EARLY YOGAACAARA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MADHYAMAKA SCHOOL

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EARLY YOGAACAARA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MADHYAMAKA SCHOOL

By Richard King

Philosopyh East & West

Volume 44, Number 4 October 1994 PP.659-683

(c) 1994 by University of Hawaii Press

p. 659

I.Introduction

D. T. Suzuki noted as early as 1928 that

Most Buddhist scholars are often too ready to make a
sharp distinction between the Maadhyamika and the
Yogaacaara, taking the one as exclusively advocating
the theory of emptiness ('suunyataa) while the other
is bent single-mindedly on an idealistic
interpretation of the universe. They thus further
assume that the idea of emptiness is not at all
traceable in the Yogaacaara and that idealism is
absent in the Maadhyamika. This is not exact as a
historical fact.(1)

As the second important philosophical school to
develop in Indian Mahaayaana Buddhism, the Yogaacaara
school seems to have developed the distinctive
features of its philosophy from a comprehensive
analysis of meditative experience (hence the name
'Yogaacaara'---the "practice of yoga"). In discussing
the philosophical perspective of the
Asa^nga-Vasubandhu school of thought, preference will
be given to the doctrinally neutral term 'Yogaacaara'
in opposition to the epithets 'Vij~naptimaatrataa'
and ''Vij~naanavaada', which are frequently used to
designate this school. This reflects the wider
denotation of 'Yogaacaara' and its relative
independence from certain specific theoretical
positions. This is particularly important when
dealing with the early stages of a school's
philosophical development. It should be noted,
however, that the term 'Vij~aptimaatrataa'
(Cognitive-Representation-Only) is preferable to
'Vij~naanavaada' (the doctrine that "consciousness
[alone] exists"), when referring to the literature of
the early Yogaacaara, since the former term (unlike
Vij~naanavaada) is at least used by Maitreyaanaatha,
Asa^nga, and Vasubandhu. In fact, since the early
Yogaacaarins did not accept the ultimate reality of
subjective consciousness (vij~naana) , the term
'Vij~naanavaada' is particularly inaccurate. This
epithet, nevertheless, may be applicable to the later
doctrinal position of the Dharmapaalan lineage of the
Yogaacaara, which, according to Yoshifumi Ueda,
upheld the view that the external world was merely a
transformation of an ultimately real subjective
consciousness (v~nanapari.naama).(2) As we shall see,
however, even the term 'Vij~naptimaatrataa' may prove
Asa^nga-Vasubandhu school of thought.
inappropriate as a final designation of the

The wide scope of the term 'Yogaacaara' is clear
from the fact that it was originally used in India as
a general term for the "practice of yoga"
(yoga-acaara). Thus, the colophon to the Four Hundred
Verses (Catu.h'sataka) of the Maadhyamika AAryadeva
describes the text as 'bodhisattva- yogaacaara.' The
term seems to have derived its later doctrinal and
scholastic specificity from the title of Asanga's
major work, the voluminous

p. 660

Stages in the Path of Yoga (Yogaacaarabhuumi). This
work, however, far from being a sectarian exposition
of Yogaacaara ideas, is a large-scale compendium of
the stages of the Buddhist path, of which only a
small part is devoted to the specific interests of
the Yogaacaara school. This is a feature of much of
Asa^nga's literary output, the other great example
being his Compendium of the Mahaayaana
(Mahaayaanasa.mgraaha). Although the works of Asa^nga
and Vasubandhu do show a marked development of ideas
in the delineation and analysis of the yogic path
when compared to their Maadhyamika predecessors. this
should not necessarily be seen as characteristic of
an antithetical attitude toward the earlier
exposition of Mahaayaana philosophy. The specific
attribution of the terms 'Yogaacaara',
'Vij~naptimaatrataa', or 'Vij~naanavada' to the
thought of Asa^nga and Vasubandhu should always be
used with extreme caution, lest one read back the
scholastic controversies of later times into the
early stages of 'Yogaacaara' thought.

It is often stated that the first evidence of
Yogaacaara ideas can be found in the
Sa.mdhinirmocana-suutra. This text is of great
historical interest, not only because it is a
'crystallization' of a particularly early phase in
the development of the Yogaacaara (in chapters four
and eight), but also because of its description of
the 'three turnings of the wheel of Dharma'
(dharma-caakra). Thus, the suutra declares that

By the first Turning of the Wheel of Doctrine,
[Buddha] taught the doctrine of the aaryasatya
and on its basis the astivaada of the Abhidharma
has been developed. This astivaada was negated by
the Praj~naapaaramitaa and there has been
established the 'suunyavaada of the Mahaayaana.
The amalgamation of both asti and 'suunyavaada is
now done in the Sa.mdhinirmocana, and it is the
last and the highest turning of the Wheel of
Doctrine.... The ultimate doctrine of the
Mahaayaana is, no doubt, taught in the
Praj~naapaaramitaa, but its way of exposition is
'with an esoteric meaning', or 'with a hidden
intention'.(3)

The Sa.mdhinirmocana-suutra, then, does not see
itself in terms of the establishment of a rival
school to the "`suunyavaadins"; rather it sees itself
as the text which 'explicates' the true meaning of
emptiness. Thus, VII.3 declares that the suutra's
purpose is to establish the doctrine of the
three-own-beings (trisvabhaava) in terms of their
lack of own-nature (ni.hsvabhaavataa).(4) This was
understood to be a development from rather than a
reaction to the philosophy of emptiness propounded in
the Praj~naapaaramita.

The Sa.mdhinirmocana-suutra is also the first
Mahaayaana text to utilize the notion of a
consciousness made up of all the seeds of past karmic
fruition (sarvabiijakavij~naana) . This
seed-consciousness soon became one of the distinctive
features of the Yogaacaara school as the concept of
aalayavij~naana, the 'store' or
'repository-consciousness' underlying the

P. 661

individual's experience of sa.msaara.(5) In the
literature of the various Abhidharma schools there
was already an exhaustive analysis of the five
sense-consciousnesses and the mental consciousness
(manovij~naana) that provide an awareness of sense
objects (vi.saya). This was a development of the
scheme of the eighteen dhaatu outlined innumerable
times in the Suutta-Pi.taka. Thus, we find Asa^nga
arguing that "the aalayavij~naana is mentioned in the
Vehicle of the Hearers (`sraavaka-yaana) through
various synonyms (paryaaya)."(6) Thus, as far as
Asa^nga was concerned, the seed-consciousness is
little more than the application of a nomenclature to
an idea already existent in Buddhism from its
inception. Asa^nga maintains that it is not
recognized as the store-consciousness in the
`sraavaka-yaana because "it is a subtle cognizable
(suuk.smaj~neya) ."(7) Asa^nga's statement is
particularly interesting since it suggests an
inclusivist attitude toward the `sraavaka-yaana.
Bearing this in mind, one suspects that Asa^nga's
attitude to the Madhyamaka school is likely to be
even more conciliatory. Reading back later
Madhyamaka-Yogaacaara polemics into the works of
Asa^nga is only likely to misrepresent the continuity
between the two scholastic traditions at this early
stage in their interaction.
The comprehensive explication of the notion of
'emptiness', as found in the philosophical literature
(`saastra) of the Madhyamaka school, provides a
doctrinal key to unlock the abstruse meanings of the
Praj~naapaaramitaa suutras. As a Mahaayaana school,
the Yogaacaara developed as a response to the
insights of those same sutras. Under such
circumstances, it would have been difficult indeed to
have ignored the centrality of the notion of
`suunyataa to these texts. In fact, the idea that the
early classical Yogaacaara of Asa^nga and Vasubandhu
found any difficulty whatsoever in embracing the
basic insights of the Madhyamaka school disregards
both the historical and textual evidence, which, on
the contrary, displays a spirit of underlying
continuity and acceptance.
Both the Madhyamaka and the Yogaacaara schools
accept the validity of the notions of
pratiityasamutpaada, pudgala-nairaatmya, and
dharma-nairaattmya, the four aaryasatyas, the
bodhisattva ideal, and `suunyataa, among many others.
With such a level of doctrinal unanimity, the two
schools can hardly be said to be in great conflict
with one another. Admittedly both Asa^nga and
Vasubandhu criticize those (Maadhyamikas? ) who
"adhere to non-existence" (naastikas,
vainaa'skas),(8) but this is only in their attempts
to delineate the true nature of emptiness as the
Middle Path between extremes. Nevertheless, one must
accept that there appears to have been a significant
development in the hermeneutics of the emptiness
doctrine in the Yogaacaara school. This, as I shall
argue in section III of this essay, stems from a fear
that the traditional Madhyamaka exposition was in
danger of advocating (or at least appearing to
advocate) the extreme position of 'nihilism'
(ucchedavaada).
p. 662

