholars as to
whether the Vij~naanavaada is a genuine idealism.
Independent of the outcome of that controversy it is
clear that Candrakiirti interprets the
Vij~naanavaada as "idealism."

3. The MA refutes the thesis that dependent
things have existence (yod, sat). It is implicit
throughout, though, that only intrinsic existence
(svabhaava) is being denied of dependent phenomena
for elsewhere the MA establishes the nominal
existence of the commonsense world (`jig-rten).

4. See, for example, Madhyaantavibhaaga, 1.5.

5. These are presumably milder versions of the
fully ramified consequences that either share all or
none of their experiences. In the former case there
would be just one consciousness, not many: and in
the latter where, unrelated by any common percepts,
each would be solipsistic with respect to the
others.

6. The analysis follows essentially the same
structure as Candrakiirti employs (MA, 6.18d-19) in
rejecting "birth from other" in any of the three
times, past, present, and future. Cf. also
Muulamadhyamakaarika, chpt. 2.

7. These are discussed through verses 6.14-97.
The most trenchant criticism is that causation
between dissimilars is impossible because
dissimilars share no common characteristics and
hence cannot be causally related.

P.259

8. It is not an additional consciousness to the
eight reckoned on by the Vij~naanavaada but a
cognitive instrument, more particularly a mode of
perception (pratyak.sa) . See Th. Stcherbatsky,
Buddhist Logic, vol. 1, reprint (New York: Dover
Publications 1962), pp. 163-169.

9. Candrakiirti gives the analogical examples of
a sword's inability to cut itself, and the finger's
inability to touch itself.

APPENDIX

6.45 (Vijnaanavada: ) There is no seeing a
subject('dzin-pa, graaha) because there is no
object (bzu^n-ba, graahya) and because he/she
thoroughly perceives the three worlds
(srid-gsum, tri-bhava) as mere consciousness
(rnam-`ses, vij~naana) that (sixth level)
bodhisattva, abiding in insight (`ses-rab,
praj~naa) , understands reality as merely
consciousness.

6.46 As waves arise from the great ocean by the
motion of the wind, so the so-called source of
all (kun-gzi, aalaya) , the seed of all
(things), only consciousness arises through its
own potential (nus, `sakti).

6.47 Therefore the nature of dependent
(gzan-gyi-dba^n, paratantra) (phenomena)--which
are the cause of things existing as imaginary
[kun-]btags, parikalpita)--is to arise without
external objects (phyi-rol-gzu^n-ba), exist,
and be naturally (ran-bzin) not an object of
elaboration (spros, prapa~nca).

6.48 (Maadhyamika:) Where is an example of a mind
with no external (objects)? If (you) say it is
like a dream, then that must be thought
(about). If whenever I have a dream the mind
also does not exist then your example is not
(an example).

6.49 If the mind exists because the dream is
recalled (dran) when waking, then external
objects will also be like that. As such your
mental recall "I saw..." likewise (de' dra)
(establishes that) externals have an existence
too.

6.50 (Vij~naanavaada:) Because the visual faculty
(mig-blo) does not exist if asleep, (externals)
do not exist. Only (kho-na) the mental
discernment (yid-kyi-`ses-pa) exists. Its
appearances (rnam-pa) are desired (zen) like
externals (phyi-rol-~nid). As with the dream so
it is considered here when (in the waking
state).

6.51 (Maadhyamika:) Just as your external object in
the dream is unborn so the mind also is not
born.

6.52 All three--the eye, visual objects, and the
mind those produce--are fictitious (rdzun-pa)
too. 6.52 Hearing. etc., i.e., the remaining
three (senses) also are not born. As in the
dream likewise here (when) awake too. Things
are fictitious. That mind does not exist. There
are no objects and the (sense-) powers
(dba^n-po, indriya) also do not exist.

6.53 Here, for however long one is not awake, the
three (i.e., eye, object, and mind) exist just
as when one is awake. When (one) awakens the
three parts no longer exist. Likewise (when
awakening) from ignorance's sleep.

6.54 (Vij~naanavaada:) Whatever mind has diseased
(rab-rib) (sense) organs, and whatever hair
(etc.) it sees because of the nature (mthu) of
disease, relative to that mind both (the
consciousness and object) are true although for
(one who) sees clearly (don-gsal) both are
fictitious (rdzun-pa).

6.55 (Maadhvamika:) If the mind exists (yet) the
objects of knowledge (ses-bya, j~neya) do not,
then as the eye and its object, the hairs, are
patently related (rjes-`brel-ba) , (people)
without the disease would also have hair lines
(appearing) to (their) mind. As this is not
(the case) , therefore (the mind) does not
exist.

6.56 (Vij~naanavaada:) The (non-diseased) perceivers
(mthon-pa-dag) do not have that mind (with
hairs) arising because the mental potential
(blo-nus) is not ripening, not because (ze-na)
it is separate from a thing (purported) to be
an (external) object of knowledge.
(Maadhyamika: Because that potential (nus) is
not present! This is not established.

6.57 The potential (nus-pa, `sakti) for a born
(consciousness) does not exist. The potential
for an entity not (yet) born also does not
exist. (Where) there are no distinctions
(khyad-par, vi`sesya) no distinguishables
exist. In consequence the son of a barren woman
would also exist.

6.58 If you consider stating (bs~nad 'dod) it by
what will come to arise, then without the
potential its "coming to arise" cannot be.
Whatever are established through dependence on
each other (pantshun-don-la brten-pa), are said
by the pious to be nonexistent (grub-min-~nid).

