Prolegomenon to Vallabhas theology of revelation

·期刊原文
Prolegomenon to Vallabha's theology of revelation

By Jeffrey R. Timm
Philosophy East and West
volume 38, number 2 (April 1988)
p 107-126

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P107

Far too often, scholars who study Asian thought
focus so exclusively on one tradition or thinker
that they fall prey to a kind of "tunnel vision."
The fact is that every moment in the history of
human thought arises in the context of claims and
counterclaims about the way it really is. Luckily,
in the context of Indian thought, at least, the
textual traditions often act as a reminder that the
most creative thinking occurs in response to
powerful counterclaims. One can hardly imagine an
Udayana without a Buddhist to attack, or a Candrakiirti
without a Saa.mkhya. All this is to say that Indian
thought is intensely dialogical.

It should come as no surprise, then, that the title
used by Vallabha, the fifteenth-century Krishnaite
philosophical theologian, for the first section of
his Tattvaarthadiipanibandha means both "the meaning
of teaching" and "philosophical debate." And it is
even less surprising that that section, which he
calls `Saastraartha, shows Vallabha fully aware of
the challenge presented by alternative views in his
response to schools like Advaita Vedaanta,
Miimaa.msaa, Nyaaya, Vai'se.ska, Yoga, and
Saa.mkhya. Any penetrating consideration of
Vallabha-who in the words of one scholar "laid the
philosophical foundations for a great resurgence of
Krishna bhakti"(1) --must take into account the
metaphysical and epistemological views which
contributed to his theology. The views he endorsed
as well as those that he rejected must be considered
if the underlying foundation of his theological
program is to be understood.

One of the views he rejected--a primary object of
his opposition throughout the `Saastraartha-was the
Vedaantic school of Advaita originating with
Sa^nkara (eighth-ninth centuries A.D.) . The
ontological framework proposed by this influential
school of thought was problematic for Vallabha as
well as for other Vai.s.nava theologians like
Maadhava and Raamaanuja. This was the case because
its solution to the problem of relation between the
phenomenal world and the realm of ultimate reality
damaged the epistemological foundation necessary for
an affirmation of transcendental knowledge in the
world, and consequently undermined the path to
liberation, the raison d' 坱 re of almost all Indian
speculative thought.

Vallabha was also dissatisfied with Nyaaya and with
Miimaa.msaa, but for different reasons. Nyaaya's
philosophical pluralism, ascribing a reality to the
things of the world, was not far removed from his
own ontology; it was certainly closer to his view on
the nature of the world than the position affirmed
by Advaita Vedaanta. The Nyaaya school, however,
made forceful claims about the role of perception
and rationality as independent means to valid
knowledge, which suggested their equality to, and
perhaps even their superiority over, scriptural
revelation. This Vallabha could not accept. Less of
a problem, in this regard,
---------------------
Jeffrey R. Timm is Assistant Professor of Religion
at Wheaten College, Norton, Massachusetts.
AUTHOR'S NOTE:I would be remiss if I did not thank
my mentor and friend, Dr. Bibhuti S. Yadav of Temple
University, for the countless hours spent discussing
Vallabha's unique contribution to the history of
Indian thought.

P108

was the textual methodology proposed by
Puurvamiimaa.msaa. As long as Miimaa.msaa occupied
itself with the development of a hermeneutical
theory designed to uncover the meaning of scriptural
revelation, Vallabha could give his endorsement. In
fact, his own hermeneutical analysis of 'sruti is
directly dependent on many of the categories of
textual analysis developed by Miimaa.msaa. However,
along with its epistemology, Miimaa.msaa proposed an
ontological scheme which argued for the eternality
of both the Veda and the world by rejecting the
existence of a divine creator. The suggestion that
there is a divine Word in the absence of a divine
speaker of that Word was anathema from the
perspective of a Vai.s.nava world view.

An alternate view of divine Word (vaac), a concept
emerging in some of the earliest hymns of the
RgVeda, was fundamental in the development of the
theology of Vallabha. His application of the "divine
Word" concept is implicitly dependent upon the
theory of 'sabdabrahman developed by Bhart.rhari
(seventh century A.D.) , associated with the
Grammarian school. The concept of spho.tadhvani
emerging from Bhart.rhari's Vaakyapadiiya, and its
subsequent effect on the Indian philosophy of
language, resonates throughout Vallabha's theology.
Closely associated with the ontological dimensions
of Bhart.rhari's philosophy of language are the
practical implications the "divine Word" concept
held for religious expression through literature and
poetry. A seminal thinker in this area is
Abhinavagupta (tenth century A.D.), whose theory of
aesthetics laid the groundwork for the elevation of
poetry as the primary mode of expressing
religious-devotional sentiment. His theory of
aesthetics receives an implicit endorsement in the
theology of Vallabha, as well as in the subsequent
literary creativity of the Vallabha tradition.

No significant development in the history of thought
occurs in a vacuum. Each of these schools, through
the collective contributions of their individual
thinkers, helped provide a shared context which
emerged from the past to demand Vallabha's
recognition and evaluation. But the theology of
Vallabha was more than a simple response to an
inherited context, for it involved a distancing from
that context with the obligation to provide a better
answer, a theology in a new key. Although the
contours of this theology will be considered, a full
exposition lies beyond the scope of this article.
The present work, then, claims to reveal a context,
a prolegomenon, if you will, to the theology of
Vallabha.

I. THE CHALLENGE OF MAADHYAMIKA

Before turning to a more detailed analysis of the
schools already mentioned, it is necessary to
consider, at least briefly, the standing challenge
to all metaphysical speculation made by the last
important movement of Indian Buddhism, Maadhyamika.
Although Vallabha does not explicitly respond to the
critique of metaphysics made by the preeminent
Indian philosopher Naagaarjuna (second century A.D.)
and his commentator Candrakiirti (seventh century
A.D.), the

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theology of Vallabha is, at least implicitly, a
response to the Maadhyamika challenge that all
metaphysical speculation is symptomatic of a kind of
"disease" and that no metaphysical assertion has a
genuine claim to make about reality.

The main thrust of the Maadhyamika critique rests
on the perceived discontinuity between the way the
world is, and what reason, while engaged in
metaphysical speculation, thinks the world to be.
Suspicious of any claim made about the nature of
reality, and equally suspicious of any epistemology
allowing such claims, Maadhyamika charges that the
philosopher engaged in metaphysics is living a sick
form of life, infecting others who take him
seriously. The only cure for this "dis-ease" is to
show the utter hollowness of all metaphysical claims
by applying the logical tool of reductio ad
absurdum.

