Early Saamkhya in the Buddhacarita

·期刊原文

Early Saamkhya in the Buddhacarita

Kent, Stephen A.

Philosophy East and West

Vol.32:3(July 1982) P.259-278

The University of Hawaii Press

(C) by University of Hawaii Press

P.259

INTRODUCTION

In the twelth canto of the Buddhacarita (B)(1)
A'svagho.sa describes the sage Araa.da's metaphysical
system, (2) and provides statements concerning the
liberating knowledge that people achieve by working
through it. Araa.da's metaphysical system consists
of twenty-five principles, the highest of which is
distinct from the others. Liberating knowledge
involves the highest principle "knowing" its
separation from the other consituents, and the
technique by which the highest principle realizes
this knowledge is the cultivation of the powers of
discrimination.
Araa.da's metaphysical system bears striking
resemblances to systems that appear in other texts
from roughly the same era. For instance, it has such
close affinities with metaphysical systems in Book
Twelve of the Mahaabhaarata(Mbh) , the Mok.sadharma,
(3) that the translator of the Buddhacarita, E.H.
Johnston, suspects both works have a common
authority, possibly a text of the little-known
Var.saga.nya school.(4)Additional similarities exist
in certain passages of the Bhagavadgiitaa(Bvg),(5)
but the difficulties over dating the latter text
make the question of influence between the two
impossible to answer with certainty.(6) Another
similar metaphysical description is elaborated in
the Indian medical text from the first century c.e.,
the Caraka Sa.mhitaa(CS) , (7) and various resem-
blances between Araa.da's reputed system, as well as
several differences, readily can be identified. (8)
Finally, several Upani.sads(U), especially the Katha
Upani.sad and the 'Svetaa'svatara Upani.sad, contain
descriptions of metaphysical systems that resemble
Araa.da's.(9)
Araa.da's system, along with the systems that
resemble it, often are referred to as forms of
"early Saa.mkhya," (10) and therefore a prelude to
II'svarak.r.s.na's classical Saa.mkhya(11) system of
about the fifth century C.E.(12) Johnston, for
instance, speaks in this manner. Franklin Edgerton,
in contrast, argues that these so-called early
Saa.mkhya systems within the Bhagavadgiitaa and the
Mahaabhaarata are but aspects of "Upani.sadic
Brahmanism," and do not represent doctrines of a
distinctive school of thought.(13) His view,
however, cannot explain all relevant passages in the
Mahaabhaarata, and therefore we must assume that an
independent tradition of nontheism was developing
during this era, and that it occasionally reveals
itself in the texts.(14) Nonetheless, Edgerton's
argument has merit when we apply it to the
Buddhacarita  the metaphysics of the twelfth canto
"are set in a framework which espouses the old
Upani.sadic notions of aatman and brahman." (15) So
it is in the Buddhacarita that Araa.da follows his
description of the path of knowledge (saa.mkhya,
although he does not use the term itself) with a
description of "another

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method [of] the same dharma, " that is, yogic
trances. The two descriptions do not disagree over
metaphysic, just method.(16) to refer, therefore, to
the metaphysics of the twelfth canto of the
Buddhacarita as "early Saa.mkhya" is not to imply
that Araa.da's reputed system was among those that
were beginning to distinguish themselves from
orthodoxy. Our use of the term will be a heuristic
one,(17) used to facilitate our efforts in examining
the metaphysics of the tewlfth canto by both
comparing them to the later classical Saa.mkhya
system, and by contrasting them with the Buddhist
criticisms that A'svagho.sa levels throgh Gautama
(as the Bodhisattva and the Buddha). When helpful,
references will be made to appropriate sections of
A'svagho.sa's story of Nanda's conversion, the
Saundarananda (S),(18) as well as to passages from
the Mahaabhaarata, the Bhagavadgiitaa, the
Yoga-Suutras (YS) (19) and the Upani.sads.

A'SVAGHO.SA'S RENDITION OF ARAA.DA'S SAA.MKHYA SYSTEM

Within verses 17-42 of the twelfth canto of the
Buddhacarita, A'svagho.sa presents Araa.da's early
Saa.mkhya system, and in verses 69-82 offers the
bodhisattva's subsequent rejection of it.(Verses
43-63 present a means to salvation through trances
[dhyaana-s] that actually have a closer affinity
with Buddhist yogic states than with orthodox Indian
ones, and verses 66-67 state the names of the
previous great sages of what Araa.da considers to be
the joint Saa.mkhya-yoga tradition.)(20)
Araa.da's system consists of twenty-five principles
(tattva-s) in which a distinction exists between one
tattva, aatman(21) or knower of the field
(k.setrajnna),(22)and the other twenty-four. The
twenty-four are further divided into two groups: one
group of eight called prak.rti(primary matter) and
another group of sixteen derived from the former,
called vikaara (secondary matter or "production" or
"derivative" [B xii 17-20]). Prak.rti consists of
avyakta (unseen power) , buddhi (intellect) ,
aha.mkaara (ego), and the five bhuuta-s (elements).
Vikaara consists of the five objects of the senses,
the five senses, the hands and feet, the voice, the
organs of generation and excretion, and manas
(mind). The exact process by which either the
eightfold prak.rti generates itself or prak.rti
generates the sixteen secondary evolutes is never
explained in this text.(23)
Together these twenty-four tattva-s comprise the
field (k.setra). Matter, both primary and secondary,
is called"the seen" and is "that which is born,
grows old, suffers from disease and dies." AAtman,
in contrast, is described as possessing the opposite
of these attributes (B xii, 22).(24) The aatman
continues to transmigrate until it discriminates
between itself (the unseen, intelligent, and
unmanifest) and "the seen" (the unintelligent and
the manifest [B xii, 29, 40-41]). A dualism is
present here between the knower of the field and the
field itself, and this dualism is to become more
clearly pronounced in the classical school(SK XIX).

SVABHAAVA(INHERENT) NATURE UNDERLYING THE EIGHTFOLD
PRAK.RTI

A multifeatured unity known as svabhaava underlies
the eightfold prak.rti and serves as its motive
force for creation. Its features are identified in B
xviii, 29-41

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as part of a series of arguments in which the Buddha
is refuting the theory that Nature (svabhaava)(25)
is the Creator of the universe. In these verses
svabhaava is described as single essence (31), all
pervading (32) , without attribute (34) or
characteristics (35), a perpetual cause (that is,
eternal [35]), productive (36), not perceptible,
unmanifest (39) and inanimate,and without conscious-
ness (ace-tana?[40]).(26)
The crucial arguments offered to refute svabhaava
center around "the rule that attributes of an effect
must also be in the cause". A'svagho.sa (via the
Buddha) objects to the early Saa.mkhya svabhaava on
the grounds that since it is without attribute
(gu.na[34]) or characteristics (vi'se.sa) it cannot
be the cause of the world (or universe) whose
physical constructions are pervaded by both.(27)
We find the same features used to describe svabh-
aava in the Buddhacarita also being assigned to avy-
akta, the ummanifest, in SKX  XI.(28) of the
classical school, with but one important difference.
The avyakta of the classical scheme contains the
three gu.na-s and through them it possesses both
attributes and characteristics. It thereby differs
from the early svabhaava, which has neither. Because
of the gu.na-s, A'svagho.sa's criticism of an
(inherent) nature in Saa.mkhya as being without
attribute(s) or characteristics and therefore unable
to be the cause of a material world full of both, is
effectively countered in the classical system (SK
XII  XIII).(29) In fact SK XIV specifically says
"the unmanifest (avyakta) is likewise established
because of the gu.na-nature in the cause of the
effect (or because the effect has the same qualities
as the cause)." This theory of gu.na production in
classical Saa.mkhya may have been influenced by the
early notions of the inherent productivity of
svabhaava (as we are about to explain). (30) In
addition, the eightfold prak.rti in early Saa.mkhya
may have evolved into the classical system's verti-
cal emanation pattern, involving the karmendriya-s
(five organs of action), the buddhiindriya-s (five
senses), manas (mind), and the tanmaatra-s (the five
subtle elements). (31) In any case, before we can
reconstruct the process by which the features of the
early Saa.mkhya svabhaava become attributed to the
avyakta of classical Saa.mkhya, we must unravel the
complicated development of the gu.na-s. It is to
this task that we now turn.

