Ethics in the Confucian Tradition

·期刊原文

Ethics in the Confucian Tradition:
The Thought of Mencius and Wang Yang-ming

By Philip J. Ivanhoe

Review by Henry G. Skaja

Philosophy East & West

V. 44 No. 3 (July 1994) pp. 559-575

Copyright 1994 by University of Hawaii Press

p.559

Studies in English of Confucian and Neo-Confucian philosophy have become increasingly sophisticated in recent years, and Philip J. Ivanhoe's recent comparative study of Mencius (ca. 390-ca. 305 B.c.) and Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) is certainly no exception to this trend. In an effort to capture the diversity as well as the historical development of the Chinese intellectual tradition, Ivanhoe argues that although Wang explicitly acknowledged his affinity to Mencius (and thus to Confucius), Wang could not help but be strongly influenced by Buddhism, which entered China from India at the beginning of the Christian era. Ivanhoe's argument is undoubtedly correct--and, in this regard, he provides a remarkably concise yet detailed account of the similarities and differences between the ethical teachings of Mencius and Wang on such issues as the nature of morality (chapter 1), human nature (chapter 2), the origin of evil (chapter 3), self-cultivation (chapter 4), and the achievement of sagehood (chapter 5). Furthermore, Ivanhoe provides three detailed appendixes which will be of value to translators and commentators who might wish to pursue this comparative research in greater detail. As indicated by Ivanhoe, the first appendix

is a study of the historical evolution of the most important collection of Wang's teachings, the Ch'uan-hsi lu.... The second appendix is an analysis of the meaning of the term ch'uan-hsi in the title Ch'uan-hsi lu.... The third appendix is a finding list for citations from the Ch'uan-hsi lu. It correlates the section numbers in Professor Wing-tsit Chan's translation [Instructions for Practical Living] to the corresponding text in the Wang Wen-ch'eng-kung ch'uan-shu edition of the Ch'uan-hsi lu. (pp. 3-4)

The considerations above do not imply, however, that Ivanhoe's comparative account of the ethical teachings of Mencius and Wang is completely unproblematic. It is not. Ivanhoe seems to assume uncritically, if not exclusively, the rationalistic or theologically oriented translations provided by Wing-tsit Chan. Thus, in spite of the correctness of Ivanhoe's basic argument in regard to the strong influence of Buddhism on Wang, one cannot but get the impression that Ivanhoe is simply providing us with a rationalistic or theological (read: mystical) interpretation of both Mencius and Wang. For example, Ivanhoe seems to assume uncritically with Chan that "t'ien" means "Heaven" (in the biblical sense of transcendent creator), so that "t'ien-ming" means "Heavenly ordinance" and "moral imperative," "jen" means "benevolence," "yi" means

p.560

"righteousness,.. "chih" means "knowing," and that "liang-chih" means "pure knowing' of alleged eternal "forms," "principles," or "patterns" (li) allegedly "endowed by Heaven" (t'ien-li) to the "nature" (hsing), "mind" or "heart/mind" (hsin) of man. Accordingly, Ivanhoe speaks of there being "an infallible, internal standard--guiding us in the moral life" (p. 7), which, in respect to Wang, is presumably the alleged object of the alleged "faculty" of "pure knowing"

One must not seek for moral guidance outside of one's own actual experiences. Pure knowing teaches the lessons one needs to learn, each and every moment of one's life. (p. 90)

The result of employing such translations is that Ivanhoe's comparative account of Mencius and Wang reads as though it is tailor-made for discussion in a theological seminar, so that we might legitimately ask just how far removed is Ivanhoe's comparative account from the genuine ethical teachings of Mencius and Wang, relative to the existential or actual historical contexts in which they respectively taught.

The answer is not far to seek. In light of the naturalistic, fallibilistic, and linguistic or socially oriented philosophy of the original American pragmatists, Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey, we find that the empirical adequacy of interpretations based on such translations as given above is certainly subject to doubt--and, indeed, the empirical adequacy of such interpretations and translations has been strongly challenged by David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames in their recent book, Thinking Through Confucius (New York: SUNY Press, 1987). Specifically, Ivanhoe does not seem to acknowledge the fact that our experience provides no evidence either of our having the alleged "faculty" of rational intuition or "pure knowing" or of its alleged object, that "t'ien' can mean "Nature" as the continuous or integral process of life/growth in general (corresponding to the Chinese "sheng," "birth/life/growth''), so that "t'ien' or "t'ien-ming," "wen" or "t'ien-wen," and "li" or "t'ien-li" can mean exclusively the various natural tendencies, habits, or "patterns" of interactivity and discursive reasoning or thinking (communication) that originate, grow, and diversify during the course of this ongoing, integral process--patterns which thus presuppose and are subject to what Peirce calls "pure spontaneity or life" (corresponding to the Chinese "tzu-jan" or "self-so" activity), that is, uncaused or "absolute chance" variation and diversification, and which, therefore, involve what Hall and Ames interpret as "the creation of novel patterns."