II. The Yogaacaara Reformulation of the Middle
Path
One of the most important features of the
Yogaacaara 'reformulation' of the Middle Path is a
marked movement away from the 'negativistic'
interpretation of emptiness found in the Madhyamaka
school. For Asa^nga there are two types of extreme
and erroneous view:

(1) that one which clings to affirming
(samaaropata) the existence of what are
nonexistent individual characteristics. having
essential nature only through verbal designation
(praj~naapti) for a given thing... and also (2)
that one which, with respect to a given thing
(vastu), denies (apavadamaano) the foundation for
the sign of verbal designation, which exists in
an ultimate sense (paramaarthasadbhuutam) owing
to its inexpressible essence
(nirabhilaapyaatmakatayaa) saying "absolutely
everything is nonexistent" (sarvena sarvam
naastiiti).(9)

Thus, for Asa^nga, a universal denial
(sarva-vainaa'sika) of the "bare given thing"
(vastu-maatra) is a view which strays from the
Buddhist path (Dharma-vi.naya).(10)

Neither reality (tattva) nor [its] designation
(praj~napti) would be known when the bare
given-thing of form (ruupa) and so forth, is
denied. Both these views are inappropriate.(11)

An important point to note is that Asa^nga here
explicitly criticizes the view that denies that there
exists a "bare given-thing" (vastu-maatra) as the
basis for the ruupa-skandha.(l2) Indeed, the
Yogaacaara school seems to have accepted the
traditional Sarvaastivaada division of dharmas into
five categories: mind (citta), mental concomitants
(caitasikaa, form (ruupa) , compounded factors
independent of the mind
(citta-viprayukta-sa.mskaara-dharmas) , and the
uncompounded factors (asa.msk.rta).(l3) This seems to
be at variance with the "naive idealism" usually
attributed to Yogaacaara thought. It should be made
clear from the outset then that the Yogaacaara school
is far more complex in its understanding of the
nature of experience than is usually acknowledged.
It must be realized, however, that the
abhidharmic taxonomy of the Yogaacaara school
(usually said to consist of one hundred specific
dharmic types) is only provisional. Such conceptual
categories are existent only in a purely conventional
and nominal sense (praj~napti-sat) . In his
Abhidharmasamuccaya, for instance, Asa^nga criticizes
the idea that matter (ruupa) is a substantial and
independent existent.(l4) Thus,

It is said that a mass of matter (ruupasamudaaya)
is composed of atoms. Here the atom should be
understood to be without a physical body
(ni.h'sraiira). The atom is determined in the
final analysis by the intellect (buddhi), in view
of the abandonment of the notion of an aggregate
(pi.n.dasa.mj~naa) , and in view of the
penetration into the relativity(15) of matter as
a substance (dravyaparini.spattiprave'sa).

p. 663

This argument was extended further by Asa^nga's
brother Vasubandhu in his Vi.m'satikaa(16) with an
attack upon the realist notion of matter (ruupa) as a
substance existing independently of the experiencing
subject. Whether this is a case of idealism depends
to a large extent upon one's understanding of the
term. Certainly, much of Asa^nga's work presupposes a
distinction between material and immaterial, and
external and internal. Indeed, in the
Abhidharmasamuccaya, (17) Asa^nga describes the
grasping subject of perceptions (graahaka) as the
material sense-organ (ruupiindriya),the mind (citta),
and the mental factors (caitasika). The inclusion of
a gross sense-faculty in the analysis of the subject
is hardly what one would expect from an idealistic
analysis. Again, in the same work,(18) Asa^nga makes
a distinction between internal and external
sensations (aadhyaatma/bahirdhaa vedanaa). Internal
sensation is "that which is produced from one's own
body (kayaa)," while its external counterpart is
"that produced by an external body."(19) However, in
Mahaayaanasa.mgraha 1.22, the notion of an external
seed (baahya) is said to be purely conventional
(sa.mv.rta) while that of an internal seed
(aadhyaatmika) is said to be ultimate
(paramaarthika).(20) Whether Asa^nga is an idealist or
not, internal or subjective states (aadhyaatmika) are
given more validity than those based upon external
(baahya) stimuli.
Attempts to delineate the thoughts of one school
of Indian thought from another in a rigid and clear
fashion are, however, fraught with difficulty. In the
sixth century C.E., subsequent to the classical
formulations of Naagaarjuna, Asa^nga, and Vasubandhu,
academic controversy did occur between the Madhyamaka
and Yogaacaara schools of Mahaayaana Buddhism, but,
as Stefan Anacker has noted,

these are really the disagreements of
sixth-century followers of Naagaarjuna and
Vasubandhu. They belong to a time when Buddhism
had become an academic subject at places such as
the University of Naalandaa. They may have
disagreed because they were academics fighting
for posts and recognition.(21)

Much of this controversy surrounded the status of
the paratantra-svabhaava in the Yogaacaara school.
The main figures in this debate were Bhaavaviveka,
Dharmapaala and Sthiramati.(22) From the Madhyamaka
point of view, those Yogaacaara texts that asserted
the 'existence' of the paratantra-svabhaava were
guilty of reification, thus straying into the extreme
of eternalism ('saasvata-vaada). It remains a moot
point as to what the Yogaacaara school actually meant
by terms such as 'paratantraastitaa'. Does the term
imply the independent existence (svatantrika) of a
realm of mutual dependency (paratantra), or is it a
descriptive (but non-ontological) term referring to
the interdependent nature of existence! On the former
interpretation, the Yogaacaarin does indeed seem to
be guilty of reifying the dependency realm itself. On
the other hand, the term may simply be an alternative
to the Madhyamaka conception of pratiityasa-

p. 664

mutpaada. One suspects that the ambiguity of the
phrase is a reflection of the ambivalence of the
Yogaacaara school itself. Different answers may be
given by different members of the school.
It is interesting in this respect to note that
various modern scholars have drawn attention to the
fact that Dharmapaala has given a peculiarly
'idealistic' tone to the Yogaacaara message, and that
to this extent he has strayed from the original
import of Vasubandhu's ideas.(23) Thus Janice Willis
(1979) notes:

Assessments which claim to characterize the whole
of Yogaacaara thought as being uniformly
"idealistic" take little notice of the fact that
historically---and according to the texts
themselves--there existed at least two varying
streams of Yogaacaara thought, viz., (1) what
may be called an "original" thread propounded
by Maitreya, Asa^nga, Vasubandhu, and Sthiramati;
and (2) a "later" thread, which found expression
notably through such doctors as Dharmapala, and
Hsuan-tsang. Both "streams" were introduced into
China--the earlier by Paramartha and the later by
Hsuan-tsang---and afterwards transmitted also to
Japan. Moreover, while there is clear evidence
that the later stream of thought, as expounded by
Dharmapaala and others is "idealistic" in
character, the same cannot and should not be
assumed for the earlier "thread," though, in
fact, this has generally been the case.(24)

