Emptiness and moral perfection

·期刊原文

Emptiness and moral perfection

By Luis O. Gomez

Philosophy East and West

volume 23, 1973 p.361-373

(c) by University of Hawaii Press

p. 361

Buddhism not only offers a system of ethics, it is
fundamentally concerned with human conduct in the
most ample meaning of the word. Buddhism did face the
basic problems of moral axiology, both in its early
and late speculations, although its method and
vocabulary are different from that of the Western
philosopher. Moreover, it is in this fact that we
find one of the distinctive characteristics of
Buddhism among the Indian systems of salvation.
Specially in contrast to the Vedaantins, with whom
the Buddhists share many common traits in the order
of metaphysics, Buddhism places value above being,
existence above essence, function above structure.

It is in the realm of ethics that we find
Buddhism's great contribution to Indian thought. The
Four Noble Truths, for instance, formulated in clear
opposition to the amoralistic speculations of the
age, do not represent a mere statement of dogma or
metaphysics, rather, they constitute one of the first
expressions of ethical theory in the history of
philosophy.

Yet, in spite of the evident fact that Buddhism
taught a positive moral and ethical doctrine, the
accusation of nihilism has been cast against Buddhism
ever since its beginnings. More than once Gautama had
to reaffirm his position of a middle way between
nihilism and realism, moral and metaphysical.(1) In
fact, avoiding these two extremes was the main
philosophical problem of Buddhism. The question was
always "how can we deny `own-existence'
(svabhaava)(2) without falling into nihilism."

Perhaps the latter schools were more often led by
dogmatical considerations than by any sincere
interest in safeguarding ethical values; the main
issue was, then, not how to insure salvation, but
rather how to secure orthodoxy. Nevertheless, the
problem of the metaphysical justification of the path
would always
------------------------------
Professor Luis O. Gomez is Professor of Philosophy at
the University of Puerto Rico.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: The substance of this article was
delivered before the faculty and students of the
Department of Indian Philosophy and Buddhist Studies
of the University of Kyoto in October, 1968.
All unmarked references in the text are to the
Bodhicaryaavataara of `Santideva, chapter and stanza
(roman and arabic numerals), as numbered in Poussin's
ed., Calcutta, 1902-1914. Abbreviations used in the
notes: Ako`s., Abhidharmako`sa of Vasubandhu, ed. P.
Pradhan, (Patna, 1967) (chapter and stanza); Bcaa.,
Bodhicaryaavataara of `Saantideva (see above); MK.,
Madhyamakakaarikaa of Naagaarjuna, ed. L. de la
Yallee Poussin (St. Petersburg: Impr. de l'Academie
imperiale des sciences, 1912) (chapter and stanza);
Rat., Ratnaavalii of Naagaarjuna, ed. Guiseppe Tucci,
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (JRAS) (London,
1934 and 1936) (chapter and stanza) ; Siks.,
`Sik.saasamuccaya of Saantideva, ed. Cecil Bendall
(St.Petersburg, 1902) (quoted by page number).
1. Cf., for example, A^nguttara-Nikaaya IV.174, 180,
182 ff.
2. svabhaavaa, "own-becoming" or ("self-existence,"
the term's extension includes the supposed
referents of our terms substance, essence, nature,
character. I have translated it literally rather
than using an inappropriate equivalent. For a
discussion of this term and ample references, see
Jacques May, Prasannapadaa Madhyamakavrtti: douze
chapitres. (Paris: Adrien-Maissonneuve, 1959), p.
324, note 328. For the Aristotelian concept of
ousia (ovoia) , which is probably closer to
suabhaava than the medieval substance, cf.
Metaphysics, V.8, VII.1-6, 16-17.

p. 362

remain the avowed purpose of all philosophical
speculation; thus, beyond the complicated question of
orthodoxy, and at a more immediate and fundamental
level, would lie the problem of ethics and salvation.

Although ethics is often identified with
morality, it would not be pertinent to the purpose of
this article to clarify the doctrine of morality
(`siila), that is, particular problems regarding
rules of conduct. The issue is the foundation for the
necessity of ethics, or, rather, of human perfection
(paaramitaa). The problem may be stated summarily as
follows: how can perfection be necessary, or at all
possible, without a substance and essence of the
human subject (aatman)? There seems to be a radical
contradiction between the doctrine of nonself, or,
even more, that of emptiness, and any possible moral
obligation.(3)

In the face of this paradox, the Buddhist
attitude has not been always as innocently sanguine
as the words of `Saantideva would seem: "All dharmas
are without self, yet this does not contradict the
connection of the fruit with the act."(4) The
question has been seriously debated more than once in
the history of Buddhism; by `Saantideva himself and,
earlier in the Maadhyamika tradition, in the locus
classicus which is chapter XXIV of the
Maahyamaka`saastra. Naagaarjuna's argumentation,
however, constitutes a refutation of ethical
absolutism, not a defense of the Buddhist position in
ethics.

