Proto-Maadhyamika in the Paali canon

·期刊原文
Proto-Maadhyamika in the Paali canon

By Luis O. Gomez
Philosophy East and West
26:2 April 1976
p. 137-165

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p. 137

El que all? llega de vero
de s? mismo desfallesce;
cuanto sabia primero
mucho baxo le parece,
y su sciencia tanto cresce,
que se queda no sabiendo,
toda sciencia trascendiendo.

These words of Saint John of the Cross could be
taken as the epitome of the wisdom of the
mystics--beyond all human science, not to be grasped
by rational discourse.(1) The mystic dwells in the
unassailable fortress of his own silence.
Unfortunately (or, perhaps rather fortunately), there
is more than one way of abiding in the sublime bliss
of the silentium mysticum, and more than one way to
attain it. There are legitimate and spurious
ecstasies, variously defined by different traditions.
Moreover, whether he remains silent or speaks, the
mystic cannot avoid returning to the province of
worldly convention, where silence would speak as much
as words. Silence is not univocal, nor is it
noncommittal, yet the ineffable seems to require it.
There is no reason for ignoring the beauty and
mystery of this dilemma. This is the mystic bind, a
tension that has not been ignored by more than one
mystic tradition; thus there is the famous koan:

Wu-tsu said: 'Traveling a road you meet a man of the
Way, do not greet him with words nor with silence.
But, tell me then, with what will you greet him?'

The equivocal nature of silence extends of course
to the experience that evokes it, and nothing is
gained by asserting that all mystics just preach and
praise ultimate silence. Nor can we avoid the
important role of doctrinal contents and framework in
the formation and direction of a mystical path of
silence. The idea that one could escape the
complexities of Buddhist thought, for example, by
characterizing it as a via mystica or as a "yoga"
would be rather simplistic. Even if the original
"enlightenment experience" of the founder was an
experience beyond all thought categories, it was
nevertheless in some way specific. The experience
behind the yoga is not contentless even when defined
as such. This is not to say that the idea of a
"doctrine of freedom from all conceptual contents" or
"an experience free from the constraints of
conceptual thought" is an impossibility. There is a
certain specificity to silence, and to the very idea
of the absence of a theoretical position; otherwise
all the proponents of the voie du silence would have
to agree with even their most vociferous opponents,
and this has yet to happen.

In fact, not only is the mystical science of
silence indeed a difficult science and a definite
commitment to a specific mode of behavior or
apprehension, there are also different modes of this
"mystical science." The injunction to seek
-------------------------------
Luis O. Gomez is Associate Professor of Buddhist
Studies, Department of Far Eastern Languages and
Literatures, at the University of Michigan.

p. 138

silence or to stop verbal profuseness can have more
than one purpose, more than one intended meaning.
Obviously, the mystics themselves consider that the
insufficiency of language operates at more than one
level. In this article a few of these levels will be
considered in the very specific framework of the
A.t.thakavagga of the Suttanipaata, while exploring
possible parallels between this Paali text and the
Madhyamaka of Naagaarjuna.

At the outset I would like to suggest that we
isolate, merely as a heuristic device, a few of the
categories within which one could consider various
Buddhist views (not always purely mystical) on the
insufficiency, inadequacy, or obstrusiveness of
words. These categories are not always mutually
exclusive, but at the same time one does not
necessarily lead to or contain the other. One could
distinguish two greater categories: (1)The Buddhist,
in attempting to explain the experience of the goal,
or the goal itself, may and often does affirm that
words cannot describe the goal (words cannot
encompass the goal); and (2) in describing the path
to that goal, he may insist that words are an
impediment in the path (by words one does not reach
the goal). To a greater or lesser extent, most
Buddhists agree on the first proposition, but their
emphasis on the second and their interpretation of
the connection between the first and the second
differ radically from one school to another.

These two basic categories can be broken down in
several ways. One could be tempted to think that
"silence about the Buddha" is primarily ontological
in purport and the "the Buddha's silence" is
methodological in nature, but this is only partly
true. Silence about the goal cannot be reduced to an
ontological stance. This type of silence includes a
very heterogeneous lot, for example, pragmatic
silence as in the parable of the poisoned
arrow(3)---a clear case of methodological silence.
One may also subsume under the first category of
silence about the goal the subclass of laudatory
silence, as in those cases when we are simply told
that the Buddha is so inscrutable that words are
inadequate to praise him. There is also the silence
of the Buddha himself, who "never preached a single
dharma.(4) This class is inextricably related to both
main categories; but, though it spans both the goal
and the path, it also includes the important class of
silence as an element in the behavior which follows
becoming a Buddha. Under silence about the goal the
most important class is, nevertheless, ontological
silence. The ultimate goal does not belong to the
realm of the speakable. A Buddha cannot be reached
"by the roads of speech."(5)

Our second main category, silence as part of the
path, also may be taken to include a variety of
doctrines about language. There is the pragmatic
silence mentioned in the previous category: if speech
is superfluous in the practice of the path, then it
is merely a waste of time. (6) But speech can also be
misleading, it could, by its very nature, lead astray
the follower of the path. This quality of speech
could be due to simple moral reasons or to
psychological reasons or even to epistemological
reasons. That is to say, talk could be an impediment
because it is the epitome of the world's sham and
frivolousness, as in "the most

p. 139

talked about," etc. Or it may be an impediment
insofar as it leads to a mental distraction,
agitation, and turbulence. Lastly, it could
constitute an obstacle because it offers a semblance
of reality, thus fooling the practitioner into
complacently believing that he has seen face-to-face
what he simply knows by words. The Buddhist
scriptures move back and forth from one category to
the other, perhaps with very good reasons, for thirst
(t.r.s.naa) and nescience (avidyaa) exist by mutual
generation.(7)

Silence about and in the goal is mystical silence
proper, that is, the silentium mysticum. But silence
in the path could be described more accurately as
"ascetic silence," that is, silence as a preparatory
exercise (propaedeutica mystica) .(8) Basically it
falls into two classes: the path-silence proper which
leads directly into mystical silence and moral or
eremetical silence which simply prepares the
environmental ground for the former.(9) Ascetic
silence, for instance, can be a way of emptying the
mind in order to make it receptive to an influx of
external light, as in the infused contemplation of
some of the Christian mystics. This type of ascetic
silence is often connected to, but still separable
from, the silence that stems from humility: the
recognition of man's impotence before the might of
God. These two differ from eremitical silence, the
purpose of which is to retreat from worldly
commitment and business, as in the beatus ille qui
procul negotiis. But all these forms can and often do
coalesce in one ascetic practice, often appearing in
the instructions of the ascetics as interdependent
and mutually reinforced.

TEXTUAL NOTE

Some of these views on words and silence form the
leading themes in the fourth book of the Suttanipaata
and are found in several significant passages in the
fifth book. The last two books of the Suttanipaata,
A.t.thakavagga and Paaraayanavagga, respectively,
constitute no doubt the oldest strata of the work and
belong to the oldest of the Paali texts.(10) The
significance of these passages cannot be exaggerated.
In many ways they anticipate (rather than foreshadow)
some of the key doctrines of the Great Vehicle and
often help establish possible connections or smooth
transitions from the Buddhism of the Nikaayas to the
Buddhism of the Great Vehicle. One is tempted to
discover here a common ground, unfortunately
neglected by the Abhidharmist and long forgotten by
the Great Vehicle.(11)

When I first read the Mahaaviyuuha-sutta of the
Suttanipaata I was impressed not only by its
freshness and directness, but also by its
originality. Somehow its advocacy of abstention from
disputes and arguments stood out as a unique stance
that could not be easily reduced to a simplistic
doctrine of abstention from disputes for the sake of
the peace of noninvolvement. It also seemed evident
that the pronouncements made in this sutta could not
be reduced to other, more common teachings of the
Paali Canon without doing some violence to the text.
Stock phrases which in the Canon were used to
indicate the highest

p. 140

knowledge, such as "jaanaami passaami" and
"~naa.na",(l2) were used here to indicate the false
science of those who were still attached to views.
Moreover their attachment was not deemed to be merely
the attachment to wrong views, but to views in
general. Also, there was no question here of teaching
the superior dharma, rather the point was that the
true follower of the path would not prefer any
dharma; he would make no claims to the possession of
a higher dharma.(13)

Further consideration of Suttanipaata passages
from the A.t.thakavagga and the Paaraayana showed
that these two sections differ radically even from
the rest of the Sn itself. The Suttanipaata passages
we have considered in this article--mostly from the
A.t.thaka--stand out among the Paali texts much like
the Mahaaviyuuhasutta. These passages strike the
reader as some of the most explicit and
representative statements of an extreme apophatic
tendency found elsewhere in Buddhist literature. This
tendency---or is it a contemplative tradition of some
kind?--reappears later in the literature of the
Perfection of Wisdom, and, even more patently, in the
Praasa^ngika Maadhyamika and in the various Ch'an
lines.

This tendency could be characterized in the
theoretical realm as the doctrine of no-views, and in
the practical realm as the practice of practicing no
dharmas. In its more extreme manifestations this
tendency is diametrically opposed to the doctrine of
right-views and the practice of gradually and
systematically cultivating the true or pure dharmas.
"Morally" it stands on an ascetic discipline of
silence which corresponds and leads to the higher
goal of silencing the mind's imaginative-discursive
faculties, whereupon the mystic reaches the ultimate
state of inner silence, considered to be itself
beyond all possible theoretical description.

Contrary to the customary insistence on "right
views" the A.t.thakavagga speaks of giving up all
views. One cannot avoid feeling that the injunction
of the Nikaayas to give up hankering for truth,
views, morality, and vows is only taken in earnest in
the A.t.thaka.(14) The men of wisdom are described
again and again as those who do not find support or
preference in anything:(15)

They fancy not, they prefer not, and not a single
dharma do they adopt. No true brahman can be led by
vows or morality; he who is thus, gone beyond, does
not rely on anything. (803)(16)

Instructions to the follower of the path could not be
more explicit:

Renounce all vows and moralities, and [all] those
acts, whether blamable or unblamable, throw away [all
ideas of] purity and impurity, fare dispassionate,
grasp not at peace. (900)

As we will see presently, this is no injunction to
moral indifference. In what way is total renunciation
like indifference?

How is this renunciation completed? The
Suttanipaata shows that there is

p. 141

still more to deny in defining the path. This
mystical science excludes all views and theories:

Giving up assumption, unattached, he builds no
reliance on knowledge itself... he does not rely on
any view whatsoever. (800)(17)

This attitude, if we may describe it thus, has
important behavioral consequences which the stanza
summarizes with the phrase "he does not take sides
among [those who uphold] the various
assumptions."(18) But, for the time being, let us
remain with the topic of not relying on views. This
idea is in fact well known to us through the
traditional doctrine of the Middle Path--avoiding the
two extremes. Thus, not to rely on views is in a
certain way a form of nondualism. However, one could
not overemphasize the distinctive mark of the
nondualism of the A.t.thakavagga (A.t.tha).(19) As in
so many passages from the Suutra literature, the
Middle Path is primarily the path of nonattachment.
Such passages put on trial attachment and its
destructive psychological effects, not the
metaphysical validity of the two extremes. The mind
moors in diverse opinions, clutches at them
passionately. The clinging to views of this
opinionated being is what perverts him; which opinion
might be the "correct" one is ultimately irrelevant.

The A.t.tha's recommendation is to abandon this
mooring or installation (nivesana) in views, this
leaning toward the extremes of this or that, which is
the result of the mind's forging an immutable
apperception (sa~n~naa) of things. The truly wise are
free of these fixations. According to the fourth poem
of the A.t.tha:

He who has no leanings here to either of the two
extremes: being or not being, here or beyond, he has
no moorings whatsoever, no clutching while
distinguishing among dharmas. (801)(20) He has not
formed (or fancied) even the least apperception in
what is here seen, heard or thought.., (802)(21)

He is not like those who are "entranced by the
passion of their views" (891d).(22) For he knows that
men are not released by means of opinions and
theories:

If a man were made pure by viewing, or if he could
abandon sorrow by means of knowledge, then one still
having additives (sopadhiko) would be purified by
something other [than himself]. It is indeed mere
opinion to speak thus. (789)(23) A true brahman is
not called pure because of something other, whether
seen or heard, whether vows of morality or something
thought. [He lives] unsoiled by sin or merit, having
given up assumptions, not fashioning any more here.
(790)(24)

The Mahaaniddesa fails to understand the true
purport of this passage when it glosses: "If a man
were made pure... by another, impure path, by a false
path...other than the Noble Eightfold Path...."(25)
The very context of the whole poem (788-795, A.t.tha
section iv), shows that the view under attack is that
of him who relies on knowledge (pacceti ~naa.na.m)
about things seen, heard or thought. Moreover,
another stanza, from section xiv, confirms our
interpretation:

p. 142

Only he should bring himself to rest. not elsewhere
should the bhikkhu seek peace. For him who has
brought himself to rest there are no assumptions,
whence, then, could there be non-assumption? (919)
(26)

This emphasis on ''self" in opposition to "other" has
no immediate metaphysical implications. It is simply
a forceful manner of expressing complete detachment
from all dharmas:

Whatever dharma he knows. whether in himself or
outside, in it he makes no station; for the good do
not call this true rest. (917)(27)