It was this "idealistic" tendency that was the
primary focus of Bhaava-viveka's attack upon the
'Vij~naanavadins'. Many contemporary scholars have
cast doubt upon the interpretation of the
Asa^nga-Vasubandhu phase of Yogaacaara as a form of
idealism.(25) Needless to say, it would be rather
presumptuous to assume that the differences betwneen
Bhaavaaviveka and Dharmapaala in the sixth century
C.E. represent irreconcilable differences between the
classical Madhyamaka and Yogaacaara positions as
represented by Naagaarjuna on the one hand and
Asa^nga and Vasubandhu on the other. in the eighth
and ninth centuries of the Common Era we do in fact
find a successful synthesis of Madhyamaka and
Yogaacaara ideas in the work of J~naagarbha and
`Saantarak.sita. One should note, however, that the
two positions are accepted on an unequal footing
(Madhyamaka being the ultimate truth). This might be
taken to suggest that the two schools are to some
degree incommensurable. Yet again the possibility
remains that later developments and interpretations
of the two schools differ from the early formulations
of the "founding fathers" of each school. Let us
turn, therefore, to the early Yogaacaara conception
of `suuyataa in order to discern if it is appreciably
different from its earlier Maadhyamika counterpart.

III. Search for a Substratum--Redefining `Suunyataa
in the Yogaacaara
The classical Yogaacaara explication of emptiness
is found at the very beginning of the
Madhyaantavibhaaga:

p. 665

There exists the imagination of the unreal, there is
no duality, but there is emptiness, even in this
there is that.(26)

Vasubandhu explains in his commentary that the
imagination of the unreal (abhuuta-parikalpa) is the
discrimination between the duality of grasped and
grasper. Emptiness is explained as "the imaginztion
of the unreal that is lacking in the form of being
graspable or grasper." Thus, for the Yogaacaarin,
`suunyataa is primarily the emptiness of grasper
(i.e., subject) end grasped (i.e, , object)
(graahaka-graahya) . Since our entire range of
experiences is characterized by a dichotomy between
subject and object with the possible exception of
some higher states of samaadhi), this amounts to a
universal application of 'emptiness' (`suunyataa).
However, the yogaacaarin stresses that the range of
'fictive' perceptions that does occur, although not
corresponding to an independently existing world of
subjects and objects, nevertheless does occur. This
particular emphasis in the use of the notion of
emptiness is a specific feature of the Yogaacaara
explanation of the term, since even in emptiness
there is an 'existent' (viz. the abhuutaparikalpa),
which nevertheless persists as such.
In this respect it might be argued that the
Yogaacaara explication of `suunyataa is more in line
with the commonsense usage of 'empty'. Garma Chang
states:

it is believed that `suunya was originally
derived from the root svi, "to swell," and
`suunya implies "relating to the swollen." As the
proverb says "A swollen head is an empty head,"
so something which looks swollen or inflated
outside is usually hollow or empty inside.
`Suunyataa suggests therefore that although
things in the phenomenal world appear to be real
and substantial outside, they are actually
tenuous and empty within.(27)

It is interesting, however, to note that prima
facie there is nothing in this brief description of
emptiness that would greatly trouble a Maadhyamika
Buddhist. One could argue that in defining emptiness
in this way, the Yogaacaarins are actually 'tidying
up' the earlier work of the Madhyamaka school. This
view is not an unattractive one, and one suspects
that throughout its long and varied history many
Buddhists have understood the Yogaacaara analysis as
such. It is also a view that appears to be gaining
increasing support from modern Western
scholarship.(28)
However, the rather knotty problem of the status
of the emptied 'entity' is one that has caused some
controversy in Mahaayaana scholastic circles. The
Yogaacaarins continually maintained that that there
was something actually given in experience, namely
a nonobjective (and hence illusory? ) perception,
while the Maadhyamikas responded by denying that
'existence' could be predicated of such an imaginary
'entity'. Whether this amounts to little more than a
quibble over the appropriate use of linguistic
conventions is a moot point that perhaps needs
further consideration.

p. 666

For the Yogaacaarin the interdependent flow of
dharmas is such that they are empty in the same way
that a container is said to be empty There is no wine
in an empty glass, but there is nevertheless still a
glass. There may be no substantiality to our
perceptions but they are nevertheless still
there.(29) Kochumottom's translation of Vasubandhu's
commentary on Madhyaanta-Vibhaaga I.1 draws our
attention to what might be called the 'container'
conception of emptiness:

Thus, when something is absent [in a receptacle].
then one, seeing that [receptacle) as devoid of
that thing, perceives that [receptacle] as it is,
and recognises that [receptacle], which is left
over, as it is, namely as something truly
existing there.(30) (MY parentheses)

Again, if we examine Asa^nga's explication of
`suunyataa, we find a similar understanding of its
appropriateness:

Emptiness is logical when one thing is devoid of
another because of that [other's] absence and
because of the presence of the empty thing
itself.(31)

Asa^nga continues,

Wherever and in whatever place something is not,
one rightly observes that [place] to be void of
that [thing]. Moreover, whatever remains in that
place one knows (prajanati) as it really is, that
"here there is an existent." This is said to be
engagement with emptiness as it really is and
without way-wardness.... Without that wayward
view, he neither affirms nor denies the given
thing.... Not otherwise would he rid himself of
the object of consciousness (aalambana) and dwell
with equanimity.(32)

All other interpretations are described by
Asa^nga as "emptiness wrongly grasped" (durg.rhiitaa
`suunyatety). (Interestingly this is the same term
that Naagaarjuna uses in his Madhyamaka-kaarikaa when
criticizing those who take `suunyataa to be a view.)
(33) Thus, for Asa^nga the designation 'empty'
(`suunya) is only predicable of an existent thing,
since "emptiness is only logical if something
exists."(34) Again we find Madhyaanta-vibhaaga I.13
declaring that

The nonexistence of duality is indeed the
existence of nonexistence; this is the definition
of emptiness. It is neither existence, nor
nonexistence, neither different nor
identical.(35)

The 'existence of nonexistence' turns out to be
the specific definition of 'suunyataa found
throughout the early Yogaacaara literature. In the
Abhidharmasamuccaya, Asa^nga states that emptiness is
"the non-existence of the self, and the existence of
the no-self."(36) In fact, within this text Asa^nga
espouses a conception of the Middle Path based upon
the Mahaayaana notion of the other-dependent nature
(pararantra//pratiityasamutpanna) of all dharmas:

p. 667

The real meaning of pratiityasamutpaada is the fact
that there is no creator (ni.hkart.rkaartha), the
fact of causality (sahetukaartha), the fact that
there is no being (ni.hsatvaartha), the fact of
dependence (paratantraartha), the fact that there is
no mover (niriihaartha), the fact of impermanence
(anityaartha) , the fact that all is momentary
(k.sa.nikaartha) , the fact that there is an
uninterrupted continuity of cause and effect
(hetuphalaprabhandhaanupacchedaartha), the fact that
there is a conformity between cause and effect
(anuruupahetuphalaatha), the fact of the variety of
causes and effects (vicitrahetuphalaartha), and the
fact of the regularity of cause and effect
(pratiniyatahetuphalaartha).
Moreover, dependent origination is momentary, but
one can also find stability within it. Dependent
origination consists of nonmoving conditions, but
these conditions are also functional
(samarthapratyaya); dependent origination does not
admit of a being (ni.hsatva), but it can also be
understood in terms of a being. Dependent origination
does not admit of a creator, but there is an
uninterrupted flow of actions and their results. It
does not arise from itself, nor from another, nor
from both. It is produced neither from its own action
nor from the action of another, nor is it without
cause (ahetu).(37)

Pratiityasamutpaada is to be understood in terms of a
realm of causally efficient but existentially
dependent (paratantra) occurrences (dharmas). For an
explanation of the causal process in terms of the
paratantra-lak.sa.na, we need look no further than
Asa^nga's own Mahaayaanasa.mgraaha.