This position is that precisely from the fact of
selflessness man is convinced of the necessity of
good conduct. This stand is illustrated rather
dramatically in such texts as the Saundaraananda, or,
for that matter, many a modern manual of Buddhist
morality. These texts perhaps justify morality only
in the narrowest sense: the detachment which they
promulgate evokes the image of a solitary monk,
indifferent to the world suffering around him. At the
very least, the emphasis is on a morality of
continence (sa^mvara`siila) rather than a positive
system of value (sattvaarthakriyaa`siila).

The Mahaayaana claims that it offers such a
system and that it is possible only on the basis of
the doctrine of nonself and universal emptiness. The
argument runs that nonself necessarily leads to
detachment and renunciation, which then lead to
altruism in its highest forms. The `Sik.saasamuccaya,
for instance, affirms that once the emptiness of
personality (pudgala) is established, all defilements
are uprooted, and they never grow again.(5) Once the
------------------------------------
3. The paradox involved in the simultaneous assertion
of nairaatmya and karmaphala was first pointed
out in the West by Hendrik Kern in his Manual of
Indian Buddhism (1896) (Varanasi: Indological
Book House, 1968), pp. 49-50, the problem has
been discussed in detail by Louis de la Vallee
Poussin in his papers "La negation de 1'ame et la
doctrine de l'acte" (JA, Sept.-Oct., no. 20
(1902): 237-306) and "Nouvelles recherches sur la
doctrine de l'acte" (JA, Nov.-Dec., no. 2 (1903):
pp. 357-450).
4. `Sik.s. 244, referring to the Pit.rputrasamaagama:
"All dharmas are without a self, yet this does
not exclude the connection of the fruit to the
act. Moreover, because they have no
self-existence, there is no contradiction with
the fact that all dharmas are as they are seen"
5. `Sik.s. 242.

p. 363

very notion of self is removed, all attachment to
self disappears, then there will be no more
attachment to profit.(6) What is more, good conduct is
not only necessary for the attainment of
selflessness, but once selflessness is attained, good
conduct follows spontaneously.(7) For, `Saantideva
claims, "only from abandonment comes success in the
attainment of one's own goals."(8) Moreover,
compassion is considered to be the very foundation of
the path to enlightenment, and it is also its
culmination.(9) As enunciated by `Saantideva in the
Bodhicaryaavataara: "...deliverance (nirvaa.na) is
complete renunciation, and I seek deliverance; if I
must renounce everything, it would be better to give
[everything] to [other] living beings" (III.11).
Implicit in this stanza is the principle that
renunciation or, even better, the true selflessness
of complete renunciation (in nirvaa.na), finds its
fulfillment in altruism. This principle is enunciated
implicitly:

Giving and the other perfections are more perfect in
the order [in which they are stated. The bodhisattva]
would not give up one better for another [less good],
except in the case of [compassionate generosity,
which is] the dam [that retains the waters of merit]
of the [bodhisattva's] career. Understanding this
[principle, the bodhisattva] applies himself
constantly to the welfare of others; compassionate,
he should even consent [to carry out] a sinful act if
he perceives that it could be for the well-being [of
others] (V.83-84).(10)

In other words, although in the order of pure
excellence the highest perfection is wisdom,
(because, so to speak, it illuminates the others),
still, in the practical order, compassion takes
precedence, because it is the dam that holds the
bodhisattva's career. In what sense? The reader will
look for an answer in vain. The Pa~njikaa is equally
silent.

Perhaps the answer to this question should be
sought elsewhere, in the eighth chapter. The eighth
chapter of the Bodhicaryaavataara, dedicated to
dhyaana, was no doubt written with the sole purpose
of presenting `Saantideva's
-------------------------------
6. `Sik.s. 11, quoting the Pramuditaabhuumi of
Da`sabhuumika, found on p. 17 of Ryuuko Kondo's
ed.; p. 13 of J. Rahder's ed.
7. `Sik.s. 121. In this connection, the
interdependence of morality and wisdom is another
form of expressing the same idea, for which see
Diigha Nikaaya I.124. It is also important to
point to the difference in the Mahaayaana and the
Theravaala view of compassion. The latter
conceives of it as a mere preliminary, whereas
the Mahaayaana accepts it as a necessary
counterpart of wisdom. For the Theravaadin
position, see: Abhidhammatthasa^ngaha, Part II.I1
and Part IX, Ako`s. VII.33, also Herbert V.
Guenther, Philosophy and Psychology in the
Abhidharma, (Lucknow: Buddha Vihara, 1957), pp.
161-165, and 301, note 3. On the interdependence
of the paaramitaa, see `Satasaahasrikaa, chap.X
(pp.1466-1469 in P. Ghosha's ed., Calcutta,
1902-1913) and A.s.tasaahasrikaa, chaps. III and
XXV (pp. 80-81 and 431 of Mitra's ed., Calcutta,
1888).
8. `Sik.s. 145.
9. The basis of the bodhicitta is compassion: `Sik.s.
7-8. Compare also `Sik.s. 11, Bcaa. V.42, and
Bodhisattvabhuumi, N. Dutt's ed. (Patna, 1967),
pp. 97-126; Unrai Wogihara's ed. (Tokyo: 1930),
pp. 140-182.
10. See references to Bodhisattvabhuumi in note 9
herein.