Let him not by such [a dharma be led to] think that
something is better, or worse, or even the same.
Touched by multiple forms, let him remain without
distinguishing or fancying (vikappayan) himself.
(918)(28)

We may now return to section iv and let the
concluding stanzas sum up the message of the poem:

They do not fancy, they do not prefer, they do not
say: 'This is total purification'. Once free from the
knotted knot of grasping, they have longing for
nothing in the world. (794) Gone beyond all limits, a
true brahman, he has no clutchings. whether by
knowing or seeing. He does not delight in passion nor
does he delight in dispassion. For him there is
nothing more to clutch at here. (795)(29)

The theme of grasping or clutching recurs
throughout the A.t.ha, and the root of this grasping
is always presented as bound to opinions and talk. It
is extremely difficult to go beyond our habitual
mooring in views because of our habit of clutching at
our distinctions among dharmas (801. 795ab). This
grasping, moreover, is the cause of our delusion
(84lab) . Upon it a man builds his world of
preferences, attachments, pat-ties, contentions and
disputes (862-873). But, what is the cause of our
preferences and attachments? The misdirected mind,
specifically the wrongly applied faculty of
apperception (sa~n~naa).(30) Apperception leads to
dualities, graspings, conflicts, and sorrow because
of its two primary functions: its power to
conceptualize and define (sa.mkhaa) and its tendency
toward division and multiplicity (papa~nca). The
capacity of these faculties to generate friction and
frustration is reinforced by the root apperception of
"I" and "mine." The A.t.tha, however, does not have a
consistent doctrine on the question of what causes
what, nor does it offer a complete or clear teaching
on the role of the idea of a self or an "I." In one
key passage it seems that the "I" idea and "thirst"
have similar or rather parallel roles:

Let him bring to a stop all the root of conception
and dispersion, [that is, ] the thought `I am'.
Whichever thirst there is in him let him drive away
as he trains ever mindful. (916)(31)

Venturing a free gloss of this stanza, one may
understand the process by which mindfulness destroys
the moorings and hankerings of the mind in the
following way: mindfulness pulls the mind back to the
ever-fleeting present, away from its extensions into
the past and the future.(32) In this way it acts in
exactly the opposite direction of the process of
apperception, and thus uproots con-

p. 143

ception (by which the "I" freezes reality to fit our
views and desires) and dispersion (by which the mind
runs out after things in order to make them
"mine").(33)

In the extremely important, yet obscure final
stanzas of the Kalahavivaadasutta (A.t.tha, poem xi),
after a pithy description of how "form is made to
cease"(34) by means of the control of
apperception,(35) the poem concludes: "for dispersion
with conception have apperception for their cause."
(874)(36) The causal series presented in this poem
reminds us of the one described in the
Sakka-pa~nhaa-sutta of the Diigha: (37) both take
human conflict and aggression as the final effect
(not old age and death) , both offer primarily
psychological explanations of the problem, without
explicit references to cosmological or eschatological
conceptions. In both texts man's choosing between the
dear and the not dear is at the root of friction and
frustration, and this picking and choosing is rooted
in wishing or wanting (chanda). In the Diigha, chanda
depends on vitakka (mental discourse), and vitakka
depends on mental (and verbal) dispersion (papa~nca).
The Kalahavivaada is more subtle, but also more
repetitive and less linear. This is not the occasion
to deal with this difficult passage in detai1,(38)
suffice it here to say that, according to this sutta,
opinions and desire (or wishes: chanda) are equally
rooted in the dualities of pleasant and unpleasant,
coming to be and ceasing to be. These dualities are
caused by contact (phassa), which here seems to be
synonymous with appropriation and the idea of "mine."
Contact depends on name and form, and name and form
can be "made to cease"(39) by bringing about a change
in the process of apperception. Thus, the calming or
bringing to rest of the process of apperception which
lies at the root of clinging, and therefore of
suffering, is the ultimate goal of the way of
silence. Not holding on to any view, not mooring in
things seen, heard, or thought, quieting down all
talk (vaada) and contention (vivaada) is an important
part in the process of quieting down affective and
cognitive dispersion (prapa~nca); the other element
in the process, mindfulness, is properly the
instrumental arm by means of which the mind is
brought to a state of emptiness from apperception.
And this state of emptiness is the only state that is
beyond suffering.

Having arrived at this juncture where the
abandonment of views and opinions is justified in
terms of its place in the process of overcoming
suffering, we are introduced to another type of
silence: the silence of the goal. The goal is clearly
a state in which "name and form are no more." This is
not a state of unconsciousness, obviously, but we
must take a few lines to allow the Sn itself to
dispel those suspicions of nihilism which are still
provoked by the over-enthusiastic rhetoric of
apophatic Buddhism.

Perhaps such suspicions are aroused with
particular force by the deservedly famous
Upasiivamaa.navapucchaa of the Paaraayana(section
vii: 1069-1076). There we are told how to reach
release in the following words, which summarize much
of what has been said above:

p. 144

Mindfully watching the [realm of] no-thing, (40)
relying [only] on "there is not", cross the flood.
Giving up desire, detached from all talk, day and
night look into the extinction of thirst. (1070) He
who has left behind attachment to all desires,
relying on no-thing, abandoning ought else, is
released in the ultimate release from apperception.
There he is firm, not to be followed. (1071)(41)

This passage should not be interpreted in terms of
the meaning that its vocabulary has in other parts of
the Tipi.taka, but, if it is understood as literally
as possible, it will reveal to us a fresh and
illuminating message. The realm of no-thing
(aaki~nca~n~nam), for instance, cannot properly be
construed as a reference to the classical hierarchy
of the samaapatti. Here this "nothing" is at the very
core and apex of the meditational path. It is that
upon which the practitioner establishes his
meditation. Giving up external perturbations
(desire-- talk) he mindfully looks into the empty,
still point of his concentration. In order to look
into this point he must rely on "no-thing" and give
up everything else (sense objects, sensations,
conceptions, etc.). This practice leads to release
from apperception.

Is this then a state of unconsciousness? In spite
of all the evidence to the contrary, one still finds
the term sa~n~na (sa.mj~naa being taken to mean
"consciousness"(42) That the meaning of the term is
close to some of the Western philosophical uses of
"apperception" is clear from the scholastic
literature and from scattered contextual
evidence.(43) In the Sn, sa~n~na is the basis for
conception and verbal distinctions (874) ,
apperceptions are formed or fashioned (pakappitaa...
sa~n~naa) (802), they can be the object of attachment
(792, 847), and together with views they are the
primary object of grasping (847) . It is also
difficult to see how the term sa~n~naa could mean
"perception" in the context of the Sn, where the
sa~n~naa are found to be formed or fashioned by the
mind, and where we are told that dualities arise from
the apperception of permanence (886). But then, is
the Upasiivamaa.navapucchaa speaking of a cessation
of apperception or conceptualization when it defines
the highest goal as "the release from sa~n~na"? This
question is best answered by the Kalahavivaada. The
problem there is how to bring to rest all "name and
form."(44) In other words, how do you stop the
conflict of dualities which is at the root of all
worldly conflicts? Form is made to cease in the
following way according to the sutta:

When he has not an apperception of apperceptions,
when he had not an apperception of non-apperception,
when he does not not apperceive, when he does not
have apperceptions without an object, for him who has
attained to this, form ceases, for apperception is
the cause of dispersion and conception. (874)(45)

No matter how we interpret the term sa~n~naa, it is
obvious that the paradoxical rhetoric of this passage
does not justify assuming that the goal is in any way
the mere stopping of mind processes or perception
tour court.

Another passage in the A.t.tha throws some light
on the meaning of the abandonment of apperception. In
the Maagandiyasutta, known by title to the

p. 145

compilers of the Sa.myuttanikaaya,(46) the goal is
described in the following terse lines:

The truly wise does not form opinions on the basis of
views or things thought out, he is not made thus. He
would not be led by actions nor by learning, he would
not be led to moorings of any kind. (846) For him who
is detached from apperceptions there are no knots,
released by insight he has no delusions. Those who
hold on to apperceptions and views go around in the
world in constant conflict. (847)(47)

The stopping of apperceptions follows the
bringing to rest of all predispositons of the mind
(732).(48) With this, all strife is ended:

For nowhere in the world does the pure fashion views
about being or non-being. The pure, having abandoned
all sham and opinions, completely detached, who could
reach him? (786) Attachment leads to talk about
dharmas. How then, and who, could talk about the
detached? For the has no assumptions, nor is he
without assumptions; he is here cleansed of all view.
(787)(49)

The clear emphasis on nonduality and freedom from
opinions, freedom from talk (whether it be what the
man released from apperception would have to say
about the world, or what the world would have to say
about him), is in fact quite apposite in the frame of
reference of the path suggested in the A.t.tha. The
Paaraayana uses a somewhat different terminology.
There the vi~n~naa.na is fixed in becoming and is
thus perturbed by becoming; the goal is to bring this
vi~n~naa.na to rest. This is not the place to discuss
the meaning of this elusive term, but for the
Paaraayana I find Hare's rendering quite appropriate
("mind at work"), and the usual "consciousness" very
inappropriate. (50) Be that as it may, we are here
concerned only with the fact that in the section on
the questions of Upasiiva (quoted earlier), the
Paaraayana abstains from asserting the cessation of
the vi~n~naa.na, and actually speaks of a release
from apperception (sa~n~naavimokhe). Moreover, in
this very same passage the question of language is
brought up again in a manner reminiscent of the
A.t.tha and not so characteristic of the Paaraayana.

In the first place, the discipline of the path
includes detachment from talk (virato kathaahi)
(1070). In the second place, the goal, the highest
release, is found in the release from apperception
(1072). Lastly, the man who has attained to this goal
is himself beyond the province of language and
conception, he cannot be in any way described or
defined:

"... he who is thus cooled and released, is there for
such a one any ideation (vi~n~naa.na)?"

"As a flame blown out by a gust of wind "ceases" and
cannot be reached by conception, in the same way the
muni, released from name and body, "ceases" and
cannot be reached by conception." (1074)(51)

He who has gone to cessation, is he no more? Or is
he in eternal well being?..." (1075)

"Of him who has gone to cessation there is no
measure, there is nothing in

p. 146

terms of which they could speak about him. When all
dharmas have been uprooted, all the ways of speech
have also been uprooted." (1076)(52)

These lines bring to mind immediately the concluding
lines of the Kalahavivaada:

Some wise men say that the highest here is the
cleansing of the spirit, still others among [the
wise] who call themselves experts on the
"remainderless"(53) say that it is passing away.
(876) But knowing that they rely still, the Muni
knows and examines [the object of] their reliance.(54)
The man who is released does not seek dispute, he
does not give himself to becoming nor to
non-becoming. (877)

According to these passages, the way to the goal
is a way of silence, the goal is beyond words, and
the man of the goal is himself beyond all talk and
speculation. Because an essential part of the
solution to the problem of sorrow and conflict is the
eradication of all "moorings of the mind",
attachments to apperceptions, the path and the goal
can best be described in terms of a nonduality or
middle path. The man of wisdom seeks to abandon the
thirst for nonexistlence as much as the thirst for
becoming (856, 1068, 801). The path is also described
in terms of this nonduality:

Cleansing is not attained by things seen or heard,
nor by knowledge, nor by the vows of morality, nor is
it attained by not seeing or not hearing, nor by not
knowing, nor by absence of morals and vows.
Abandoning all these, not grasping at them he is at
peace, not relying, he would not hanker for becoming.
(839)(55)

It is again significant that the Paaraayana's
formulations of nonduality are often softer.(56) For
instance, instead of speaking of not grasping at any
dharma, as does the A.t.tha, the Paaraayana says that
the man of wisdom (here called bhikkhu in contrast to
braahma.na, which is more common in the A.t.tha) is
an expert in all dharmas (1039, 1112). The A.t.tha is
always very explicit about its radical views:

When a man confined in views puts something first in
the world as "the highest", calling all else "the
lowest," he has not gone beyond dispute. (796) The
experts call a knot (bond) that leaning on which one
regards everything else to be lowly. Therefore the
bhikkhu does not lean on anything seen, heard or
thought, nor no morals and vows. (797)(57)

Those who, grasping at views argue and say: "Only
this is the truth," to them you should say when talk
begins: "There are none here to reply to you in
strife." (832) But those who do follow a path of not
taking sides, who do not oppose views by means of
views, from them who will you obtain, Pasuura, from
them who here do not have a "highest" to grasp at?
(833)(58)

In conclusion, it is obvious then that the
A.t.tha's intention is not to propose a different
view. Nor does it propose a nonview (systematic
rejection of all views). The involved rhetoric of
this short text seems to be aimed at an injunction to
detachment from the tendency of the mind to become
fixed in cognitive and affective extremes, in
immutable mind-made polarities. I do not believe we
could consistently interpret the A.t.tha as the
pronouncement of a self-serving

p. 147

Buddhist who believes that the clash of views is
counterproductive merely because there is only one
correct view and that he who possesses that view
(that is, the Buddhist) can afford not to enter the
ring of dispute, for, after all, he knows that he is
right. No, we have in the A.t.tha a doctrine of
nonduality, found elsewhere in the Paali Canon only
sporadically. Whether the practice of such a doctrine
is humanly possible is another question, which is not
the concern of this article.