With the well-known technique, developed by
Naagaarjuna in his Muulamadhyamikakaarikaa, called
catu.sko.ti or four-cornered negation, Maadhyamika
rejects the possibility of making any sort of
meaningful claim involving ontological predication.
According to the critique, every ontological
statement rooted in a subject/predicate logic can be
reduced to a tautology or a selfcontradiction.
Consider, asks Candrakiirti, the statement, "the
human soul is eternal." What is the relationship
between the subject, " the human soul," and the
predication, "is eternal"; are the two terms
identical or different? If they are identical, we
are left with a tautology: the eternal human soul is
eternal. If they are different and distinct, what
could possibly justify the claim that they are
related?(2)

The Maadhyamika program applies the reduction-to-
absurdity technique to every sort of metaphysical
claim in an effort to show the utter emptiness of
ontological statements. Subject/predicate logic is
useful for mundane purposes, but when it is used to
make metaphysical claims it becomes a kind of
deceptive referring act: saying "X exists" becomes
the basis for the belief that X actually exists. The
commitment to a world view or theory about the way
the world is, is embraced as a shelter (d.r.sti)
from the anxiety, psychological insecurity, and fear
accompanying the desire of the ego to say "I am,"
and the ego's wish to avoid nonbeing. Such
commitment, asserted in the context of ideological,
religious, or metaphysical discourse, is a
self-deception symptomatic of a sick form of life.
Properly applied, catu.sko.ti is the medicine used
to treat the "dis-ease." Once the patient is cured,
the medicine becomes irrelevant.(3)

The Maadhyamika school represents the final chapter
in the history of Indian Buddhism. Despite the
decline of Buddhism's influence in the Indian
subcontinent, Maadhyamika's challenge to the
enterprise of metaphysics has had an enduring effect
on the character of Indian philosophy. The Vedaantic
thought of both `Sa^nkara and Vallabha, although
they conflict in their basic claims about the nature
of reality, can be understood as attempts to justify
the Hindu vision of ultimate reality in the face of
Maadhyamika's challenge. Before considering

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how this challenge was met from within Vedaanta, it
is necessary to examine the logic of
"God-talk"--rejected by Maadhyamika as a deceptive
referring act--from the standpoint of another school
in Indian thought, Nyaaya.

II. NYAAYA RATIONAL THEOLOGY

Nyaaya is one of the six "orthodox" schools within
Hinduism and therefore affirms the spiritual
authority of the Vedic scriptures. Closely
associated with the school of Vai'se.sika
established by Ka.naada, Nyaaya asserts a variety of
pluralistic realism which, unlike Maadhyamika, takes
seriously the possibility of knowing something about
the metaphysical nature of reality. Through the
proper application of reason within the categories
of accepted pramaa.na, or means to valid knowledge,
we can acquire knowledge about the world and about
God. Pramaa.na, according to the Nyaayama~njarii,
written by Jayanta Bha.t.ta (ninth century A.D.), is
"the collocation of conscious as well as unconscious
factors which result in producing such an
apprehension of knowable objects that is different
from illusion and doubt."(4)

The means to valid knowledge, according to Nyaaya,
are fourfold: perception (pratyak.sa), inference
(anumaana), comparison (upamaana), and testimony
('sabda). Jayanta, following the definition given by
an earlier Nyaaya thinker, Gautama, the author of
the Nyaayasuutra, asserts that perception is "that
knowledge which arises from contact of a sense with
an object; it is unnamable, uncontradicted, and
determinate."(5) Unlike Gautama, Jayanta clearly
distinguishes between perception as a means to
knowledge and perception as knowledge itself, but in
either case perception is primarily associated with
illuminating a really existing multiplicity of
objects which make up the world.

The second category of pramaa.na, according to
Nyaaya, is inference: the means to knowledge of that
which is beyond direct perception. Knowledge of an
unperceived object is achieved through the
apprehension of a perceptible object of knowledge,
along with the recognition of the invariable
concomitance of what is perceived and that which is
beyond perception. The classic example of this
pramaa.na of inference--reasoning from the
perception of smoke rising from a distant mountain
to the conclusion of fire on the
mountain--illustrates the five terms involved in the
Nyaaya syllogism: (1) On that distant mountain is a
fire (the hypothesis); because (2) smoke is rising
from that distant mountain (reason based on
perception); (3) whatever possesses smoke possesses
fire, for example, a fireplace (an example
supporting the invariable concomitance between smoke
and fire); (4) smoke is rising from that distant
mountain such as is invariably accompanied by fire
(the statement of invariable concomitance) ;
therefore,(5) on that distant mountain is a fire
(the conclusion). The five terms of the syllogism
function together to establish knowledge of the
unseen fire burning on a distant mountain. This
pramaa.na of inference is important in the Nyaaya
program to develop a rational theology proving the
existence of God.

The third means to valid knowledge accepted by the
Nyaaya school is called

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upamaana, or comparison. According to Jayanta, the
pramaa.na of comparison consists in associating an
object not known before with some other well-known
object through the remembrance of instruction given
by an authoritative person and through the
perception of resemblance between the unknown object
and the known object.(6) The steps involved in
reasoning on the basis of comparison are illustrated
in the following example given by Jayanta in his
Nyaayama~njarii. A person visiting a certain forest
is told by the game warden that an animal called a
gavaya, resembling a cow, lives in the forest.
During his walk through the forest, this person
encounters an animal resembling a cow and recalls
the description of the gavaya given by the game
warden. On the basis of this recollection, knowledge
that this animal is a gavaya is established. In
response to the objection that comparison is merely
a form of inference and should not be considered a
distinct pramaa.na, Jayanta argues that comparison
is different from inference because it always
involves the denotative power of words given by an
authoritative person, whereas inference produces
knowledge in the absence of such words.

The final category of pramaa.na affirmed by Nyaaya
is 'sabda, or verbal testimony. It is defined as the
instruction of a reliable person (aapta) who knows
the truth and who communicates it correctly.
According to Jayanta, a reliable person should not
have an imperfect knowledge of the subject he wishes
to impart, but on the other hand he need not be
omniscient. Thus, the value of testimony as a means
to valid knowledge is dependent on the honesty and
competence of the speaker. The validity of the Veda
is established on this basis. God, who is
all-knowing, is the author of the Veda, and
consequently everything taught by this text is
valid. The Vedic scripture should be accepted as an
extraordinary form of testimony because of the
extraordinary nature of its author. Nyaaya argues
that this claim does not involve a pattern of
circular reasoning because the existence of God--the
author of the Veda--is not established on the basis
of scriptural claims, instead, it is established
through the application of rationality and
inference.

The systematic use of inference to prove the existence
of God, as both the creator of the world and the
author of the Veda, is the modus operandi in the
Nyaayakusumaa~njali, written by Udayana (eleventh
century A.D.) . Udayana, a staunch opponent of
Buddhism in general, and Maadhyamika in particular,
(7) turns his attention to the development of a
rational theology in the Nyaayakusumaa~njali. In the
fifth section of this work, Udayana presents two
parallel series of proofs: one set for proving the
existence of God, the second for proving the
authorship of the Veda. In the first proof for the
existence of God, Udayana (like Aquinas, who was
composing the Quinque Viae at about the same time in
Europe) argues for the existence of God on the basis
of efficient causation. The world is an effect and,
like any other effect, points to a variety of causes
which must include an efficient cause possessing a
nature capable of producing such an effect. Udayana
writes:

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Earth, et cetera, have a maker as their cause;
because they have the nature of an effect.(8)
In this abbreviated version of the five-part
syllogism, Udayana is attempting to establish, on a
rational basis, the existence of a creator who is
capable of creating something as great as this
world. Clearly rejecting the Maadhyamika claim that
the use of reason in metaphysical issues is
symptomatic of "disease," Udayana claims to prove
the existence of God.