p. 364

own Mahaayaanist concept of meditation. According to
the author, the prime object of meditation is, of
course, inner calm (`samatha) (VIII.4); but this calm
is only preparatory to the real object of meditation:
namely, the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta)
(VIII.89). The bodhicitta, or germinal thought of
awakening, is developed through two meditational
practices, according to this chapter; the
paraatmasamataa and the paraatmaparivartana.
Paraatmasamataa, or the basic equality between self
and others, is best described in the words of
`Saantideva:

First he should develop earnestly the notion of
nondifference of self and others [in the following
way: ] all beings have sorrow and happiness as I do,
they should therefore be protected by me as if they
were my own self. As the body should be protected as
one, although it has many parts, so should one
protect everything in the world with its many
divisions, for it is one in sorrow and happiness.
Although my suffering is not felt in other bodies,
yet it is difficult to bear because of my love of
self; likewise, though I myself cannot experience the
sorrow of others, this sorrow is difficult to bear
for others because of their love of self. The sorrow
of others I must destroy, because it is sorrow as
much as my own, and I must help others because they
are living beings as much as myself. When we consider
that happiness is equally pleasant to me and to
others, then what special quality do I have which
could justify striving [only] after my own good? When
we consider that fear and sorrow are unpleasant to me
and to others, then what special quality do I have by
which I should protect myself, not another (VIII.90-96).

He who wants to protect himself as well as others
should practice the supreme mystery: "Behave towards
yourself as the worldly do towards others, and
towards others, do as they do towards themselves."
(VIII.120).(11)

Paraatmaparivartana, or the substitution of self
for others, follows as a corollary to this last
statement. It is described by `Saantideva as the
giving of one's ego to another and the adoption of
that person's ego as one's own. What is specially
significant is the reason `Saantideva gives for the
practice of this substitution: because the notion of
a self and the attachment which originates in it are
the only causes of all suffering in this world, one
should give up such a notion (VIII.134). Altruism is
an exercise in renunciation. Thus, if I give my "I"
to another, and adopt his "I," it is both to appease
my suffering and the suffering of others (VIII.136).

At this point we are ready to understand why
`Saantideva had said earlier that altruism should
take precedence over the development of any of the
"private virtues." Altruism acts as the safeguard,
the dam, of all other virtues, of all moral
perfection, because it is the only guarantee of
active selflessness. `Saantideva considers compassion
as the most effective antidote against the
surreptitious selfishness of solitary asceticism.

Still, we are in doubt: Why altruism? Because,
there being no self, replies
--------------------------------
11. Although rhetorically this is the converse of the
Christian dictum "You shall love your neighbor as
yourself" (Matt. 19: 19) , the purport is
identical.

p. 365

the Buddhist, there is no reason why we should avoid
our sorrow and not that of others. "If [you contend
that this avoidance of only our own suffering],
although unreasonable, is a fact arising from our
notion of a self, [we answer that] if it is not
reasonable, then it should be rejected by all means,
both in respect to the self and in respect to others"
(VIII.100). As the following stanza explains: "A
series (sa^mtaana) or an aggregate (samudaya) are as
false as a line [of ants] or an army: there is no one
to whom sorrow could belong; therefore, [who could
claim] that [certain sorrows] are his own? All
sorrows without exception have no owner, only because
they are sorrow should they be avoided, no special
rule is applicable in respect to this"
(VIII.101-102). At this point the following objection
is presented: "If there is no subject who suffers
here in sa^msaara, then there is no reason why we
should avoid sorrow (our own or that of others),
since there exists no suffering being who could be
the recipient of compassion." Although this objection
has been implicitly answered in the previous stanzas,
`Saantideva replies: "Then, why should we avoid pain?
Because everybody agrees on that. If it is to be
avoided, then all [should be] equally [avoided]. If
not to be avoided, then the self too [should be
treated] as [other] beings" (VIII.103). At this point
the Pa~njikaa comments, with a slight tinge of irony:

It is not reasonable to argue that sorrow should not
be avoided because there is no self. Why? Because
[the avoidance of sorrow is accepted] by everyone
without objection or contention. Even the Caarvaakas
avoid their own suffering. Yet, they are certainly
not free from error, because they accept a self and
since the essence of a self cannot be apprehended.
Moreover, its existence is not proven by mere
acceptance, and there is no means of valid cognition
that can prove it, while there are many things which
contradict it. Consequently, if we must avoid sorrow,
then we must avoid all sorrows, and if we will not
avoid them all, then we should not avoid our own
either. [That is to say, if you could validate your
claim,] our conclusion [would then be] that our own
sorrow, which is of the nature of the five groups of
grasping, should not be avoided as [in the case of]
all [other] beings, since there is no true difference
[between the self and others] (Pa~njikaa ad
VIII.103).