The A.t.tha does, however, point at a possible
reason why such a doctrine is necessary:

There are not in fact many and various truths, except
for the worldly apperception of "permanents."
Fashioning arguments on views, they pronounce a
duality of dharmas: `true and false." (886)(59)

The holding on to these apperceptions of
immutable principles or objects is growing roots in
mere figments of the imagination. The stability of
these principles is deceptive, for they are in fact
wrought by an unstable mind:

Who still has principles (dhammaa) fashioned,
constructed, prejudiced and not cleansed, when he
sees advantage in assumption, he is [only] relying on
a "peace" which depends on agitation. (784)(60)

The defender of views, of course. favors his own
views above all others (904), but,

The true brahman does not attach himself to fancies
or concepts, he does not regard any view as all
important, nor is he a friend of knowledge. Yet,
having known the opinions of men at large, he regards
even-mindedly the extremes at which others clutch.
(911)(61)

Whatever opinions are held by men at large, he,
having known, does not form attachment to any of
them. Why should the unattached seek attachment, he
who does not give in to things seen or heard?
(897)(62)

But together with its pronouncements on views and
talk, the A.t.tha weaves in important contemplative
and moral (or, perhaps better, ascetic)
recommendations. Mooring in views, grasping at
apperceptions, is not fundamentally a cognitive
process and it must be stopped by a specific method
of ascetic training.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
One should train ever mindful, driving out whatever
thirst there is within. (916cd)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Touched by multiple forms, he will not make a station
in them fancing himself [as this] or that.(918cd)(63)

He should grow calm in himself, the bhikkhu would not
seek peace from something else.... (919ab)

These lines are followed by specific instructions on
how to attain "calm within himself":

p.148

His eyes do not roll about,(64) he turns his ear away
from village talk, he does not hanker after flavors,
nor does he consider as "mine" anything in the world.
(922)

He does not gather and make store of things to eat,
drink, chew, or wear, nor is he afraid of not
obtaining these. (924)

Let him be intent on contemplation, not loitering
around, let him put a stop to worrying, let him not
be unheedful. He will seek to dwell in a spot where
noises are few. (925)

He would not be led to speaking falsehood, ever
watchful, he is free of sham and malice,(65) he will
not despise others for their way of life, for their
wisdom, for their morals or vows. (931)

But the most characteristic elements in the conduct
of the sage are his nongrasping at the ideas of `me'
and `mine' and the resulting detachment from views,
opinions, and comparative judgments:

He who has no idea of `mine' in all names and forms,
nor grieves at what is not, he loses nothing in the
world. (950)

For whom there is no 'this is mine' or `another's is
that' with respect to anything, he has found nothing
to make into `mine' and never grieves `this is not
mine'. (951)

The muni does not speak of `equal', `low' or `high';
serene, having left all egotism behind, he does not
grasp at anything nor does he reject anything. (954)

This man who does not form a support on anything is
then free from the thirst to become one thing or stop
being another. (856)(66) He is no longer attached to
views and opinions, which are nothing but our attempt
to fashion the world in our own image. Calm. free of
desire to become, of desire to establish himself, he
turns away from talks and disputes (859); he is in
fact beyond talk, for his virtues, his calm, and his
detachment do not belong to the province of talk and
conception (913-914, 876-877, 1076).

The distinctive moralizing tone of many passages
in the A.t.tha cannot be overlooked. At times one
cannot avoid the feeling that the whole discourse is
about the bliss of escaping worldly noise and strife.
One is reminded of the words of Fray Luis de Leon:

iQue descansada vida
la del que huye del mundanal ruido;
y sigue la escondida
senda por donde han ido
los pocos sabios que en el mundo han sido !(67)

But the passages we have quoted above should convince
the reader that the moralizing and the praise of the
hermit's life are, in fact, ancillary to a more
fundamental message. Views and disputes are not
simply abandoned out of the convenience and peace of
la vida retirada; at their roots is a fundamental
error, wrong apperception, and a fundamental moral
wrong, clinging to `I' and `mine'. Views and disputes
are the external signs of passionate apperception;
talking, opinionating, gimmicking are the signs of
inner turbulence and crazy

p. 149

grasping, The path recommended in the A.t.tha is then
a path of detachment, but primarily of detachment
through silence, outer and inner silence.

Moreover, the goal itself is very appropriately a
state of silence in the sense that the apperceptive
faculty is "calmed into submission." At this stage
the mind rests only on its silent center. Because it
clings now to no apperception, because it is free of
dispersions and fixations, there is no way that it,
the mind itself, can be described or pinpointed by
the way of talk or concept. Thus, the primary purpose
of methodological silence is not disengagement or
solitude but the discovery of the inner silence which
is calm.

With regard to ontological silence, the A.t.tha
does not present a full theory in the sense of a
metaphysical edifice or groundwork for the
ineffability of the ultimate goal. Nor can we
interpret the A.t.tha in terms of a given right-views
theory. In other words, the A.t.tha is not proposing
an indirect or preparatory means of establishing or
cultivating a specific right view, nor a world view
which must be hidden under the mantle of silence or
protected from the worldly by reserving it for only
those who are worthy of it. What is found in the
A.t.tha is (1) a psychology of human friction and
frustration, and (2) a few pointers to a human
condition beyond the present state of friction and
frustration--all of which can be summarized in an
injunction to practice a type of silent mindfulness
and concentration, in which no specific view is to be
sought or upheld.

Thus, the A.t.tha's doctrine of silence in is no
way empty of a theory. There is, certainly, a basic
theory with regard to clinging and the ineffability
of nonclinging. The A.t.tha's doctrine, however, is a
`no-doctrine'' in the sense that someone who accepts
this doctrine is expected to have an attitude with
respect to it which is precisely the contrary of what
we normally expect from someone who espouses a
theory. And this is not the philosophical silence of
skepticism nor the methodological bracketing of the
phenomenologist. It is the simple fact that to be
practically consistent, a theory of the silencing of
the moorings of apperception must be self-abrogating.
Thus, the theory is incomplete without the practice
because theory cannot silence itself by itself. It
must culminate in a practice which will bring its
consummation by consuming it.(68)

COMPARATIVE NOTE

One is of course immediately tempted to compare
the religion without an ultimate concern of the
A.t.tha with the speculative flights of the
Maadhyamika. There too prapa~nca and adhinive`sa
stand out as two of the main enemies.(69) There too
all views (d.r.s.ti) are to be given up for the sake
of a goal about which the Great Sage never pronounced
a single word.

According to the Prasannapadaa (Pras 351),(70)
emptiness is also called nirvaa.na because it is
defined as the stopping of all mental and linguistic
dispersion (prapa~nca). This dispersion is nothing
but talk, the talk that chains men to things (Pras
373, 448); it involves the conflict between the
multiple polarities that define things in the world:

p. 150

knowledge and the knowable, speakable and speaker,
doer and act, cause and effect, jars, clothes, crown
and chariots, form and sensation, women and men, gain
and loss, happiness and sorrow, fame and disrepute,
blame and praise, etc... (350)

When the mind seizes at things there is this
dispersion (350-351) from which results the mind's
uncontrolled fancying (ayoni`so vikalpa: 350-351,374,
452).(71) As part of this mental disorder, mooring
(abhinive`sa) in the ideas of `I' and `mine' grows;
and this is the root of the perturbation of the
kle`sas, which is the cause of rebirth. (351) Only
when seizing at an immutable form for things ceases,
through the vision of emptiness, does the whole
series end. (350-351)

The goal then is to put to rest all seizing or
apprehending sarvopalambhopa`samah: xxv. 24a) ,
putting to rest the dispersions of the mind
(prapa~ncopa`samah: xxv. 24b). This goal is not
defined by any ultimate principle, the Buddha in fact
never taught a single dharma (xxv. 24cd). For what is
sought is the bringing to calm of the harborings of
the mind. The Maadhyamika seeks to stop all
apprehensions of an immutable reality, thing or
principle, all apperceptions of being and not being,
coming to be and ceasing to be. For,

When no being is obtained, which one could imagine
not to exist, then, deprived of all basis, how could
non-being stand before the mind? When neither being
nor non-being stand before the mind, then, having no
where else to go, without support, the mind is
brought to rest.(72)

Thus, the true function of emptiness is to free
the mind of its own harborage and hankering.
Emptiness, then, cannot constitute itself a view, a
principle; it cannot be reified if it is to fulfill
its liberating role:

The non-operation of all views which is the escape
from all grasping and mooring, that is here
emptiness. (247)

Emptiness, wrongly perceived brings destruction....
(xxiv. II)

The conquerors describe emptiness as the escape from
all views, but those for whom emptiness is a view,
they are called `incurable'. (xiii. 8)

The Master spoke of the abandonment of both coming to
be and ceasing to be, therefore, nirvaa.na cannot be
appropriately called neither being nor non-being.
(xxv. 10)

Ultimately, truth is beyond the reaches of knowledge
itself, beyond all speech. (374)

When the mind processes [of fancying and
apprehending] are no more, whence would there be a
superimposition of signs (nimitta), without this
[superimposition] whence would there be the process
of speech. It is therefore firmly established that
the Blessed Buddhas have never taught anything. (364)

A Buddha is free of all fancying and mental
fashioning. He is therefore beyond all speech, He
never preached any dharmas. (366)

Further-more, nothing can be said about the
Buddha. Those who believe that they can come to
understand the Buddha through the prolixity of their
talk and speculation have not seen the Buddha in
truth (xxii. 15). They are like blind

p. 151

men looking at the sun. (448)(73)

The Maadhyamika doctrines referred to above are
all strongly reminiscent of the A.t.tha. Yet, there
are no parallels in the A.t.tha corresponding to the
philosophical groundwork of the Madhyamaka. We miss
the rhetoric of the tetralemma, the ontological
framework of causation and dependent origination, the
double truth, etc. It is true that the analogy does
not break down because of these differences; the
basic elements which we recognized in the A.t.tha are
for the most part in the Madhyamaka: silence as a
part of the way to calming the workings of wrong
apprehension, a goal beyond all talk and the
conqueror of the goal who is beyond all description
or verbal apprehension. And these are, no doubt,
characteristic of and central to the teachings of
both A.t.tha and Madhyamaka. Yet, the differences
that exist are seldom unimportant, though they may be
considered subtle or marginal to the religious quest.

The radical statement of "Buddha's silence" as
found in the Madhyamaka is not to be found anywhere
in the A.t.tha, or, for that matter, in the whole
Paali Canon. One thing is to say that Buddhas do not
cling to views and do not enter into disputes, and
another is to say that from the moment of his
awakening the Buddha never spoke a word. It is not
only a question of emphasis or rhetorical
pyrotechnics. There is an important philosophical
difference. In the first case we are dealing with a
very concrete description of the way to do something
and of the results that follow, in the second case we
are dealing with the ontological explanation and
justification of the experience and its value,

We find agreement on the fact that truth is not
multiple (Madhyamaka xviii.9, A.t.tha 886ab), but the
A.t.tha makes no attempt to define the one truth. The
Madhyamaka, it is true, ends up by declaring that the
one truth is neither truth, nor untruth, etc. (xvii
8), but the point is that while Naagaarjuna seeks to
establish dialectically and ontologically the value
and significance of nonapprehension, the A.t.tha is
taking that very nonapprehension as the point of
departure for practical injunctions. The A.t.tha
requires silence because it contributes to final calm
and release, the Maadhyamika, because all dharmas are
beyond speech, ineffable, empty and from the
beginning pure (Pras. 539).

The A.t.tha does not seem to be at all concerned
with the existence of a formed body of Buddhist
--doctrines (if there was one of them), or with the
possibility that these doctrines could be
incompatible with its teachings of nonduality,
whereas Naagaarjuna is patently conscious of the
conflict. On the one hand, he seeks to derive as much
as possible of his doctrine from the rhetoric of
older speculations and dogmas. On the other hand, he
is forced to construct a hierarchy of two levels of
truth, by means of which he will secure a place among
Buddhist "truths" to the specifics of the path as
taught in the suutras.

It is true that the "ultimate truth" of the
Madhyamaka is beyond all words and understandings
(Pras. 493) and is thus placed on a similar position
as the goal of the A.t.tha; but the moment that a
"conventional truth" is posited the situation
changes. This conventional truth or transactional
truth (vyavahaara)

p. 152

is a necessary element in the plan of the path, for
without it one could never reach the ineffable
ultimate (xxiv.l0). Such subtleties are a far cry
from the direct and simple injunction to silence of
the A.t.tha. The "double truth" could imply.
Naagaarjuna's protestations notwithstanding, the
hypostatizing of silence.(74) The A.t.tha is content
with freely jumping from silence to speech,
Naagaarjuna is still concerned with the
inconsistency. In other words, the A.t.tha seems to
have understood effortlessly that silence is not to
be reified, that mystical silence is not literal or
physical silence. The Maadhyamika, on the other hand,
requires the most abstruse rhetoric to wrestle with
the dilemma of words vs. silence.