In light of these empirical considerations, it can be shown, by employing the rationalistic or theologically oriented translations provided by Wing-tsit Chan, that Ivanhoe presupposes the standard Aristotelian interpretation of Mencius, and a Platonic or Neo-Platonic interpretation of Wang (the Buddhist influence on Wang notwithstanding). Indeed, in

p.561

chapters one and two, Ivanhoe has Mencius argue in the traditional Aristotelian (read: medieval) manner for a developmental account of morality in which "human nature has [potentially] a specific structure" or "hierarchy" of "well-defined" yet nascent "parts" and "values" allegedly "endowed by Heaven" as its "content," so that the alleged "function" of the "Heavenly-endowed mind" or "heart/mind" (hsin) is that it should come to "know" this alleged structure, hierarchy, or "form" and to "manifest" (actualize) it in practice:

According to Mencius, human nature has a specific content: human beings are born with a well-defined set of physical, mental and emotional capacities. These different parts are arranged in a very special structure and the shape of this structure emerges as an individual matures. Human nature has a proper course of development; it grows to maturity slowly and only if raised in an appropriate environment and given proper care. This is why Mencius used so many agricultural metaphors in his discussions of human nature. If human nature develops as it should, the mind will take its rightful place as governor of the self. it will function in its natural capacity and guide one through a life of moral self cultivation. Only in this way can human nature achieve its full form. (p. 47)

On the other hand, Ivanhoe has Wang argue in Platonic fashion that "the moral aspects of human nature were fully formed at birth; [that] they were an endowment of mature moral dispositions" or "virtues," which are purportedly "known" by the "Heavenly-endowed mind" or "heart/mind" if only "the obscuration of selfish desires" is eliminated (p. 38):

Wang believed human beings were endowed with a perfect and complete moral nature at birth. This moral nature was identical with principle [li or t'ien-li]. One became aware of principle through its conscious aspect: liang chih (pure knowing) which is the mind in itself in its active, knowing aspect. (p. 46)

In Wang Yang-ming's time, the Buddhist notion of an original, pure and fully formed inner nature--an inner nature which was obscured by an outer, defiled physical nature--had become the dominant view among Confucian thinkers. Wang accepted this view of human nature. For him, the original, pure and fully formed nature was Heavenly principle, and this principle defined the Confucian Way. (p. 47)

The dubious reference to Buddhism notwithstanding (consider the Buddhist notion of `suunyataa or the emptiness of things), we might wonder whether Ivanhoe is offering us a comparative account of Aristotle and Plate on the alleged eternal essences or forms (of things or else as things in themselves, the eide) as the alleged object of rational intuition or "knowing" (noesis, episteme) and "true speaking" (piston logos) by an alleged eternal, omniscient mind (Nous)--rather than a comparative account of the ethical teachings of Mencius and Wang in respect to the

p.562

social nature of morality (varying habits or patterns of human interaction or transaction) and human nature (or life) as emphasized in the Confucian tradition (note Hsun-tzu as an exception). In regard to this social nature, consider the following remarks by Mencius (translations by Henry Skaja):

Insofar as what is genuine (ching) in respect to people is concerned, people have the natural ability to act in a way that is desirable (k'e-yi wei shan). This is what I mean by "desirable" (shan). That a person should act in a way that is undesirable (wei pu-shan) is hardly the fault of his/our natural ability (ts'ai). (Mencius 6A/6)

... There are gifts of Nature (t'ien as the integral process of life/growth in general), and there are gifts bestowed by people. Our natural ability to express affection and appropriate conduct towards one another (jen and yi), to interact (chung) in a manner of mutual trust (hsin), and to unfailingly enjoy (le) what is mutually desirable (shan)-these are gifts of Nature. (6A/16)

... Everyone shares the desire to be esteemed (tended/attended to by Others). But in fact, everyone already has in person that which is genuinely esteemed (kuei = valuable, desirable). It is just that we never really think about it ... that is, our natural ability to express jen and yi (6A/17, 16)

That which people do not have to learn, yet are able to do, is what they are naturally able to do (liang-neng). That which people do not have to reflect upon, yet realize in practice, is what they naturally realize in practice (liang-chih). Now, there are no young children who do not realize loving their parents, and none of them as they grow do not realize respecting their elder brothers. Loving one's parents is jen. Respecting one's elders is treating them appropriately (yi) There is nothing left (for a ruler) to do but to extend this throughout the world (i.e., to others). (7A/15)

That Ivanhoe should have Wang argue that "the moral aspects of human nature were fully formed at birth," that infants and children are "endowed by Heaven" with a fully mature moral or social nature, is simply incredible, if not bizarre--unless we assume that Ivanhoe presupposes some version of Plate's account (logos) of eternal forms, including the alleged eternal form of the good in itself, as the alleged object of rational intuition or "pure knowing" (noesis, episteme) and "true speaking" (piston logos) by an alleged eternal, omniscient, and omnipotent mind (Nous). Does Ivanhoe in fact assume this presupposition for purposes of interpreting and translating the ethical or socially oriented teachings of Mencius and Wang? The reader can decide for him/herself by considering the subsequent chapters, summarized here by the following remarks of Ivanhoe:

The power accorded liang chih [pure knowing] was free from the pressure of tradition. The moral mind simply responded to each and every situation, like a mirror reflecting things placed before it. Tradition had no place on the mirror of the mind; it could only be an impediment to the mind's spontaneous function.