Of course, a real objector would not be satisfied
by such an answer. It seems that the argument is on
two different levels. On the one hand, what is
conventionally true is rejected, on the other hand,
the author appeals to the belief of common man in
support of his thesis. What are the author's criteria
for accepting or rejecting the validity of common
knowledge? How can he defend his position if he will
say that sorrow itself is only the result of illusion
and that upon destroying the notion of self all
sorrows disappear? (at VIII. 134-135).

It is evident that `Saantideva himself was not
wholly satisfied with the explanation we have quoted,
for he felt it necessary to take up the issue again
at IX.76-78:

"If there are no beings, for whom shall we feel
compassion?" "[We feel

p. 366

compassion for a being] who has been imagined through
an illusion accepted [as real] for the sake of the
goal to be attained" (IX.76).

Praj~naakaramati comments:

... For it is Buddhahood that we seek... and
Buddhahood cannot be attained while there is
perception of any dharmas; and the nonperception of
all dharmas is achieved through development of
wisdom; and this development of wisdom occurs through
constant exercise for a long period of time. But this
effort is produced under the surveillance of
compassion, compassion is first exercised toward
suffering living beings, and constitutes the basis
for the obtainment of the rest of the equipment.
Therefore, one should accept the illusion of existing
living beings for the sake of the object to be
attained.... Therefore, there is first compassion
with beings for its object, secondly, with dharmas
for its object, and lastly with no object at all.(12)

Thus, although through wisdom the nonobjectivity
of beings is described from the point of view of the
ultimate goal (paramaarthata.h), in terms of covering
truth (sa^mv.rtyaa), they are not contradicted. This
has been explained in the following stanza: "Because
wisdom shares in reality, and compassion in covering,
after considering things as they are, it occurred to
you: `There are no beings in this world. But, when
you became full of compassion, the mother of the ten
forces, then your love for the suffering world was
like that of a father to his son."(13) In the
Catu.hstava too, it is said: "Nowhere, Protector, do
you hold the conception of a being, yet you are above
all compassionate to suffering living beings"(l4)
(Pa~njikaa ad IX.76 c-d).

Apparently, `Saantideva and Praj~naakaramati have
resorted to dogmatics at this point. They seem to be
trying to save the Buddhist path at all cost, in
spite of the fact that their philosophy seems to
contradict the path and all its implications.
Surprisingly, the objector is relentless and attacks
the very notion of the path: "'If there are no
beings, then whose is the task to be performed?'
`Effort too is truly the result of illusion. But, an
illusion which leads to the goal, and the purpose of
which is to allay the suffering of living beings,
should not be rejected' " (IX.77). The objector
replies in the Pa~njikaa: "'But, then why not accept
the idea of a self?' " (ad IX.77). `Saantideva
explains: "From the illusion of a self... egotism,
which is the cause of all suffering, increases. If
egotism cannot be destroyed from this view of a self,
then it is better to cultivate the idea of nonself"
(IX.78). This passage, a veritable justification of
error, will not be as puzzling as it seems if we turn
back to `Saantideva's justification of emptiness
(`suunyataa) in IX.47-53.

What is the value of emptiness? The author of the
`Sik.saasamuccaya explains that emptiness is superior
to other-views (like that of mere nonself:
anaatmataa) in that it destroys all attachment, all
grasping, including that which is the obstacle of
conception (j~neyaavara.na), whereas other doctrines
can only destroy passionate attachment
(kli.s.t.at.r.snaa) (IX.47).
-----------------------------
12. `Sik.s. 212, according to the Ak.sayamatisuutra.
13. Ratnadaasa, Gu.naparyantastotra, stanza 33.
14. Naagaarjuna, Catu.hstava,I.9.

p. 367

Thus, the purport of emptiness is the function of
emptiness, not its essence; for it has no essence.(15)
Similarly, the purport of compassion is the function
of compassion. Emptiness and compassion exist both
for the sake of enlightenment. But, what is this
enlightenment (bodhi)? It is nothing less than the
very practice of perfection (paaramitaa) ,
particularly that of altruism. "For giving," says the
Ratnamegha, "is the enlightenment of the
bodhisattva."(16)

With the culmination of the bodhisattva's path,
he does not abandon other living beings, by the power
of his vow he remains in sa^msaara. In the words of
the first Bhaavanaakrama:

... although he is in possession of the knowledge
that all dharmas have no own-existence, concern for
all beings has not ceased, insofar as "[bodhisattvas]
abide with the defects of sa^msaara, unsoiled by
sa^msaara. But, how can there be this effortless
serenity? The cause is explained as follows: "He
perceives through the nonrepresentation of a supreme
selfless knowledge." Because that knowledge of the
nondualists which is characterized by nonduality, and
which is considered by them to be the supreme, from
the point of view of the ultimate goal, even that
knowledge, the yogin perceives as selfless, lacking
ownexistence, by means of the knowledge of the
nonrepresentation of a nonduality. Therefore, since
there is nothing else to be seen, it is effortless;
since there is no imagination left, it is
serenity.(17)

Thus, there is a saintly illusion that the true
bodhisattva must overcome as much as he must conquer
worldly illusion. The illusion of the ultimate goal
deceives through the magic trickery of virtue and
knowledge (pu.nyaj~naanaa- sambhaaramaayaa) ; its
antidote is the conjunction of wisdom and means
(praj~nopaaya-yuganaddha), and this union is effected
through true detachment; even in the vision of the
ultimate goal, bodhisattvas do not find a foothold,
for they do not reject the truth of covering
(sa^mv.rti).