But the greatest difference between the two
doctrines lies in their points of departure. The
A.t.tha sets out to find (or describe) a practical
solution to human sorrow, not merely the abstract
sorrow of rebirth, but the everyday sorrow of strife
and aggression. Naagaarjuna sets out to prove that
all dharmas lack self-subsistence
(ni.hsvabhaavaadharmaa.h). This leads to a concern
with conduct in the case of the A.t.tha, and, on the
other hand, a concern with dialectics in the case of
Naagaarjuna.(75)

SPECULATIVE NOTE

In conclusion, the A.t.tha's "theory of
no-theory" can be compared rather successfully with
the Praasa^ngika Maadhyamika stand. Parallels between
the two doctrines become more obvious and valuable if
we are willing to concede that the practical
motivations or imperatives behind the Maadhyamika are
close to those of the A.t.thakavagga. Moreover, the
Maadhyamika's opposition to the dharma and
svalak.sa.na theories of the Abhidharmists is
thoroughly consistent, though by no means identical
with the A.t.tha's rejection of all mooring in
dharmas.

At this point several highly speculative
questions arise. First, do we have in the
A.t.thakavagga an early example of a continuous
tradition of apophatic Buddhism? If so, could we be
justified in speaking of a "protomaadhyamika" in the
A.t.thakavagga? Last, what is the historical
connection, if any, of this proto-Maadhyamika and a
possible Indian "proto-Ch'an"? There is more than one
reason why these legitimate historical questions must
remain in the speculative realm. One does not have to
bring back to life the specter of "original Buddhism"
to be able to speak of earlier or latter strata in
the Canon, and the A.t.tha no doubt belongs to the
earliest.(76) The words "earliest" or "quite early,"
however, do not mean much in terms of absolute
chronology, nor do they, in the least, help to
clarify the A.t.tha's doctrinal or historical role in
the development of Buddhist dogmatics. Moreover, the
propriety of the term "protomaadhyamika" depends also
on the establishment of a definite connection between
the A.t.tha and the Maadhyamikas. One first step in
this direction would be to show that Naagaarjuna knew
the A.t.thakavagga or that he belonged to a monastic
or contemplative tradition stemming from a religious
milieu close or identical

p. 153

to that of the A.t.thakavagga. Although the later
seems likely, it is a thesis falsification insofar as
reliable spiritual lineages and hagiographies are
wanting. As to Naagaarjuna's knowledge of the Paali
Canon, it seems quite obvious that he must have known
some form of the Sa.myukta and the Madhyama AAgamas,
and by implication we may conclude that he knew the
other AAgamas, but there is no foolproof way of
determining specifically which were the texts he was
familiar with. Most certainly he believed that the
avyaak.rtaani held much of the key to understanding
the whole of the Buddha's message, but there is no
way of ascertaining whether the A.tt.ha was in anyway
pivotal to his exegesis of the canonical texts.

If the connection with Naagaarjuna is difficult,
or impossible to establish, any connection with the
Ch'an tradition must remain in the realm of pure
speculation. (77) It is somewhat suggestive that some
Indian masters found Ch'an congenial to their view of
the path. It is also interesting to note that as
Maadhyamika turned toward a svaatantrika position,
and its abhidharmic traits became stronger, it
eventually found itself in frank opposition to the
no-doctrine path of Ch'an at the bSam-yas debate
("Council of Lhasa").

In the present state of our knowledge it would be
more reasonable to discard the possibility of a
one-line transmission and assume that the apophatic
teachings of the A.t.tha, the Maadhyamika and,
perhaps, the Ch'an, represent one type of path
theory. It is also more accurate to envision this
type not as a unique and isolated phenomenon, but
rather as one tendency among others that grew among a
complex of doctrinal attempts to define, refine, or
map out the Buddhist mystical path.

Thus, in spite of the differences and
difficulties outlined above, the Maadhyamaka and the
A.t.tha both belong to the same type of Buddhist
tradition with regard to the value of views and the
function of conceptual thought. This is the same type
to which such traditions as the Ch'an belong, and
which is characterized by the rejection of all views:
views are not given up for the sake of right views,
what is to be abandoned is attachment to views.
Because such interpretation of the path presupposes
the goal of complete eradication of the conceptual
harborages of the mind, it is often connected to a
doctrine of jiivan-mukti or "leap theory'' of
release. This class of Buddhist plans of the path
should be contrasted to the "right-views" theories in
which the cultivation of right views and the gradual
transformation of mind is emphasized.(78) There are,
of course, intermediate types, such as we find in the
latter Maadhyamika of the Bhaavanaakramas. While most
Buddhists agree that the goal is beyond words, the
issue is whether the transition from specific verbal
directives or descriptions of the path to its
consummation in the final face-to-face experience of
the goal is best understood as a quantitative
transformation or as a qualitative leap.

The problem for the gradualist is the textual and
philosophic tradition which states that all dharmas,
being interdependent, are empty, therefore
ungraspable and from the beginning at peace. Such
doctrines seem to exclude the possibility

p. 154

or functional value of a gradual path, or of any path
at all.(79) By the same token, the "leap theory" must
explain how it is that specific actions must precede
awakening and the final obtainment of the goal. If no
specific steps are called for how is it that not
everyone is immediately liberated?(80)

The Madhyamaka attacks the problem by using the
traditional abhidharmic understanding of the middle
path as pratiitya-samutpaada. Causal connection
guarantees the specificity of the path. However,
Naagaarjuna is forced to bring in his double-truth
theory to save this very causal connection after he
has undermined it through his critique of
self-subsistence (svabhaava). The A.t.tha, on the
other hand, never considers these problems. Perhaps,
if we had to get an answer from the A.t.tha, we could
assume that the answer is to be found in the fact
that true nonclinging to views includes the negation
of all hypostases of negation: neither attached to
passion nor attached to dispassion (A.t.tha 795, 813.
et al.). In the end, in spite of all his scholastic
efforts, Naagaarjuna would probably agree with the
A.t.tha, for neither of the two is proposing calm and
silence as a reifiable absolute but as a
self-abolishing directive to nonclinging. In
principle, the problem of the function of the path in
emptiness never should have arisen, but precisely
because negation is in no way univocal, it had to
arise. The fundamental illusions which are at the
root of samsaric bondage belong to the realm of
language and conceptualization. But silence by itself
leads nowhere, first, because the process of
conceptualizing is indissolubly connected with a
basic state of thought and speech dispersion
(prapa~nca) which is affective as well as cognitive,
and second, because silence itself belongs to the
realm of speech.

Thus, our picture of the Middle Path would be
incomplete and unfaithful if we were to overemphasize
the cognitive aspect (avidyaa) at the expense of the
affective (t.r.s.naa), or if we were to take the
directive to silence as an injunction to live in the
bliss of the deaf and the mute. The wrongly directed
minding (ayoni`so manasikaara), which is at the base
of the agitation of becoming, must be uprooted by a
complete bringing to rest of clinging, affective and
cognitive. The pitfall of mystical ineffability is
that the directive to silence, if understood at a
purely cognitive level, could be reified and
transformed into a new apprehension of speech, a
source of further dispersion of thought and wordiness.
The directive of the A.t.tha thus comes close to that
of the Maadhyamaka: to take the pronouncements on
emptiness as the true view is to moor in emptiness as
if it were another object for clinging. But, unlike
the Maadhyamaka, the A.t.tha very aptly emphasizes
the connection between conduct (abstention from
strife, dispute, and frivolous talk) and meditation
(mindfulness, contemplation) on the one hand, and the
abandonment of clinging to views, on the other. That
is, the A.t.tha clearly sees the interconnectedness
of the various levels of silence. The Madhyamaka
lacks such a perception; but Naagaarjuna's masterwork
is an attempt at grounding the practice in a
philosophical rhetoric, it is not a guide to
practice. We should not make too much of its silence
with respect to the affective and practical side of
nonclinging, or assume that Naagaarjuna was ignorant
of this

p. 155

important aspect of Buddhism as a path of liberation.

In conclusion, one should not be too harsh with
Naagaarjuna. Many of the passages from the A.t.tha
that we have discussed above cannot be harmonized in
any way with much of what is found in the abhidharma
tradition of the Hiinayaana, against which, no doubt,
Naagaarjuna was reacting in the spirit of a tradition
close to that of the A.t.tha. In his study on
prapa~nca and sa~n~naa, ~Naa.naananda makes it a point
to criticize the Madhyamika for its excessive
dialecticism.(81) I tend to agree with his stance in
this regard, something of the spirit of the
Tripi.taka is lost among so much dialectical
flourish, but I cannot avoid feeling that
~Naa.naananda has chosen the wrong man to pick on. It
is true that both the Prajnaapaaramitaa and the
Maadhyamika (and later, in a similar spirit, even
Ch'an) tend to fall (almost addictively) into
formulistic word games and overlook the simple,
practical recommendations of some of the passages in
the Paali Canon, especially in the Nikaayas. But,
then, the same accusation could be made against the
whole of Buddhism, much of the Tripi.taka included.
The religion which rose out of the Buddha's silence
is no doubt one of the most verbose, abstruse and
pedantic of them all. And this applies in particular
to the abhidharma that Naagaarjuna was attempting to
refute. In many ways, Buddhism has failed to follow
the advice of the A.t.thakavagga: to keep away from
contentions and disputes by not grasping at views.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Early Buddhist views on the role of language and
theorization do not contain anything comparable to a
theory of language. With the exception of the older
parts of the Suttanipaata (A.t.thakavagga and
Paaraayana) and scattered passages in the Nikaayas,
the Paali tradition has adopted a view of avidyaa
which suggests a condemnation of specific theories or
views, rather than an outright rejection of the
clinging to theorizing and opinionating. The
ineffability of the goal is not taken to imply the
impossibility of theorization (as in the
Maadhyamika) , and theorization is not seen as
inextricably connected to clinging (as in the
Suttanipaata) . Nevertheless, the Paali tradition
preserves, in the Suttanipaata and elsewhere, several
important passages in which one could perhaps
discover some kind of "proto-Maadhyamika."(82) These
classic lines suggest, however, several
interpretations. not all of which lead necessarily to
a Maadhyamika position.

The Paali tradition contains in the first place
(and in a considerable majority of the cases)
passages which approach the question of languages
from a variety of ontological angles, namely: from a
moral perspective (slander, falsehood, etc., as
generators of unwholesome roots) , from the
perspective of the prophylaxis of meditation
(frivolous talk destroys calm and concentration),
from the point of view of established doctrinal truth
(one should not adopt or promulgate false teachings),
etc. But the least frequent passages are of greater
interest. These we have placed into two basic
categories: (1) goal-silence (the goal is

p. 156

utterly undescribable) and (2) path-silence (talking
and theorizing are obstacles in the path).

The various levels at which these views on language
and conceptualization are developed do not
necessarily meet in the texts and conceivably could
be considered or accepted separately and
disconnectedly, as they often are. However, they
could all fall into one pattern built around the
ineffability of the goal. And this happens in the
A.t.thakavagga, where the root of suffering and
becoming is discovered in the mind's tendency to
passionately cling to its own fancies: its own
prolific conceptualizations, rooted in wrong
apperception (sa~n~naa). This view of the position of
the conceptual process in the plan of the path is
theoretically close to Naagaarjuna, and in this sense
one could easily interpret most of the authentic
works of Naagaarjuna as consistent with at least one
non-Mahaayaana tradition.(83) Or one could propose a
type or tendency common to both the A.t.tha and
Maadhyamika surviving also in isolated passages in
the Nikaayas, such as some canonical interpretations
of the `indeterminables' (avyaak.rtaani).

However, one all important difference subsists
between the tone of the A.t.tha and that of the
Madhyamaka. Some key passages from the A.t.tha could
be called "proto-Maadhyamika" passages in the sense
that they anticipate some of the axial concepts of
the Maadhyamika. The A.t.tha, however, contains
explicit directives, consonant with its moralizing
tone, for the eradication of clinging and the
abandonment of theorization, and clearly makes way
for a corresponding contemplative and ascetic
practice. References to this practice are absent in
the Madhyamaka and scarce in the other works of
Naagaarjuna.(84)

Moreover, the theoretical framework of the
Maadhyamika is totally absent from the A.t.tha. The
twofold truth, emptiness, causation, and dependent
origination, the indeterminables, the tetralemma, the
equivalence of sa.msaara and nirvaa.na, are
conspicuous by their absence.

But then, perfect correspondence would be just
that, and not anticipation. Whether one is willing to
bestow the honorific of "proto-Maadhyamika" on the
A.t.tha depends mainly on whether one is willing to
recognize the practical core around which
Naagaarjuna's dialectical edifice has been built.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Note: References to Paali texts are all to the Paali
Text Society editions. by volume and page numbers
unless otherwise indicated.

Abbreviated References

Abhidharmako`sa: . references by ko`sasthaana and
kaarikaa numbers in P. Pradhan, Abhidharm-
Koshabhasya of Vasubandhu (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal
Institute, 1967)

A.s.taada`sa: referred to by folio of the Gilgit
Manuscript as edited by Edward Conze. The Gilgit
Manuscript of the A.s.taada`sasaahasrikaapraj~naa-
paaramitaa, Serie Orientale Roma, 26 and 46,
(Rome: ISMEO, 1962, 1974).

p. 157

Bhaavanaakramas:
G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts, Part II Serie
Orientale Roma, IX. 2, (Rome: ISMEO, 1958) .
Sde-dge xylograph. Tohoku No. 3926.
G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts, Part III Serie
Orientale Roma, 48, (Pome: ISMEO, 1971).

Bodhicaryaavataara: references to chapter and stanza
nos. in L. de la Vallee-Poussin's, ed., in
Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta, 1901-1914).

Bodhicaryaavataara Pa~njikaa: references to page in
the edition mentioned above.