THE EARLY AVYAKTA (UNSEEN FORCE) AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
GU.NA-S

Nowhere in A'svagho.sa's description of Araa.da's
Saa.mkhya system are the three gu.na-s mentioned,
despite the fact that A'svagho.sa knows of them (B
vii 53, and n.) and even refutes them at B xxvi
10-14. There seem to be several reasons for their
omission. To begin, the variety of descriptions
attached to the term gu.na-s within the
Mahaabhaarata verses of early Saa.mkhya indicates
that their meaning is in a state of flux. (32)
A'svagho.sa, however, seems to use them in a form
different still from those of the epic, since to him
they seem to signify " the three bhaava-s" (states
of being) closely identified with moral attributes.
(33) It was these three bhaava-s in the capacity as
moral attributes within avyakta, the unseen force,
that determine for the latter the means or mechanism
by which the individual is

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bound to sa.msaara. Because the gu.na-s only are a
facilitationg force to avyakta, E. H.Johnston
believes that A'svagho.sa feels no need to mention
them in Araa.da's Saa.mkhya description. (34)

THE THREE EARLY SAA.MKHYA GU.NA-S AND THE BUDDHIST ROOTS OF
GOOD AND EVIL

The gu.na development within Brahmanism closely
parallels the development of the Buddhist notions of
the three roots of goods (ku'salamuula) (35) and the
roots of evil (aku'salamuula), (36) and A'svagho.sa
may take advantage of this correspondence. We see
their parallelism, as does A'svagho.sa, by
associating the three roots of good with the gu.na
sattva and the three roots of evil with the gu.na-s
rajas and tamas. (37) Through this association we
can understand more fully the processes of salvation
in the appropriate developmental stages of both
Buddhism and early Saa.mkhya thought. (38)
The three roots of evil are raaga (passion),dve.sa
(hatred, enmity), and moha (ignorance, as delusion
of mind) , (39) but, in addition, A'svagho.sa
occasionally uses the gu.na term rajas to cover the
two Buddhist terms raaga and dve.sa (B vii, 53 and
n.). These three roots of evil, along with the three
roots of good, are the cause (hetu) by which karman
is perpetuated. Interestingly, in the Pali Nikaayas,
nirvaa.na is achieved with the disappearance of the
three roots of evil, (40) a feat achieved in the
Saundarananda by yoga techniques. (41) Similarly, in
this early stage of Saa.mkhya, liberation occurs
when the gu.na-s rajas and tamas are destroyed by
the increase of sattva (B xxvi 10-11) . The des-
truction of ignorance (and the acquisition of
knowledge) is complemented by an increase in good
deeds and moral merit, and this destruction of
ignorance is brought about "through learning,
intelligence and effort" (B xxvi 11). Certainly
'effort' involves a meditational process (as it does
in the Saundarananda text and Yoga).42
Worth noting, however, are the differences between
the Buddhsit hetu and the gu.na-s, since A'svagho.sa
criticizes the early Saa.mkhya salvational model as
self-contradictory. Essentially he argues (B xxvi
10-14) that sattva can never destroy rajas and tamas
because, by definition, all three are permanent.
(43) A'svago.sa, in contrast, accepts the standard
notion of the skandha-s, which are impermanent by
definition, and whose karmic causes can therefore be
destroyed. (44)

THE FIVE SKANDHA-S AND THE SAA.MKHYA TATTVA-S OF
MATTER

Interestingly, the content of these skandha-s
corresponds closely to the early Saa.mkhya analysis
of the corporeal individual, omitting the avyakta.
(45) The skandha rupa (physical form, body) is
analogous to the elements and their evolutes,the
objects of the senses; vedanaa (sensation) equates
with the senses; samj~naa (ideation, perception, the
naming faculty) with the Saa.mkhya manas (mind);
vij~naana (consciousness) with the early buddhi; and
sa.mskaara (dispositions, formative forces, mental
phenomena), insofar as it was thought to relate to
the "integrating action of the personality, with
aha.mkaara" (46) An additional

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ucomparative point involves the influence of "the
power of the act" in both systems, it being one of
the three causes of transmigration in early
Saa.mkhya (B xii 23) and also serving as the means
by which the skandha-s are perpetuated (S xvii 19).

THE SAA.MKHYA CAUSES OF SA.MSAARA AND THE FACTORS
THROUGH WHICH THEY WORK

Returning again to Araa.da's Saa.mkhya description,
the sage first first gives the three causes of
sa.msaara as being wrong knowledge (aj~naana), the
power of the act (karman), and desire or craving
(t.r.s.naa [B xii 23]). These three causes are
comparable to the Buddhist cause (hetu) of
transmigration: moha (ignorance, delusion), raaga
(passion), and dve.sa (hatred, enmity). Within early
Saa.mkhya, the three causes seem to function by
eight factors (B xii 23-24) in a manner as follows:
(47)

Sa.msaara


Three causes of  Factors by which the three 
sa.msaara  causes work 

wrong knowledge 1.misunderstanding (vipratyaya 
 (aj~naana)  [see B xii 25]) 
 2.wrong attribution of person- 
  ality (aha.mkaara [see B xii 
  26]) 
 3.confusion of thought(sa.mdeha 
  [see B xii 27]) 
 4.wrong conjunction (abhisamp- 
  lava [see B xii 28]) 
 5.lack of discrimination 
  (avi'se.sa [see B xii 29]) 

power of the act 6.wrong means (anupaaya 
 (karman)  [see B xii 30]) 

desire or craving 7.attachment (sa^nga 
 (t.r.s.naa)  [see B xii 31]) 
 8.falling away (abhyavapaata 
  [see B xii 32]) 

Araa.da continues by explaining what he means by
each of the eight factors by which the three causes
of sa.msaara function (B xii 25-32).After having
done so, however, he also attributes transmigration
to a fivefold ignorance (B xii 33-37),(48) as well
as to a person's unjusted identification with
corporeal individuality (B xii 38). It is unclear
how these descriptions of the causes and the
perpetuataion of sa.msaara are related.(49)Interest-
ing to note, however, is that the fivefold ignorance
Araa.da identifiesstorpor (tamas),delusion (moha),
great delusion (mahaamoha), darkness (taamisra) and
blind darkness (andhataamisra)become,in Saa.mkhy-
akaarikaa XLVIII,the five viparyaya-s(errors or mis-
apprehensions).(50)

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To summarize the complicated development of the
gu.na-s discussed earlier: the three gu.na-s in the
early Saa.mkhya of Araada are but bhaava-s, "states
of being," each having moral qualities through which
the unseen avyakta attaches a person to sa.msaara.
The moral actions associated with the three gu.na-s
are divided into two kinds: those moral actions
containing the sattva gu.na, propelling a person
into higher rebirth (and eventual release); and
those containing the rajas or tamas gu.na,
perpetuating the cycle of existence.These moral
qualities within sa.msaara have three causes, and
these causes themselves seem to work by eight
factors that variously relate to each of them. This
twofold division of the three gu.na-s parallels the
division and functions of the three Buddhist roots
of good and evil. Liberation is achieved with the
increase of sattva (51) and the concomitant extin-
guishment of rajas and tamas, a process similarly
described in parts of the Mahaabhaarata and Yoga
Suutras iii 55.
A'svagho.sa choses not to mention the gu.na-s in
Araa.da's early Saa.mkhya description apparently
because he considers them to be merely the
'mechanism' through which avyakta attaches sa.msaara
to the individual, and their description is not
considered necessary once avyakta itself is
mentioned.
Apparently the gu.na-s attain their classical,cos-
mological and psychological significance only when
the term prak.rti begins to mean but the first of
twenty-four material tattva-s, and loses its meaning
as the inclusive title of the eight tattva-s ound in
the earlier speculation.(52)

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SVABHAAVA IN RELATION TO THE
CLASSICAL SAA.MKHYA CONCEPTS OF PRAK.RTI, AVYAKTA,
AND THE GU.NA-S