p.563

Wang believed the li (principles) of Confucian thought were the ideal universal language. He believed in the same language as Mencius; this is what makes it so difficult to distinguish Wang's fully discovered sage from Mencius' fully developed sage. But Wang believed this language was innate, there was no need to learn it. The mind itself was this language; it only awaited a concrete situation to describe. An individual could awaken to this mind in an instant of insight. He would then speak this language fluently, without hesitation or doubt. (p. 114)

In chapter 3, Ivanhoe focuses on the origin of evil, which is an issue that has always been a source of heated controversy among theologians. Here, I would argue, Ivanhoe has Mencius hold the belief that the failure to "fully develop," "know," and "manifest" in practice and speech the alleged eternal essences or forms of things is purportedly the cause of evil. On the other hand, I would argue, Ivanhoe has Wang hold the belief that the failure to eliminate "selfish desires" results in the failure to "purely know" and "manifest" in practice and speech the alleged eternal forms in themselves--which, again, is purportedly the cause of evil.

Chapter 4 focuses on self-cultivation, Here, I would argue, Ivanhoe has Mencius hold the belief that self-cultivation consists in the development of the allegedly nascent yet eternal forms which allegedly constitute and "define human nature," so that they can become "fully known" and "manifested" in practice and speech. On the other hand, I would argue, Ivanhoe has Wang hold the belief that self-cultivation consists in the elimination of selfish desires, in order that the alleged eternal forms in themselves can be "purely known" and "manifested" in practice and speech.

Chapter 5 focuses on the issue of sagehood. Here it seems Ivanhoe has Mencius argue that to "fully develop," "know," and "manifest" in practice and speech the alleged eternal essences or forms which allegedly constitute and "define human nature" is thereby to achieve sagehood. On the other hand, it seems Ivanhoe has Wang argue that to fully eliminate selfish desires--that is, allegedly, to "purely know" and "manifest" in practice and speech the alleged eternal forms in themselves--is thereby to achieve sagehood. Accordingly, in light of the considerations above, it comes as no surprise to find that Ivanhoe concludes his comparative account of Mencius and Wang with the following remarks:

The differences between Mencius and Wang have at times led me to question the bond Wang felt united them. But the relationships among the various issues 1 have examined--the ways these issues fit together for each thinker--cast up two pictures that, when compared, leaves me without doubt as to Wang's heritage and his allegiance. The similarity between their two visions of how one should live one's life dispels my doubts and leaves me wondering how two thinkers so dissimilar can be so much alike. (p. 114)

p.564

Although Ivanhoe may not be in doubt in regard to the similarities and dissimilarities between the ethical teachings of Mencius and Wang, this does not imply that the similarities and dissimilarities have been adequately pointed out. Ivanhoe's comparative account of Mencius and Wang raises more doubts that it dispels and, thus, raises more questions than it answers. For this reason, among others indicated above, Ivanhoe's comparative account of Mencius and Wang will prove to be a valuable resource for those who seek to understand the historical development, as well as the contemporary relevance, of the Confucian philosophical tradition--in contrast to that of the West. It is only by means of such comparative understanding that we can come genuinely to engage contemporary mainland Chinese intellectuals in a mutually progressive dialogue.

Response to Henry C. Skaja
Philip J. Ivanhoe
I must take issue with Henry Skaja's review of my Ethics in the Confucian Tradition: The Thought of Mencius and Wang Yang-ming. It contains numerous claims which seem at best misleading and at worst false. It also relies upon several mistaken translations. Moreover, Skaja provides no real evidence for the criticisms he makes nor any developed arguments for his views. He does appeal to American pragmatists and to David Hall and Roger Ames' Thinking Through Confucius, but I will argue that these appeals are irrelevant and inconsequential.

It is often difficult to grasp the nature of the criticisms Skaja makes. On the most basic level, he employs philosophical terms in a vague and idiosyncratic manner. For example, at one point he says, "... Ivanhoe presupposes the standard Aristotelian interpretation of Mencius and a Platonic or Neo-Platonic interpretation of Wang.... Ivanhoe has Mencius argue in the traditional Aristotelian (read: medieval) manner...." It is not clear what Skaja means by "the standard Aristotelian interpretation." What is the nature of this interpretation; in what sense is it standard and to whom? And what is one to make of Skaja's equation of "Aristotelian" with "medieval"? Moreover, am I being accused of giving a Platonic or Neo-Platonic interpretation of Wang? I never use either term (nor others that Skaja employs to describe my position such as "eternal essences" or "forms"). "Platonic" and "Neo-Platonic'' philosophies are very different: the philosophical systems of Plate and Plotinus are quite distinct from one another, as are the philosophies of Augustine, Frege, and a host of others who have been called "Platonic."

Skaja claims that I provide "a rationalistic or theological (read: mystical) interpretation of both Mencius and Wang." First, it is not at all clear what he means by "rationalistic." If we read this with a small "r" in

p.565

the sense of a web of beliefs and conventions of reasoning that hang together consistently, then any system of thought by definition is rational. The assertion that "rational" is the same as " theological" is clearly false as is his further conflation of "theological" with "mystical." Many mystical thinkers have no notion of a deity (in fact those in theistic traditions usually get in trouble for having too vague a notion of God). Skaja further claims that my interpretation "of the ethical teachings of Mencius and Wang" suffers from relying on "the rationalistic or theologically oriented translations provided by Wing-tsit Chan." Again this is simply false. First, it seems gratuitous to criticize Professor Chan in such vague terms and without producing a shred of evidence or argument to support this claim. Second, I could not possibly have relied upon Professor Chan's translation of the Mencius since he has not translated the text. (He does provide a few excerpts from it for his monumental Source Book, but anyone who consults Chan's work will see that I did not make use of these.) Third, as I state clearly on page viii of my book, while greatly aided by Professor Chan's work on the Chuanxilu (as every responsible scholar of the text is), "In order to bring out, with greater clarity, the philosophical issues raised in this study I have provided my own translations of all passages from Wang's work." I also translated material that had never appeared in English.