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6.59 If (it) comes from the fructifying potential
(nus-smin) of what has (already) stopped
(`gag-pa) then another will arise from
another's potential. The continuum's parts
(rgyan-can-rnams) there are different from each
other. Therefore, everything will arise from
all.

6.60 If(you) say, "The continuum's parts there are
different yet the continuum on those is not
different, therefore there is no fault,'' (we
Maadhyamikas say) "Prove this! Because it is
not right that when (skabs) a (single)
continuum it is (internally) not different.

6.61 The qualities (chos) which are dependent on
love (byam-pa) and aggression (~ner-spras) ,
because of otherness do not belong to the one
continuum (rgyud, sa^mtaana). Whatever have an
individuality (so-so-ba, p.rthag tra) by
(their) own character (ra^n-mtshan-~nid,
svalak.sa.na), cannot rightly belong to one
continuum.

6.62 (Vij~naanavada: ) The birth of a visual
consciousness (mig-blo, cak.surdhii) is
produced immediately (de-ma thag-tu) and wholly
(kun-nas,) from what is its own potential. This
potential which is the support of its own
consciousness is perceived (rtogs) as the
formed organ called "the eve."

6.63 Knowledge (rnam-par-rig) which arises from a
(sense-) organ (dha^n-po, indriya). (e.g.) an
appearance of blue, etc., arises from its own
seed without an external object. From not
understanding (this) people accept (len) that
the mind (sees) external objects.

6.64 If you (Vij~naanavaada) says: "As in a dream
where there are no separate (objective) objects
of form (gzugs-don), a mind arises from its own
ripened potential having their shape(rnam,
aakaara), similarly here in the waking state
the mind (yid, manas) exist (though) without
external (objects)."

6.65 (We Maadhyamikas reply:) Just as in a dream
there is no eye (Faculty operating, yet) a
mind-consciousness (yid-sem) of blue
appearances, etc., arises, why is it similarly
not born from Its own ripened seed in a blind
person who has no eye faculty (mig-dban,
cak.sur-indriya)?

6.66 If in your view the potential of the sixth
(consciousness only) has ripened in the dream
(-state) and is not there in the waking state,
then similarly why it is incorrect to say that
at the time of dreaming there is no ripened
potential of the sixth (consciousness).

6.67 Just as the absence of a visual faculty (mig)
is not the cause (rgyu, hetu) of this
(metnal-consciousness when awake), so in dreams
also sleep is not the cause, Therefore, in
dreams too that object (d^nos, bhaava) and eye
are accepted as the cause of perceiving
(rtogs-pa) a fictitious subject (rdzun pa'i
yul-can).

6.68 Because whatever answer is offered (btab-pa)
(by you) is seen (merely to) replicate the
thesis (dam-bca', pratij~naa) . this debate
(rtsod) is clarified (sel-byed). The buddhas
taught that things never exist.

6.69 (Vij~naanavaada:) A yogin who from the oral
instruction of a guru sees the ground of the
earth (full) with skeletons, also sees that the
three components (of perception--the object.
organ. and consciousness) are unborn because
they depend on the workings of a distorted mind
(log-pa-yid. manasikaara).

6.70 (Maadhyamika:) Your objects of the (sense-)
organ and mind (may be seen by ? another), so
if the (yogin) develops a mind of repulsion
(mi-sdug, a`subha) (to the skeletons) then
likewise another mind directed (blo-gtad) (to
them) would perceive that object. This, though,
is fallacious (rdzun-pa) (for it) is not
produced.

6.71 Like (a person who) has a diseased (sense-)
faculty, a spirit (yi-dwags, preta) at a
flowing river also experiences (blo) pus. In
summary, as there are no objects of knowledge
so also there is no mind. Understand this
meaning thus.

6.72 If there is no (external) object (gzu^n,
graahya) , and the subject (`dzin-pa~nid,
graahakataa) is separate from (it), and there
exists a dependent thing (gzan-dba^n d^nos,
paratantra-bhaava) that is empty (sto^n-pa) of
the two, then by what will its existence (yod,
sat) be known? As it is not grasped (bzu^n-ba),
to say "it exists Is Inappropriate.

6.73 It is not established as being experienced
(myo^n-ba, anubhava) by itself. If (you
Vij~naanavaadas say) it is established at a
later time from recall (dran-pa, sm.rti) (then
that) is not established for (the potential for
recall) can be established (without
apperception). It is not established by (your)
statement.

6.74 Apperception (ra^n-rig, svasa^mvedanaa) is
established though indeed (mod-kyi) dependent
on (rag) (memory). So also the memory of
memor) is not right and because the (experience
and

P.261

memory of it) are other so birth in a continuum
is not known. This argument also defeats the
distinctions.

6.75 Because for us (a memory comes) from that which
will experience (myo^n, anubhava) the object
(yul, vi.saya), this memory (of yours) which is
other does not exist. Therefore I will remember
sights and thoughts. This (understanding) is
also the manner of worldly conventions.

6.76 Therefore if there is no apperception what will
grasp (`dzin-pa) your dependent (paratantra)
(consciousness). Because the agent, action, and
acted on are not the same it is incorrect that
that (consciousness) is grasped by itself.

6.77 If things exist that are naturally (^no-be)
dependent, having a self that is unborn and
unknown, then what harm can the son of barren
women (bring) to another? Like this, it is
incorrect (that your dependent things) have an
existence.