If the dependent nature is representation-only
(vij~naptimaatra), the support of the manif-
estation of objects (arthaabhaasaa'sraya), why is
it dependent and why is it so called? Because it
arises from its own trace-seeds (vaasanaa-biija),
it is dependent upon conditions. Because, after
its birth, it is incapable of subsisting by
itself for a single instant, it is called 'the
dependent'.(38)

In this work we see a new gloss put upon the
traditional Madhyamaka explanation of the dependently
arisen as that which arises dependent upon
trace-seeds (vaasanaa-biija). Nevertheless, there is
still a characteristically Madhyamaka refusal to use
the dualistic language of 'existence' and
'nonexistence'. No dharma has an independent self,
being dependent (paratantra) upon all other dharmas
for its existence. Thus, a dharma "exists" only
insofar as it participates in the causal network of
interdependent dharmas. As the Abhidharma had pointed
out, no dharma has independent existence, since it
occurs as the result of a long and complex chain of
interdependent factors (dharmas), which themselves
are produced in dependence upon other conditions.
Thus, a dharma is 'empty of itself but not of
another'. Dharmas, then, are in one sense existent
(bhaava), but not in the everyday sense of being a
definable and independent "entity" or "object."
Dharmas are not existent (bhaava) in the everyday
sense of the term, since they are not distinguishable
and separate 'entities'; they have no independent
self in their constructed nature (parikalpita) .
Nevertheless, dharmas are not totally nonexistent
(abhaava), either, since they are by

p. 668

definition (svalak.sa.na) factors (dharmas) of
experience; that is, they are cognizables.
Nevertheless, dharmas are not as they appear to
unenlightened minds. They are not 'objects' in that
they do not possess the existential substantiality
required in order to be "existent" (viz. that they
are persistent and independent "entities"
distinguishable from one another and definable in
terms of a name or designation, praj~napti). Thus, we
find in the Yogaacaara, as in the Madhyamaka school,
a pointed refusal to become involved in an
ontological debate.
It is interesting that this type of analysis is
something of a bridge-building exercise between what
might be seen as an undue emphasis upon negative
language (via negativa) in the exposition of
emptiness by (some?) Maadhyamikas on the one hand,
and the overarching realism (via positiva) of the
Abhidharma schools on the other hand. As such the
Yogaacaara movement can be seen as a "re-forming" of
the Middle Path. This is not to say that such a
reformation is necessarily out of step with the
understanding of `suunyataa as systematized in the
`saastras of Naagaarjuna (who is clearly neither a
nihilist nor a realist in the accepted senses of the
terms), but merely that, in its emphasis upon the
'given' of meditative and so-called 'normative'
perception, the Yogaacaara aim is to establish the
appropriate parameters of linguistic usage and a
rigorous logic for the establishment of the
Mahaayaana position on experientially verifiable
grounds.
Another predominant feature of the early
Yogaacaara exposition of the Middle Path is the
explanation of the selflessness of dharmas
(dharma-nairaatmya) in terms of an "ineffable
intrinsic nature" (nirabhilaapya svabhaavataa). All
of these technical phrases are attempts to establish
a concise definition of emptiness that would clearly
distinguish it from an extreme and nihilistic
interpretation. It is here that we encounter the
major problem in explicating `suunyataa, one which I
believe was an important factor in the early
Yogaacaara attempts to reexplain this fundamental
Mahaayaana concept.
The nihilistic interpretation of emptiness is the
view that if all is empty then it does not really
exist. Avoiding this conclusion without at the same
time reifying what one declares to be empty of
intrinsic nature (svabhaava) has proved to be the
major preoccupation of Maadhyamika scholasts. The
problem, however, may prove to be insurmountable
within the realms of conventional language. The
nihilistic interpretation of emptiness can only be
avoided by emphasizing the redeemed (or
"deobjectified") status of the 'given' (vastu) in
perception It is clear that such an endeavor is bound
to lead the careless thinker toward the opposing
extreme of eternalism. The Mahaayaana 'Middle Path' is
indeed a thin tightrope on which to balance. Let us
consider this problem more fully in an attempt to
clarify the relationship between the Maadhyamaka and
the early Yogaacaara.

p. 669

IV. The Problem of Nihilism (Ucchedavaada) in the
Madhyamaka
As we have seen, the early formulations of
'classical Yogaacaara', as found in the works of
Asa^nga and Vasubandhu, place a specific emphasis
upon what might be called 'the container conception
of emptiness'. This is the declaration that for x to
be empty, x must exist in some form or other. This is
a clear attempt to secure the Mahaayaana conception
of `suunyataa firmly on the rails of the Middle Path,
and resist the entrapments of an encroaching
nihilism. Such a tendency is also found in the
renewed efforts to establish some form of
quasi-substantial basis to the appearance of the
world. Thus, Mahaayaana-sa.mgraaha II.2 says that the
paratantra-lak.sa.na is 'the locus for the
manifestation (aabhaasaa'sraya) of nonexistent (asat)
and illusory objects (bhraanta-artha) '.
AAlayavij~naana is described as the 'locus of the
knowable (j~neyaa'sraya)'.(39)
The appeal to a substratum ushers in a movement
away from mainstream Indian Madhyamaka, which
explained the origination of the world in terms of a
dynamic process of fluctuating and interdependently
arisen (pratiityasamutpanna) dharmas. Both the
Abhidharma and Madhyamaka perspectives are based upon
the 'deconstruction' of conventionally postulated
entities [praj~napti/sa.mv.rti-sat) such as tables,
chairs, and persons (pudgala) into momentary 'events'
(dharma). The Abhidharmic schools developed a highly
complex understanding of the causal process; no
single entity or dharma was the product of a single
cause but rather was the end result of a multiplicity
of causal factors contributing to its manifestation
on a number of different levels.
Of course, the various schools of Indian Buddhism
had widely differing conceptions of the nature of
causality--ranging from the momentariness theories of
the Sarvaastivaadins to the denial of
`substance-causality' as found in the Madhyamaka. All
the schools, however, were unanimous in focusing upon
the notion of dependent co-origination
(pratiityasa-mutpaada) as the central conception for
explaining the phenomenon of change. The fact that
all dharmas arise interdependently was subsequently
turned on its head by the Madhyamaka school, which
declared that dependent origination was no
origination at all (anutpaada). This is because a
conditioned and evanescent 'entity' could not be said
to exist, since (from a Madhyamaka perspective at
least) 'to exist' means to exist absolutely. Thus, if
there is no entity that originates, then the concept
of origination itself becomes devoid of meaning.
Nevertheless, all schools agreed upon the centrality
of pratiityasamutpaada even if they did not agree
upon its precise implications. The importance of the
dependent co-origination scheme lies in the fact that
it does not require the existence of some ultimate
support, over and above that which arises
interdependently, to account for that origination
itself.
The appeal to a substratum shows a
dissatisfaction in the early Yogaacaara literature
with the efficacy of the Madhyamaka explanation of