Having described in part the evolution of prak.rti,
avyakta, and the gu.na-s we now can connect the
development of these three entities with that of
svabhaava, described earlier. What occurs between
the time of A'svagho.sa and II'svarak.r.s.na's
classical work is that the features of svabhaava as
the motive force behind the eightfold prak.rti
become posited as the features within the classical
avyakta. In the process, the latter acquires a new
meaning, different from the (older) notion of it
being the 'unseen force'of the morallaw. In
classical Saa.mkhya it now means the "unmanifest
force" in which lie at rest the manifold creative
power (as gu.napari.naama) of the three gu.na-s. The
moral qualities through which Araada's early avyakta
worked are transferred from the gu.na-s of the
earlier thought to the eightfold bhaava-s within the
buddhi of classical thought.(53)
While II'svarak.r.s.na rejects the idea that sva-
bhaava is a creative principle, the concept may have
influenced classical notion in two other areas.
First, svabhaava as" the inherent nature of things'
becomes the term used in relation with suffering as
the (apparent) linkage between puru.sa and manifest
creation in Saa.mkhya-kaarikaa LV.(54) if there is a
connection, thought, between svabhhava in this later

P.265

sense and the earlier notion of nature underlying
all prak.rit, it is simply that now suffering is
what underlies all creation.
Second, there is a quite early notion of svabhaava
described by A'svagho.sa in Buddhacarita ix 59-62
that may have influenced the classical notion of
gu.n-apari.naama, the ever-varying proportions of
the interacting gu.na-s causing the manifestations
of prak.rti. In this descriptions, 'Suddhodana's
counsellor is stating to the Boddhisattva various
philosophical, disputes of the day in a vain attempt
to convince the latter to return to his home. One of
the materialistic or naturalistic philosophies
described contains a doctrine in which the four
elements (space being omitted from the usual list of
five),(55) usually in mutual opposition, now "group
themselves together" according to their own inherent
nature (or according to natural development) and
from the world. One is reminded of the classical
notion of the gu.na-s, whose natures are dissimilar
if not antagonistic, but that also interact to from
the mainfest universe. While indeed there is a
similarity between these two ideas, no precise
connection between the older syabhaava notion and
the classical gu.napari.naama theory can be drawn
with certainty.(56)

BUDDHI

Comparatively little is known about buddhi prior to
the classical period. One of the few things the
texts allow us to say is that the eithtfold buddhi
of classical Saa.mkhya is not known in Araa.da's
system. Furthermore, it also seems true that in some
earlier Saa.mkhya systems buddhi should be
translated as "consciousness" (cetanaa)or "intellect"
(vij~naana), and these meanings contrast to its
characterization within the classical school as
simply "ascertainment" or "determination"(adyavas-
aaya[SK XXIII]). This devaluation of buddhi probably
occurs concomitant with the developing idea of the
transcendence fo puru.sa, the latter itself being
considered conscious as opposed to those emanations
within material creation (prak.rti in her vyakta or
generating form) which are unconscious. To fit
within this classical dualism, the conception of
buddhi has to be appropriately modified, and its
adyavasaaya designation resulted. However, while
this general outline of the modification of buddhi
concept holds true for the Mahaabhaarata, Araa.da's
references to buddhi are too vague to allow placing
Araa.da's use within this scheme.(57)

AHA.MKAARA AND AATMAN

While the function of aha.mkaara in Araa.da's
Saa.mkhya is difficult to determine, its very
appearance within it is important to note with
regard to the development of classical Saa.mkhya
thought. It translates as 'ego' or 'I' and is the
cause of the corporeal individual's activity. In
part its purpose in early Saa.mkhya is to subsume
the functions of two other principles, mahat aatman
(Great Self) and jiiva aatman (individualized self
or soul), both of which, in various texts, had
animated the body and connected it with the
transmigrating soul.(58) In the Buddhacarita, an

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association involving transmigration seems to exist
between the aatman and aha.mkaara, as seen in one of
the Bodhisattva's objections to Araa.da's Saa.mkhya:
"and as for this imagined abandonment of the ego
principle (aha.mkaara), as long as the soul (aatman)
persists, there is no abandonment of that principle"
(B xii, 76).(59)
By the time of II'svarak.r.s.na's classical system,
the aatman has disappeared and its transmigrating
function is assumed by the subtle body (li^nga,
li^nga'sariira). In addition, aha.mkaara assumes the
individual aspects of aatman,(60) already having
been associated previously with it (as in the
Buddhacarita).

Buddhi, Aha.mkaara, and Cosmological Speculation

Although early Saa.mkhya (as well as early Buddhism)
emphasizes the investigation of the individual more
than the cosmos, when the cosmos is considered it is
usually done through mythological means.(61) So we
find in Buddhacarita xii 21 that Kapila (a famous
Indian sage reputed to be the founder of Saa.mkhya)
and his pupil (probably AAsuri) are symbolic of
buddhi,(62) Prajaapati symbolizes aha.mkaara(63) and
Prajaapati's sons represent the five elements.(64)
Unrelated to this particular set of mythological
figures is another set of cosmological speculations,
also in the twelfth canto. In Araa.da's description
of the trances(dhyaana-s), each aruupya (attainment)
is associated with certain divine spheres, and such
associations probably are indicative of Yoga
practices of this time.(65) It is worth noting that,
in a similar view,there are cosmological associations
between the three worlds and the three gu.na-s in
Saa.mkhyaakarikaa LIV. The modest conclusion that we
can deduce from this material is that in early
Saa.mkhya, early Yoga, classical Saa.mkhya, and
later Yoga there is the notion that liberation
includes a journey through the cosmos, probably to
reach a location beyond the control of cosmological
fate.

ELEMENTS, GROSS ELEMENTS, SUBTLE ELEMENTS, AND
OBJECTS OF THE SENSES

Two categories of principles (tattva-s) exist within
Araa.da's Saa.mkhya that are not found in the later
Saa.mkhya scheme of the Saa.mkhyaakarikaa.
II'svarak.r.s.na's system has not accepted either
the five objects of the senses (B xii 19) or the
five elements (B xii 18) within its list of
twenty-four material evolutes, although both groups
are easily mistaken for being in the classical
system. Notions underlying Araa.da's five elements
(bhuuta-s)  space (aakaa'sa), wind (vaayu), fire
(tejas), water (ap) and earth (p.rthivii)  are
less philosophically discriminative than those upon
which the classical five gross elements  also
space, wind, fire, water, earth  are based, but
the agreement of the names themselves often obscures
this fact. Nor do the gross elements have generative
potential as do the earlier elements.
Similarly, the five objects of the senses within
Araa.da's description  'sabda (sound) , ruupa
(form) , spar'sa (touch), gandha (smell) , rasa
(taste)  appear to be the same as the five
classical subtle elements (tanmaatra-s), but this
appearance

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falls away with the realization that the latter five
of the Saa.mkhyakaarikaa are both subtle potentials
above the plane of gross corporeality, and also
productive entities themselves. The early objects of
the senses, in contrast, are not productive (that
is, nothing further is emanated from them) and they
exist within the material, perceptible creations of
the world. It is true, however, that these four
categories  the elements, the gross elements, the
subtle elements, and the senseobjects  undergo a
complicated transformation as the early Saa.mkhya is
evolving toward II'svarak.r.s.na's work.

THE ELEMENTS

Beginning with the five elements found within the
primary matter (prak.rti) of early Saa.mkhya, their
productive capacity can be explained by the state of
philosophical speculations during an era which made
"no hard and fast distinction between animate and
inanimate, between material and spiritual, or
between substance and quality."(66) These elements
were "cosmic forces inhering in the substances from
which they took their name," and it was accepted
that from them composition of the secondary
evolutes, (68) but the Buddhacarita says nothing
about the evolutionary process from the primary to
the secondary groupings.