It is hard to imagine how Skaja could have formed the mistaken belief that I view either Mencius or Wang as theists. Consider the opening paragraphs of my third chapter, "Religious traditions such as Christianity, which claim the world was created and is sustained by an omniscient, omnipotent and compassionate God have found the existence of manifold evil in the world especially bothersome.... Mencius had a remarkably different picture of the world. His world was not the creation of an omniscient, omnipotent and compassionate God." My approval of Fingarette's basic approach in Confucius--The Secular as Sacred (p. 143 n. 10) should also show that I do not interpret early Confucians in this way. It is truly incredible that Skaja should appeal to Hall and Ames on this point. For in my review of their book, I say, "Hall and Ames draw attention to one of the most important characteristics of early Chinese thought in general and Confucius in particular when they describe the immamental cosmos of the Chinese and contrast it with the transcendental cosmos characteristic of the West" (PEW 41 [1991]: 241-242). Later in the same review, I say, "They (Confucianism and Taoism) are both 'this-worldly' philosophies of organism, though with very different organization" (p. 251). l suspect that Skaja entertains the mistaken view that anyone who believes in truth is at least a Platonist (perhaps he further believes this entails being a theist--which would also be wrong). But many realists about truth are not metaphysical dualists. Mencius and Wang both are naturalistic realists about truth.

p.566

Skaja claims that I speak of "there being 'an infallible, internal standard-guiding us in the moral life,' which, in respect to Wang, is presumably the alleged object of the alleged 'faculty' of 'pure knowing."' I nowhere claim that such a standard is the object of liang chih. Liang chih being a kind of faculty is the standard. In the same way, clear vision is not the object but the standard of seeing accurately. This is one of the most fundamental aspects of Wang's thought.

In his translation of Mencius 6A/6, Skaja renders the phrase k'o yi wei shan as (an) "ability to act in a way that is desirable." It seems strange at best to render shan as "a way that is desirable." Moreover, since Mencius here is describing what he means by the term hsingshan, if shan means "a way that is desirable," then, according to Skaja, Mencius' famous doctrine is not that "human nature is good" but rather that "human nature is a way that is desirable." In the next translation, Mencius 6A/16, Skaja translates the phrase jen yi chung hsin as "Our natural ability to express affection and appropriate conduct towards one another (jen and yi) to interact (chung) in a manner of mutual trust (hsin)...." I see no precedent for his taking the word chung to mean "interact." Further, even if this were plausible, one cannot take hsin as an adverb modifying a preceding "verb." Earlier in this same paragraph, he gives us "There are the gifts of Nature (t'ien as the integral process of life/growth in general)...." Here he commits a mistake Angus Graham described well as "a confusion between translation and interpretation" (see Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts, p. 289). In fact Skaja's mistake is even more egregious as he combines English description with the romanization of the term he is "translating" (t'ien) as a gloss to his own translation, "Nature." It is interesting to note that later in this same response, Graham translates t'ien ming as "the decree of Heaven" while, like myself, disavowing a dualistic metaphysics. Earlier in his review, Skaja seems to hold that such a translation is illegitimate and commits one to dualism and theism.

Skaja does not offer any developed arguments against my interpretations, nor does he challenge the evidence I adduce in support of them. For example, he objects to my account of Mencius' theory of human nature as a "structured" "hierarchy" of "parts" "endowed by Heaven." I have a developed argument supported by extensive textual evidence to support my interpretation of this aspect of Mencius' philosophy. One piece of my evidence is Mencius 6A/15, which goes, in part: "These are what Heaven has given us. If one takes one's stand in the great that is within, the small cannot take it away. This is what makes one great." This is by no means the only evidence I adduce to support my interpretation, but I do not understand how one could possibly read this passage as not entailing the claims that there are parts of the self, that these are hierarchically arranged and endowed by Heaven. Unfortunately, Skaja

p.567

challenges neither the arguments nor the evidence I offer for my interpretation.

There are only two places in his review where Skaja attempts to offer evidence in support of the claims he makes. The first occurs after he quotes my description of Wang's view of human nature. He says, "The dubious reference to Buddhism notwithstanding (consider the Buddhist notion of `suunyataa or the emptiness of things)...." This strikes me as rather poor evidence. For the notion of `suunyataa has meant many different things to Buddhists in very different cultures and times. My claim is that in texts like the Platform Sutra we see Chinese Buddhists redefining "emptiness." For them there exists a transpersonal Buddha Nature which is the true nature of all things. Things are "empty" of individual natures, which are simply a function of a false view of the self. This is the view that Wang embraces but with a Confucian spin. In my book, I provide considerable textual evidence, both from specific Buddhist texts and Wang's works, to support this claim. Skaja may find Wang's idea difficult to accept. But that does not mean Wang did not believe it.