Chalmers: R. (Lord) Chalmers, Buddha's Teachings,
Harvard Oriental Series, No. 37 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1932).

Da`sabhuumika: Ryuko Kondo, Da`sabhuumii`svaro naama
Mahaayaanasuutram (Tokyo: Daijyo Bukkyo Kenkyo-kai
[sic], 1936).

Ga.n.davyuuha: ed. P. L. Vaidya (Darbhanga: Mithila
Institute, 1969).

Hare: E. M. Hare, Woven Cadences, Sacred Books of the
Buddhist, 15 (London, 1948).

Ka`syapaparivarta: ed. (Baron)A. von Stael-Holstein
(Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926).

Lalitavistara: S. Lefmann, Lalita-Vistara, Leben und
Lehre des Caakya-Buddha, Vol. 2 (Halle, 1902,
1908).

Madhyamaka: references to chapter and karika in L.
de la Vallee-Poussin, Muulamadhyamakakaarikaas de
Naagaarjuna avec la Prasannapadaa Commentaire de
Candrakiirti, Bibliotheca Buddhica, No. 11 (St.
Petersburg, 1903-1913).

Madhyaantavibhaaga-.Tiikaa: ed. Susumu Yamaguchi
(Nagoya: Librairie Hajinkaku, 1934).

Mahaavastu: ed. Emile Senart, 3 vols. (Paris, 1882--
1897).

Neumann: K. E. Neumann, Die Reden Gotamo Buddhos aus
der Sammlung der Bruchstucke Suttanipaato des
Paali Kanons, (Leipzig, 1911).

Nyanaponika: annotated German translation of
Suttanipaata, (Konstanz: Verlag Christiani, 1955).

Pa~ncavi.m`sati: Pa~ncavi.m`satisaahasrikaapraj~naapaaramitaa,
ed. Nalinaksha Dutt, Calcutta Oriental Series, No.
28 (London, 1934).

Prasannapadaa: ref. to pages in Madhyamaka, above.

Vajracchedikaa: Vajracchedikaapraj~naapaaramitaa, ed.
E. Conze, Serie Orientale Roma, XIII, 2d ed.
(Rome: ISMEO, 1974).

NOTES

1. The stanza is from St. John's poem "Coplas del
mismo hechas sobre un extasis de harta
contemplacion", pp. 410-412 in Ruano's edition:
Crisogono de Jesus, Matias del Ni~no Jesus, y
Lucinio Ruano, Vida y obras de San Juan de la
Cruz, Doctor de la Iglesia Universal, (Madrid:
Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1972). The lines
can be prosaicly translated: "He who truly arrives
there, will loose consciousness of himself;
whatever he used to know now seems insignificant
to him, yet his science grows so much that
afterwards he remains knowing, even beyond all
science.'' The gulf that separates the Christian
mystic's view of silence and ignorance as
conditions of the mystic path and goal from that
of the Buddhist can be fully appreciated by
perusing St. John's remarks in Noche oscura, I. 10
ff., II.11 ff., these chapters are analyzed in
Leonard A. McCann, The Doctrine of the Void in St.
John of the Cross (Toronto: Basilian Press, 1955).
Compare also, St. John's comments on the lines "
... la musica callada, la soledad sonora..." in
Cantico espiritual, canciones 14 y 15, sec. 25-26,
in Ruano. Also, Dichos de luz y amor, 131, and
Federico Ruiz-Salvador, Introduccion a San Juan de
la Cruz (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos,
1968), pp. 99-104, 429-442.
2. Wu-men-kuan, case xxxvi. Furuta Shokin, Mumonkan,
(Kyoto: Kadogawa Bunsho, 1968) , p. 124. The
problem of words and silence is repeatedly taken
up in the Ch'an tradition, confer, for example,
the locus classicus in Yuan-wu's comments on the
Pi-yen lu's case lxv (pp. 269-278 in Asahino
Sogen's edition, Hekigan-roku (Tokyo: Iwanami
Shoten, 1937). In this passage the simplistic
stereotype of Ch'an's aversion to words is exposed
for what it is. There is a parallel case in
Wu-men-kuan xxxii; also compare case xxiv.
Yuan-wu, by the way, chastises Vimalakiirti for
his superficial "answer" to Ma~njusri's question.
Important desiderata in this area of Ch'an are
studies

p. 158

of the mo-chao ch'an and k'an-hua ch'an conflict
and, of course, on the yen-ch'uan kung-an (gosen
koan).
3. Majjhima Nikaaya, I. 426-432.
4. The Paali Canon never used such a strong formula
to express the ineffability of the Buddhist
message. The stronger form is clearly Mahaayaana.
The classical statement is found in Prasannapadaa,
p. 366, a passage quoted by Bu-ston to show that
sectarian and school differences in Buddhism are
"ultimately" meaningless.
5. See our comments on Suttanipaata 1076, below. The
"roads of speech" are also mentioned in the
Ka`syapaparivarta, section 125: "He does not moor
in Dharma even in terms of dispassionateness, how
much less then by the utterances of the roads of
speech!" (vaakpathodaaharena). Compare A^nguttara
Nikaaya, II. 9, where the Tathagata is said to be
vaadapathaativatta. Also compare, Ga.n.davyuuha
(Vaidya) pp. 17, 21, 22 and 184, Da`sabhuumika
(Kondo) p.14, Pa~ncavi.m`satii, p. 212, and A.s.
taada`sa, folio 253a.
6. Cf. the interpretation of prapa~nca as "delay" or
"obstacle" in the Pali Text Society Dictionary,
s.v. Also, compare, Pa~ncavi.m`sati pp. 200,
491-492, and A.s.taada`sa f. 250a.
7. Itivuttaka, p. 34; Abhidharmako`sa, III. vs. 27 -
29 and VI. vs. 3 (corresponding to L. de la
Vallee-Poussin, III. pp. 69-72, 88-91, and VI.
pp. 136-139.
8. E. Cornelis, in his Valeurs chretiennes des
religions non chretiennes (Paris: Ed. du Cerf,
1965), p. 162, mentions the fact that Jaspers
considers "que la secheresse meme des
nomenclatures de l'abhidharma est un procede
stylistique exactement adapte aux necessites d'une
propedeutique au silence mystique." Unfortunately
no reference is given.
9. The distinctions we have drawn here seem to be
purely a priori or, better, formal, and
similarities on this point do not contain
necessary material implications. Some of these
distinctions are made explicitly by St. John in
Subida del Monte Carmelo, III.II.I, "... para que
el alma se venga a unir con Dios en esperanza, ha
de renunciar toda posesion de la memoria, pues
que, para que la esperanza sea entera de Dios,
nada ha de haber en la memoria que no sea Dios; y
como (tambien hemos dicho) ninguna forma, ni
figura, ni imagen, ni otra noticia que pueda caer
en la memoria sea Dios ni semejante a El, ahora
celestial, ahora terrena, natural o sobrenatural....
de aqui es que, si la memoria quiere hacer alguna
presa de algo desto, se impide para Dios..."
Similar considerations appear in, op. cit., III.3.13,
5.3, and passim. For mystical silence, cf. Llama
de amor viva, 2.21, and Dichos de luz y amor,, 27,
99, and, on the anagoge, 138. On ascetic silence,
see Subida, III.3.4, 5.1-2, and 9; Dichos, 117,
121, 155, 179, and St. John's letter of 22
November 1587 to the nuns at Beas,in Ruano, p. 371.
In some of these passages ascetic and eremitic
silence are not separated in any way, as is to be
expected.
10. Regarding the age of the Suttanipaata and the
"Arthavargiiya" see the summary of the question
in Yamada Ryujo, Daijo Bukkyo Seiritsu Ron
Josetsu, Shiryo Hen: Bongo Butten no Shobunken,
(Kyoto: Heirakuji, 1959) , pp. 54-55 (on
Arthavargiiya), 25-27 and 48 (on Suttanipaata).
11. In the scholastic literature, the Suttanipaata is
quoted extensively only in the paracanonical work
Nettipakara.na (canonical in Burma). There is,
however, one full commentary attributed to
Buddhaghosa, the Paramatthajotikaa (the first part
of which is dedicated to the Khuddakapaa.tha), and
commentaries to books IV (A.t.thakavagga) and V
(Paaraayanavagga), the Mahaa- and Cuu.la- Niddesa,
respectively (both canonical).
12. Sn, 908, 911. Henceforth all references to
Suttanipaata will be given with the abbreviation
Sn followed by the stanza number, according to the
Paali Text Society edition, or simply with the
stanza number when the context leaves no doubt
about the source.
13. Sn 905 and passim.
14. On the traditional d.r.sti-`siilavrata-paraamar`sa,
cf. Abhidharmako`sa, V. 7-8. But also compare
A^nguttara-Nikaaya (henceforth, AN), II., p. 42:
"kaamesanaa bhavesanaa brahmacariyesanaa saha iti
saccaparaamaaso di.t.thithana samussaya"; AN, III.
p. 377, Majjhima-Nikaaya (henceforth, MN), I., p.
433. Digha-Nikaaya (henceforth, DN), III., p. 48,
etc. Compare the use of upaadaana in MN, I., pp.
50-51: "kaamupaadaana.m di.t.thupaadaana.m
siilabbatupaadaana.m attavaadupaadaana.m", also,
MN.I., pp. 95-97. Detachment from all virtues and
convictions is also prescribed by St. John.
Confer, for example. Subida del Monte Carmelo,
Book II, i.2, xxix.8, and III, iii.3 and ix.3, but
contrast Book II, xvii.4 and also Cautelas, 3, and
Cantico Espiritual, iii.3, the inconsistencies in
St. John clearly are due to reasons quite
different from the ones behind similar
inconsistencies in Buddhism,

p. 159

see, for example, Subida II, vi,l ff. and Noche
Oscura, I, vi.8. The relinquishment of virtue is
not to be construed as antinomianism; in Buddhism
the number of texts substantiating this point are
legion. Perhaps one of the most apposite loci
classici is the Sama.nama.n.dikasutta (MN, II.,
pp. 22-29).
`siila-vrata (siilabbata or siilavata) could be
read as a determinative or a copulative compound,
but in Sn 839 the word is broken up as a
copulative. The word `siila, incidentally, is also
closer to the etymological meaning of our words
moral and morality (mores) than to the
contemporary usage of these terms.
15. In quotations, the stanza number will follow each
stanza being quoted.
16. A number of difficulties arise in translating
this passage. Purekkharoti seems to mean "prefer"
(as per 794 and 859), as it does sometimes in
classical Sanskrit, but it also suggests the idea
of "prejudging" or "predetermining." Also, neyya
(as in 846) could mean "to be followed" or
"imitated," that is, "to be copied, pin pointed or
figured out" by means of his habits (`siila) and
convictions (vrata).
17. Here atta (apta) is clearly "what is adopted or
assumed (cognitively and affectively)," compare,
787 and 790ff. Hare translates "assumption" and
Nyanaponika, not so gracefully, "das einst
Geglaubte," implying that there is a new `belief'
to be adopted once the past (non-Buddhist) beliefs
have been abandoned.
I am translating ni-`sri and its derivatives
(nissaya, nissito, etc.) with various forms of the
verb "to rely." Hare uses "trust" or "have
recourse," which is quite alright, but I prefer to
preserve something of the literal meaning of
"leaning on."
18. "Sa ve viyattesu na vaggasaarii" (800c).
19. Henceforth A.t.tha will stand for A.t.thakavagga.
20. The first line, "Yassuubhayante pa.nidhiidha n'
atthi," is rendered by Hare: "Who here directs his
thoughts to neither course"; Nyanaponika, "Der
kein Verlangen hat nach beiden Enden," Neumann.
"Nach beiden Enden wer da nimmer hinspaht";
Chalmers, "When pray'rs for future life... cease."
Basically, the problem seems to be pa.nidhi,
Neumann and Chalmers take this world in its ]ate
meanings, but it is more appropriately construed
in its literal meaning of "placing down [-forth],"
hence, "direct" or "fix" [the mind]. Hare and
Nyanaponika are both acceptable, but Nyanaponika's
rendering fits the context better. As usual, be
follows Mahaa-Niddesa closely, where the word is
glossed (p. 109), "ta.nhaa...abhijjhaa, lobho...."
But, in this passage the inclination (pa.nidhi)
being described is something more than mere
longing; the word obviously refers to inclination
in general, and the two extremes could be
emotional, moral, or conceptual.
21. Kappa and pakappayati: "form [in the mind],"
"fancy," the process by means of which the
apperception (sa~n~naa) is formed, this gives rise
to the multiplicity of fancies or imaginings
(vikappa). The dividing factor is the papa~nca,
the fixation factor is the sa^nkhaa. The kappa is
the active function of the "moulding" (Hare) of
the sa^nkhaara. See the pertinent notes of
Nyanaponika in pp. 266 (on Sn 209), 281 (on Sn
373), 293 (on Sn 530), 257-258 (Sn 148), and 293
(on the key stanza 538). However, his comments on
sa^nkhaara, p.305. are not as apposite, since he
fails to see the closeness of the Sn usage to
another, related term: abhisa^nkharoti. His
interpretation of sa~n~naa in the Kalahavivaada
also seems to be a bit off the mark, for he still
feels that the term is being used there in the
context of the classical four samaapatti schema,
which is obviously not the case. Nyanaponika,
however, does take the term as we do in a latter
part of his note on stanza 874, where he
translates papa~ncasa.mj~naasa^nkhaa with
"Vorstellung und Begriff der Vieiheitswelt, "
(p.332). But his translation of 874d is weak:
"Denn vom Bewusstsein stammt die Vielheitswelt in
ihren Teilen," this in spite of his commentary
notes.