p. 670

the origination of the world. The problem, of course,
was brought about by the Madhyamaka's insistence that
dependent origination is no origination at all
(pratiityasamutpaada = anutpaada) . What the
Madhyarmaka means by this, of course, is not to deny
the origination of entities, which remains within the
scope of conventional existence (sa.mv.rti-sat), but
merely to point out the inappropriateness of such
conceptions as origination (utpaada) of inherently
existing entities on an ultimate level (para-
maartha). In fact, for the Madhyamaka school the
conventional arising and cessation of entities is
only possible because they are essentially empty.
"For emptiness everything goes, for nonemptiness
nothing is possible."(40)
However, if x is empty and thus ultimately does
not inherently exist, then surely it cannot exist
conventionally either. This, put rather
simplistically, is the import of the Yogaacaara
attack upon the "universal emptiness" of (at least)
some Maadhyamikas. To be fair to the Madhyamaka, such
criticism is largely irrelevant and misrepresents the
school's basic position. Emptiness is not a
declaration of universal nonexistence or nihilism,
but is rather a further explication of the doctrine
of dependent co-origination. A denial of the
emptiness of entities makes it impossible to assign
any change to their intrinsic natures (svabhaava); it
is only if something is empty that it can originate,
subsist, decay, and cease to exist. But, as the
Maadhyamika is quick to point out, the origination of
an empty entity is not what we would normally
consider origination at all!
It is interesting to note, then, that the only
way in which the Maadhyamika can make his critic
understand the meaning of emptiness is to lay stress
upon the fact that in the debate over change
("Becoming") vs. entity ("Being"), the Maadhyamika
comes down firmly on the side of the givenness of
change and impermanence, and consequently
'desubstantializes' (or deconstructs) the notion of a
'nonempty entiry'.(41) This is not to deny the
givenness of the entity (i.e., its 'experiential
facticity'), but rather to deny its reality as an
inherently existing entity. In other words, it is a
denial of the 'entityness' of that entity. The entity
remains as such (tathataa, that is, as an empty
entity) , devoid (`suunya) of its 'own intrinsic
nature' (svabhaava).
The attempt to differentiate the Madhyamaka
conception of `suunyataa from nihilism is liable to
mislead insofar as it comes dangerously close to
reifying the empty entity by making such statements
as "the entity remains as such." This statement is
necessary, however, for the Maadhyamika to make the
point that his is not a blanket denial of everything.
Thus, in attempting to differentiate emptiness
(`suunyataa from nihilism (ucchedavaada) , one is
inevitably forced to refer to that entity, having
already denied its own self-existence, by declaring
that it is empty. The very explication of emptiness
in conventional language, therefore leads to
apparent contradiction (whether the Madhyamaka
position does in fact lead to paradox is a moot point
since some Buddhist schools, notably the

p. 671

Tibetan dCe lugs pa, suggest logical resolutions of
such problems via the doctrine of the two levels of
truth). The very act of referring to an entity
necessitates its self-identity or
self-referentiality; that is to say, in order to
refer to the entity that has just been declared to be
empty, one must refer to it as an 'it' (as an
'entity'), and as such one is immediately guilty of
reification. Self-identity being denied, one cannot
help but refer to the emptied entity in an attempt to
explain the nature of its emptiness. Necessarily this
involves an implicit affirmation of that (empty)
entity's self-identity. The problem appears
insurmountable and reflects why the best answer from
the Madhyamaka perspective is often said to be the
profound silence that 'roars like a lion'.
The problem with any attempts to explain the
internal dynamics of the emptiness doctrine is that
they become embroiled in problems of ineffability and
the limitations of language. This has led to three
common misinterpretations of the Madhyamaka position.
Firstly there is the view that Madhyamaka doctrine is
little more than self-contradictory non-sense.
Secondly, one might argue that it is a form of
unabated nihilism, or thirdly that it is the
reification of an ultimate entity (i.e., a form of
absolutism). That such misinterpretations occur is
inevitable for as long as one fails to grasp the
point of the Madhyamaka explanation--namely, that an
entity 'exists' only insofar as it is empty of its
own essence (ni.hsvabhaava).
The self-contradictoriness of `suunyataa is a
frequent criticism of the Madhyamaka school that is
upheld, in the main, by the various non-Buddhist
schools of philosophy. `Sa^nkara's attitude to the
Madhyamaka school seems to have amounted to no more
than a contemptuous dismissal.(42) The second
interpretation of the Madhyamaka position, that it is
a form of nihilism, is a frequent cry of later
Yogaacaarins (e.g., Dharmapaala).(43) The reification
of an ultimate entity ('Emptiness' with a capital
'E') is the mark of the absolutistic interpretation
of Madhyamaka.(44) All three interpretations miss the
point of the Madhyamaka enterprise, which is not
surprising since, to a large extent, to grasp fully
the Madhyamaka conception of emptiness is tantamount
to a conversion to its own position, since the
concept is fundamental to the basic paradigmatic
orientation of the school. Dharmas arise
interdependently; that is to say, they have no
independent basis--no substantiality. However, they
are not completely nonexistent. Because of the
Madhyamaka's radically "deconstructive" nature, one
cannot accept its arguments unless one accepts that
it has reduced all opposing arguments to absurdity!
The Madhyamaka position is likely to seem
peculiarly at odds with itself for as long as the
Madhyamaka's central premise is not accepted--that
premise being that the emptiness of own-being
(`suunyataa-svabhaava) is neither a denial of the
object (being just a denial of its own-being) nor an
assertion of its existence (existence presupposing
own-being).

p. 672

Naagaarjuna makes it clear on many occasions that the
terms 'emptiness' (`suunyataa) and 'dependent
co-origination' (pratiityasamutpaada) while having
the same meaning (ekaartha), strike a middle path
between all dogmas.(45) As Such they are
designations or pointers (praj~napti), and as the
Mahaayaana saying suggests,'the finger that points at
the moon is not the moon!'

Emptiness was proclaimed by the Conquerors as the
relinquishing of all views, but those for whom
there is a view of 'emptiness' are declared to be
incurable.(46)

This view is supported by Naagaarjuna's pupil
AAryadeva, who argues in Catu.h'sataka XV1.25 that

No criticism can be leveled against someone who
does not hold a thesis, be it [about] existence,
non-existence, or [both] existence and
non-existence. even if [you try] for a long
time.(47)

V. Soteriology as the Focus of the Dispute between
the Schools
Buddhism has always been primarily interested in
the attainment of salvation and freedom from
suffering, and one of the main problems of the
post-Maadhyamika thinkers was that of explaining and
arguing for the existence of suffering given that
everything was empty (`suunya). It would appear from
the ideas and arguments of the developing Yogaacaara
school that the Madhyamaka understanding of emptiness
was seen by some to subvert the possibility of
suffering. Naagaarjuna argues that it is only because
things are empty that change, impermanence, and
suffering can occur. Consequently, without emptiness
not only could the world of change never have
occurred but there could also have been no way out of
it.(48) Change can only occur because dharmas are not
absolute.