OBJECTS OF THE SENSES

Five of the evloutes within Araa.da's nonproductive
secondary matter are the objects of the senses,
traditionally known as sound, form, touch, smell,
and taste. These were the five basic qualities or
attributes perceived by the senses. The lack of
philosophical clarity, however, between substance
and quality meant that the material objects of the
world are classified according to the qualities (of
sound,taste,and so on) that the senses perceive.(69)
Each sense object may have been "the special and
sole object of one of the organs of sense," and also
may have had an association with a particular
element.(70)
Refinements of thought in the Vai'se.sika school
could have stimulated Saa.mkhya into modifying
several of its components. Vai'se.sika established
the relationship between the elements (earth, water,
fire, air, and space) and their respective qualities
(smell, taste, form, touch, and sound), and the
latter group serves as the objects of sense
perception.(71) These qualities existed only insofar
as they inhered in the elements themselves, and this
fact probably presented a problem for early
Saa.mkhya thought. In the Buddhacarita's Saa.mkhya
system, the objects of the senses have a separate
identity from the elements (bhuuta-s) , and
Vai'se.sika critics could have argued that
individual elements exist only insofar as they were
particularized by their inherent qualities. While
early Saa.mkhya would not have accepted the premises
of the Vai'se.sika argument, it nonetheless could
have been clear that Vai'se.sika had made a
philosophical advance by distinguishing between
substances and their qualities. If the elements
produced the objects

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of the senses,(72) then early Saa.mkhya would have
been hard-pressed to explain how the generative
elements produce nongenerative entities (the objects
of the senses) that are nothing but their own
qualities.(73)
These Vai'se.sika developments could have influenc-
ed classical Saa.mkhya's interpretations of both the
elements and their sense objects.(74) In any case,
the objects of the senses are removed from its
cosmological scheme of twenty-four material entities,
and the Saa.mkhyakaarikaa only makes passing
reference to them as the objects of the organs of
action (SK XXVIII and XXXIV) . The elements,
previously thought to have been productive, are
reduced to unregenerative tattva-s found at the last
stage of the emanation process. By eliminating the
five sense objects, however, a vacancy of five
tattva-s is created,and this vacancy is subsequently
filled with a new fivefold designation, the
tanmaatra-s (subtle elements) . Within Saa.mkhya
speculation this new group appears for the first
time in the Saa.mkhyakaarikaa and not gonly fills
the numerical vacancy created by the expulsion of
the five objects of sense, but also now has a
creative potency that had been assigned previously
to the elements. Its five individual members bear a
resemblance to the names of the five sense objects,
but no correspondence exists in the functioning of
the two. The tanmaatra-s are conceived as "extremely
fine or subtle potentials" that combine to produce
the corporeal world (For example,the mahaabhuuta-s).
(75) While Vai'se.sika distinguishes between
substances and (among other things) the qualities
and specificities(vi'se.sa-s) which inhere in them,
classical Saa.mkhya distinguishes between the
nonspecific (avi'se.sa) subtle elements and the
specific (vi'se.sa) gross elements which are
generated out of them.

SUMMARY: ELEMENTS OBJECTS OF THE SENSES, SUBTLE
ELEMENTS, AND GROSS ELEMENTS

Having thus suggested a possible explanation for the
appearance of the classical Saa.mkhya tanmaatra-s,
we can now understand the complex relationship
between Araa.da's elements and the objects of the
senses and II'svarak.r.s.na's subtle elements and
gross elements. The early Saa.mkhya elements are
found within the eightfold creative prak.rti, the
latter generating the sixteen constituents of
secondary matter through its underlying inherent
nature of svabhaava. At this stage of philosophical
thought, no difference is made between substance and
quality, so no scrutiny of the substantive nature or
corporeality of the elemental concept has yet
occurred, as will happen within the Vai'se.sika
school, In a manner which is not entirely clear, the
five sense objcets (along with the other eleven
tattva-s of secondary matter) are generated from
prak.rti, and each of the five seems to have
particular relationships not only with the senses
but also with individual elements.
This early Saa.mkhya scheme may have been affected
by the Vai'se.sika analysis of substance and
quality. As a logical consequence of this analysis,
the general acceptance of the elements as corporeal
substances may have stimulated

P.269

Saa.mkhya to remove from them not only their status
as primary tattva-s but also their previously
assigned generative capacities. At the same time the
five objects of the senses are no longer considered
substantive entities but rather qualities or
attributes of substantive entities that give them
their specific characteristics.
The necessary adjustments are made within the
classical system by eliminating the five sense
objects and relegating the elements to the lowest
position in the evolutionary process  a position
indicative of their corporeal and gross substance.
The five vacancies created by the exclusion of the
sense objects are filled by the subtle elements, a
new group within Saa.mkhya speculation that
necessarily assumes the creative capabilities
previously held by the elements and that allows them
to serve as the generative source for the gross
elements.

THE KNOWER OF THE FIELD (K.SETRAJ~NA), PURUSA,AND
AATMAN

The soul or Soul is regarded both as aatman (B xii
20 and 81), and the knower of the field (k.setraj~na
[B xii 20 and 80]), an association also common in
the Mahaabhaarata.(76) In Araa.da's system both
terms have individual and cosmic significance,(77)
but their exact meaning is unclear. One way to
explain thdir difference is to regard aatman usually
as the "cosmic soul" and k.setraj~na as "that
portion of the cosmic soul that is attached to the
individual."(78) The difficulty becomes, of course,
understanding exactly what the relationship is
between the individual and cosmic soul.
The best clue regarding the difference is given in
Buddhacarita xii 80-81, in which the aatman (as
soul) is understood to be unknowing (aj~na) and the
knower of the field (k.setraj~na) to be knowing
(j~na). Presumably this knowing is in regard to the
field of primary and secondary evolutes, and the
soul's true separation from it.

Earlier, in Buddhacarita xii 65, there exists a
description of the liberated knower of the field
(k.setraj~na) as "that supreme Absolute (parama.m
brahma) , without attribute, everlasting, and
immutable". Two verses earlier, the term "self"
(aatman) is used enigmatically: "But another,
skilled in regard to the inner self, causes his self
to cease by his self and since he sees there is
nothing, he is declared to be one for whom nothing
exists" (B xii 63). In this passage, the last of the
'selves' seems to be equated with the knower of the
field in xii 64, and it is the latter who achieves
liberation.
Several things need to be said about these three
enigmatic verses (B xii 63-65) in an attempt to
clarify Araa.da's use of aatman and k.setraj~na in
the early Saa.mkhya sections. To begin, it seems
that the term k.setraj~na is the name given to
aatman, when, as it gains liberation, it 'knows the
field' of creation. Prior to liberation, aatman is
aj~na, unknowing (B xii 80-81).(79)
Next,I take the three references to "self" in Bud-
dhacarita xii 63 to mean that the cosmic, 'knowing'
self associated with Brahman causes the individual's
inmost psychological nature or essence, 'the inner
self', to cease its notion of a

P.270

'personality' self. Finally, the supreme Absolute is
not to be taken as a cosmic being but rather as a
cosmic condition of mok.sa. Sen Gupta points out
that had this term been understood as indicating a
supreme God, the Bodhisattva certainly would have
criticized the theory on these grounds.(80) Keeping
all of this in mind, I reinterpret Buddhacarita xii
63 to mean, "But another, skilled in regard to the
cosmic aatman, causes his unknowing self to cease by
his k.setraj~na...."
Of significance for the later doctrine of the
classical puru.sa is that the difference between
k.setra and k.setraj~na explicitly foreshadows the
classical dualism. Furthermore, the unknowing aatman
and the knowing k.setraj~na are reflected in the
classical doctrines of the deluded puru.sa
'apparently' entangled in matter and the witnessing
puru.sa conscious of its separate nature from it.
The descriptions of the supreme Absolute in
Buddhacarita xii 65 ("without attribute, everlasting
and immutable") resemble those of puru.sa in
Saa.mkhyakaarikaa XIX (possessed of isolation or
freedom, inactive, and indifferent). Finally, the
similarity between the individual k.setraj~na and
the individual puru.sa-s is striking.
Of course there are significant differences between
Araa.da's and II'svarak.r.s.na's school.The classical
scheme is much more insistent on the ontological
separation of puru.sa and prak.rti than is the early
separation between k.setraj~na and k.setra. One
suspects that, to an adherent of classical
Saa.mkhya, even the statement in Buddhacarita xii 64
that liberation occurs when the "knower of the
field...escape[s] the body" would be considered to
have unjustly compromised the absolute separation
between the material and the nonmaterial principles.
(81) Furthermore, the term aatman does not appear in
the Saa.mkhya-kaaikaa,its transmigrating and indiv-
idualizing functions having been assumed by the
subtle body and aha.mkaara, respectively.