The other attempt at offering textual evidence occurs after Skaja provides us with four of his own translations of passages from the Mencius. I have already pointed out some of the mistakes these translations contain. But what are they evidence for? Presumably, though not evidently, they support the "conclusion" Skaja draws immediately afterward, "That Ivanhoe should have Wang argue that 'the moral aspects of human nature were fully formed at birth,' that infants and children are endowed by Heaven' with a fully mature moral or social nature, is simply incredible, if not bizarre...."

First, I see no sense in arguing against my interpretation of Wang's philosophy by providing a series of quotes from the Mencius. This is particularly surprising when one considers that the main point of my book is to argue that Wang, though claiming to follow Mencius, actually saw him very differently from the way he saw himself. On pages 38-39 of my book, I argue and provide evidence for the view that Mencius and Wang differ on the very issue Skaja raises.

Skaja appeals to American pragmatists as showing the "empirical" inadequacy of my interpretations of Mencius and Wang. First, as I hope is clear, Skaja has failed to demonstrate that he has a grasp of what my interpretations are. Second, what necessary connection does pragmatism have to interpretations of two very different Chinese thinkers? Again Skaja provides no evidence or argument. He seems to think that pragmatists have things right and therefore Mencius and Wang must both be pragmatists. The first claim may be true (though unlikely); the second strikes me as implausible and a clear case of reading Western philosophical ideas back into Chinese thought (which is what Skaja wrongly accuses me of doing). Skaja goes on to invoke Hall and Ames in the same

p.568

cause. But even if their interpretation of Confucius' thought were correct, what necessary connection does this have to Mencius and Wang? Their book is about Confucius. Hall and Ames explicitly deny that their interpretation of Confucius applies to Neo-Confucians (p. 11) and warn that "Beginning as early as Mencius and continuing into the Neo-Confucian period," Confucius' followers changed his thought in significant ways that make blanket statements about what "Confucians" thought, at best, ill advised (p. 196).

Henry Skaja's review of my work is both inaccurate and unfortunate. I hope that people will read my book and judge its merits for themselves. It is not without faults, but I do believe it is of some value.

Reply to Philip J. Ivanhoe
Henry G. Skaja
I would like to thank Philosophy East and West for this opportunity to reply to the remarks of Professor Ivanhoe in regard to my review of his book, Ethics in the Confucian Tradition: The Thought of Mencius and Wang Yang-ming. In an effort to clarify the philosophical nature of my review and criticisms, any mistakes or shortcomings on my part not-withstanding, I would like to reiterate that, for a number of reasons, "Ivanhoe's comparative account of Mencius and Wang will prove to be a valuable resource for those who seek to understand the historical development, as well as the contemporary relevance, of the Confucian philosophical tradition--in contrast to that of the West." One of the reasons for this claim, I submit, is that Ivanhoe's comparative account raises a number of contemporary philosophical issues (consider, for example, the recent works of Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam regarding the issues of pragmatism, culture, and realism) which stem directly from the longstanding problem of interpreting and translating adequately the key Confucian philosophical concepts and terms in terms of traditional Western philosophical ideas and vocabulary: jen, yi, li, tao, te, chih, chun-tzu, t'ien, t'ien-ming, li or t'ien-li, liang-chih, and others.

In regard to the problem just mentioned, which is itself philosophical in character (compare Gerald Larson and Eliot Deutsch, eds., Interpreting Across Boundaries [1988], and David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking Through Confucius [1987]), my criticism was that Ivanhoe largely employs the rationalistic, intuitionistic, or theologically oriented translations of the terms just mentioned provided by Wing-tsit Chan. That is, I submit, Ivanhoe employs translations of Confucian philosophical terms that presuppose what Hall and Ames call "the language of transcendence" as a means of interpreting or explaining these terms: the language of underlying substance (ousia, hypostasis), first principle (arche), or cause (aiton), eternal essence (ti esti), being (eon), or form/idea (eidos)--or, in other

p.569

words, the language of knowing (noesis), self-evident truth (aletheia) and intuitive or innate knowledge (episteme), the latter of which is Chan's translation of "liang-chih." What I meant by this criticism may not have been made altogether clear in my review (see below), but it was in no way meant to imply a wholesale criticism or to deny the value of Professor Chan's numerous translations of Chinese philosophical terms. Accordingly, my criticism was not meant to deny that Chan provides a number of alternative translations of Chinese philosophical terms. For example in his monumental Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Chan translates "t'ien" as "Heaven" and alternatively as "Nature"; and, in his translation of the Ch'uan-hsi lu (Instructions for Practical Living), Chan consistently, and I think rightly, translates "t'ien" as "Nature"--his translation of "t'ien-li" as "Principle of Nature" (in contrast to Ivanhoe's "Heavenly principle") notwithstanding. Furthermore, my criticism was not meant to deny that Ivanhoe himself provides a number of original translations of passages from the Mencius and Ch'uan-hsi lu--although I failed to make this point explicit.