Although Vedaanta would agree with Nyaaya's claim
that God exists, it would reject the notion that a
proof could be established solely on the basis of
human rationality. There is a fundamental problem
with Nyaaya's emphasis on inference as the basis of
theological understanding. According to Vedaanta,
'sruti, or revealed scripture--that category of
testimony in Nyaaya which has God as its authority
(aapta)--is the incomparable, preeminent authority
in all transcendental matters. Both `Sa^nkara and
Vallabha emphasize the preeminence of 'sruti; but
despite their mutual disagreement with Nyaaya, these
two exponents of Vedaanta do not understand the
nature of scripture in exactly the same way.

⒒. THE RESPONSE OF ADVAITA VEDAANTA

Each school within Vedaanta stresses the importance
of revealed scripture. The contents of scriptural
revelation have been analyzed and interpreted by the
various Vedaantic schools of thought as a primary
source of transcendental knowledge capable of
leading the authentic seeker to liberation. One of
the most influential forms of Vedaanta, and
certainly the best known in the West, is the school
of Advaita Vedaanta established by `Sa^nkara. In
order to make sense of its epistemology and its
understanding of Vedic scripture, we must first
consider the ontology it proposes. The salient
points of this ontology are revealed by considering
Advaita Vedaanta's solution to the fundamental
metaphysical problem of "relationship."

What is the nature of the relationship between
ultimate reality, called Brahman in the Upani.sadic
texts, and the phenomenal world of ordinary
experience? How can an abiding ultimate reality,
which is characterized as "Being, " have any
connection with a world--marked by decay and
impermanence-characterized as a process of becoming?
One form of the Advaita solution to this problem is
presented in a theory of causality called vivarta.
According to this view, the problem of relating
nirgu.na Brahman with the world of change is
resolved by understanding Brahman as the cause of
the world, which does not itself undergo any change.
The world is an effect that preexists in the cause,
but it does not share the reality of its cause;
therefore, the phenomenal world is a mere
"appearance" devoid of any ontological purchase. By
denying ontological significance to the phenomenal
world, the problem of relationship is resolved,
because from the standpoint of reality there is no
world. The only reality, in the final analysis, is a
qualityless Brahman, and only through liberation
does the immediate and direct realization of
Brahman's nonduality arise.

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The ontology presented by Advaita Vedaanta leads to
conclusions not unlike the epistemological
skepticism developed in Maadhyamika Buddhism.
Brahman, according to the Advaita view, is so
absolute that statements made about it, insofar as
such statements are made from within the phenomenal
order of becoming, can do no more than weakly point
to ultimate reality. Nothing "really real" can be
said about Brahman because "to say something" occurs
in and through the phenonmenal world.

This position leads to some interesting problems
when the notion of divine revelation is considered.
Although things in the world may have a practical or
provisional reality--Advaita Vedaanata calls this
level vyavahaarika--nothing in the phenomenal realm
is really real; that is to say, nothing shares the
ontological status accorded to Brahman. What, then,
is the nature of divine revelation, either in the
form of a text like the Veda, or in the form of a
divine incarnation? A popular example in the Advaita
tradition describes God's special revelations, which
arise in the phenomenal world, as the roar of a
dream lion which awakens the slumbering man.
Revelations have provisional value because they can
awaken one to the truly existent, ultimate reality
of Brahman. But because such revelations are
manifested within the phenomenal realm, because they
fall within the category of vyavahaarika, they can
never share the ontological status of Brahman.

Other thinkers in the wider tradition of
Vedaanta found the position of Advaita Vedaanta
completely unsatisfactory. The problem with this
view of revelation is expressed in a Dvaita Vedaanta
critique of Advaita Vedaanta found in the
Nyaayaratnaavali, written by Vaadiraaja (sixteenth
century A.D.).

One who is afflicted with a mania producing
[conviction in] an inextinguishable "Great
Illusion," who moreover declares, while posturing as
one grounded on the Scriptures, a [belief in the
world's] depravity based on the depraved condition
of the all-assisting Scriptures, kills his own
mother! I believe that he gets amusement by bringing
harm to everyone.(9)

Vaadiraaja is claiming that Advaita Vedaanta is
involved in a fundamental self-contradiction. Like
all schools of Vedaanta, Advaita claims to ground
its position on 'sabda-pramaa.na in the form of
'sruti. But at the same time it denigrates the
status of 'sruti by relegating scriptural revelation
to the status of vyavahaarika, a mere "appearance"
within the phenomenal realm. This, according to
Vaadiraaja, is like the man who, owing his very
existence to his mother, kills her.

Vallabha agrees. He raises a similar objection in
the `Saastraartha, accusing Advaita Vedaanta of a
self-contradiction related to its refusal to accept
the unsublatable reality of the divine incarnation,
K.r.s.na.

According to the view of Maayaavaada and so on,
`Sriik.r.s.na, et cetera, is not considered to be
Brahman due to [K.r.s.na's] existence in the world.
But they say His [Brahman's] essential nature is
being-bliss-consciousness. Therefore, on

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account of absence of proof in their own view, they
proclaim this state of affairs by following the path
of devotion. This should be understood. They accept
truth established by a logic opposed to their own
position.(10)

Vallabha is pointing out that to make a claim about
Brahman is to speak in the world and to speak from
the authority of scripture revealed in the world.
Since the proponents of Advaita Vedaanta accord the
world only a provisional reality, they claim that
K.r.s.na cannot be, in the final analysis,
identified with highest Brahman. But, because they
assert that Brahman is nirgu.na, without qualities,
the only self-consistent stance for them would be
silence. Yet they claim that Brahman is
being-consciousness-bliss, "a truth established by
a logic contrary to their own position.'' A genuine
and full affirmation of God's revelation, both
scriptural and incarnational, is a fundamental
concern for Vallabha. And it is this concern which
lies behind his program to "purify" the nondualism
of Advaita Vedaanta.

The positions of both Sa.nkara and Vallabha are
described as advaita, or nondual. We have seen that
for `Sa.nkara the problem of relationship between
nirgu.na Brahman and the phenomenal world is
resolved by denying the world's ontological
significance. Reality is one, without a second, and
consequently the world-because it opposes the
unchanging Brahman through its character of
continual becoming-is described as a mere
appearance, not "really real," a state of affairs to
be transcended. Curiously this attempt to reconcile
the appearance of the world with the claim for
Brahman's nonduality lands Advaita Vedaanta back
into a kind of dualism. For those trapped in
ignorance, the world "exists"; it has an existential
reality, albeit provisional, and over against the
dualistic experience of the world is the promise of
the nondual "experience" of Brahman, the goal of
spiritual striving.