Not cutting away convention, preceded by great
compassion, free of perverted views, they dedicate
themselves to the fulfillment of the welfare of
living beings. If it would happen that they abide in
this supramundane wisdom [only], then there would be
no dedication to the means [to save others]. But,
because the bodhisattva is free from perverted views
when he dedicates
---------------------------
15. In this connection one should consider the
celebrated passage in the MK., often quoted in
favor of the Pure Land doctrine: "To this we
reply that you do not understand the purpose of
emptiness, nor emptiness itself, nor the meaning
of emptiness, thus you defeat yourselves."
(XXIV.7) See Tsutsumu Yamaguchi, Daijoo to shite
no joda, Tokyo, 1966, pp. 37-39 (first pointed
out to me by my friend, Masamichi Ichigo), where
a rather loose, but classical, and, ultimately,
correct interpretation of this stanza is given.
Yamaguchi's rendering of `suunyataaprayojana as
the "practice of emptiness" may be rather
farfetched philologically, but philosophically
"the purport of emptiness" must be its practice.
Yamaguchi offers a beautiful exposition of the
philosophic problem in chap. 2 of his Kuu no
sekai (Tokyo, 1970). See also, Yamaguchi's "The
Concept of Pure Land in Nagaarjuna's Doctrine,"
The Eastern Buddhist 1 (1966): 34-47.
16. `Sik.s. 34.
17. Guiseppe Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts 2 vols.
(Rome: ISMEO, 1956), Part II, pp. 217-218.

p. 368

[himself] to the practice of [these] means,... there
appears the correct wisdom settled in the reality of
the ultimate goal [which is present] in [all] things,
which turns the practice away from supramundane
knowledge.(18)

In these passages a characteristically Mahaayaana
turn of thought can be perceived, which does not
appear as explicitly in `Saantideva. It is the return
to the practice of the path, away from the merely
speculative interpretation. The bodhisattva ideal
points to an awakening to the insufficiencies of the
nihilistic concepts of the Abhidharma.(19) Bound by
the mythology and the logic of the idea of nonself,
the Mahaayaana made use of this very concept,
interpreted it as total emptiness in an attempt to
recover reality. However, in attempting to return to
what they considered the Master's teaching, very
seldom were they able to overcome the shortcomings of
the metaphysical interpretations of the nairaatmya
formula; though it was often understood
psychologically or, as in the case of Naagaarjuna, as
merely a step in a dialectical process. Thus, the
Maadhyamika seeks to restore the psychological
concept of radical detachment to the center of the
Buddhist path by interpreting the negation of self as
the basis for the radical negation of anything
graspable, of any hold for the mind.(20) The
"metaphysical" speculations of the Maadhyamika may be
explained as an endeavor to salvage the ascetic and
psychological foundations of Buddhist mysticism in
its pristine emphasis on selflessness by going beyond
the rigid explications of the Abhidharma.

Thus, Buddhist doctrine is not metaphysical
doctrine for the Maadhyamika philosopher.(21) What is
it then? The immediate purpose of his dialectics is
to refute all metaphysical systems, but this is only
in order to bring about
-------------------------------
18. Ibid., p. 221. The Tibetan text lacks most of
this passage.
19. This tendency finds its culmination in the school
of Saaramati, and suutras such as the
Mahaaparinirvaa.na of the Mahaayaana, where
emptiness and nonself are given up altogether as
ultimate truths.
20. Cf. Bcaa. IX.28-35 and Pa~njikaa thereto, also
MK. XIII.7-8, XVI.9, and XXV.24.
21. Cf. Pa~njikaa to Bcaa. IX.73 (de la Vallee
Poussin's ed.), p. 476: "Nothing arises, nothing
ceases, either endowed with a self or not having
a self." Also MK. XVIII.6: "The self has been
made known by the buddhas, nonself has also been
taught by them, that there is neither a self nor
a nonself has also been taught by them." While
commenting on this and the following stanza, the
Prasannapadaa underlines the neutrality of the
Middle Way. The commentary to the previous
stanzas, however, seems to agree with the
position held by de la Vallee Poussin (JA,
Sept.-Oct. 1902, no. 20, pp. 241 ff.). The French
indologist would identify the rejection of the
antinomies in Naagaarjuna with his acceptance of
the nonexistence of the self. This would be
nothing more than a reduction of Maadhyamika
dialectics to the nairaatmya theory.
Naagaarjuna's position, however, is that from the
fact that no self can be apprehended, follows the
nonexistence of the groups of grasping, and from
this follows the nonvalidity of the concepts of
existence and nonexistence. The intent of the
doctrine of total emptiness is clearly seen in
such passages as Rat. I.29-30, 35, 38-39, 76,
II.3-5, A.s.tasaahasrikaa, pp.277-282, 313-321,
359-361, 441-443. This is very different from the
Hinayaama interpretation of the middle way (cf.
Ako`s. IX, pp. 469 ff., in Pradhan's ed.).