THE BODHISATTVA'S REJECTION OF ARAA.DA'S SAA.MKHYA
SYSTEM

All of the Bodhisattva's refutations of Araa.da's
Saa.mkhya doctrines challenge, in some way, the
existence of the soul (aatman). Within this overall
framework, the Bodhisattva's arguments can be
divided into two categories: those describing the
necessary continuation of samsar-ic potencies within
an aatman; and those which criticize Araa.da's
notion of knowledge. Regarding the continuation of
samsar-ic potencies within an aatman, the
Bodhisattva begins his refutation by saying that
when the k.setraj~na achieves his separation "from
the primary and secondary constituents" (B xii, 70),
the inactivity of the mind, and the longevity of the
state itself create the "imagination" of it being an
eternal condition (B xii, 74). However, the three
causes (hetu-s) of karman and transmigration  the
power of the act, ignorance, and desire  still
"remain in a subtle state" within the soul (B xii,
74) , since the latter contains the "causal
conditions" in which they grow. Consequently, the
soul itself is described as "a seed" for both
further transmigration and further karman (B xii
70-71). Inevitably the soul will find " that it will
again become bound from the continued existence of
causal conditions" (B xii 71). Furthermore, the
Bodhisattva asserts that the ego-principle
(aha.mkaara,

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probably used in its animating and transmigrating
sense described earlier) persists as long as does
the soul (B xii, 76).(82)
The next set of three arguments are those which
are directed at the Saa.mkhya notion of knowledge,
each of the three addressing a different meaning
related to the word "knowledge" itself. The first
argument located "knowledge" as "reason" and
criticizes the Saa.mkhya liberation by saying that
since the "activity of reason" is an attribute, a
soul that possesses such an attribute necessarily
becomes identified with it, just as a fire is
identified with its attributes of outward appearance
and heat. Liberation, therefore, has not been
achieved (B xii 77-78).(83) What is at issue here is
whether the knower of the field ever can separate
permanently from its field, and the Bodhisattva is
claiming that the k.setraj~na cannot.
The Bodhisattva continues along these lines by
stating that the very nature of a k.setraj~na, a
knower of the field, necessitates that there be a
k.setra, a field for it ot know, and this necessity
of an orientation to a field precludes the knower of
the field from ever being released permanently from
it (B. xii 79-80). The Bodhisattva has not accepted
the claim Araa.da made that the knower of the field
obtains freedom from " the rushing torrent of birth
and death" (B. xii 41) by "properly" discriminating
the "mind, voice, intellect, and action" (B, xii 31)
 that is, "that which lacks intelligence, the
seen"  from "the intelligent....the unseen" (B.
xii 40) . The Bodhisattva responds that discrimina-
tion is not enough for a soul to gain permanent
liberation, since its necessary orientation to the
field of existence invariably draws it into the
cycle of transmigration.(84)
The final argument against Araa.da's liberation
scheme is directed against the soul in its aatman or
unknowing state. The Bodhisattva charges that the
existence of the quality of unknowing need not be
established through the existence of an aatman that
lacks knowledge. As is the case with common things,
like logs or walls, "the quality of not-knowing is
well established" without them having an aatman (B.
xii 81). When combined with the previous argument
about the impossibility of a k.setraj~na ever
gaining complete release from its field, the
Bodhisattva seems to be saying that, if Araa.da's
liberation system involves a change occurring from
an unknowing to a knowing state, then neither state
requires that an aatman exist for the change to
occur.
Nonetheless, the conclusion reached through each
of these arguments is that everything resembling a
doctrine of a soul has to be abandoned before there
will be assurance that liberation from matter will
be permanent. Beyond knowledge of the field is the
complete "abandonment of everything" (B. xii 82).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A'svagho.sa, through the character of Araa.da,
describes an early Saa.mkhya that on certain points
has basic affinities with various other Saa.mkhya
descriptions dating around the first centuries C.E.
It is a Saa.mkhya of twenty-five principles, one
principle standing rather separate from the
twenty-four material tattva-s(prin-

P.272

ciples.) This material group of twenty-four tattva-s
is divided into primary and secondary forms. Primary
matter, called prak.rti, is thought to be eightfold,
and consists of avyakta, buddhi, aba.mkaara, and the
five bhuta-s (elements). From these eight principles
are produced the sixteen tattva-s of secondary
matter, called vikaara (a production or derivative).
(Unfortunately the text does not describe the
specifics as to how this generation takes place.)
These sixteen tattva-s include the usual five senses
plus a sixth, manas (mind) (as was typical for this
period of Indian thought), the five sense objects,
and the hands and feet, the voice, and the organs of
generation and excretion (elsewhere known as the
karmendriya-s, the organs of action). All sixteen
are considered to be uncreative and ungenerative.
Underlying the eightfold prak.rti is a principle
called svabhaava, which is thought to be the
(inherent) nature by which the eightfold prak.rti is
creative and generative.By the time of the classical
scheme, the notion of a nature (or an inherent
nature) causing the creation of the universe has
become posited in the avyakta, which as "unmanifest
force" carried a different meaning than does the
first tattva of early Saa.mkhya, avyakta as "unseen
force." This inherent nature that motivates
generativity within classical Saa.mkhya does so
through the three gu.na-s, and by having these three
exist within avyakta, the latter obtains both
attributes and characteristics, making it more
plausible as the source of all creation. The basic
scheme, however, of a horizontal emanation that
exists in early Saa.mkhya's eightfold prak.rti
reappears in the classical system's emanations from
aha.mkaara of the karmendriya-s, the buddhiindriya-s,
manas, and the tanmatra-s.
While A'svagho.sa does not mention the three
gu.na-s in canto xii, his omission simply may
indicate that at this early stage they are not
considered to be significant in the process of
creation. The gu.na-s are conceived to be the three
bhaava-s, states of being, having the moral
qualities through which avyakta (unseen force)
attaches a person to sa.msaara. The gu.na-s, as
moral qualities in this text, are divided into two
groups: those qualities and actions of the sattva
gu.na that lead to higher rebirths (and eventual
release); and those qualities and actions of the
rajas and tamas gu.na-s that lead to lower births.
In this twofold division one can see concepts
similar to the Buddhist roots of good (=sattva) and
evil (=rajas and tamas) which also determine a
person's condition of rebirth.
The cause or causes of sa.msaara are unclear,since
Araa.da gives three different causal schemes, and
the schemes themselves cannot be linked together.
First, he claims the causes of sa.msaara to be wrong
knowledge (aj~naana), power of the act (karman), and
desire or craving (t.r.s.naa), and these three
causes themselves function by eight factors. Next,
he attributes transmigration to a fivefold ignorance,
and immediately follows by saying that a person
"wanders in the cycle of transmigration" because of
his false identification with corporeal individuality.
Early Saa.mkhya salvation is thought of as the
increase of sattva with an accompanying
extinguishment of rajas and tamas. The Buddha
criticizes this