In the `Saastraartha, Vallabha points out that
this kind of thinking establishes a soteriological
non sequitur. By tacitly affirming a cosmological
dualism-the gulf between the phenomenal realm, in
which ordinary human beings are trapped, and the
ultimate reality of Brahman--Advaita Vedaanta
undermines the very possibility of liberation. For
what could act as a bridge between these two realms?
Nothing in the world, no scripture, no incarnation,
no revelation, shares the ontological status of the
"really real"; consequently, how could any of these
things carry one beyond the phenomenal? Thus,
following the logic of the Advaita view, human
beings are hopelessly trapped in the endless rounds
of sa.msaara.

Vallabha's solution to this problem is implied when
he calls his position `Suddhaadvaita Brahmavaada,
the theory of pure, nondualistic Brahman. He is
asserting a nondualist form of Vedaanta which,
unlike `Sa^nkara's, does not lead to the troubling
conclusions of cosmological dualism. According this
view, the world is real and identical with God,
having God as both its efficient and its material
cause.

The idea that God is the material cause, as well
as the efficient cause of the

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universe, is established on the basis of key
scriptural statements cited in the `Saastraartha,
but God's material causality is supported by reason
as well. "Despite [it being His creation], the
universe is the form of God. Otherwise existence
would arise from nonexistence."(11) Through the
power of maayaa, which is inherent in God, the
universe arises. Vallabha distinguishes his position
from Advaita Vedaanta by characterizing maayaa not
as some indescribable force separable from ultimate
reality, but instead as one of the principal powers
of God following the statement of the
Bhaagavatapuraa.na.(12) Also counted among God's
powers is avidyaa, the principle of ignorance. On
the basis of the difference between these two
powers, Vallabha develops a fundamental concept of
his theology: the distinction between the real
universe (prapa~nca) and the unreal process of
sa.msaara-that endless round of rebirth and redeath
experienced by the souls who are deluded by
ignorance.

Both knowledge and ignorance are powers of God which
are created only through maayaa. They affect the
soul alone, not any other; so also suffering and
powerlessness.(13)

Here Vallabha indicates an ontological priority;
knowledge and ignorance are dependent on maayaa. The
world is a real creation of God and shares the
reality of its creator, but sa.msaara-characterized
by suffering and powerlessness--is not a real
creation; it results from "the ego's assertion of
itself (abhimati) ... which takes the form of
"I-ness" and "my-ness."(14) As soon as
individualized consciousness, in the form of a soul,
ceases regarding itself as distinct from the rest of
creation, the process of sa.msaara is extinguished.
The world, however, because it is a real creation,
does not at that moment cease to exist."(15)

This distinction between the real universe and the
illusion of sa.msaara is supported by describing the
universe as God's ontological revealment. God
reveals Himself--becoming all that is--through the
process of selective revealment and concealment
(aavirbhaava-tirobhaava) of infinite attributes.

After delighting in Himself He becomes as if hidden.
This is accomplished by means of maayaa. He is
veiled by this existence [which is His creation]...
and it is said that the appearance of limitation
everywhere is by His wish.(16)

By concealing the full expression of His nature
through His power of maayaa, the multiplicity of
forms in creation is revealed. Phenomenal revealment
is dependent upon ontological concealment. Despite
the reality of the universe and its essential
identity with God, Vallabha rejects a simple
pantheistic identity.

At the same time that God enters into the process
of becoming--through concealing the fullness of His
essential nature and revealing Himself as the
creation-He remains unaffected by the process.

Brahman indeed has endless forms and, though
possessing parts, is undivided.(17)

Between members of the same class (sajaatiiya),
between classes (vijaatiiya) , and internally
(savagata), [God] is devoid of these three types of
dualism.(18)

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God becomes the created universe through the
pluralism or diversity of forms and the
relationships between those forms, and yet He
remains transcendent, beyond the three categories of
relationships. The simultaneity of God's immanence
and transcendence is explained not by denying the
reality of the universe, but by recognizing each and
every individual form as an incarnation through
which God reveals a limited dimension of His
reality, while concealing His essential and enduring
fullness. All things are identical and present
everywhere because everything is God. However,
because God places a limitation on the attributes
that are manifest in a given form, that form--viewed
as distinct from all other forms--reveals only an
infinitesimal portion of God's unending fullness.

Why does God create in this way? After quoting the
B.rhadaaraa.nyaka, "He wished for another and He
became such, "(19) Vallabha comments that
"ontological revealment in the form of the universe
is only for the sake of delight which is impossible
without diversity."(20) By creating the universe out
of sheer delight, God differentiates Himself from
Himself, becoming "self-forgetful" for the sake of
manifesting diversity. At the same time (from the
perspective of ordinary human understanding), God's
glory, revealed through His capacity for unending
creativity, acts as a lure drawing the created forms
back to God. The universe, then, embodies the
unfolding of God's cosmic autobiography.

According to Vallabha, this autobiographical
creativity is linguistically structured. Quoting the
Bhaagavatapuraa.na (10.85.4), he writes:

Wherever, by whom, from whom, of whom, to whom, as
whatever, whenever--all this is God directly as
matter, person, and Lord.(21)

Everything in creation is God, and God is the
ultimate denotative locus of all words, the
foundation for all relationships expressed
grammatically through the seven Sanskirt cases.
After "speaking" the creation into existence, God
speaks again, out of compassion, providing the means
for liberation. To appreciate fully the central
place of "word" in Vallabha's theology, we must
briefly consider the philosophy of language in two
important schools of thought: Puurvamiimaa.msa and
the Grammarian school.

IV. MIIMAA.MSA PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

Closely associated with Vedaanta philosophies is the
school called Miimaa.msaa. The relationship between
Vedaanta and Miimaa.msaa is indicated by the fact
that Vedaanta is also called "Uttara" Miimaa.msaa,
designating its scriptural focus as the "Uttara" or
"later" sections of the Veda, which are the
Upani.sads. Mimaa.msaa proper, or "Puurva"
Miimaa.msaa, as it is called, stresses the
importance of the Braahma.na sections of the Vedic
text, subordinating both the earlier Mantra and the
later Upani.sad to the inquiry into the rituals of
sacrifice. According to the Miimaa.msaa school, the
proper interpretation of the Veda is by

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no means a simple matter; consequently Miimaa.msaa
has developed a theory of intepretation-principles
of Vedic hermeneutics--which has subsequently been
employed by thinkers outside the Miimaa.msaa
tradition including Vallabha.