Having not dependently arisen, how will there be
suffering? It has been said that suffering is
impermanent. Thus, it is not self-existent.(49)

However,it would appear that many Yogaacaarins
believed that an unqualified and universal
declaration of emptiness subverted the reality of
suffering in sa.msaara and so was in danger of
subverting the very basis of the Buddhist tradition,
namely the Four Noble Truths. This concern clearly
predates the Yogaacaara and is expressed by
Naagaarjuna himself at the beginning of the chapter
on the Four Noble Truths in his Madhyamaka-kaarikaa.
Naagaarjuna's response, however, does not appear to
have been sufficient for the early Yogaacaarins,
since a concerted effort is made to further
distinguish emptiness from the extreme of nihilism.
According to the Yogaacaara formulation of the
Middle Path, dharmas are empty of the prapa~nca-based
constructions (parikalpita) of discursive thought,
but are not empty insofar as they do exist in some
form. The Madhyamaka of course did not deny that
dharmas exist in some form; it

p. 673

merely rejected their true or ultimate status as
inherently existing entities. For the Yogaacaarin the
perception itself really existed, though devoid of
the reificatory notions of grasper and grasped
(subject and object). What, then, was the status of
these perceptions! The Yogaacaara response was to say
that they were like dreams and illusions. But how
could something be said to exist and yet also be an
illusion! The problem here is that these Mahaayaana
schools are involved in a debate which, even on their
own premises, is in the realm of strict ineffability.
Conventional language just cannot do the work
required of it because of the inevitable tendency for
the unenlightened listener to reify its referents. As
we have seen, it is possible to argue that the
Yogaacaara definition of emptiness as "the existence
of nonexistence" is merely an example of 'word-play'
in an attempt to clarify the Madhyamaka conception of
emptiness. While it seems possible that some
Yogaacaarins understood the definition in this
manner, it is also possible that the 'search for a
substratum' evident within many Yogaacaara texts is
strongly suggestive of a shift in paradigm.
The search for a substratum to explain the
origination of the world of du.hkha was felt to be
both unnecessary and fallacious by the Maadhyamikas.
For Naagaarjuna all such attempts to find a ground of
existence lead to absolutism in that they postulate a
permanent (and thus absolute) entity. In this way the
author of the Madhyamaka-kaarikaa steered clear of
all explanations of the world based upon an
ontological distinction between appearance and
reality. The reason for this is that such endeavors
are dangerously close to subverting the Middle Path
in their acceptance of some form of absolute reality
supporting and transcending phenomenal (that is
'dharmic') manifestation. For Naagaarjuna such a
conception of the world process contradicts the
fundamental principle of dharma-nairaatmya.
'Appearance' or manifestation is only possible
because all dharmas are empty of an intrinsic nature.
If there was any dharma that possessed such an
essence (svabhaava), then it could never be subject
to change or dissolution. Clearly such a conclusion
was unacceptable to Naagaarjuna. Thus, one should
relinquish all belief in inherently existing
entities.
However, outside the Madhyamaka school this
explanation seems either to have been misunderstood
(hence the frequent cries of 'ucchedavaadaa') or, at
best, was felt to be inadequate. The movement toward
a more substrative model of reality can be seen in
new ways of formulating the meaning of emptiness in
the literature of the early Yogaacaara school. For
instance, in commenting on the Madhyaanta-vibhaaga's
statement that defilements are adventitious
(kle'sasya aagantukatvata.h, 1.23), Vasubandhu makes
the following points: "[The purity of emptiness is
established] by shaking off the adventitious
defilements. However, this is not a change in
own-nature."(50) Emptiness, then, is "neither defiled
nor pure by its very nature."(51) What is one to make
of the reference to the 'nature of empti-

p. 674

ness'? Is the phrase to be understood in the
traditional Madhyamaka sense to mean that the
inherent nature of things is their lack of an
inherent nature, or is there a postulation of some
form of svabhaava here that would not be consonant
with the Madhyamaka tradition? Furthermore. one can
also find references in the work of Asa^nga to the
"ineffable inherent-nature" (nirabhilaapya
svabhaavataa) of dharmas. Thus we find Asa^nga
arguing in the Bodhisattva-bhuumi that the Buddhas
and bodhisattvas

[H]aving penetrated the non-self of dhdrmas
(dharma-nairaatmya), and having realized, because
of that pure understanding, the inexpressible
nature (nirabhilaapya svabhaavataa) of all
dharmas, know the sameness (sama) of the
essential nature of verbal designation
(praj~naptivaada) and the nondiscursive knowledge
(nirvikalpaj~neya). That is the supreme Suchness
(tathataa).(52)

The movement away from an emphasis upon the
lack-of-essential-nature (ni.hsvabhaavataaa) of
dharmas to their 'ineffable-essential-nature' may be
interpreted as a subtle introduction of
'essentialism' (svabhaavataavaada) into the Mahaayaana
tradition at a time when the 'nihilism' of the
Madhyamaka position may have been seen to be too
'extreme' and uncompromisingly negative in its
exposition.

VI. Doctrinal Ambivalence in the early Yogaacaara
The remarkable fact about the early formulations
of classical Yogaacaara, as established in the texts
of Asa^nga and Vasubandhu, is their hermeneutical
'open-endedness'. It is possible to understand these
works as attempts to express and reformulate the
Madhyamaka message. Alternatively, they may be seen
as reactions to the 'nihilism' of the Madhyamaka
school. In the former case the ineffable own-nature
(nirabhilaapya svabhaavata) of dharmas is an attempt
to explain that their emptiness transcends the
categories of 'being' (bhaava) and 'nonbeing'
(abhaava). As such, their 'own-nature' (svabhaava) is
merely their common quality of 'lacking an
own-nature' (ni.hsvabhaavataa). However, ineffability
may also refer to the fact that there is some
positive sense in which own-nature (svabhaava) can be
found in dharmas. In this case we have a
quasi-substantialist position, dharmas being real in
some ultimate sense if not in any linguistically
expressible sense. if the latter were the correct
interpretation, then we would have pinpointed a clear
difference of opinion between Asa^nga and Vasubandhu
on the one hand and the Maadhyamikas on the other.
Whatever the allegiance of the earliest Yogaacaarins
as the school developed, it did eventually develop
its own distinctive understanding of emptiness pace
Madhyamaka. The appeal to a substratum is a clear
example of the Yogaacaara attempt to distinguish the
Mahaayaana idea of emptiness from a nihilistic
interpretation.

p. 675

In the light of the problem of explicating the
notion of emptiness, we are now in a position to
reevaluate the import of the Yogaacaara's particular
formulation of the doctrine. The attempt to qualify
the emptiness of an entity as allowing for the pure
given-ness (vastumaatra) of that entity clearly
constitutes an attempt by the early Yogaacaarins to
differentiate emptiness from nihilism. The question
of the relationship between the Madhyamaka and the
early classical formulations of Asa^nga and
Vasubandhu, however, remains a moot point. It could
be argued that Asa^nga conceived of emptiness along
broadly Madhyamaka lines, and that his own
formulations of the doctrine are merely developing
the Madhyamaka position by emphasizing what I have
called the "experiential facticity" of objects (i.e.,
the "given-ness" of experience). This provides a
characteristically Yogaacaara emphasis on experience
without necessitating a break with the Madhyamaka
tradition on this issue.
Attempts to differentiate emptiness from
nihilism, however, inevitably lead to the assertion
of the reality of the emptied thing and as such can
lead to the reification of that empty entity. The
extent to which Asa^nga took his own formulation of
`suunyataa to be fundamentally different from those
of his predecessors largely depends on the extent to
which he takes his own use of language seriously.
Thus, on the one hand, Asa^nga may be defending
Madhyamaka from a nihilistic interpretation by
attempting to distinguish it from a blanket denial of
everything, while on the other hand he may have been
attacking the Maadhyamikas for their encroaching
nihilism. if the latter is in fact the case, then
Asa^nga took his own statements concerning the
given-ness of the entity at face value, and from the
Madhyamaka point of view was indeed guilty of
reification. From this it would be clear that there
is a different conception of emptiness at work in the
treatises of the early Yogaacaarins. Both
interpretations of Asa^nga's position are possible.
Determining which of these is correct may prove
particularly problematic since the very
paradoxicality of explaining emptiness in (reifying)
language points to its inexpressibility.
Any defense of emptiness against the charge of
nihilism is always likely to result in the
possibility of reification insofar as reference to
the given-ness of the entity is taken literally, that
is, not purged of its ontological implications. This
is an unfortunate consequence of the problems
inherent in the self-referential nature of language.
Thus, on the one hand Asa^nga may be rescuing the
Madhyamaka position from fallacious nihilistic
interpretations, or alternatively he may be
criticizing the Madhyamaka school. This hermeneutical
problem is complex, and any resolution of it would
necessitate not only an examination of Asa^nga's own
conception of emptiness, but also a consideration of
his attitudes toward his Madhyamaka predecessors.
Examining the latter proves particularly

