Ethics in Early Buddhism

·期刊原文

Ethics in Early Buddhism

By David J. Kalupahana

Reviewed by Koller, John M.

Philosophy East and West

Vol. 50, No. 4 (October 2000) pp. 620-623

Copyright 2000 by University of Hawaii Press

Hawaii, USA

p. 628 Ethics in Early Buddhism Philosophy East and West, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Oct. 2000)

Ethics in Early Buddhism by David J. Kalupahana is a small volume that makes a large contribution to the study of Buddhist ethics. As the title suggests, Kalupahana, an internationally recognized scholar of early Buddhism, focuses his scholarship on the discourses of the Buddha contained in the Pāli canon. But his philosophical concerns are as broad as the field of ethics itself, and his understanding of Buddhist ethics is based on a careful analysis of the full development of Buddhism, Mahāyāna as well as Theravāda texts. As in his earlier work, A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities (University of Hawai'i Press, 1992), Kalupahana argues cogently for a pragmatic, experientially grounded, understanding of Buddhist

p. 629 Ethics in Early Buddhism Philosophy East and West, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Oct. 2000)

thought, rejecting the essentialist and absolutist interpretations of experience that characterize so much philosophical thought, Asian as well as Western.

Part 1 situates early Buddhist ethics in its historical context, contrasting it with the deontological ethical theory that characterized much of the Upani.sads and that culminated in the Bhagavad Gītā on the one hand and with the utilitarian theory that grounded much ancient Indian practical thought, including the realpolitik of Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra on the other. This historical context contributes to our ability to see how the Buddha steered a middle path between moral absolutism and the moral relativism of self-interest.

In part 1 Kalupahana also tackles the problem of knowledge, for much of moral theory is shaped by epistemological concerns, with epistemological absolutism giving rise to moral absolutism and epistemological relativism giving rise to moral relativism. Here Kalupahana analyzes the Buddha's experiential method of insight and understanding, which gave rise to the central Buddhist insight into the nature of existence, namely interdependent arising (paṭicca samuppāda), a middle view that eschews essentialism and eternalism on the one hand and nihilism on the other. His conclusion is that early Buddhist ethics is a middle way rooted in the middle-way ontology of paṭicca samuppāda and grounded in an experiential way of knowledge. Part 1 concludes with illuminating explorations of what this middle way ethics has to contribute to the important ethical issues involved in the fact-value distinction, the problem of will or choice, and the relation of the individual and society.

In part 2, the heart of the book, Kalupahana proceeds to analyze the Buddhist conceptions of the moral life, its underlying principle, and its justification. As he notes, the early discourses present various accounts of the moral life. Integrating these accounts, Kalupahana examines Buddhist morality in terms of its beginnings in the cultivation of virtues (sīla), its flowering in the practice of the eightfold path, and its fulfillment in the attainment of the freedom of nibbāna.

In a careful analysis of the Brahmajāla Sutta, the seven virtue clusters that are mentioned or discussed in many places in the early discourses are identified and clearly explained. The first virtue cluster includes non-hurting (ahiṁsā), which, in its positive sense, is the virtue of friendliness and compassion. The second, non-stealing, in its positive sense, is being satisfied with what one has. The third, avoiding vulgar sensuality and evil, focuses on living the "higher" life of brahmacariya. The fourth focuses on telling the truth and being trustworthy, while the fifth extends the virtue of truth-telling to refraining from malicious speech and using speech to create harmony, and the sixth extends right speech even further, renouncing all harsh speech and taking care always to speak lovingly to help others. The seventh virtue cluster is also about speech, namely refraining from gossip and frivolous talk and, positively, to use speech that is appropriate to the occasion and that promotes morality and well-being in the community.

These seven virtues, which advance the well-being of both the individual and society, are the foundation of Buddhist morality on which the morality of the noble eightfold path builds. As Kalupahana points out, "These seven virtues are embodi-

p. 630 Ethics in Early Buddhism Philosophy East and West, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Oct. 2000)

ments of the ultimate criteria of the good, namely the welfare of oneself (attahita) and the welfare of other (parahita)" (p. 73). According to the Buddha, in Aṅguttara 2.217, the highest ideal is both to fully embody these virtues in oneself and to cause others to fully embody them as well.

The way of virtue (sīla), although the foundation of morality, is not in itself a complete moral way, for while it is a guide to good conduct, it does not proceed fully from an understanding that accepts complete responsibility for the whole of one's life. The eightfold path, on the other hand, is a moral path that begins with understanding (sammāditthi) and intentionality (samāsaṅkappa), that is, with the agent's understanding that action issues from knowledge and inclination, with the agent taking full responsibility for his or her knowledge, dispositions, and actions. Thus, when the seven virtues are incorporated into the eightfold path as right speech, right action, and right livelihood, these guides to conduct become a genuinely moral way, for they are now fully internalized in the moral agent.

The final three constituents of the eightfold path are right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration. Right effort refers to the diligent effort to rid oneself of all evil and unwholesome tendencies and the effort to cultivate and maintain good and wholesome tendencies. Right mindfulness refers to the deep, ultimately non-dual, understanding of the body, feelings, mind, and experienced things -- an understanding that reveals the dynamic connections between them. Right concentration refers to focused, non-dual understanding with an equanimity that takes one beyond bias and prejudice. The epistemological focus of these three constituents of the path on direct, non-dual understanding as the basis of the moral way shows that self-knowledge and intentionality are at the heart of the Buddhist moral way.

Kalupahana's analysis of nibbāna as the fulfillment of the moral way shows how the enlightenment and freedom of nibbāna make possible the practice of perfect morality, a practice exemplified by Śākyamuni's life after experiencing nibbāna. As Kalupahana argues, "If the immoral life is one of passion, hatred, and confusion, the moral life has to start with their restraint and conclude with their complete elimination" (p. 86). The freedom of nibbāna is simply the elimination of the driving forces of ignorance, grasping, and hatred. With their elimination a person awakens to the vision of the total dynamic interrelatedness of everyone and everything, an awakening that unlocks the energy of enlightened and compassionate action symbolized by the Buddha and embodied in the Theravāda arhant ideal and the Mahāyāna bodhisattva ideal. This is why, as Kalupahana argues, the ontological principle of paṭicca samuppāda is the fundamental moral principle.

In part 3, Kalupahana sketches the social, political, and legal applications of Buddhist morality. While suggestive, these five short chapters only hint at the profound social and political dimensions of the central Buddhist principle of interdependent arising.

I recommend this book to all students of Buddhism and ethics. Its succinct and lucid prose is based on careful scholarship that is informed by sophisticated philosophical analysis.