p. 369

a radical transformation of thought.(22) Its ontology
has been correctly described as an abolitive
ontology: its conception of reality only serves the
function of abolishing the grasping at conceptions,
the settling down (abhinive`sa) in imaginings and
ideologies. After all, in the opinion of `Saantideva
the mystic, thought alone is the source of all evil
and thought alone should be controlled and corrected
(V.6-14). This is the sole aim of the morality of
continence. In this very connection, `Saantideva the
philosopher has this to say:

Once you have adopted the notion of emptiness, the
notion of existence disappears, yet later, through
exercise in the notion of "nothing exists," the
notion of emptiness also disappears. Once you do not
conceive of any entities which could be assumed not
to exist, how could nonexistence stand before the
mind, which then will have no support' And when
neither existence nor nonexistence stand before the
mind, then the mind is at rest, without an object,
because it has nowhere else to go (IX.33-35).(23)

The Pa~njikaa explains the meaning of these famous
stanzas (`Saantideva is supposed to have levitated
beyond the sight of his audience as he recited
them)(24) as the rejection of any possibility of
clinging to emptiness, clinging to the idea that
ultimate truth has an essence (paramaarthasvabhaava),
or clinging to it as if it had an essence. Nirvaa.na
is the stopping of this clinging. As expressed in the
Ratnaavalii: "Nirvaa.na is the destruction of all
tampering with being and nonbeing."(25)

Consequently, this being the bodhisattva's aim,
he should put an end not only to self and the five
groups of grasping, but also to emptiness and to
selflessness as absolute values.(26) Thus,
Maadhyamika "ethics" could be said to rest on the
principle of the ultimate analysis of emptiness,
especially on the analysis of the emptiness of moral
values. In this way it claims to have superseded
absolutism and its individual psychological
manifestations: self-righteousness, self-complacence,
and the rest. This is aptly expressed in the the
words of the Abhisamayaala^nkaara: "by means of
wisdom there is no station in becoming, by means of
mercy there is no standing in quietism."(27)

Therefore, the one aim of the application of
compassion is the reflexive effect of compassion: the
training of the mind in the notion of selflessness.
When `Saantideva projects himself into the self of a
beggar (VIII.141 ff) he
------------------------
22 In its moral intent, the meditation on the void
is not wholly different from the charnel-ground
meditations, which pursue aims similar to those
of the Christian meditatio mortis. The
meditations on the void, however, pretend to
uproot not only passion, but also all
intellectual clinging. See passages referred to
in note 20 herein.
23. Cf. `Sik.s. 257 and references in note 21 herein.
24. Bu-ston, History of Buddhism, p. 163 of E.
Obermiller's translation (Heidelberg, 1931).
25. Rat.I.42.
26. The roots of this radical interpretation of
nonself, or, rather, of this attitude of extreme
selflessness, can be traced to the Suttanipaata,
see Suttanipaata IV.11 (862-877), IV.12 (878-894),
and IV.14 (917).
27. Abhisamayaala^nkaara I, stanza 10a: "praj~nayaa
na bhave sthaana^m k.rpayaa na `same sthiti.h."

p. 370

is not concerned about the beggar's selflessness. If
he were concerned with this, then he would be making
selflessness into an absolute principle of unlimited
application, and clinging would thence arise. As a
result of this, egotism would eventually follow,
perhaps not as the philosophical concept of a self
(aatman), but certainly as the psychological habit of
grasping and self-centeredness (mamakaara and
aha^mkaara).(28)

The Maadhyamika Buddhist contends that the
paradox implicit in his position will be a paradox
only as long as we insist on clinging to the rather
pedestrian view that good can only respond to
rational volition. Once we understand, he would
claim, that true good is the result of the cessation
of all volition, the paradox disappears.(29)