p. 676

difficult since Asa^nga wrote in an era before
Madhyamaka-Yogaacaara polemics arose, and his
position vis-a-vis that question is thus not alto.
gether clear. The question of Asa^nga's relationship
to the Madhyamaka school is far from easily settled.
If the early Yogaacaara movement was formulated
as a reaction to rather than a reform of mainstream
Madhyamaka, Asa^nga and his successors have some
difficulties in overcoming the Madhyamaka critique of
their position. For how can the other-dependent
(paratantra) realm be said to 'exist' in some form
without risking ontological attribution! AS
Naagaarjuna argues, if there is no independent "self"
there can be no "other" to be dependent upon since
"other nature" (parabhaava) is the "self-nature"
(svabhaava) of an 'other' (MK XV.3). Bhaavaviveka
picks up on this argument in his disputations with
the vij~naanavaadins, pointing to the absurdity of
asserting that an illusion exists (vij~napti //
bhraanti-maatra).(53) Paul Williams puts the point
very succinctly when he notes that

The vij~naavaada difficulty stems from reference
to an entity at the same time as maintaining its
ineffability, and reflects a failure to transcend
the Madhyamaka progression from conditional
occurrence to ni.hsvabhaavataa and thence to no
occurrence at all. Nevertheless, the fact that
the Madhyamaka position seems paradoxical cannot
be doubted, the interesting point being that for
the Madhyamaka the vij~naanavaada position was
paradoxical and vice versa. Mutual
incomprehensibiliy and paradoxically due to
shifting structural presuppositions was common to
Indian philosophy.(54)

One suspects that the developing Yogaacaara
school felt uneasy about the Madhyamaka equation of
pratiityasamutpaada with anutpaada. Nevertheless, in
the early Yogaacaara literature one can even find
references to the renunciation of vij~naptimaatrataa,
usually taken to be the definitive concept of the
Yogaacaara school. In the Mahaayaanasa.mgraha, for
instance, Asa^nga explicitly states that
representation-only (vij~naptl-maatra) is to be
relinquished once one has transcended
dichotomizing-consciousness (vij~naana) and the
duality of subject and object.

Thus, upon investigating the 'mental chatter'
(manojalpa) which appears as an object, the
bodhisattva enters the imagined nature
(parikalpita-svabhaava) . Upon entering
representation-only (vij~naptimaatra), he enters
the dependent nature. How then does he enter the
perfected nature (parini.spannasvabhaava) ? He
enters it upon rejecting altogether the notion of
representation-only (vij~naptimaatrasa.mj~na) .
Thus, for the bodhisattva who has destroyed the
notion of an object (arthasa.mj~na), the mental
chatter resulting from the impression of the
heard Dharma does not have the capability to
arise with the appearance of an object and,
consequently, does not arise anymore as
representation-only When the bodhisattva resides
in the "name-without concept" with regard to all
objects (sarvaarthe.sunirvikalpakanaama),

p. 677

when he resides through yogic perception
(pratyak.sayogena) in the dharmadhaatu, then he
possesses nirvikalpaj~naana, in which the
objective-support (aalambana) and the
supported-consciousness are totally identified. It is
then that the bodhisattva has entered the perfected
nature.(55)

This supramundane (lokottaara) knowledge
corresponds to the final stage of enlightenment
outlined by Asa^nga and Vasubandhu where even the
notion of representation (vij~napti) is relinquished.
For how can you talk of representation in the absence
of an object that is being represented! Thus,
Vasubandhu declares in Trisvabhaava-nirde'sa 36 that

Through the perception that there is mind-only
(citta-maatra), there arises.the nonperception of
knowable things. Through the nonperception of
knowable things, there arises the nonperception
of mind also.(56)

Taken at face value, these statements suggest
that there remains considerable room for debate as to
the precise relationship between the doctrinal
positions of the early Yogaacaara and the Madhyamaka
schools. It is also not clear that the early
Yogaacaara philosophy is straightforwardly
"idealistic" since there appears to be the
acknowledgment at times that at the highest levels of
attainment both citta and vij~napti-maatra are to be
transcended. One suspects that the early Yogaacaara
of Asa^nga and Vasubandhu, as laid down in such texts
as the Bodhisattva-bhuumi and the
Trisvabhaavanirde'sa, represents a philosophical
school in transition.(57)

NOTES

1- Suzuki 1928, p. 255. Quoted in Willis 1979, p. 21,
and Harris 1991, p. 68.

2 - Ueda 1967, pp. 155-165.

3 - Sa.mdhinirmocana-suutra VII.30. See Lamotte 1935,
pp. 85 ff.

4 - lbid., pp. 67, 193.

5 - Asa^nga evidently thought that the
aalayavij~naana was so important that he devoted
the introduotory section of his
Mahaayaanasa.mgraaha to an examination of its
meaning.

6 - Mahaayaanasa.mgraaha I.11.

7 - Ibid., I.10

8 - For example, see Willis' translation of the
Tattvaartha chapter of the Stages of the
Bodhisattva Path (Bodhisattva-bhuumi), in Willis
1979, pp. 106, 109, etc.

p. 678

9 - Willis' translation, ibid., p. 106.

10 - See ibid., p. 106, and Wogihara's (1930-1936)
edition of the Bodhi- sattvabhuumi, p. 45.

11 - Willis 1979, p. 109, and Wogihara 1930-1936, pp.
45-46.

12 - Willis 1979, p. 21.

13 - Compare this with the statement made by
Yasomitra in his Abhid- harmako'sabhaa.
syavyaakhya 1.16: upalabdhivastumaatragraha.nam
/ vedanaadayastucaitasaa vi'se.sagraha.naruupa.h
/ "[The six consciousnesses (vij~naana) ]
apprehend, grasping only the given-thing. How-
ever, it is the mental concomitants of sensation
that, grasping, specify the form (rupa) ."
Williams (1980), p. 15, says that "the distinc-
tion between vij~naana- and sa.mj~naaskandhas
largely marks the dif- ference between
apprehending a composite thing and becoming
consciously aware of the state of affairs marked
by that thing." Compare this also to the
nineteenth-century British idealism of Francis
H. Bradley, where reality is experience or pure
apprehension (before the intervention of
concepts).

14 - Rahula 1971, p. 66.

15 - 'A-parini.spatti', literally 'not-absolute' or
'not-fulfilled'. Rahula trans- lates it as
'non-realite'.

16 - Thus, Vi.m'satikaa,vv. 11-14, criticizes 'atomic
realism' on the grounds that the idea that the
sense objects that one apprehends are made up of
atoms is not demonstrable on purely experiential
(i.e., phenomenological) grounds. Simply
speaking, it contradicts the given-ness of
perception. The concept of a unique and
indivisible atom (paramaa.nu) is also rejected,
as such an entity would have no facets with
which to connect to other atoms. Thus v. 12
states that "One atom simultaneously conjoined
with six other atoms must have six facets. Yet,
if they are said to occupy the same space,
[being the smallest occupier of space possible],
then their aggregate would be no more than a
single atom" (.sa.tkena yugapadyogaatparamaa.n-
o.h.sa.da.m`sataa, sa.n.naam samaanade`satvaat
pi.n.dah syaad a.numaatraka.h).

17 - Rahula 1971, p. 32.

18 - Ibid., p.118.