As long as the Miimaa.msaa program remains on the
level of epistemology, focusing on the development
and application of the principles of Vedic
interpretation, no conflict arises between Vallabha
and Miimaa.msaa. However, Miimaa.msaa thinkers like
`Sabara (fourth-fifth century A.D.), Prabhaakara
(seventh-eighth century A.D.) , and Kumaarila
(seventh century), made certain ontological claims
which Vallabha was compelled to reject. The problem
with Miimaa.msaa from the perspective of Vedaanta is
highlighted by considering the Miimaa.msaa concept
of language.

The dual form of the Miimaa.msaa concept of language
is evident in the distinction between two terms,
'sabda and pada. Unfortunately both terms can be
translated as "word, " obscuring a fundamental
distinction. The term 'sabda is more comprehensive,
for it may be used to mean not only "word" in
general, but also "Word" as divine revelation or as
testimony from any authoritative source. We have
already discussed this connotation of 'sabda in the
examination of the Nyaaya pramaa.na theory. Pada, on
the other hand, has a much more restricted meaning;
it focuses on "word" as a constituent part of
language.

These two terms, 'sabda and pada, are at the heart
of two related views of language developed by
Miimaa.mmsaa: 'sabdanityatva and padanityatva.(22)
From the perspective of the first view,
'sabdanityanva, language is understood
metaphysically as the fundamental and necessary
requirement for human existence. To be human is to
have language because language provides the
categories of meaning which ultimately pattern all
human knowledge. It is not man who is the author of
language, but it is instead language itself that
speaks to man, manifesting a context in which man
responds. The second view of language, padanityatva,
presents language in its more pragmatic character;
word and its meaning are viewed as the fundamental
constituents of language, which is in turn
considered as a medium of expression. From this
perspective, words and sentences are understood as
external forms capable of revealing their inner
meaning only if the proper hermeneutical principles
are applied.

Responding to the demands of the padanityatva theory
of language, Miimaa.msaa developed a theory of
textual interpretation which provided a means for
understanding the truth enshrined in the words of
the Vedic scripture. The principles of the
Miimaa.msaa hermeneutical program were accepted and
utilized by the schools of Vedaanta, including
Vallabha. However, in developing the implications of
the 'sabdanityatva theory of language, Miimaa.msaa
makes claims about the nature of the Vedic scripture
incompatible with the Vai.s.nava theology of
Vallabha.

The validity of the Veda can be established beyond
any doubt, according to Miimaa.msaa, only if it is
agreed that the Veda has existed eternally and that
it is

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authorless. Kumaarila, for example, is not satisfied
with the Nyaaya understanding of 'sabda-pramaa.na,
which bases the validity of scripture on the idea
that the aapta, the authoritative person making a
truth claim, is none other than God, who is
omniscient and trustworthy. The problem, according
to Miimaa.msaa, is this: how can someone who is not
omniscient recognize that quality in another?

One who accepts [validity] in the realm of the
ritual that has to be performed ('sraddheya-) on the
basis of statements [of those persons whose]
credibility in matters connected with the objects of
the senses has been experienced, will have to
establish [the aapta's] credibility and competence
by means of something else. Were praamaa.nyam to be
intrinsic, then what is the purpose of making it
depend on the senses, etc.(23)

Since the quality of omniscience is not perceptible
by those who are themselves not omniscient, the
Nyaaya pramaa.na of 'sabda, or verbal testimony,
breaks down when it is applied to the Veda where the
aapta is supposed to be God. Kumaarila, therefore,
denies the possibility of a creator of the world and
argues in favor of the beginninglessness of the
Vedic tradition. This is necessary in a theory which
asserts the "givenness" of language and the
self-validity of the special use of language in the
Vedic scriptures.(24)

Vallabha would agree with Miimaa.msaa's negative
valuation of the Nyaaya attempt to establish the
validity of the scripture on the basis of an
extrascriptural appeal to logic. Miimaa.msaa goes
too far, however, when it rejects the existence of
God. Life depends upon language, but the "giveness"
of language is not divorced from the "giveness" of
the God who speaks. This commitment to the existence
of God moves Vallabha away from Miimaa.msaa's
'sabdanityatva, and, even though it is not explicity
mentioned by him, towards the metaphysics of
language proposed by Bhart.rhari (seventh century
A.D.) and the aesthetics of language developed by
Abhinavagupta (tenth century A.D.).

V. BHART.RHARI'S CONCEPT OF WORD

In the opening verse of his Vaakyapadiiya,(25)
Bhart.rhari states that Brahman is the eternal and
undifferentiated reality of Word ('sabdatattva),
beyond birth and death, from which arises all
differentiation in the form of subject and object.
This idea of 'sabdabrahman-Brahman as
Word--developed by the Grammarian school reflects
the concept of vaac, the potency of the divine Word
through which the absolute enters into a process of
becoming. Vaac is a concept expressed in some of the
earliest Vedic metaphysical speculation.(26)

Although 'sabdabrahman, or vaac, is one and
indivisible, it functions as the world's efficient
and material cause. The idea that the effect (that
is, the world of constant becoming) is an actual
transformation of the cause (that is, 'sabdahbrahman
or vaac) appears in the opening verses of
Bhart.rhari's Vaakyapadiiya. Some scholars, however,
have argued that the theory of causality presented
in the Grammarian school is the vivarta view of
Advaita Vedaanta. If this is correct,

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then the case for a connection between the theology
of Vallabha and the Grammarian school is greatly
weakened.

Pradipakumar Mazumdar,in his book Philosophy of
Language: An Indian Approach, asserts that Bhart.rhari
affirms the view of Advaita Vedaanta: the phenomenal
world is anirvacaniiya, incapable of logical
determination of definition."(27)

This principle of indeterminability (anirvacaniiyatva)
has been ontologically hypostatized into the concept
of Avidyaa or Nescience.... The phenomenal world is
thus an illusory superimposition on the `Sabdabrahman
through the operation of Avidyaa, the final principle
of indeterminability.(28)

The metaphysics of Bhart.rhari's philosophy of
language is without doubt nondualistic. But
Bhart.rhari's nondualism does not automatically
support Mazumdar's conclusions. Mazumdar claims that
the concept of causality in the Grammarian school
follows the vivarta theory, but the question is open
to debate.

Two central ideas in the beginning of the Vaakya-
padiiya, pointed out by Subramania Iyer, (29)
indicate a difference from the vivarta view. First,
as we have already mentioned,

"ultimate reality, Brahman, which is without
beginning or end, is of the nature of the word
('sabdatattva) and from it are manifested all the
objects and the whole Cosmos."(30)

Second,

"This ultimate Reality is One, but it manifests
itself as many because of its many powers. It does
so, however, without losing its One-ness. It is not
different from its powers but it appears to be
different."(31)

The Vaakyapadiiya, independent of the later
v.r.t.ti, appears to suggest that the phenomenal
world is not illusory; rather the illusion rests in
the perception of distinction between the phenomenal
world and ultimate reality.