Nevertheless, in what arguably presupposes a rationalistic, intuitionistic, or theologically oriented means of interpretation, Ivanhoe translates jen as "benevolence," yi as "righteousness," "li" as "rites," te as "virtue," t'ien as "Heaven" (here Ivanhoe provides no gloss or index), li as "principle," t'ien-li as "Heavenly principle," chih as "knowing," and liang-chih as "pure knowing" (in contrast to Chan's "innate knowledge") --the latter of which, as indicated by Ivanhoe in his reply, is itself purportedly "an infallible, internal standard--guiding us in the moral life." Thus, although I do not believe or claim that Ivanhoe views Mencius or Wang as theists and/or theologians, the rationalistic, intuitionistic, or theologically oriented language that Ivanhoe employs in his translations tends to suggest, if not imply, that he does presuppose some such view. As indicated by Peirce, the doctrine of "infallibility" or "absolute certainty" is decidedly a theological, as well as a rationalistic or intuitionistic (a priori), doctrine of the medieval period. As also indicated by Peirce (and more recently by Wittgenstein), our experience provides no evidence that we have the alleged faculty of infallibility or absolute certainty. Infallibility or absolute certainty is one of the alleged criteria for knowledge (scientia) presented by the medieval theologians--along with absolute exactitude, necessity, or universality.

But the scientific spirit requires a man to be at all times ready to dump his whole cartload of beliefs, the moment experience is against them. The desire to learn forbids him to be perfectly cocksure that he knows already. Besides positive [in contrast to mathematical] science can only rest on experience; and experience can never result in absolute certainty, exactitude, necessity, or universality. (Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 1, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, [1931], p. 24; brackets mine)

p.570

In short, the philosophical problem that I was addressing in my review is what Hall and Ames call the problem of adequate "philosophical translation." it is in respect to this problem that my review of Ivanhoe's book presupposes some familiarity with Hall and Ames' Thinking Through Confucius, as well as with the pragmatism of Peirce and Dewey:

If contemporary comparative philosophic activity is any indication, it might be the pragmatic philosophies associated with Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead, and extended toward a process philosophy such as that of A. N. Whitehead, that can serve as the best resource for philosophical concepts and doctrines permitting responsible access to Confucius' thought.... This is hardly a controversial move, of course, since many from both the Chinese and Western contexts have pointed out the similarities between pragmatism and process philosophy, on the one hand, and classical Chinese philosophy on the other. ( p. 15)

In spite of the fact that Hall and Ames focus specifically on the thinking of Confucius, I (if not they) would argue that appeals to their Thinking Through Confucius, and to the pragmatism of Peirce and Dewey, are not altogether "irrelevant and inconsequential" with respect to interpreting and translating adequately the ethical teachings of Mencius and Wang Yang-ming.

The key concepts and terms that have shaped the Confucian philosophical tradition--that is, the concepts and terms that Confucius employs in the Analects to articulate the "Way" (tao), the way of the sages, exemplary persons, or rulers (chun-tzu chih tao), sociopolitical harmony (ho), and cultural development (wen or wen-hua)--have indeed posed a long-standing problem of interpretation and translation in terms of traditional Western philosophical ideas and vocabulary. Elsewhere, I have attempted to show how this problem can in part be ameliorated by employing the pragmatism, or pragmatic naturalism, of Peirce and Dewey as a means of philosophical interpretation and translation ("Getting Clear on Confucius: Pragmatic Naturalism as a Means of Philosophical Interpretation" [diss., University of Hawaii, 1992]). The basic clue to unlocking the problem, I have argued, lies in the concept of nature (t'ien, hsing).

Specifically, I have argued that both the pragmatists and the Confucians conceive the process of nature in general (t'ien) as integral to that of human nature in particular (jen-hsing), so that both conceive nature primarily in terms characteristic of human experience or life (jen-sheng) as a continuous process of creation and growth (sheng, birth/life/
growth), involving what Hall and Ames call "the creation of novel patterns." (Note that "pattern" or "patterns" is A. C. Graham's preferred translation of "li," so that "t'ien-li" can legitimately be translated as the various "natural patterns" of activity and discursive thinking or commu-

p.571

nication that continue to emerge and grow during the course of this ongoing life/growth process.) Accordingly, I have argued that both Peirce and Mencius conceive (human) nature as the continuous creation and growth of social "mind"--community and communication--or "heart-mind" (hsin), and that both Dewey and Mencius (in contrast to Hsun-tzu) conceive human nature as irreducibly social or cultural in character (wen). When conceived as such, we find that Mencius' account of human nature--as well as that of Wang, I would further argue--amounts to a naturalistic interpretation of the social or culturally oriented "Way" (tao) taught by Confucius and of the key notions, indicated above, that Confucius employs in the Analects to articulate the Way. Thus, I would agree with Ivanhoe's claim that "Mencius and Wang are both naturalistic realists" (in regard to truth)--although we seem not to agree on the meaning of "naturalism" or "naturalistic realist."

In light of the considerations above, I hope to make it clear (if it was not done so earlier) that the basic argument presupposed in my review of Ivanhoe's book is that the pragmatism, or pragmatic naturalism, of Peirce and Dewey provides one of our most appropriate means of interpreting and translating Confucian as well as other Chinese philosophies (such as Taoism if not Chinese Buddhism)--which is, of course, not to deny the value of other means of interpretation and translation that are, and have been, employed, such as the philosophies of Plate, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Whitehead, among others. Furthermore, since the pragmatism, or pragmatic naturalism, of Peirce and Dewey is relevant to contemporary philosophical discussion, it also provides an opportune means of indicating the contemporary relevance of Confucius and Confucian philosophy.