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Saa.mkhya notion of release by saying that if all
three gu.na-s were permanent entities, then sattva
could not destroy the other two, which thereby makes
release impossible to achieve. Buddhism avoids the
difficulty of permanent but non-liberating entities
by describing the individual as being composed of
five impermenant skandha-s, but one notes with
interest that, with the exception of avyakta, the
early Saa.mkhya primary and secondary emanations can
be correlated with them.
Having mentioned briefly the evolution of early
avyakta into the classical tattva-s of the same name
but different internal forces, we can say little
about two of the remaining seven tattva-s of the
early period, buddhi and aha.mkaara. From the
Mahaabhaarata we know that buddhi may have been
thought to be consciousness (cetanaa) or intellect
(vij~naana), conceptualizations that have to be
modified within the classical system so as to
maintain the unconscious nature of prak.rti and her
evolutes.
Aha.mkaara(ego) probably has some association with
attaching an animating principle to an individualiz-
ed transmigrating soul. In the classical period it
fully subsumes the individual aspects of aatman,
while the transmigrating aspects of the latter are
posited within the subtle body. Finally, aha.mkaara
and buddhi in Araada's system probably has
applicability more to notions concerning the
individual than to the cosmos, since when the cosmos
is referred to it is done only through mythological
figures. Within the classical system their
cosmological significance is expanded.
Concerning the remaining five of the eight early
tattva-s of prak.rti  the five elements  a
considerable amount can be said. In the classical
system they are not creative principles, and their
closest approximation is the five uncreative
principles lowest in the emanation process, the
mahabhuuta-s. Their demotion to ungenerative
tattva-s might have occurred under the same
influence that also might have caused the
disappearance of the five sense objects in the
Saa.mkhyakaarikaa emanation scheme: the critical
examination of the difference between substance and
qualities undertaken in the Vai'se.sika school. The
pressures that could have been felt as a result of
this examination could have affected not only the
new interpretation of the elements as mere
substances within II'svarak.r.s.na's system, but
also the removal from the emanation scheme of the
five sense objects as a consequence of their new
status as nothing but qualities or attributes of the
organs of action (karmendriya-s). In the numerical
places of the early elements are posited the five
subtle elements (tanmaatra-s), and this replacement
allows classical Saa.mkhya to both maintain the
tradition of twenty-five tattva-s and provide the
mahabhuuta-s with a generative source.
While the distinction within Araa.da's system
betweem k.setraj~na and aatman is not clearly
delineated, it appears that the latter is the term
applied to the former when aatman is still within
the influence of sa.msaara. This distinction that is
made between k.setraj~na (knower of the field) and
k.setra (the field of matter) is a precursor to the
classical dualism between puru.sa and prak.rti.

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The Bodhisattva's rejection of Araa.da's Saa.mkhya
notion of liberation concentrates on the
difficulties with the postulation of a soul. The
first set of refutations address the question of the
subtle samsar-ic potencies of the three hetu-s and
aha.mkaara within a k.setraj~na. The next set of
refutations criticize various notions of knowledge.
One attack is against the notion of a liberating
knowledge that is either one of "reasoning" or of
"knowing the field of matter," since both qualify
the eternal nature of the liberated state due to
their necessary external orientation to an entity.
The other attack implies that a state of unknowing
exists independently of an aatman, just as the state
of salvific knowing exists independently of
k.setraj~na.In the final analysis, only the complete
abandonment of everything ensures complete land
eternal liberation.

NOTES

1. E.h. Johnston, The Buddhacarita:or, The Acts of
the Buddha Part I, Sanskrit Text; Part II
translation, cantos I-XIV. (1936; reprint Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1972). All English renditions
of these cantos, as well as references to the
introductory remarks (indicated by Roman numerals),
are from Part II. Translation of cantos XV-XXVIII
are from the Tibetan, Acta Orientalia, XV.
2. Araa.da (Pali, A.laara Kaalaama) was, according
to tradition, one of Gautama's teachers after the
Bodhisattva's renunciation. Of the various sketchy
accounts of his teachings, only the Buddhacarita
indicates that his doctrines resembled Saa.mkhya-yoga.
Even then, the dhyaana-s to which Araa.da refers
were Buddhist, not orthodox Yoga, in nature. See
G.P. Malalasekara, Dictionary of Pali Proper Names,
I(London: Luzac and Co.,1960), p.297; also Indumate
Karunartne, "AA.laara Kaalaama, " Encyclopedia of
Buddhism, ed. G.P. Malalasekera, Fascicule A-ACA (n.
p.: Government of Ceylon, n.d.), p.378; Biswanath
Bhattacharya, A'svagho.sa: A Critical Study (West
Bengal: Santiniketan, 1976),pp.403-409.
3. The term "saa.mkhya" itself appears in Mok.sad-
harma 12.228.27, 28,36:12.232.1 (in reference to
12.231.5); 12.289.4-5; and 12.290.59-60. So cites
Franklin Edgerton in The Beginnings of Indian
Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1965),p.36,n.2.Elsewhere appear references to "the
path of knowledge" and descriptions of emanation
systems that are Saa.mkhya in nature.
4. B pp.lvi-lvii; 172, n.33.Gerald Larson, however,
says Johnston's claim that the common source was the
Vaar.saga.nya school is based upon weak evidence.
For Larson's detailed discussion see his Classical
Saa.mkhya (Delhi:Motilal Banarsidass, 1969), pp.109,
151-155.
5. Edgerton, ibid., indicates that the term "saa.-
mkhya: appears in the Bhagavadgiitaa at ii.39, iii.3
v.4-5. References to the system, however, appear
elsewhere in the text, even though the term itself
is not used. See Franklin Edgerton, The Bhagavad
Giitaa (1944; reprint, Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1972), pp. 196-198;R.C.Zaehner, The Bhagavad-
Giitaa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973),
pp.139-141 203. An interesting interpretation of
Saa.mkhya in the Bhagavadgiitaa is David White's
"Proto-Saa.mkhya and Advaita Vedaanta in the
Bhagavadgiitaa, " Philosophy East and West 29,
no.4(October, 1979): 501-507.
6. Johnston believes that the older parts of the
Bhagavadgiitaa could have been in existence in
A'svagho.sa's day, having dated the poet's works
from "between 50 B.C.and 100 A.D., with a preference
for the first century A.D." (B., p.xvii) .
Bhattacharya, Asvagho.sa, p.19, places the poet
"about 100 A.D."
7. Larson,Classical Sa.mkhya,p.242. Dasgupta dates
the Caraka Sa.mhitaa at 70 A.D. S.N. Dasgupta, A
History of Indian Philosophy, I(1922; reprint,
London: Cambridge University Press, 1955), p.213.
8. For a critique of the Saa.mkhya system within
the Caraka Sa.mhitaa, see Dasgupta, History of
Indian Philosophy, pp.213-217.