Muta has also been variously interpreted; I
take it to belong with the root man (thus, with
muni, etc.). Compare sa.mmuti and stanzas 714,
798-799, 846, and, especially 839. Nyanaponika's
"Erfahrendes' seems to me a good compromise
between the commentatorial derivation from m.r`s-
and the derivation from man-; he takes it, though,
correctly to be cognate to mata. (Also, compare,
Cuu.la-Niddesa, p. 298, and Mahaa-Niddesa, pp.
87-89.)

It would seem pertinent at this point to
mention two important passages from the Nikayas in
which nonattachment to things seen, heard, etc. is
formulated in the succint manner of the A.t.tha,
but in obvious reference to mindfulness. The
Bahiya-sutta (Udaana I. 10) is the most condensed
of the two and makes no explicit reference to
craving for sense objects. This aspect of the
doctrine is

p. 160

brought out in the Maalu^nkya-sutta (or Maalukya)
of the Sa^myuttra Nikaaya (hence-forth, SN), IV.,
pp. 72-74, where mindfulness is presented not only
as the antidote to lust, but also as the final
condition of the mind, beyond all dualities and
moorings of the mind (Saara.t.thapakaasinii,
however, interprets differently). Compare, also,
Theragaahaa, stanzas 794-817.
22. "Sandhi.t.thiraagena hi te `bhirattaa."
23. I take upadhi literally (upa-dhaa), but there is,
of course a certain sense of "cover up," "sham."
The poet is playing here with the idea of
foraneous matter (a~n~nena) piling up as
"additives" or "agglutinants" to build up a
semblance of a self. An upadhi is a "substratum"
only in the sense that it is a base we build in
order to have something to lean on, but it is not
a real base, it is something added to the true
nature of things, not something underlying them or
giving any real support to illusion.
24. "Fashioning", pakubbamaano. Compare, abhi(ni)sa^m-
kharoti.
25. Pp. 85-86. Followed by Nyanaponika in 789 and
790.
26. This passage could not be more reminiscent of the
Maahdyamika. Compare, also, Sn 795d, 813d, and
860d.
27. "Rest," nibbuti.
28. "Naatumaanam vikappayan ti.t.the." An equally
acceptable rendering: "Though touched my multiple
forms, he would not make a station [in them]
fancying himself [to be this or that]." Evidently,
vikappayan is to be taken in the sense of
"separating and contrasting" oneself with respect
to the multiple forms of the world. Thus,
Nyanaponika, "Nicht moge man sein Selbst
vergleichend unterscheiden." The word ruupa,
however, encompasses much more than the "Tugenden"
of Nyanaponika's rendering.
29. Nyanaponika takes samuggahiita as a noun meaning
"dogmas," but it is clearly a participle of much
broader meaning, and interchangeable with
uggahita, "that which is grabbed, grasped, or
clutched." The change from the third person plural
of 794 to the singular of 795 is in the original
text.
30. Sec note 21, herein. Also see Bhikkhu Nanananda's
excellent study on papa~nca and
papa~ncasa~n~na-sa^nkhaa: Concept and Reality in
Early Buddhist Thought (Kandy: Buddhist
Publication Society, 1971). Our interpretation of
sa~n~naa (sa^mj~naa) is also confirmed by the
scholastics: see, for example, Abhidharmako`sa, .
II. stanza 47ab, and commentary to II. stanza 24
and I. stanza 14cd; Visuddhimagga chapter XIV,
par. 130.
31. "Muula.m papa~ncasa^mkhaayaa / mantaa asmiiti
sabbam uparundhe / yaa kaaci ta.nhaa ajjhatta.m /
taasa.m vinayaa sadaa sate sikkhe //"Compare, Sn
1111: "ajjhatta~n ca bahiddhaa ca vedana.m
naabhinandato / eva.m satassa carato vi~n~naa.na.m
uparujjhati //"
The doctrine of no-self is not presented
explicitly in the Sn. There are, however, two
important passages that could be interpreted as
statements of such a doctrine. In the classical
passage at Sn 1119, the Buddha is attributed the
words: "su~n~nato loka.m avekkhasu... sadaa sato
attaanudi.t.thim uuhacca...." ("regard the world
as empty... always mindful, uproot views about
[the / your] self"). Whether we construe these
lines as an example of anattavaada in the
classical sense or as an example of the A.t.tha's
teaching advising the monk not to fancy himself as
being this or that, being or not being (918, see
note 28, herein), is truly not as important as the
fact that this passage brings out the important
connections: `emptiness-mindfulness-selflessness'.
The other passage which seems to contain a
pronouncement on the self question is Sn 756:
"anattani attamaanam passa loka.m... nivi.t.tham
naamaruupasmim, `ida.m sacca.m' ti ma~n~nati."
("See that the world has thoughts of self with
regard to that which is not [the] self, mooring in
name and form, the world thinks "this is the
true". )
32. Compare note 31, herein, and Sn 1070-1072
(discussed below), also, 855, 1041, 1055-1056,
1105-1111. Less important, but of some interest
are 933, 1026, 1035-1036, 1039, 1062, 1119 (see
note 31, herein). Notice that most passages on
mindfulness are from the Paaraayana.
33. In the practice of mindfulness, no doubt one must
find the first irreconciliable difference between
Christian and Buddhist mysticism. A few passages
in St. John's Subida seem, for a moment, to be
speaking of something close to mindfulness (and
there is, to be sure, a certain minimal point of
contact). Thus, Subida, II. 12. 3, II. 14. 11, and
III. 2. 14, emphasize the importance of
withdrawing from the fruit of the "imiginative
faculties" and emptying the mind of everything
except the "memory" of God. But the true nature
and purpose of this withdrawal (olvido, in
contrast to

p. 161

sm.rti) comes through transparently in II. 8-9,
II. 12. 4ff., II. 14. 10, and III. 11-14, Llama
3. 19-21 and of course in the whole edifice of
the noche pasiva del espiritu in Noche oscura. A
careful perusal of these passages shows how
superficial any attempt would be at reducing one
type of mysticism to the terms of another, as
attempted by so many (see, for example, George
Grimm in his "Christian Mysticism in the Light of
the Buddha's, " Indian Historical Quarterly 4
(1928): 306-338).
34. On the basis of 872 we must surmise that in 873-874
ruupam stands for naamaruupa. Equivalent, no doubt,
to the naamakaaya of 1074. Compare, 530, 736, 756.
35. This is the only way I can interpret what is
described in 874, discussed below. Compare, the
Po.t.thapaada-sutta (DN I.178 ff.), where (p.181)
the idea of control, rather than suppression, is
clearly suggested.
36. "Sa~n~nanidaana hi papa~ncasa.mkhaa." Compare
916, also 530, 886, and 1041. Compare Itivuttaka,
pp. 53-54, but contrast Udaana, p. 77.
37. DN I.276-277.
38. Compare also the causation "series" in the
Dvayataanupassanaa-sutta, Sn, pp. 139 ff.
39. The Paali is here less active: "form... ceases,"
"vibhoti ruupam."
40. On this refreshingly different use of the term
aaki~nca~n~na, confer, Sn 976, 1063, 1091, 1098-
1100, 1115. Also, Compare, aki~ncana, in 490,
501, 620, 645, and, of less value, 176, 455.
41. "Anaanuyaayii": Hare, "untrammelled," Nyanaponika,
following Cuula-Niddesa, "nicht weiter-wandern."
Perhaps better, "not having anything else to follow,"
that is, he is an asaik.sa.
42. Also, "perception." By Nyanamoli, for instance,
in his Path of Purification. Confer, note 21,
herein.
43. Confer, notes 30 and 36, herein.
44. Confer notes 34 and 39, herein. The context of
the sutra itself does not allow a literal
interpretation, that is, "making body and mind to
cease completely." The cessation is to take place
in this life. Confer the ditthaddhammaabhinibbutaa
of 1087. But, perhaps this is to be interpreted
like the di.t.the dhamme aniitiham of 1053, or in
the light of the twofold typology of nirvaana
(sopaadisesa and nirupaadisea).
45. There is no place here for the reduction of this
passage to the meditational stage of the eighth
aruupa-samaapatti (nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naa) .
Compare, Nyanaponika pp. 331-332). Mahaa-Niddesa
considers the person who has gone through the
path described here as an aruupa-magga-sama^ngii
(pp.279-280) and does not seem to appreciate the
ascending and dialectic nature of the four steps.
It also seems to ignore the fact that the
Kalahavivaada is explicitly talking about the
complete ending of becoming and sorrow. At any
rate, the meaning of the four (or five)
samaapattis is not at all clear, particularly if
we insist on nevasa~n~naanaas~n~nasamaapatti and
the nirodhasamaapatti as mental states "without
perception" or "without feeling." It is difficult
to see how the sa~n~naavedayitanirodha, which is
beyond the state of nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naa,
could be a simple return to "na sa~n~naa." The
key to the term is no doubt in the word vedayita.
But a clarification must await further research.
The canonical literature is not always very
helpful. Passages where the highest samaapatti is
praised and recommended without a clear
definition are abundant (see, for example, AN IV.
429-432, 433-434, and MN I 159-160). In other
places the canon seems to confirm interpretations
like those of Buddhaghosa with words such as
those of MN III. 45: "ayam, bhikkhave, bhikkhu na
ki^mci ma~n~nati, na kuhi~nci ma~n~nati, na
kenaci ma~n~nati." But, then, contrast MN 111.
28: "puna ca param, bhikkhave, saariputto sabbaso
nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naayatana^m samatikkamma
sa~n~naavedayitanirodha^m upasampajja viharati /
pa~n~naaya cassa disvaa aasavaa parikkhiinaa
honti / so taaya samaapattiyaa sato vu.t.thahati
/ so taaya samaapattiyaa sate vu.t.thahitvaa ye
dhammaa atiitaa niruddhaa viparinataa te dhamme
samanupassati `eva^m kirame dhammaa ahutvaa
sambhonti hutvaa pa.tiventi' ti / so tesu
dhammesu anupaayo anapayo anissito appa.tibaddho
vipamutto visa^myutto vimaariyaadikatena cetasaa
viharati / so `natthi uttari nissaranam ti
pajaanaati / tabbahuliikaaraa natthitvevassa hoti
/".
Also, compare, the analysis of the jhaanas
and samaapattis in the Cuulasu~n~nataa-sutta of
the MN (III. pp. 104 ff.).
Release is not always attained by way of
the samapattis (a fact well known to the
defenders of the satipa.t.thaana or vipassanaa
meditation system) . Confer. for example,
Mahaasatipatthaana-sutta, DN II., pp. 290ff., and
Sama~n~naphala-sutta, DN I., pp. 75ff. Compare,
also, the analysis of the samaapattis in DN I.,
pp. 178ff. (Potthapaada-sutta). In the traditional
account of the Buddha's enlighten-