As indicated in my review, it seems that "Ivanhoe presupposes the standard Aristotelian interpretation of Mencius...." By this I mean an interpretation conceived in terms of the following: Aristotle argues as though there exists a first principle, cause, or generator of natural activity (proton kinoun, eternal first mover which is itself unmoved); as though there exists a hierarchy of eternal (timeless and unchanging) essences or forms implicit in the nature of things (what has been called "the natural order") as the alleged object of knowing (noesis) and true speaking (piston logos); and as though there exists a determinate or fixed hierarchy of goods, purposes, or ends (what has been called "the moral order") "to which all things aim," so that "nature does nothing in vain" and so that "we deliberate not about ends but about means." In this regard, consider the following remarks by Dewey:

When men believed that fixed ends existed for all normal changes in nature, the conception of similar ends for men was but a special case of a general belief. If the changes in a tree from acorn to full-grown oak were regulated by

p.572

an end which was somehow immanent or potential in all the less perfect forms, and if change was simply the effort to realize a perfect or complete form, then the acceptance of a like view for human conduct was consonant with the rest of what passed for science. Such a view, consistent and systematic, was foisted by Aristotle upon western culture and endured for two thousand years. When the notion was expelled from natural science by the intellectual revolution of the seventeenth century, logically it should also have disappeared from the theory of human action.

In fact, ends are ends-in-view or aims. They arise out of natural effects or consequences which in the beginning are hit upon, stumbled upon so far as any purpose is concerned. Men like some of the consequences and dislike others. Henceforth ... attaining or averting similar consequences are aims or ends. These consequences constitute the meaning and value of an activity as it comes under deliberation.... They are in no sense ends of action. In being ends of deliberation they are redirecting pivots in action. (Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology [1922], pp. 224-225)

The question that I posed in my review is whether Ivanhoe does in fact presuppose an Aristotelian interpretation of Mencius. It seems to me that he does. Although Ivanhoe does not employ the term "eternal essences or forms," he does presuppose (the idea of) a "grand design" laid down by t'ien implicit in the nature of things and affairs. For example, according to Ivanhoe,

A society based on li ["rites"] would be a peaceful and prosperous society because it followed the grand design lain down by Heaven [t'ien]. It was the right way to live one's life because it accorded with this design--not because of the benefits to be derived by such a life. (P. 5)

They [the rites] defined a system that was more than the best possible shape for society; they had transcendent value. They were the discovered structure of the way the world should be. (P. 5)

Mencius provided a new rationale for this ideal society. He maintained that the traditional obligations, rituals and social practices were right, because they were the refined expression of what we truly are. They were grounded in our very nature, and to fulfill them was to accord with the design of Heaven. (P. 8)

According to Mencius, human nature has a specific content: human beings are born with a well-defined set of physical, mental and emotional capacities. These different parts are arranged in a very special structure and the shape of this structure emerges as an individual matures...given proper care. (P. 47)

On the other hand, as I have indicated in my review, it seems that Ivanhoe presupposes "a Platonic or Neo-Platonic interpretation of Wang." By this I mean an interpretation that is construed, in whole or in part, in terms of Plate's account (logos) of there being alleged first principles or causes, eternal essences (beings) or forms/ideas in themselves,

p.573

including the alleged eternal form/idea of the good in itself, as the alleged object of the alleged faculty of rational intuition or "pure knowing" (noesis, episteme) and "true speaking" (piston logos) by an alleged eternal, omniscient, and (here I should have said "and/or") omnipotent mind (nous). Again, I leave it to the reader to decide whether Ivanhoe does presuppose some version or variation of this account, in whole or in part, in respect to his account of Wang. It was in support of my contention that he does--the issues of dualism and the difference between Mencius and Wang notwithstanding-that l pointed out Ivanhoe's speaking of there being "an infallible, internal standard--guiding us in the moral life"--as well as the other quotations that I indicated from Ivanhoe's book. In this regard, consider also the following remarks by Ivanhoe.

[Wang] saw the universe as a vast, integrated system ordered by li (principles)....Wang believed principle extended throughout the universe and that it gives the universe both its physical and moral shape. Hsin chih pen ti(The mind in itself) is identical with t'ien li (Heavenly principle), and in its conscious aspect it is liang chih (pure knowing). Principle is the universal organizer and orderer. It extends throughout the universe, gives the universe its shape and texture, orders its tempo and in its conscious aspect--pure knowing--is aware of its work. (Pp. 15, 17)

The mind-in-itself is the conscious aspect of the physical and moral structure of the cosmos.... It is not only transpersonal; it unites everything in the universe.... Individual minds are instances of this universal mind, and in becoming aware of this they come to know their true form. Here we see the intimate relationship between Wang's metaphysics and his ethics. We also see how his metaphysical views led him to describe the task of self-cultivation as a process of discovery rather than one of development (P. 18)

Wang asserts that ... the mind naturally knows Heavenly principle. According to Wang, we are not only capable of arriving at an understanding of how the world should be, we already know. Complete and perfect knowledge is inherent in the human mind; we fail to know only in not being aware of what we know.... Wang distinguished between hsin chih pen ti (the mind in itself)--the mind of complete and perfect knowledge--and jen hsin (the human mind)--the mind in itself "obscured" by selfish human desires.... Once these are removed, the mind in itself naturally operates as an infallible moral guide. (P. 19)