Gaurinath Sastri argues that this is the position
of Bhart.rhari. In his book, A Study in the Dialectics
of Spho.ta, Sastri distinguishes the concept
of causality at work in Bhart.rhari's Vaakyapadiiya
from the vivarta view.

...the Absolute in the system of Bhart.rhari is a
dynamic principle. It produces the universe out of
itself. It appears to be the material and the
efficient cause of all that exists. Although `Sankara
would call the Absolute the material and efficient
cause in one, the concept of causality is not
applicable to it in absolute reality. If the
metaphysical position of `Sankara was to be expressed
in exact terminology, Brahman would be said to
appear as the cause and not to be the cause in
absolute reality of the world. The position of the
grammarians follows, of course, from the conception
of the Absolute as endowed with the multiple powers
which are as real as the Absolute.(32)

In a footnote to this passage, Sastri expresses the
idea that nothing in the

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Vaakyapadiiya suggests that Bhart.rhari views the
powers of Brahman as unreal; hence, "the objective
world that owes its origin to [these powers] cannot
be unreal. It is only the difference among objects
which is a figment of imagination, "(33) This
fundamental insight into the nature of ultimate
reality is shared by Vallabha. Unlike Advaita
Vedaanta, which views the world as a mere appearance
of Brahman, Bhart.rhari (at least in the
Vaakyapadiiya) suggests that reality--which includes
the created order--is both ontologically and
cosmologically nondual.

Like Puurvamiimaa.msaa, the Grammarian school
suggests a "two-level" theory of language. However,
unlike Miimaa.msaa, this view of language did not
lead to the atheistic rejection of a divine creator.
For Bhart.rhari the divine Word principle
('sabdabrahman) is the cause of the phenomenal
order. The relationship between the creator and the
created is expressed in one of the most important
contributions to the Indian philosophy of language,
the concept of spho.ta. This pivotal concept is
stated in the Vaakyapadiiya, I.44:

In the words which are expressive the learned discern
two aspects: the one [the spho.ta] is the cause of
the real word [while] the other [dhvani] is used to
convey the meaning.(34)

Simply stated, the concept of spho.ta presents a
distinction between the eternal word ('sabdatattva),
which transcends all division and change, and the
pluralism of sounds and letters used to convey
meaning. In an ordinary process of communication the
spho.ta of the speaker is "clothed" in the
particular sounds or letters (dhvani) perceived by
the hearer. Successful communication occurs when,
through the dhvani of the speaker, the changeless
spho.ta, already existing in the mind of the hearer
as a potentiality, becomes manifest.

Despite the apparent dualism between spho.ta and
dhavni, these two are, in the final analysis, nondual.
Harold Coward, in his book Sphota Theory of Language,
puts the matter this way:

The logic of Bhart.rhari's philosophy of language is
that the whole is prior to the parts. This results
in an ascending hierarchy of speech levels. The word
is subsumed by the sentence, the sentence by the
paragraph, the paragraph by the chapter, the chapter
by book, and so on, until all speech is identified
with Brahman."(35)

The recognition of spho.ta's nonduality is obscured
by the fact that it is always experienced in
association with the dhvani. Due to the one's
inability to see through the pluralism of dhvani to
the underlying unity of spho.ta, human language
becomes understood as a collection of discrete and
mutually contradictory words designating discrete
and mutually contradictory forms in the world.
Hence, the underlying unity of reality, and of the
divine Word which is reality, remains hidden.

Bhart.rhari's philosophy of language cannot be
understood apart from its metaphysical moorings.
Unlike much of the linguistic analysis current among

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contemporary Western philosophers, much of the study
of language in the Hindu context is pursued for
extralinguistic reasons. T.R.V. Murti, makes this
point when he says, "through philosophy, Speech
becomes conscious of itself. It awakens to its role
as the creator and matrix of Word and Meaning which
encompass the entire universe of things."(36) This
sentiment is at the center of the grammarian concern
with language, a concern shared by Vallabha.

In an accolade to K.r.s.na, Vallabha says, "You are
the Lord of the Word (vaagii'sa)"(37) and goes on to
explain that by an ontological "speech-act" the Lord
of the Word enters into the process of becoming; in
this process God is revealed as matter, person, and
Lord. Thus, Vallabha explains that God "is present
within all effects which correspond to the meaning
of a Word,"(38) and is the ultimate denotative locus
of each and every word, sentence, theory, and
metaphysical speculation.(39) Herein lies Vallabha's
radical reversal of Maadhyamika's programmatic
excision of all metaphysical discourse. Replacing
Maadyamika's "coming to rest of the world of named
things" (prapa~ncopa'sama) with a joyous embrace of
the world of named things (prapa~nca), Vallabha's
theology stands as an invitation to share in God's
delight, where word, object, and the relationship
between them participate in the ontological reality
of a God who speaks.

Given Vallabha's perspective on langauge, it should
not be surprising that he placed great importance on
the use of words in the creative process;
philosophy, mythology, revelation, poetry--all are
authentic means for revealing the true nature of
God. In this regard, Vallabha's theology appears
shaped, at least implicitly, by one of the most
influential thinkers in the arena of Indian
aesthetics, Abhinavagupta.

VI. ABHINAVAGUPTA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

Abhinavagupta, associated with the school of Kashmir
`Saivism, wrote on both aesthetics and metaphysics;
his greatest contribution to the Indian history of
ideas is the connection he forged between these two
areas of philosophy. According to J.L.Masson and
M.V.Patwardhan, "Abhinava is able to restore to
poets an important place in the intellectual
hierarchy by showing their underlying philosophical
seriousness."(40) By adapting the view of language
presented in Bhart.rhari's spho.ta theory, (41)
Abhinavagupta described the inner dynamics at work
in the creation and appreciation of poetry and art.

Unlike the relatively exclusive, rarified activity
of metaphysical thinking, the wide appeal of the
literary arts makes them particularly well suited to
evoke a transcendental experience of special
spiritual value. The process has been described like
this:

...watching a play or reading a poem for the
sensitive reader entails a loss of the sense of
present time and space. All worldly considerations
for the time being cease.... We are not directly and
personally involved, so the usual medley of desires
and anxieties dissolve. Our hearts respond
sympathetically

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but not selfishly. Finally the response becomes
total, all-engrossing, and we identify with the
situation depicted. The ego is transcended, and for
the duration of the aesthetic experience, the normal
waking "I" is suspended.(42)

A full description and analysis of Abhinava's views
on poetics and aesthetic experience is, of course,
beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say
that central to aesthetic experience is the category
of "rasa," the manifestation of a particular emotion
in the mind of the audience. Like spho.ta, rasa
denotes not only the experience in the mind of the
audience, but also the creative experience of the
poet, and finally the essence of all the factors
that make the literary work what it is.(43) There
are many different kinds of rasa corresponding to
the spectrum of human emotions, but according to
Masson/Patwardhan, the pluralism of rasa is unified
in the preeminent 'saantarasa, a profound experience
of tranquility and bliss. Like the spho.ta theory
for Bhart.rhari, 'saantarasa provides Abhinava with
the metaphysical ground for all aesthetic
experience, and ultimately points to the underlying
unity between the aesthetic (rasaasvaada) and the
religious (brahmaasvaada).