p. 162

ment it is said that Sakyamuni learnt the third
and fourth samaapattis from his teachers Kalama
and Ramaputra, realized that these did not lead to
emancipation, and proceeded to develop his own
method. The nirodhasamaapatti is not presented as
the culmination of the new path. See references in
Andre Bareau, Recherches sur la biographie du
Buddha, Premiere Partie (Paris: Ecole Francaise d'
Extreme Orient, 1963). See also, Buddhacarita,
Canto XII.
The Nettipakara.na (pp. 76, 100) enumerates five
samaapattis with terms reminiscent of the Sn:
sa~n~naa, asa~n~na, nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naa,
vibhuutasa~n~naa, nirodhasa~n~naa. Dhammapaala,
commenting on this unorthodox list, is obviously
at a loss as to its meaning. Compare, Nyanaponika,
pp. 331-332.
46. SN III.,p.9.
47, Notice the contrast between the person who is
sa~n~na-ratta and the one who is pa~n~naavimutta
and, therefore, sa~n~naaviratta.
48. "Sabbasa^mkhaarasama thaa sa~n~naaya uparodhanaa,"
compare, the passages in note 27, herein.
49. It is interesting to note that a person's views
are here taken to be in some way the basis and
cause of the view others take of him. Could we say
that a person's "own thing" and "gimmick" is that
by which others and he himself identify his own
being?
50. The vi~n~naana of the Sn is closer to the
vij~napti (active) of Yogaacaara psychology, than
to the fundamental awareness of consciousness. It
is the active graha.na and upalabdhi of the mind
(Abhidharmako`sa I. vs. 16a.), the act of notation
by means of which the sa~n~naa operates
(Abhidharmako`sa II. vs. 34ab.).
51. I am not at all satisfied with my rendering,
"ceases," for atta.m paleti (gacchati). This is a
standard idiom for the setting of the sun, and, as
pointed out by Nyanaponika in his note (p. 355),.
it has been purposefully chosen to avoid both the
idea of annihilation and the idea of a permanent
blissful abode, a duality about which Upasiva will
question the Buddha in the next stanza (1075).
Compare also, 876-877.
The simile of fire is also used to avoid both
extremes: fire, one of the basic elements, does
not cease to exist, it simply becomes imperceptible
or ungraspable when it runs out of fuel. On this
point, confer, E. Frauwallner, Geschichte der
indischen Philosophie, vol. 1(Salzburg: Otto
Muller Verlag, 1953) , pp. 225ff., and his
important reference to Mahaabhaarta XII.187.2, 5-6
in note 131, p. 470. Also, to the question "so uda
vaa so n'atthi udaahu ve sassatiyaa arogo" (1075),
the answer is: "... na pamaa.nam atthi," etc.
(1076) translated below.
52. Compare, note 5, herein. Also the stock phrase for
many of the passages on the indeterminables
(avyaak.rtaani), where the topic is the uprooting
of the thirst and the grasping of the skandhas, by
means of which one could pinpoint a person of the
world, but not a Buddha who has uprooted them.
Confer, for example, SN IV., pp. 373-380, 384,
401-403, (compare, SN IV., p. 52). On the viannana
of the man who is released, compare the
Upaya-sutta of SN III. 53-54.
53. "Remainderless" : anupaadisesa!!
54. The idea that the Buddha "sees through" those who,
believing themselves experts in release, are still
deeply rooted in attachment, reminds me of
Kierkegaard's ironist, who sees through the
inauthenticity of the pious. Compare, for example,
the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. D.
F. Swenson and W. Lowrie, (Princeton, N. J.:
Princeton University Press, 1941, pp. 537-544.
Another interesting, but also partial parallel is
found in St. John's remarks on those who cling to
the mental images of meditation without letting go
into the void of contemplation (Subida del Monte
Carmelo,II.xii.6)
55. The question is not the metaphysical validity of
any theory, of any of the extremes, but rather the
deceit and destructiveness of clinging. The
problem is mooring in views; 785ab,
"di.t.thiinivesaa na hi svaativattaa / dhammesu
niccheyya samuggahiita.m." Both extremes are a
bond (801), whether it is becoming or nonbecoming
makes no difference (776, 856, 786, 877, 1068).
56. The differences between Paaraayana and A.t.tha
are mostly differences of emphasis. Both texts are
very close, especially when compared with the rest
of the Sn. But differences in approach, language,
meter, and style suggest different origins for
A.t.tha and Paaraayana.
57. Notice that no view is to be the considered the
highest. As we will point out below, this
"choicelessness" creates a problem for the
formulation of directives in the path. This is the
"nondual bind" which has important philosophical
and practical implications, especially in the
Mahaayaana. I have considered some of these
implications in an article on the Buddhist
"absolute" to appear shortly in the special volume
on Buddhism of Estudios de Asia y Africa del Norte
(Mexico, DF)

p. 163

58. A "highest" could also be a "beyond" (param). How
far off the mark is the Mahaa-Niddesa at times
will be appreciated from its gloss of the word
visenikatvaa: "senaa vuccati maarasenaa /
kaayaduccarita.m maarasenaa, vaciiduccarita.m
maarasenaa, manoduccarita.m maarasenaa...
sabbaakusalaabhisa.mkhaaraa maarasenaa / yato
catuuhi ariyamaggehi sabbaa ca maarasenaa sabbe ca
patisenikaraa kilesaa jitaa ca paraajitaa... tena
vuccati visenikatvaa ti..." (pp. 174-175).
59. This is one of the most doubtful passages in the
A.t.tha, it is also one of the few with evident
metaphysical implications (possible parallel to
Maadhyamika ontology, too). The Pali reads: "na
h'eva saccaani bahuuni naanaa /a~n~natra
sa~n~naaya niccaani loke." Chalmers: "Apart from
consciousness, no diverse truths exist." Hare:
"Indeed there are not many divers truths, Save
from surmise on `lasting' in the world."
Nyanaponika: "Nicht gibt es Wahrheit vielerlei,
verschieden, Von ew'ger Geltung in der Welt, es
sei denn bloss im Dunken." Neumann: "Verschieden
vielfach kenn' ich keine Wahrheit, Bloss
wahrgenommen die da ewig bleibe...." Only Hare
comes close to an acceptable rendering. The word
sa~n~naaya must be construed verbally with
niccaani as its object. The Chinese (Taisho 198,
p. 182-b-14) is unclear.
60. "Kuppapa.ticcasanti.m
发送此图片到手机
Proto-Maadhyamika in the Paali canon

By Luis O. Gomez
Philosophy East and West
26:2 April 1976
p. 137-165

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

p. 137

El que all? llega de vero
de s? mismo desfallesce;
cuanto sabia primero
mucho baxo le parece,
y su sciencia tanto cresce,
que se queda no sabiendo,
toda sciencia trascendiendo.

These words of Saint John of the Cross could be
taken as the epitome of the wisdom of the
mystics--beyond all human science, not to be grasped
by rational discourse.(1) The mystic dwells in the
unassailable fortress of his own silence.
Unfortunately (or, perhaps rather fortunately), there
is more than one way of abiding in the sublime bliss
of the silentium mysticum, and more than one way to
attain it. There are legitimate and spurious
ecstasies, variously defined by different traditions.
Moreover, whether he remains silent or speaks, the
mystic cannot avoid returning to the province of
worldly convention, where silence would speak as much
as words. Silence is not univocal, nor is it
noncommittal, yet the ineffable seems to require it.
There is no reason for ignoring the beauty and
mystery of this dilemma. This is the mystic bind, a
tension that has not been ignored by more than one
mystic tradition; thus there is the famous koan:

Wu-tsu said: 'Traveling a road you meet a man of the
Way, do not greet him with words nor with silence.
But, tell me then, with what will you greet him?'

The equivocal nature of silence extends of course
to the experience that evokes it, and nothing is
gained by asserting that all mystics just preach and
praise ultimate silence. Nor can we avoid the
important role of doctrinal contents and framework in
the formation and direction of a mystical path of
silence. The idea that one could escape the
complexities of Buddhist thought, for example, by
characterizing it as a via mystica or as a "yoga"
would be rather simplistic. Even if the original
"enlightenment experience" of the founder was an
experience beyond all thought categories, it was
nevertheless in some way specific. The experience
behind the yoga is not contentless even when defined
as such. This is not to say that the idea of a
"doctrine of freedom from all conceptual contents" or
"an experience free from the constraints of
conceptual thought" is an impossibility. There is a
certain specificity to silence, and to the very idea
of the absence of a theoretical position; otherwise
all the proponents of the voie du silence would have
to agree with even their most vociferous opponents,
and this has yet to happen.

In fact, not only is the mystical science of
silence indeed a difficult science and a definite
commitment to a specific mode of behavior or
apprehension, there are also different modes of this
"mystical science." The injunction to seek
-------------------------------
Luis O. Gomez is Associate Professor of Buddhist
Studies, Department of Far Eastern Languages and
Literatures, at the University of Michigan.

p. 138

silence or to stop verbal profuseness can have more
than one purpose, more than one intended meaning.
Obviously, the mystics themselves consider that the
insufficiency of language operates at more than one
level. In this article a few of these levels will be
considered in the very specific framework of the
A.t.thakavagga of the Suttanipaata, while exploring
possible parallels between this Paali text and the
Madhyamaka of Naagaarjuna.

At the outset I would like to suggest that we
isolate, merely as a heuristic device, a few of the
categories within which one could consider various
Buddhist views (not always purely mystical) on the
insufficiency, inadequacy, or obstrusiveness of
words. These categories are not always mutually
exclusive, but at the same time one does not
necessarily lead to or contain the other. One could
distinguish two greater categories: (1)The Buddhist,
in attempting to explain the experience of the goal,
or the goal itself, may and often does affirm that
words cannot describe the goal (words cannot
encompass the goal); and (2) in describing the path
to that goal, he may insist that words are an
impediment in the path (by words one does not reach
the goal). To a greater or lesser extent, most
Buddhists agree on the first proposition, but their
emphasis on the second and their interpretation of
the connection between the first and the second
differ radically from one school to another.

These two basic categories can be broken down in
several ways. One could be tempted to think that
"silence about the Buddha" is primarily ontological
in purport and the "the Buddha's silence" is
methodological in nature, but this is only partly
true. Silence about the goal cannot be reduced to an
ontological stance. This type of silence includes a
very heterogeneous lot, for example, pragmatic
silence as in the parable of the poisoned
arrow(3)---a clear case of methodological silence.
One may also subsume under the first category of
silence about the goal the subclass of laudatory
silence, as in those cases when we are simply told
that the Buddha is so inscrutable that words are
inadequate to praise him. There is also the silence
of the Buddha himself, who "never preached a single
dharma.(4) This class is inextricably related to both
main categories; but, though it spans both the goal
and the path, it also includes the important class of
silence as an element in the behavior which follows
becoming a Buddha. Under silence about the goal the
most important class is, nevertheless, ontological
silence. The ultimate goal does not belong to the
realm of the speakable. A Buddha cannot be reached
"by the roads of speech."(5)

Our second main category, silence as part of the
path, also may be taken to include a variety of
doctrines about language. There is the pragmatic
silence mentioned in the previous category: if speech
is superfluous in the practice of the path, then it
is merely a waste of time. (6) But speech can also be
misleading, it could, by its very nature, lead astray
the follower of the path. This quality of speech
could be due to simple moral reasons or to
psychological reasons or even to epistemological
reasons. That is to say, talk could be an impediment
because it is the epitome of the world's sham and
frivolousness, as in "the most

p. 139

talked about," etc. Or it may be an impediment
insofar as it leads to a mental distraction,
agitation, and turbulence. Lastly, it could
constitute an obstacle because it offers a semblance
of reality, thus fooling the practitioner into
complacently believing that he has seen face-to-face
what he simply knows by words. The Buddhist
scriptures move back and forth from one category to
the other, perhaps with very good reasons, for thirst
(t.r.s.naa) and nescience (avidyaa) exist by mutual
generation.(7)

Silence about and in the goal is mystical silence
proper, that is, the silentium mysticum. But silence
in the path could be described more accurately as
"ascetic silence," that is, silence as a preparatory
exercise (propaedeutica mystica) .(8) Basically it
falls into two classes: the path-silence proper which
leads directly into mystical silence and moral or
eremetical silence which simply prepares the
environmental ground for the former.(9) Ascetic
silence, for instance, can be a way of emptying the
mind in order to make it receptive to an influx of
external light, as in the infused contemplation of
some of the Christian mystics. This type of ascetic
silence is often connected to, but still separable
from, the silence that stems from humility: the
recognition of man's impotence before the might of
God. These two differ from eremitical silence, the
purpose of which is to retreat from worldly
commitment and business, as in the beatus ille qui
procul negotiis. But all these forms can and often do
coalesce in one ascetic practice, often appearing in
the instructions of the ascetics as interdependent
and mutually reinforced.

TEXTUAL NOTE

Some of these views on words and silence form the
leading themes in the fourth book of the Suttanipaata
and are found in several significant passages in the
fifth book. The last two books of the Suttanipaata,
A.t.thakavagga and Paaraayanavagga, respectively,
constitute no doubt the oldest strata of the work and
belong to the oldest of the Paali texts.(10) The
significance of these passages cannot be exaggerated.
In many ways they anticipate (rather than foreshadow)
some of the key doctrines of the Great Vehicle and
often help establish possible connections or smooth
transitions from the Buddhism of the Nikaayas to the
Buddhism of the Great Vehicle. One is tempted to
discover here a common ground, unfortunately
neglected by the Abhidharmist and long forgotten by
the Great Vehicle.(11)

When I first read the Mahaaviyuuha-sutta of the
Suttanipaata I was impressed not only by its
freshness and directness, but also by its
originality. Somehow its advocacy of abstention from
disputes and arguments stood out as a unique stance
that could not be easily reduced to a simplistic
doctrine of abstention from disputes for the sake of
the peace of noninvolvement. It also seemed evident
that the pronouncements made in this sutta could not
be reduced to other, more common teachings of the
Paali Canon without doing some violence to the text.
Stock phrases which in the Canon were used to
indicate the highest

p. 140

knowledge, such as "jaanaami passaami" and
"~naa.na",(l2) were used here to indicate the false
science of those who were still attached to views.
Moreover their attachment was not deemed to be merely
the attachment to wrong views, but to views in
general. Also, there was no question here of teaching
the superior dharma, rather the point was that the
true follower of the path would not prefer any
dharma; he would make no claims to the possession of
a higher dharma.(13)

Further consideration of Suttanipaata passages
from the A.t.thakavagga and the Paaraayana showed
that these two sections differ radically even from
the rest of the Sn itself. The Suttanipaata passages
we have considered in this article--mostly from the
A.t.thaka--stand out among the Paali texts much like
the Mahaaviyuuhasutta. These passages strike the
reader as some of the most explicit and
representative statements of an extreme apophatic
tendency found elsewhere in Buddhist literature. This
tendency---or is it a contemplative tradition of some
kind?--reappears later in the literature of the
Perfection of Wisdom, and, even more patently, in the
Praasa^ngika Maadhyamika and in the various Ch'an
lines.

This tendency could be characterized in the
theoretical realm as the doctrine of no-views, and in
the practical realm as the practice of practicing no
dharmas. In its more extreme manifestations this
tendency is diametrically opposed to the doctrine of
right-views and the practice of gradually and
systematically cultivating the true or pure dharmas.
"Morally" it stands on an ascetic discipline of
silence which corresponds and leads to the higher
goal of silencing the mind's imaginative-discursive
faculties, whereupon the mystic reaches the ultimate
state of inner silence, considered to be itself
beyond all possible theoretical description.