The destruction of the notions of subject and
agent, which necessarily accompany volition, must be
achieved if we seek true goodness, actual goodness.
This idea is aptly expressed in the Vajracchedikaa:"
...that which is the Tathaagata's perfection of
patience, that really is no perfection. And why?
Because, Subhuuti, when the king of Kali^nga cut my
flesh from every limb, at that time I had no
perception of self, no perception of a being, no
perception of a soul, no perception of a person, nor
had I any perception or no-perception. And why? If,
Subhuuti, at that time I had had a perception of a
self, I would have had a perception of ill-will at
that time...."(30)
----------------------------
28. In this connection it is worth mentioning an
anecdote from the life of the Sixth Patriarch of
Zen: The famed monk Shen-hui asked Master
Hui-neng whether he had any perceptions of a self
(literally: mind or heart, hsin). The Master
replied that he would perceive a self when
dealing with his own shortcomings, but he had no
notion of a self when dealing with others
(section 44, pp. 118-119 of W. T. Chan, trans.,
The Platform Scripture of the Sixth Patriarch
(N.Y.: St. John's Univ. Press, 1963) ) .
Conceptually, this story is the exact converse of
`Saantideva's exposition of paraatmaparivartana,
but in practice they amount to the same thing. In
both cases the Buddhist adept seeks to destroy
his egotistical thought habits and establish a
direct relationship with reality as it occurs. He
does not seek to establish an absolute law of
metaphysics that may be applied to any
circumstance. But in order to obtain this open
insight into the ever-changing world and this
serenity of selflessness, he makes use of the
very conceits which bind him.
29. Too Often Buddhist ethics is considered simply a
doctrine of teleology: the aim is nirvaa.na, the
means, `siila, samaadhi and praj~naa. Although
this might be true of the Hiinayaanistic view of
the path, the bodhisattva doctrine, in displacing
the goal of extinction away into eternity and
reinterpreting the notion of nonself in
altruistic terms, transformed Buddhist ethics
(cf. Bcaa. III.10 and Pa~njikaa thereon). The
distinction between deontology and teleology is
based on the notions of self and purpose. The
ethics of salvation, as expressed in Buddhist
doctrine, tend to destroy both notions: self and
purpose. Without self-existence there can be no
law of obligation, without purpose, no set goal
for human actions. The Buddhist position could be
compared to that of the dilige, et quod vis fac
of St. Augustine. In Kant's Metaphysik der Sitten
(Part II, Introduction, sections iii-v) , he
proposes that the highest values of human conduct
are, in fact, at the same time deontological and
teleological. These ends, which are also duties,
are one's own perfection and the happiness of
others (p. 385, first ed.). No comparison is here
intended with the totality of the systems of Kant
or St. Augustine.
30. Vajracchedikaa Praj~naapaaramitaa, ed. and
trans. Edward Conze (Rome: ISMEO, 1957),

p. 371

Of course there is no room here for ethical
indifference, the Buddhist is not merely practicing
mental gymnastics for its own sake. His main
contention, as has been stated, is that no true
goodness exists as long as there is the idea of a
self, and as long as there is the idea of goodness.
Merit and demerit belong to the sphere of personal
transactions, but here there is no perfection as long
as egotism of one kind or another is the primary
motive: goodness appears only where there is no
notion of a person or of a transaction.

Much of early Buddhist philosophy could be
thought of as a vain attempt at reinterpreting the
doctrine of detachment in terms of metaphysical
formulas. To this purpose, the concept of nonself--no
doubt very old, but lacking a metaphysical denotation
in its earliest history--was to fit perfectly. The
fundamental question should have been whether any
discursive structure could adequately express a
doctrine of complete detachment, which often
underlined the importance of transcending all forms
of speech, of breaking the bonds of
conceptualization. But there can be no doubt about
the fact that most Buddhists understood the nonself
doctrine literally and considered detachment rather
as the corollary of nonself, not conversely.(31)

The doctrine of emptiness adds a new dimension to
the metaphysical understanding of selflessness:
absence of self, with regard to the subject, destroys
the very root of attachment: the blindness of egotism
(aha^mkaara) ; with regard to others, emptiness
extirpates the root of love and hatred, of
self-righteousness and conceit: the idea of an object
that could be possessed (mamakaara). Yet, as soon as
compassion is placed on an equal footing with
emptiness, this latter concept cannot be understood
as a subtle form of metaphysical nihilism. The basis
of compassion is the realization of the absurdity of
suffering, insofar as it is groundless, but
compassion cannot be based on nothingness pure and
simple. Moreover, there can be no question of
nothingness here, as nothingness is never the object
of thought. The nothingness we fear, the Buddhist
would argue, is the nothingness that can be conceived
in terms of a framework or objective support external
to it. Why is this called nothingness? Because the
frame of reference is one that is previous to our own
thinking, we are not conscious of its
all-encompassing presence, for it is our own self.
This is the nothingness which begets fear, apathy,
and indifference, because the ever-present willing
subject despairs when it finds no reference point
outside itself.(32) The Mahaayaanists, however,
consider equally disastrous the consequences of the
conversea; seeing emptiness of self but not of the
object. For then nonself is merely an idea that fails
to reach to the very
-------------------------
sec. 14 e, p. 77 of the translation, from which this
is quoted. See also sec. 20 a-b, p. 86, and
A.s.tada`sasaahasrikaa, ed. Edward Conze (Rome:
ISMEO, 1962), chapter 67, p. 175.
31. One cannot help suspecting that the Maadhyamika
dialectitian, for one, is often confused by his
own terminological heritage; that the rhetoric he
has inherited beclouds his very understanding of
the mystical path.
32. Cf, Rat. I.29-60, especially 39-42.

p. 372

source of attachment: the construction of ideas
(judgments) about things. The dharmas become the new
frame of reference for the false idea of nothingness.
True emptiness is emptiness without a reference point
in the self or outside of it. True emptiness cannot
be conceived nor apprehended, what is to be total
nongrasping could not possibly be grasped. In fact,
in order to be attained it must be empty of emptiness
itself.(33)