This view, however, has been forcefully challanged
in an article by Edwin Gerow and Ashok Aklujkar.
According to their critique far from providing a
coherent philosophy of aesthetic experience,
'saantarasa remains a sort of embarrassment to
Abhinava's poetics.

Since the state of 'saanti, as the goal of the
viraagin, involves the renunciation of emotional
attachment, the 'saanta rasa... would in effect
become the emotional awareness of the absence of
emotion! The 'saanta rasa poses the threat of
confusing the "real" world of philosophical,
spiritual experience with the "transient" one of
art.(44)

The wedge driven between rasaasvaada and
brahmaasvaada is powered by the idea that the
multiplicity and transience characterizing rasa
("reflecting the inherently complex character of
man's emotional life")(45) are simply incongruous
with the "oneness" and permanence of "real"
spiritual experience. Any attempt to reduce one to
the other does damage and disservice to both. Far
from making it preeminent, or giving it status as
the metaphysical ground, Abhinava strove to
neutralize 'saantarasa, isolating it in a special
category kept distinct from the other rasa. In this
way it could not desiccate the complexities of
emotional coloration required by artistic expression
and aesthetic experience.

To its credit the Gerow/Aklujar critique stands as
an important corrective to the Masson/Patwardhan
elevation of 'saantarasa. However, in the final
analysis, this critique is seriously compromised by
its uncritical reliance upon Advaita Vedaanta
categories in developing the problem of relationship
between rasaasvaada and brahmaasvaada. Contrary to
the basic assumption behind their critique, Abhinava
did not directly adopt the ontology of Advaita
Vedaanta. Even though the nondualist label is
appropriate for Abhinava's Kashmir `Saiva

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context, his advaita differs significantly from
`Sa^nkara's.(46) For Abhinava, as for Vallabha, the
ontological gulf between a "really real" Brahman and
an illusory world is specious. Gerald Larson makes
the aesthetic implications of this ontological shift
clear when he says:

For Abhinavagupta what appears to be important is
the fullness or one might even say the "concretion"
of the ultimate or absolute, which sublimates
subjectivity and objectivity... and is actively
present throughout the manifested world on all
levels. Such an ultimate or absolute can only be
suggested or evoked, and hence it was probably no
accident that Abhinavagupta was preoccupied with the
dimension of the vikalpa-realm which comes closest
to evoking or manifesting the ultimate--namely, the
aesthetic or suggestive use of language as found in
poetry and drama.(47)

Abhinava was not operating from within a
metaphysical framework which isolates the religious
from the aesthetic, nor was he suggesting a
reductionism which effaces the constituent
multiplicity and complexity of the aesthetic
experience in some silent Other. Compare this with
Vallabha's theology of revelation: the world as
God's process of creative self-revealment could be
said to be homologized in the aesthetic experience.
Like the aesthetic, an enlightened experience of the
world (prapa~nca) voids the categories "I," "me,"
and "mine," while delighting in the diversity which
arises for the sake of delight.

For Abhinava, and I believe for Vallabha as well,
poetry and literature through the medium of
dhvani--the words and sounds that make up the
work--provide a context for a revelatory experience.
Just as in the moment of realization (saayujya) the
process of Becoming becomes transparent to itself,
allowing its inherent unity to shine forth, so, too,
at the highest level of aesthetic experience, the
fundamental unity within diversity is revealed to
the connoisseur of rasa. At that moment he is lifted
out of the ordinary mode of consciousness which
perceives the world in terms of "I," "me," and
"mine, " and yet he remains conscious of the
diversity through which the poet speaks; from this
perspective and rigid distinction between aesthetic
experience and religious experience seems
superfluous. No wonder that the experiencer of
'saantarasa has been compared with the religious
contemplative(48) as well as the
grammarian-philosopher.(49)

The practical advantage of employing poetic
expression as a medium for religious revelation lies
in its ready accessibility and wide appeal.
Abhinava's theory of aesthetics recognizes the
potential in every human being for genuine religious
experience even in the absence of the radical
withdrawal from the world required by the life of
contemplation or the rigorous intellectual training
demanded by the vocation of metaphysical thinking.
One evidence that this democratizing force is
supported by the theology of Vallabha is the strong
literary-poetic movement emerging early on within
the Vallabhite tradition. In addition to the
a.s.tachaap, the eight poetic giants of the early
sampraadaya, the tradition counts among its ranks
the poet and philosopher Jagannaatha Pa.n.di-

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taraaja (seventeenth century A.D.) , who was
responsible for making explicit the central role of
aesthetics in the theology of Vallabha through the
systematic adaptation of Abhinava's thought into the
Vallabhite context.

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Much has been left unsaid in this condensed
presentation of some major trends in the history of
Indian thought. My effort in this article has been
to provide a context for understanding not only what
Vallabha has said, but also why he said it. In
developing his theology Vallabha was aware of the
currents in Indian thought of his time, as well as
the historical and textual origins of that thought.
Although Buddhism was no longer an important
religious force in medieval India at the time of his
writing, the legacy of the Maadhyamika challenge to
any program of metaphysical speculation remained.
Vallabha's response to that challenge was the
unabashed affirmation of a God who first speaks to
create a world and then, speaking again, draws his
devotees beyond the limits of human discourse. Being
honest to the Word of God, he rejected Nyaaya's
rational theology, which amounted to nothing less
than a divination of human logic, the Maadyamika
critique notwithstanding.

Advaita Vedaanta can also be viewed as a Vedaantic
response to the Buddhist critique of "God-talk."
Reacting to the Maadhyamika reduction of all
subject/ predicate logic to absurdity, `Sa^nkara
proposed a Brahman who was beyond predication, and a
world which was, in the final analysis, a mere
appearance. This pushes God not only beyond the
domain of human logic, but also beyond the
possibility of human contact. It results in a
cosmological dualism--an unbridgeable gulf between
man and God--precluding the possibility that God may
speak and that man may hear. For Vallabha this
position was unacceptable, for it denigrated the
reality of a God who speaks by reducing Him to a
silent "Other."
Seeking to establish his theology of a speaking
God--a God who is simultaneously immanent and
transcendent-Vallabha adopts, modifies, and
integrates ideas from various branches of Indian
thought: from Miimaa.msaa he borrows a hermeneutical
methodology in an attempt to reveal the absolute
integrity of scriptural revelation; from the
Grammarians he adopts a philosophy of language to
show how God speaks and the implications of that
speaking; and from the tradition of Indian
aesthetics he develops the implications for language
used as a medium for the expression of religious
sentiment.