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9. For a brief but informative discussion of the
most obvious instances of Saa.mkhya metaphysics in
the Upani.sads, see Robert Ernest Hume, The Thirteen
Principal Upanishads (2d ed. 1931; reprint, New
York: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp.8-9. The
term "saa.mkhya-yoga" appears in 'Svet. U.6.13.
10. On the meaning of the word "Saa.mkhya : Edger-
ton says "it is the rationalizing, reflective,
speculative philosphical method.....[the] 'reason-
method'. It seems a natural term to describe the
method of gaining salvation by 'knowledge'" (Beginn-
ings, p.36).
11. All quotes from classical Saa.mkhya are taken
from Larson's translation of the Saa.mkhya Kaarikaa
(SK).
12. Eliade dates the Saa.mkhyakaarikaa as being
not later than the 5th century C.E. Dasgupta,
however, dates it to about 200 C.E.Larson says that
the Saa.mkhyakaarikaa was translated into Chinese
between 557-569 C.E., so we can presume that the
original existed before then. See Mircea Eliade,
Patanjali and Yoga, trans. Charles Lam Markham (New
York: Schocken Books, 1975), p.16; Dasgupta, History
of Indian Philosophy, p.212; and Larson, Classical
Sa.mkhya, p.4.
13. Franklin Edgerton, " The Meaning of Saankhya
and Yoga, " American Journal of Philosophy 45, no.1
(1924): 32, see pp.36f; also Beginnings, pp.36-39.
14. See Larson,Classical Sa.mkhya, pp.128-139, esp.
pp.133-136.
15. Larson, Classical Sa.mkhya, p.133.
16. The dhyaana-s which Araa.da describes are ones
that, with a single exception, a Buddhist monk
achieves. On the claim that the Saa.mkhya and the
Yoga of the Buddhacarita do not represent distinc-
tive schools but are two aspects of the same school,
see Larson, Classical Sa.mkhya, p.130. On the
relationship between orthodox Yoga and Buddhist
dhyaana-s, including the ones described by Araada,
see: Malalasekara, Dictionary, p.297; Louis de la
Valle'e Poussin, "Le Bouddhisme et le Yoga de
Patanjali, " M'elanges Chinois et Bouddhiques
(1936-1937), pp.228-230.
17. Johnston divides early Saa.mkhya into three
chronological periods-an atheistic stage, a theistic
stage, and another atheistic stage. Larson, in
contrast, prefers to avoid a chronological scheme,
and instead wishes "simply to point to the various
strands or traditions of speculation and to show how
they come together in the later texts of the period"
(p.139). For the purposes of this article, we have
adopted an approach similar to Larson's. See: E.H.
Johnston, Early Saa.mkhya (1937; reprint, Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1974),pp.80-87.
18. E.H.Johnston, The Saundarananda: or, Nanda the
Fair (London:Oxford University Press, 1932).
19. All references to the Yoga Suutras will be
taken from: James Haughton Woods, The Yoga System of
Pata~njali, Harvard Oriental Series, vol.17 (1914;
reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972).
20. The sages listed by Araa.da are similarly cited
in the Mahaabhaarata as being Saa.mkhya teachers.
K.B.Ramakrishna Rao, "The Buddhacarita and the
Saa.mkhya of Araa.da Kaalaama, " Adyar Library
Bulletin 28 (1964): 232.
21. On the development of the term 'aatman' in the
Upani.sads,see Hume,The Thirteen Principal Upanisads,
pp.23-32.
22. For a discussion of the development of this
term within the context of the Upani.sads, the
Mahaabhaarata, and the Bhagavadgiitaa, see Zaehner,
The Bhagavad-Giitaa, pp.333-335. The earliest use of
the term is 'Svetaa'svatara Upani.sad 6.16, where it
appears to be "an alternate word for the puru.sa of
the Saa.mkhya system" (p.333). For its appearance in
the Mahaabhaarata and the Pa~ncaraatra system, see
Johnston, Early, pp.44-45.
23. In Edgerton's translation of Mbh. 12.298, the
generation of a twenty-four principle material
nature, similar to Araa.da's, is described.
Beginning with the avyakta, each of the tattva-s of
prak.rti emanate out of the previous one, and the
objects of the sense emanate out of the elements.
The rest of the process is jumbled. See Beginnings,
pp.323-324.
24. Compare SK XIX.
25. As a consequence of the Tibetan and Chinese
words used for "nature," there is some linguistic
difficulty determining whether the original Sanskrit
word was prak.rti or svabhaava, but the context of
the argument leads Johnston to decide firmly upon
the latter. See Early, pp.70-71; also Bvg. v.14.

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26. Johnston, B, p.lvix; Early, pp.70-71.
27. Johnston, Early, p.70. Put differently, the
debate here is over the consturction of causal
chains of existence within early Indian speculation.
Karl H.Potter points out that these chains were
areas of contention between the different schools.
See his Presuppositions of India's Philosophies
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1963),
pp.106-111.
28. SK X: "The manifest (vyakta) is caused,finite,
nonpervasive, active supported emergent, composite,
dependent. The unmanifest (avyakta) is the
opposite." SK XI; (Both) the manifest and unmanifest
are (characterized by the) three gu.na-s (qualities
or 'strands'); undiscriminating, objective; general;
nonconscious; productive; the puru.sa is the
opposite of them, although similar (to the avyakta
as characterized in vs.X.).
29. Johnston, Early, p.71. This is not to say,
though, that the Saa.mkhyakaarikaa belief in the
gu.na-s' functions is in any way a response to
A'svagho.sa.
30. Johnston, Early, p.69. Compare B,p. lvii, how-
31. Larson,Classical Saa.mkhya, pp.113, 174;J.A.B.
van Buitenen. "Studies in Samkhya, II," Journal of
the American Oriental Society 77 (1957): 22-23; see
SK XXV.
32. Johnston, B,p. lviii. He cites the meanings of
gu.na in the epic verses as: (a) " 'quality'
generally, " (b) "objects of the senses, " (c)
"anything evolved, which is described as a gu.na of
that from which it is evolved," (d)" qualities which
serve to distinguish the varieties of the three
gu.nas of prak.rti"; and (e) "the gu.nas themselves
" [as they are known in the classical scheme].
33. Johnston, B lvii. Johnston's interpretation of
the early Saa.mkhya gu.na-s in the Mahaabhaarata as
having solely moral functions is challenged by Van
Buitenen, who claims instead that the gu.na-s had
cosmic, evolutionary meaning. See J.A.B.van
Buitenen, "Studies in Samkhya, I" Journal of the
American Oriental Society 76(1956): 153, 155-156.
Larson, however, correctly synthesizes van
Buitenen's and Johnston's views (see pp.116-120). We
can still accept, therefore, Johnston's discussion,
at least as it applies to the Buddhacarita.
34. Johnston, B, p.lix.
35. Although A'svagho.sa never mentions the three
roots of good per se, Johnston infers term from B
ii, 56; xii, 68; and S, v. 17, where hetu works for
good and not evil. See Johnston, B,p.xlii.
36. On this parallel,see Johnston,Early, pp.36-37.
Edgerton, in his Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit
Dictionary, cites (s.v.) one of the Aku'salamuula
slightly differently from Johnston; 'replacing'
raaga with its synonym, lobha (desire, longing for
greed) . Consequently, the three roots of good
(ku'salamula) that Edgerton cites (s.v.) are alobha
(non-desire) , adve.sa (non-enmity) , and amoha
(non-delusion of mind, non-ignorance) . Franklin
Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and
Dictionary, 2 vols. (1953, reprint, Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1970). On the relationship between
rajas and raaga see J.A. B.van Buitenen, "Studies in
Saa.mkhya, III," Journal of the American Oriental
Society 77(1957): 93.
37. Johnston, B, pp.101-102, n. 53. On the concept
of rajas and tamas as a collective entity, see van
Buitenen, "Studies in Samkhya, III," p.100.
38. Johnston, B, pp. xli-xlii.
39. Johnston points out that "within the Saa.mkhya
range of ideas, " the meaning of moha "bears
resemblance to the delusion of puru.sa, by which,
when in contact with prak.rti, imagines, though it
is really a separate entity, it is identical with
it." "Some Saa.mkhya and Yoga Conceptions of the
'Svetaa'svatara Upani.sad," Journal of the Royal
Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (1930):
860.
40. Johnston, B, p.xlii.He claims that this is not
true in the later Abhidharma. For Nikaaya examples
of the calming or suppressing of one's lower nature
or passions, and the refinement of one's good
nature, see Sa.myutta Nikaaya 1,5,8; xlvii, III, II,
V; XLVII, III, v, vii, and so on.
41. Johnston, B, pp.xlii-xliii. For the choice of
the meditational subject best designed to overcome a
person's most active evil, see S, xvi, 53-67.
42. See Early,pp.35-36. On the complementary roles
of Saa.mkhya and Yoga in the Mahaabhaarata and the
Bhagavadgiitaa, see Edgerton, Beginnings, p.38; and
"Meaning." On the opposition between sattva and
raaga, see B vii 53. For a discussion on the belief
that the purification of sattva is tantamount to
release, see van Buitenen, "Studies in Saa.mkhya,
III," pp. 98-99.
43. This argument could not have been used against
II'svarak.r.s.n.a's Saa.mkhya, however, since
"neither sattva as an independent principle nor
sattva as emancipation for the individual are
doctrines held by classical Saa.mkhya. We can
conjecture that, with the radical otherness of
puru.sa in