19 - Interestingly, Asa~nga also makes room for a
third category of sensa- tion, that which is
both internal and external. This latter
sensation is produced by the interaction of the
external sense-spheres (baahyaayatana), which
are the support of the sense-organs
(indriyaadh.i.sthaana) , and the 'spheres of
internal form' (aadhyaatmikaani ruupii.ny
aayatanaani, which constitute the 'internal
body' (aadhyaatmakaaya).

p. 679

20 - Lamotte 1938, vol. 2, pp. 39-40.

21 - Anacker 1984, p. 3.

22 - See Kajiyama 1969, pp. 193-203. See also
Hirabayashi and leda 1977, pp. 341-360, and leda
1980.

23 - See Ueda 1967, pp. 155-165, for a brief but
definitive examination of the differences
between Paramaartha and Dharmapaala in their
exegesis of Vasubandhu's works. See also Walpole
Rahula 1972, pp. 324-330.

24 - Willis 1979, p. 21.

25 - See for instance, Wayman 1965, passim; Rahula
1972, pp. 82-85; Nagao 1979, p. 39 (or Nagao
1991, p 198) ; Willis 1979, pp. 20-36;
Kochumottum 1982, pp. 197-234; and Harris 1991,
pp. 152-175.

26 - Madhyaanta-vibhaaga I.1: abhuuta-parikalpo
'stidvayam tatra na vidyate, `suunyataa
vidyatetu-atra tasyaam-apisa vidyate.

27 - Chang 1971, p. 60.

28 - For instance, Rahula 1972, passim; willis 1979,
pp. 13-36; Anacker 1984; Nagao 1979, pp. 29-43,
reprinted in Nagao 1991, pp. 189-199; and Harris
1991, pp. 63-83, 102-179.

29 - For an interesting discussion of this, see Nagao
1978, pp. 66-82, recently reprinted in Nagao
1991, pp. 51-60.

30 - Kochumottom 1982, p. 236.

31 - yena hi `suunya.m tada-sad-bhaavaat yac-ca
`suunya.m tad sad-bhaavaac chuunyataa yujyeta
(trans. in Willis 1979, p. 114; see also
Wogihara 1930-1936, p. 47).

32 - Willis 1979, pp. 117, 121; Wogihara 1930-1936,
pp. 47, 49.

33 - Madhyamaka-kaarikaa 24.11.

34 - tad sad-bhaavaac chuun yataa yujyeta. See
Wogihara 1930-1936, p. 47.

35 - Madhyaanta-vibhaaga 1.13:
dvaya-abhaavohi-abhaavasya bhaava.h `suunyasya
lak.sa.nam na bhaavo na-api
ca-abhaava.hnap.rthaktva-eka-lak.sa.nam. See
also Madhyaanta-Vibhaaga 1.2: na `suunya.m naapi
caa'sunya.m tasmaat sarva.m vidhiiyate, sattvaad
asattvaat sattvaac ca madhyamaa pratipac ca saa,
"Neither empty nor nonempty, so is everything
described; that indeed is the Middle Path, for
there is existence as well as nonexistence, and
again existence."

36 - Rahula 1971, p. 65.

37 - Note that my translation is dependent upon the
French translation of W. Rahula (1971), 1. chap.
1, sec. 2, p. 44.

p. 680

38 - Mahaayaanasa.mgraaha II.15.1. See Lamotte 1938,
vol 2, p. 107.

39 - Ibid., p. 89.

40 - Vigrahavyaavartanii, v. 70.

41 - The Madhyamaka position is grounded in the
Buddhist conception of the world as impermanent
(anitya) and lacking an abiding self (anaatman).
Thus we find Naagaarjuna, in Madhyamaka-kaarikaa
XXI. 4, suggesting the following axiom: "For
impermanence is never absent in entities."

42 - See Ingalls 1954, pp. 291-306; Biderman 1978,
405-413; Whaling 1979, pp. 1-42.

43 - See Hirabayashi and leda 1977, pp. 341-360.

44 - The foremost example of the absolutistic
interpretation of Madhyamaka is the work of
T.R.V.Murti. Candrakiirti notes in
Prasannapadaa 247-248 that the person who
reifies emptiness is like the person responding
to the merchant who has nothing to sell with the
words "all right let me buy some of that
nothing!" Nevertheless, the majority of critics
attacked the Madhyamaka for its apparent
nihilism. The absolutistic interpretation of
Madhyamaka was not prevalent in traditional
Indian sources, absolutism generally being seen
as a feature of the Brahmanical / Upani.sadic
heritage and not the Buddhist.

45 - See, for instance, Vigrahavyaavartanii, v. 71.

46 - Madhyamaka-kaarikaa 13.8: `suunyataa
sarvad.r.s.tiinaa.m proktaa ni.hsara.na.m
jinai.h, ye.saa.m tu `suunyataad.r.s.tis taan
asaadhyaan babhaa.sire.

47 - sad asat sadasac ceti yasya pak.so na vidyate,
upaalambha's cire.naapi tasya vaktu.m na
`sakyate(trans. in Lang 1986, pp. 150-151).

48 - See Madhyamaka-kaarikaa 24:18-28.

49 - Ibid., 24.21: apratiityasamutpanna.m kuto
du.hkha.m bhavi.syati, anityam ukta.m du.hkha.m
hi tat svaabhaavye ne vidyate.

50 - Madhyaanta-vibhaaga-bhaa.sya I.17.

51 - Madhyaanta-vibhaaga-bhaa.sya I.23.

52 - Trans. in Willis 1979, p. 79.

53 - Madhyamakah.rdaya-kaarikaa chap. 5;
Praj~naaapradiipa chap. 25. Candrakiirti also
attacks the views of the citta-maatra. He does,
however, clearly grasp the fact that the
Yogaacaara position is not a naive form of
subjective idealism. In Madhyamakaavataara
VI.45, he points out that for the Yogaacaara
school, if the object is absent, so, too, is the
subject. However, the view which equates the
dream and wak-

p. 681

ing states is criticized by Candrakiirti in
Madhyamakaavataara VI.48-53. Again in
Madhyamakaarvataara VI.65, the author asks "if
the cognition of 'blue' is mental and not
sensory, why is it that a blind man cannot see
blue?" Candrakiirti also clearly distinguishes
the Madhyamaka conception of `sa.mv.rti' from
the Yogaacaara notion of paratantra' (see
Madhyamakaavataara VI.80-81).

54 - Williams 1980, p. 12.

55 - Mahaayaanasa.mgraha 111.9. See Lamotte 1938,
vol. 2, pp. 164-165 [143a16].

56 - Trisvabhaava-nirde'sa, v.36:
citta-maatropalambhena
j~neyaarthaanupalambhataa,
j~neyaarthaanupalambhena syaac
cittaanupalambhataa. See also Tri.m`sikaa, v.
29, Madhyaantavibhaaga 1.6 and the bhaa.sya upon
it. One might wish to argue that such statements
are to be understood in a specifically yogic
context only and so should not be taken to refer
to the Yogaacaara's own distinctive doctrinal
position. However, in discussing such movements
as this, it is difficult to draw a hard and fast
line between the theoretical and the practical.
This is reflected in the fact that the
Yogaacaara derives some of the evidence to
support its own philosophical perspective from
meditative experiences. See, for instance, the
reference to yogic perception in
Mahaayaanasa.mgraaha III.9, quoted above.

57 - Perhaps a distinction can be made between those
texts written by Asa^nga for the Mahaayaana in
general, e.g. the voluminous
Yogaacara-bhuumi (containing the
Bodhisattva-bhuumi), and the
Mahaayaanasa.mgraaha, and those texts written
specifically for a Yogaacaara audience.

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