In reply to my review, Ivanhoe quite rightly points out that, in contrast to religious traditions such as Christianity, the world of Mencius and Wang "was not the creation of an omniscient, omnipotent, and compassionate God" (theos). Nevertheless, this does not imply that, for Wang, liang-chih ("pure knowing") is itself an "infallible standard" of moral guidance, "free from the pressure of tradition," so that "the li (principles) of Confucian thought were the ideal moral language" (p. 114). Be this as it

p.574

may, here further historical and textual research is clearly in order. As I have indicated, the doctrine of infallibility or absolute certainty is itself a rationalistic, intuitionistic (a priori), or theological doctrine.

The original translations from the Mencius that l presented in my review were meant to indicate the social nature of morality and human nature for Mencius; that Mencius was the author of the terms "liang-neng" (natural ability) and "liang-chih" (roughly, our natural ability to realize or understand what is found to be desirable) employed by Wang; and that Mencius, at least, does not regard our moral or social nature as "fully formed at birth." Thus, since Wang undoubtedly borrows these terms from Mencius, it seems reasonable to doubt whether Wang regards our moral nature as fully formed at birth--unless we assume that Ivanhoe presupposes in respect to Wang some version or variation of Plate's account of there being alleged eternal essences, principles, or forms/ideas. As indicated above, I leave this question open.

Ivanhoe seems to regard as strange my translation of the phrase "k'o-yi wei shan" as the natural "ability to act [wei] in a way that is desirable"--note that I do not translate "shan" as "a way that is desirable," nor would I translate "hsing-shan" (the expression attributed to Mencius) as "human nature is a way that is desirable." Mencius explicitly defined "shan" as "k'o-yu-chih" (7B/25)--literally, that which can be desired (tended, attended to, or pursued) without conflict or contradiction: that which is desirable. Thus, D. C. Lau (Mencius [1976], p. 199) and A. C. Graham (Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature [1986], p. 32) translate, respectively, Mencius' definition as follows:

The desirable is called ... [shan].
It is the desirable that is meant by ... [shan].

However, "shan" also carries the connotation of doing something in a desirable manner (this point has been impressed upon me by Chung-ying Cheng). Thus, when Mencius uses the expression "shan yen" (7B/32), it can mean to speak in a manner or way that is desirable; and when he uses the expression "shan tao' (7B/32), it can mean to act in a manner or way that is desirable. For example, Mencius explicitly states (4A/12) that

There is a way (yu tao) ... to gain the confidence of one's superiors ...to be trusted by one's friends ... to please one's parents ... to act with integrity [Graham's translation of ch'eng] ... [that is, to] understand/realize/express what is socially desirable (ming shan)....

In this regard, consider also the following remarks by Dewey in his "The Construction of Good" ( The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action [1929], p. 260):

p.575

The fact that something is desired only raises the question of its desirability; it does not settle it. Only a child in the degree of his immaturity thinks to settle the question of desirability by reiterated proclamation: "I want it, I want it, I want it."

In short, I submit, Mencius argues (6B/2) that everyone has the natural ability to act as a sage (wei Yao Shun, to act as the sages Yao and Shun)--that is, to interact with others in a manner or way that is found to be mutually or socially desirable, upon critical reflection or thinking (ssu), relative to the existential or actual situation at hand--bearing in mind that people and things exist, act, or interact relative to one another and not as absolute individuals or things-in-themselves. Accordingly, l submit, Mencius argues (6A/1-3) that distinctively human nature (jen-hsing) or life (jen-sheng) tends to, but does not necessarily result in, that manner or way of interaction which is found to be mutually desirable upon critical reflection or thinking--that is, "the way of creative love and appropriate conduct towards others" (jen yi chih tao)--relative to the existential or actual situation at hand, "just as water tends downward."

Ivanhoe sees no precedent for my rendering of "chung" in the Mencius (6A/16) as "to interact." Here I admit that my rendering is somewhat original and incomplete as it stands. "Chung" is commonly rendered as "loyalty" or "faithfulness." Nevertheless, "chung" is at least four times rendered by D. C. Lau in his translation of the Analects as "do(ing) your best for others" (1/8, 5/28, 9/5, 12/10), and in his translation of the Mencius (6A/16) as "conscientiousness," so that it seems legitimate to render "chung" as "to interact" conscientiously with others. Furthermore, in the Analects (4/15), Confucius mentions "chung" and "shu" together (the latter of which is translated by W. T. Chan as "reciprocity," and by R. T. Ames as "putting oneself in the other person's place") as the "thread" which binds his teachings together, so that, in light of the above and other considerations, it seems legitimate to render "chung hsin" as "to interact (conscientiously) in a manner of mutual trust" or "faith"--that is, loyalty. I don't insist upon this interpretation and translation, and shall leave it at that for now.

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize that there is much that is of value in Ivanhoe's Ethics in the Confucian Tradition that I have not pointed out or emphasized. My criticisms were meant to be philosophical in character. It is hoped that they stimulate an initial and/or closer reading of Ivanhoe's book--and further, fruitful comparative philosophical discussion.