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II'svarak.r.s.na's atheistic work, sattva could at
best play only a major role in the process of
emancipation, but could not be emancipation itself.
The necessary adjustment is made by making the means
of emancipation be an acquisition of knowledge
through a bhaava composed of sattva; ie., the bhaava
j~naana..., while still insisting that emancipation
lie beyond anything to be found in prak.rti, where
sattva and the other gu.na-s existed." Stephen
A.Kent, "Valentinian Gnosticism and Classical
Saa.mkhya: A Thematic and Sturctural Study" (Ann
Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Microfilm
service, 1978), p.43 (M.A.thesis). On the role of
sattva in classical Saa.mkhya's liberation scheme,
see Stephen A. Kent, "Valentinian Gnosticism and
Classical Saa.mkhya: A Thematic and Sturctural
Comparison," Philosophy East and West 30,no.2(April,
1980):251-252.
44. Johnston, B, pp. xli-xliii; see Potter,Presup-
positions, pp.102,103,112-113.
45. Johnston, Early, p.21.
46. ibid.
47. See Johnston, B, p.170,n.24.
48. On Araada's equating the fivefold ignorance to
the five do.sa-s (faults) , see Johnston, B, p.172,
n.34; Johnston, "Some," pp.862,873; compare YS ii.3.
49. See Johnston, B, p.lx.
50. Larson,p.111. For a valuable discussion of the
rajas-ic and tamas-ic elements within the fivefold
ignorance and the relationship between the fivefold
ignorance and the rajas/tamas grouping, see van
Buitenen, "Studies in Saa.mkhya, III," pp.100-101.
51. See Johnston, Early, p.35.
52. Johnson,B,p.lviii.The use of the term"prak.rti"
in classical Saa.mkhya can be confusing, since it
often appears as the general title for 'matter'.
When the creation process is in progree, however,
'prak.rti' means but the 'starting point' from which
the gu.na-s activate, and it is in this sense that
the term is used here.
53. Johnston, Early, pp.69,71-72. On p.72 he also
states that Araa.da's Saa.mkhya is the final
developmental stage before the important association
of avyakta with prak.rti (for example, the classical
notion) was made. Furthermore, he says that the
svabhaava theory could only have been held by
anii'svara (atheistic) Saa.mkhya schools that did
not accept an II'svara as being the creative force
of the world. In theistic, ii'svara systems, such as
the 'Svet.U., "the ii'svara himself has the function
of creation and the necessity for a principle of
svabhaava, separate from prak.rti and setting it in
motion does not arise, and accordingly the use of
the term in such systems is not frequent."
54. SK LV: "the puru.sa,which is conscious,attains
there the suffering made by decay and death; until
deliverance of the subtle body; therefore, suffering
is of the nature of things (svabhaava)." Johnston,
in contrast, claims that the (apparent?)connection
between puru.sa and the manifest world is explained
in the Yoga Sutras as being accidental (naimittika).
See Johnson, B, p.lx; and Vaacaspatimi'sra's
explanation of YS. ii.17 in Woods, The Yoga System,
p.142.
55. Bix. 59-62 only mentions the elements fire and
water, but the process by which they coalesce is
still clear. In Early, p.67, Johnston identifies the
group holding this materialistic view as the
bhuutacintakas of the Mahaabhaarata (12.224.50, see
12.229.2ff) and who are better known as the
Kvabhaavavaadins.
56. Johnston, Early, p.67. On p.69 he also claims
that the classical gu.napari.naama theory might be
borrowed"from the Yoga form of Saa.mkhya, " a
reference to the Bhaa.sya on YS iii.13(in Woods, The
Yoga System, p.213).
57. Johnston, Early, p.60, see p.72; B, p.lix-lx.
Also see van Buitenen, "Studies in Saa.mkhya, III,"
pp.100-102,106.
58. Johnston, Early, p.83, For a brief history of
the development of the jiiva aatman concept, see
Kent, Valentinian...Study, pp.34-37, 53-55. Another
probable function of aha.mkaara was to generate the
bhuuta-s; see van Buitenen, "Studies in Saa.mkhya,
II," p.23.
59. Also see B ix., 64, which is a description of
the Saa.mkhya doctrine: "there are others who assert
that the coming into being and the passing away from
being is solely on account of the soul."
60. See Kent, Valentinian...Study, pp.34-37.
61. Or so claims Johnston, B,p.lvii.
62. Ibid., p.169, n.21. Concerning the place of
Kapila and AAsuri within the Saa.mkhya system, see
Larson, Classical Saa.mkhya, p.149 and SK LXIX-LXX.
63. More precisely, Prajaapati symbolizes " the
bhuutaaman, here taken as equivalent ot aha.mkaara."

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Johnston, B,p.169,n.21.For the five Mahaabhaarata
references equating Prajaapati with aha.mkaara, see
Johnston, Early, p.17.
64. Johnston, B,p.170,n.21. Although the emanation
process is unclear, one wonders whether the
reference to Prajaapati and his sons should be taken
as an indication that the five elements generate out
of aha.mkaara. Johnston, "Some," p.864 claims that
this was the common emanation pattern found in the
Mahaabhaarata, as mentioned above in n.23.
65. Johnston, B,p.lxi. See also YS iii.26, and the
accompanying Comments and Explanations.
66. Johnston, "Some," p.869.
67. Ibid. Johnston even claims that "spiritual
functions" can also evolve from them. I do not know
what he means by this, since, as I see it, all of
the secondary tattva-s are material in nature. In
some way, however, Johnston's claim may be related
to the Yoga practice of meditation on the elements.
See Mircea Eliade, Yoga, Immortality, and Freedom,
trans. Willard R. Trask, Bollingen Series 76 (Now
York: Pantheon Books, 1964), p.195; and Johnston's
reference to "yogic absorption in the elements" in
"Some," p.869.
68. Johnston claims this in "Some," p.870,although
admitting that the evidence is scany to support it.
While never explaining fully the process by which
the eightfold prak.rti, through svabhaava, creates
the secondary evolutes, he does offer a few remarks
concerning how secondary matter was thought to have
related to the elements: " Originally each member of
the ['sabda] group was considered a gu.na
[attribute] of one of the elements only...but the
later theory...gives one element the qualities of
all five, the next four, and so on to the last of
one only." Ibid.,pp.
867-868.
69. Johnston, "Some," p.870.
70. Ibid.,p.867. The relationship between the five
elements, the objects of the senses and the senses
is very unclear.
71. See, for instance, Karl H.Potter, ed.,Encyclo-
pedia of Indian Philosophies: Indian Metaphysics and
Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyaaya-Vai'se.sika up
to Ga.nge'sa (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), pp.
86-87; 112-119; 161-162; Erich Frauwallner, History
of Indian Philosophy, trans. V.M. Bedekar 2 vols.,
(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973), 2:14.
73. I borrow this basic argument from Frauwallner
I, pp.272-274; see also Johnston, "Some," p.871.
74. On the intermediary stage between Araa.da's
system and the Saa.mkhyakaarikaa, in which the
eightfold and sixteen-fold dividision falls into
disfavor in the Mahaabhaarata, see Johnston, "Some,"
pp. 870-871.
75. Larson, Classical Saa.mkhya p. 205; see Dasgu-
pta, p.251.
76. See Edgerton, Beginnings, p.41, and n.2.
77. Sen Gupta, p.121; Larson, Classical Saa.mkhya,
p.122.
78. Johnston, Early, pp. 54-55, based upon Mahaab-
haarata passages; accepted by Larson, Classical
Saa.mkhya, p.123. This is confused, though, when
Johnston (B,p.lx) says that A'svagho.sa regards the
soul "as an individual, not a universal." On the one
hand, he fails to specify whether he is addressing
A'svagho.sa's notion of aatman or k.setraj~na. On
the other hand, he fails to clarify what he means by
" universal" (especially in relation to the
Mahaabhaarata notions of aatman as "cosmic" soul).
79. See Edgerton, "Meaning," pp.22-29.
80. Sen Gupta, p.122.
81. SK LXII: "Nothing, therefore, is bound,nothing
released, likewise not anything transmigraces.
(Only) prak.rti in its various forms transmigrates,
is bound, and is released."
82. For a general discussion of the Buddhist at-
tempt to explain " how bondage came about and how
freedom is to be gained. " see Potter, Presupposi-
tions, pp.113, 131. In their causal scheme the
Buddhists avoid postulating attempt to prevent the
problem of subtle but lingering karm-ic seeds.
83. For a critique concerning the setting forth of
Truth or "Knowledge" within the classical Saa.mkhya
scheme, see Potter, Presuppositions, pp.216-217.
Although it pertains to the classical school,
Potter's discussion is relevant here.

84. Commenting on B xii.79 (p.180), Johnston say,
"the argument apparently is that the fact that the
k.setraj~na is called 'sariirin [having a body]
shows that it did not exist before there was a body
for it to inhabit (the bond therefore being anaadi
[having no beginning, existing from eternity]).