With this conception of "nothingness, " the
Mahaayaanist believes, the suppression of all notions
of persons or self will not entail the abolition of
interpersonal values. For what is false here is not
the phenomena of interpersonal relations but the
notion of permanent, graspable entities; and only the
first is a necessary condition for ethical values.
Metaphysically speaking, the problem may be expressed
thusly: when an elephant is produced by a magician,
no one can deny that there is an elephant, but
everybody knows that this elephant was not born, nor
will he die, that there is no permanent substance
that could be called elephant. Ethically speaking,
the implications are discussed by `Saantideva: "There
is no sin in killing a phantom, because there is
nonexistence of thought in the case of mere phantoms.
But, in the case of a phantom endowed with the
illusion of thought as we are, sin and virtue obtain"
(IX.11).(34) The difference between the simile of the
phantom and reality lies in the fact that when we
look at a phantom we think "this is only illusion,
only I am real"; but, in looking at the world around
us we must say: "I am an illusion and this is also an
illusion."

Thus, in conclusion, of the various
possibilities, the Maadhyamika philosopher considers
that the following three would evidently invalidate
ethical values: (1) If the ego is real (or
self-existent), but the external world is not teal
(its existence depends on the ego). This is the case
of the man killing the phantom--idealism, (2) If the
external world is real (self-existent), but the ego
is not real (its existence depends on nonpersonal
substances). This is the position of Abhidharmic
realism. (3) If both the ego and the external world
are self-existent. This is the position of the naive
realists.

On the other hand, he would contend that ethical
values are not in conflict with an ontology such as
is expounded, of course, by the Maadhyamikas:
everything lacks self-existence, including the ego,
including the external dharmas. The very concept of
real and unreal--which presuppose self-existence
--cannot be applied to any phenomenon in an ultimate
sense. This last possibility is not merely a
sufficient condition for ethics, it also implies
ethical
-----------------------
33. At least insofar as we may be allowed to propose
a means to represent the unexpressible, perhaps
the Maadhyamika philosopher will permit us to say
that this emptiness should belong to the realm of
mystical psychology, not to metaphysics.
34. Compare Rat. II.9-15. The opposite seems to be
expressed in A.s.tasaahasrikaa, P. 441, as it
compares the bodhisattva to a man created by
magic to whom it does not occur `the magician is
near to me, but the audience is far from me'. For
a mere illusion cannot have thought to make these
distinctions.

p. 373

values by necessity, since it destroys the only real
obstacle to the exercise of goodness: self-conceit.

We must therefore distinguish two dialectic
movements in the Maadhyamika theory of value: the
first movement is ontological when self-existence
(svabhaava) is denied, psychological when absolute
goodness is rejected. The second movement is
ontological when the validity of causation is
affirmed against the contentions of the nihilists, it
is psychological when the necessity for perfection is
emphasized. One must be very careful not to consider
these two movements as two different levels of truth.
The sphere of convention or covering (sa.mv.rti) is
the realm of conceptualization, the transactional
field (vyavahaara); to it belong both dialectic
movements of the Maadhyamika. The ultimate goal
(paramaartha) is simply the abolition of this sphere
at any dialectic level. Existence itself, does not
fit any of these conceptual slots that have been
called "movements" here.

The idea of value belongs to the sphere of
concepts, which, the Maadhyamika would add, is not
the same as saying that it is relative, as if there
were something that is absolute. In this way, as a
mere concept, the concept of good is bordering with
that of evil and with evil actions themselves, which,
after all, are the final outcome of grasping at
concepts. But good, as an existential attitude or as
existence itself, belongs to what earlier has been
called "existence," that is, what is beyond the
grasping of conceit and concept. This is
metaphysically, emptiness; ontologically, conditioned
production (pratiityasamutpaada); and, ethically, the
perfection of the threefold purity
(triko.tipari`suddhi).

The relevance of "existence" to the Maadhyamika
Buddhist has often been overlooked because of an
exaggerated emphasis on the supposed nihilism of this
school. To the Maadhyamika existence is the crucial
issue. The fact of relations and responsibilities is
accepted without debate.(35) The discovery of
existence, as it occurs (yathaabhuuta), and the
abandonment of tampering with being and nonbeing is
achieved through the path. The paradox is not only
that in this way sa.msaara and nirvaa.na are made to
be the same, but also that the greatest obstacle to
our own good, our own self is overcome. The
selflessness thus attained appears as the only basis
for ethical action: "If the self is dear to you, do
not love yourself. If you want to protect yourself,
you should not protect yourself."(36)
-----------------------
35. Cf.Pa~njikaa to Bcaa. IX.2: "ida^m
pratyayataamaatram eva avicaaramanoharam astu."
36. Though the very similar lines often found in the
Gospels (Matt. 10:39, 16:25, Mark 8:35, Luke
8:24, 17.33, John 12:24-25) must be understood in
a theistic context and could be interpreted
dualistically (see, for example, the
Interpreter's Bible, vol. VII, p. 377), both
passages point to similae conceptions of the
religious foundations of conduct.

proofread by Shie Ming-ju