Vallabha was more than a synthetic thinker. Responding
to the inherited context, he developed a new
theology rooted in scriptural realism: to take God
seriously means to take the words of God seriously.
Any claim to know something about God must remain
honest to the words spoken by God, even when these
words appear self-contradictory. Through his
theology of Word, Vallabha affirmed the fundamental
paradox of God's creativity. The fact that Being,
nondual and absolute, chooses to become many is
beyond the ken of

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logic. Vallabha was a philosophical theologian who
recognized, and masterfully engaged, both the power
and the limits of human reason. In this, I believe,
he has something to teach us today.

NOTES

1. Diana L. Eck, Banaras: City of Light (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), p. 223.

2. For a detailed account of the Maadhyamika view on
this issue, see chapter fourteen, "Self and the
Way Things Really Are," in Mervyn Sprung's Lucid
Exposition of the Middle Way (Boulder, Colorado:
Prajna Press, 1979), pp.165-186.

3. Ibid., p. 151.

4. C. D. Bijalwan, Indian Theory of Knowledge (New
Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1977),p. 49.

5. Ibid., p. 68.

6. Janaki Vallabha Bhattacharyya, ed., Nyaaya-Ma~njarii:
The Compendium of lndian Speculative Logic (Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), pp.295-297.

7. Karl Potter cites Udayana's AAtmatattvaviveka in
this regard, in Presuppositions of India's
Philosophies (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood
Press, 1972), p. 240.

8. George Chemparathy, An Indian Rational Theology:
Introduction to Udayana's Nyaayakusumaa~njali
(Vienna: The De Nobili Research Library, 1972),
p.86.

9. L.Stafford Betty, Vadiraja's Refutation of `Sa^nkara's
Non-Dualism (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), p.17.

10.na hi maayaavaadaadimate 'sriik.r.s.naadirvyava-
haaryatvaad brahma bhavitum arhati te tu sadaan-
andacitsvaruupam ity aahu.h ata.h svamate yathaa
tathaa padaarthasiddhyab haavaac ced bhaktimaa-
rgaanusaare.naiva vadantiiti j~naatavya.m tadaa
te.saa.m pratitantranyaayaabhyupagamasiddhaanto
bhavati (commentry to verse 100). Note: The
`Saastraartha is quoted here from K.N.Mishra,ed.,
Tattvaarthadiipanibandha.h (Varanasi: Anand
Prakashan Sansthan, 1971). All translation from
Sanskrit is mine, unless otherwise noted.

11.taad.r'so'pi bhagavadruupa.h anyathaa asata.h
sattaa syaat (commentary to verse 23).

12.Bhaagavatapuraa.na, 10.39.55.

13.vidyaavidye hare.h 'saktii maayayaiva vinirmite
te jiivasyaiva naanyasya du.hkhitva~n caapy
anii'sataa (verse 31).

14.abhimatyaatmakatvaat asattvenaasya ga.nanaat
aj~naana.m bhrama.h asad ityaadi'sabdaa aha.m
mametiruupe sa.msaara eva pravartante na tu
prapa~nce (commentary to verse 23).

15.sa.msaarasya layo muktau na prapa~ncasya
karhicit (verse 24a).

16.aatmarama.naanantara.m tirohitam iva bhavati iti
maayayaa taad.r'sabhaava.h tena ve.s.tita.m bhavati...
sarvatra svecchayaa paricchedaavabhaana.m coktam
(commentary to verse 25).

17.anantamuurti tadbrahma hy avibhakta.m vibhaktimat
(verse 26b).

18.sajaatiiya vijaatiiya svagatadvaitarvajitam
(verse 66a).

19.B.rhadaara.nyaka Upani.sad, 1.4.3.

20.rama.naartham eva prapa~ncaruupe.naavirbhaavokte.h
vaicitrya.m vinaa tadasambhavo yata.h (commentary
to verse 23).

21.yatra yena yato yasya yasmai yadyadyathaa yadaa
syaad ida.m bhagavaan saak.saat pradhaana-
puru.se'svara.h (verse 69).

22.Francis X. D'sa, `Sabdapraamaanyam in `Sabara and
Kumaarila (Vienna: The De Nobili Research Library,
1980), pp. 29-30.

23.Ibid., p. 194.

24.Ibid., p. 200.

25.Satyakam Varma, Vaakyapadiiyam (Brahmakaanda) of
Shri Bhart.rhari (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal,
1970), p.1.

26.V.S.Agrawala, The Thousand-syllabled Speech
(Varanasi: N.p., 1963).

27.Pradipkumar Mazumdar, Philosophy of Language: An
Indian Approach (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar,
1977),p.3.

28. Ibid.,p.3.

P126

29.Iyer believes that Bhart.rhari's view of causality
is in agreement with the vivarta theory: he bases
his view on the supposition that the v.rtti, or
commentary, written on the Vaakyapadiiya was the
work of Bhart.rhari. See K. A. Subramania Iyer,
Bhart.rhari (Poona: Deccan College, 1969),p. 130.
30.Iyer, Bhart.rhari, pp. 98-99.

31.Ibid., p. 99.

32.Gaurinath Sastri, A Study in the Dialectics of
Spho.ta (Delhi:Motilal Banarsidass, 1980), p.xii.

33.Ibid., p. 89, n. 14.

34.K. A. Subramania Iyer, trans., Vaakyapadiiyam of
Bhart.rhari (Poona: Deccan College, 1966), cited
in Harold G. Coward, Spho.ta Theory of Language
(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980), p. 73.

35.Coward, Sphota Theory, p. 15.

36.T. R. V. Murti, "Some Comments on the Philosophy
of Language in the Indian Context," Journal of
Indian Philosophy 2(1974): 325.

37.vaagii'sa ki.m te vacaniiyam asti (commentary to
verse 1).

38.sarve.sv ever padaarthe.su kaarye.su svaya.m
ti.s.t.ha.ms taany antarayati (commentary to
verse 70).

39.ekaiko vaado brahma.na ekaikadharmapratipaadakai-
kaikavaakya'se.sa iti bhagavaa.ms taan sarvaanevaa-
nusarati (commenary to verse 70).

40.J. L.Masson and M.V. Patwardhan, Saantarasa and
Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics (Poona:
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1969), p.
ix.

41.Coward,Sphota Theory, p.75.

42.Masson and Patwardhan, `Saantarasa, p. vii.
43.G.B.Mohan Thampi, "Rasa as Aesthetic Experience,"
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (Fall 1965):
75-79.

44.Edwin Gerow and Ashok Aklujar, "On `Saanta Rasa
in Sanskrit Poetics," Journal of the American
Oriental Society 92, no. 1 (1972): 82.

45.Ibid.

46.This is one of three basis theses of Gerald
Larson's "The Aesthetic (rasaasvaada) and the
Religious (brahmaasvaada) in Abhinavagupta's
Kashmir `Saivism," Philosophy East and West 26,
no. 4 (October 1976): 371-387.

47.Ibid., p. 383.

48.Masson and Patwardhan, Saantarasa, p.viii. Coward,
Sphota Theory, p.76.