Contrary to the customary insistence on "right
views" the A.t.thakavagga speaks of giving up all
views. One cannot avoid feeling that the injunction
of the Nikaayas to give up hankering for truth,
views, morality, and vows is only taken in earnest in
the A.t.thaka.(14) The men of wisdom are described
again and again as those who do not find support or
preference in anything:(15)

They fancy not, they prefer not, and not a single
dharma do they adopt. No true brahman can be led by
vows or morality; he who is thus, gone beyond, does
not rely on anything. (803)(16)

Instructions to the follower of the path could not be
more explicit:

Renounce all vows and moralities, and [all] those
acts, whether blamable or unblamable, throw away [all
ideas of] purity and impurity, fare dispassionate,
grasp not at peace. (900)

As we will see presently, this is no injunction to
moral indifference. In what way is total renunciation
like indifference?

How is this renunciation completed? The
Suttanipaata shows that there is

p. 141

still more to deny in defining the path. This
mystical science excludes all views and theories:

Giving up assumption, unattached, he builds no
reliance on knowledge itself... he does not rely on
any view whatsoever. (800)(17)

This attitude, if we may describe it thus, has
important behavioral consequences which the stanza
summarizes with the phrase "he does not take sides
among [those who uphold] the various
assumptions."(18) But, for the time being, let us
remain with the topic of not relying on views. This
idea is in fact well known to us through the
traditional doctrine of the Middle Path--avoiding the
two extremes. Thus, not to rely on views is in a
certain way a form of nondualism. However, one could
not overemphasize the distinctive mark of the
nondualism of the A.t.thakavagga (A.t.tha).(19) As in
so many passages from the Suutra literature, the
Middle Path is primarily the path of nonattachment.
Such passages put on trial attachment and its
destructive psychological effects, not the
metaphysical validity of the two extremes. The mind
moors in diverse opinions, clutches at them
passionately. The clinging to views of this
opinionated being is what perverts him; which opinion
might be the "correct" one is ultimately irrelevant.

The A.t.tha's recommendation is to abandon this
mooring or installation (nivesana) in views, this
leaning toward the extremes of this or that, which is
the result of the mind's forging an immutable
apperception (sa~n~naa) of things. The truly wise are
free of these fixations. According to the fourth poem
of the A.t.tha:

He who has no leanings here to either of the two
extremes: being or not being, here or beyond, he has
no moorings whatsoever, no clutching while
distinguishing among dharmas. (801)(20) He has not
formed (or fancied) even the least apperception in
what is here seen, heard or thought.., (802)(21)

He is not like those who are "entranced by the
passion of their views" (891d).(22) For he knows that
men are not released by means of opinions and
theories:

If a man were made pure by viewing, or if he could
abandon sorrow by means of knowledge, then one still
having additives (sopadhiko) would be purified by
something other [than himself]. It is indeed mere
opinion to speak thus. (789)(23) A true brahman is
not called pure because of something other, whether
seen or heard, whether vows of morality or something
thought. [He lives] unsoiled by sin or merit, having
given up assumptions, not fashioning any more here.
(790)(24)

The Mahaaniddesa fails to understand the true
purport of this passage when it glosses: "If a man
were made pure... by another, impure path, by a false
path...other than the Noble Eightfold Path...."(25)
The very context of the whole poem (788-795, A.t.tha
section iv), shows that the view under attack is that
of him who relies on knowledge (pacceti ~naa.na.m)
about things seen, heard or thought. Moreover,
another stanza, from section xiv, confirms our
interpretation:

p. 142

Only he should bring himself to rest. not elsewhere
should the bhikkhu seek peace. For him who has
brought himself to rest there are no assumptions,
whence, then, could there be non-assumption? (919)
(26)

This emphasis on ''self" in opposition to "other" has
no immediate metaphysical implications. It is simply
a forceful manner of expressing complete detachment
from all dharmas:

Whatever dharma he knows. whether in himself or
outside, in it he makes no station; for the good do
not call this true rest. (917)(27)

Let him not by such [a dharma be led to] think that
something is better, or worse, or even the same.
Touched by multiple forms, let him remain without
distinguishing or fancying (vikappayan) himself.
(918)(28)

We may now return to section iv and let the
concluding stanzas sum up the message of the poem:

They do not fancy, they do not prefer, they do not
say: 'This is total purification'. Once free from the
knotted knot of grasping, they have longing for
nothing in the world. (794) Gone beyond all limits, a
true brahman, he has no clutchings. whether by
knowing or seeing. He does not delight in passion nor
does he delight in dispassion. For him there is
nothing more to clutch at here. (795)(29)

The theme of grasping or clutching recurs
throughout the A.t.ha, and the root of this grasping
is always presented as bound to opinions and talk. It
is extremely difficult to go beyond our habitual
mooring in views because of our habit of clutching at
our distinctions among dharmas (801. 795ab). This
grasping, moreover, is the cause of our delusion
(84lab) . Upon it a man builds his world of
preferences, attachments, pat-ties, contentions and
disputes (862-873). But, what is the cause of our
preferences and attachments? The misdirected mind,
specifically the wrongly applied faculty of
apperception (sa~n~naa).(30) Apperception leads to
dualities, graspings, conflicts, and sorrow because
of its two primary functions: its power to
conceptualize and define (sa.mkhaa) and its tendency
toward division and multiplicity (papa~nca). The
capacity of these faculties to generate friction and
frustration is reinforced by the root apperception of
"I" and "mine." The A.t.tha, however, does not have a
consistent doctrine on the question of what causes
what, nor does it offer a complete or clear teaching
on the role of the idea of a self or an "I." In one
key passage it seems that the "I" idea and "thirst"
have similar or rather parallel roles:

Let him bring to a stop all the root of conception
and dispersion, [that is, ] the thought `I am'.
Whichever thirst there is in him let him drive away
as he trains ever mindful. (916)(31)

Venturing a free gloss of this stanza, one may
understand the process by which mindfulness destroys
the moorings and hankerings of the mind in the
following way: mindfulness pulls the mind back to the
ever-fleeting present, away from its extensions into
the past and the future.(32) In this way it acts in
exactly the opposite direction of the process of
apperception, and thus uproots con-

p. 143

ception (by which the "I" freezes reality to fit our
views and desires) and dispersion (by which the mind
runs out after things in order to make them
"mine").(33)

In the extremely important, yet obscure final
stanzas of the Kalahavivaadasutta (A.t.tha, poem xi),
after a pithy description of how "form is made to
cease"(34) by means of the control of
apperception,(35) the poem concludes: "for dispersion
with conception have apperception for their cause."
(874)(36) The causal series presented in this poem
reminds us of the one described in the
Sakka-pa~nhaa-sutta of the Diigha: (37) both take
human conflict and aggression as the final effect
(not old age and death) , both offer primarily
psychological explanations of the problem, without
explicit references to cosmological or eschatological
conceptions. In both texts man's choosing between the
dear and the not dear is at the root of friction and
frustration, and this picking and choosing is rooted
in wishing or wanting (chanda). In the Diigha, chanda
depends on vitakka (mental discourse), and vitakka
depends on mental (and verbal) dispersion (papa~nca).
The Kalahavivaada is more subtle, but also more
repetitive and less linear. This is not the occasion
to deal with this difficult passage in detai1,(38)
suffice it here to say that, according to this sutta,
opinions and desire (or wishes: chanda) are equally
rooted in the dualities of pleasant and unpleasant,
coming to be and ceasing to be. These dualities are
caused by contact (phassa), which here seems to be
synonymous with appropriation and the idea of "mine."
Contact depends on name and form, and name and form
can be "made to cease"(39) by bringing about a change
in the process of apperception. Thus, the calming or
bringing to rest of the process of apperception which
lies at the root of clinging, and therefore of
suffering, is the ultimate goal of the way of
silence. Not holding on to any view, not mooring in
things seen, heard, or thought, quieting down all
talk (vaada) and contention (vivaada) is an important
part in the process of quieting down affective and
cognitive dispersion (prapa~nca); the other element
in the process, mindfulness, is properly the
instrumental arm by means of which the mind is
brought to a state of emptiness from apperception.
And this state of emptiness is the only state that is
beyond suffering.

Having arrived at this juncture where the
abandonment of views and opinions is justified in
terms of its place in the process of overcoming
suffering, we are introduced to another type of
silence: the silence of the goal. The goal is clearly
a state in which "name and form are no more." This is
not a state of unconsciousness, obviously, but we
must take a few lines to allow the Sn itself to
dispel those suspicions of nihilism which are still
provoked by the over-enthusiastic rhetoric of
apophatic Buddhism.

Perhaps such suspicions are aroused with
particular force by the deservedly famous
Upasiivamaa.navapucchaa of the Paaraayana(section
vii: 1069-1076). There we are told how to reach
release in the following words, which summarize much
of what has been said above:

p. 144

Mindfully watching the [realm of] no-thing, (40)
relying [only] on "there is not", cross the flood.
Giving up desire, detached from all talk, day and
night look into the extinction of thirst. (1070) He
who has left behind attachment to all desires,
relying on no-thing, abandoning ought else, is
released in the ultimate release from apperception.
There he is firm, not to be followed. (1071)(41)

This passage should not be interpreted in terms of
the meaning that its vocabulary has in other parts of
the Tipi.taka, but, if it is understood as literally
as possible, it will reveal to us a fresh and
illuminating message. The realm of no-thing
(aaki~nca~n~nam), for instance, cannot properly be
construed as a reference to the classical hierarchy
of the samaapatti. Here this "nothing" is at the very
core and apex of the meditational path. It is that
upon which the practitioner establishes his
meditation. Giving up external perturbations
(desire-- talk) he mindfully looks into the empty,
still point of his concentration. In order to look
into this point he must rely on "no-thing" and give
up everything else (sense objects, sensations,
conceptions, etc.). This practice leads to release
from apperception.

Is this then a state of unconsciousness? In spite
of all the evidence to the contrary, one still finds
the term sa~n~na (sa.mj~naa being taken to mean
"consciousness"(42) That the meaning of the term is
close to some of the Western philosophical uses of
"apperception" is clear from the scholastic
literature and from scattered contextual
evidence.(43) In the Sn, sa~n~na is the basis for
conception and verbal distinctions (874) ,
apperceptions are formed or fashioned (pakappitaa...
sa~n~naa) (802), they can be the object of attachment
(792, 847), and together with views they are the
primary object of grasping (847) . It is also
difficult to see how the term sa~n~naa could mean
"perception" in the context of the Sn, where the
sa~n~naa are found to be formed or fashioned by the
mind, and where we are told that dualities arise from
the apperception of permanence (886). But then, is
the Upasiivamaa.navapucchaa speaking of a cessation
of apperception or conceptualization when it defines
the highest goal as "the release from sa~n~na"? This
question is best answered by the Kalahavivaada. The
problem there is how to bring to rest all "name and
form."(44) In other words, how do you stop the
conflict of dualities which is at the root of all
worldly conflicts? Form is made to cease in the
following way according to the sutta:

When he has not an apperception of apperceptions,
when he had not an apperception of non-apperception,
when he does not not apperceive, when he does not
have apperceptions without an object, for him who has
attained to this, form ceases, for apperception is
the cause of dispersion and conception. (874)(45)

No matter how we interpret the term sa~n~naa, it is
obvious that the paradoxical rhetoric of this passage
does not justify assuming that the goal is in any way
the mere stopping of mind processes or perception
tour court.

Another passage in the A.t.tha throws some light
on the meaning of the abandonment of apperception. In
the Maagandiyasutta, known by title to the

p. 145

compilers of the Sa.myuttanikaaya,(46) the goal is
described in the following terse lines:

The truly wise does not form opinions on the basis of
views or things thought out, he is not made thus. He
would not be led by actions nor by learning, he would
not be led to moorings of any kind. (846) For him who
is detached from apperceptions there are no knots,
released by insight he has no delusions. Those who
hold on to apperceptions and views go around in the
world in constant conflict. (847)(47)

The stopping of apperceptions follows the
bringing to rest of all predispositons of the mind
(732).(48) With this, all strife is ended:

For nowhere in the world does the pure fashion views
about being or non-being. The pure, having abandoned
all sham and opinions, completely detached, who could
reach him? (786) Attachment leads to talk about
dharmas. How then, and who, could talk about the
detached? For the has no assumptions, nor is he
without assumptions; he is here cleansed of all view.
(787)(49)

The clear emphasis on nonduality and freedom from
opinions, freedom from talk (whether it be what the
man released from apperception would have to say
about the world, or what the world would have to say
about him), is in fact quite apposite in the frame of
reference of the path suggested in the A.t.tha. The
Paaraayana uses a somewhat different terminology.
There the vi~n~naa.na is fixed in becoming and is
thus perturbed by becoming; the goal is to bring this
vi~n~naa.na to rest. This is not the place to discuss
the meaning of this elusive term, but for the
Paaraayana I find Hare's rendering quite appropriate
("mind at work"), and the usual "consciousness" very
inappropriate. (50) Be that as it may, we are here
concerned only with the fact that in the section on
the questions of Upasiiva (quoted earlier), the
Paaraayana abstains from asserting the cessation of
the vi~n~naa.na, and actually speaks of a release
from apperception (sa~n~naavimokhe). Moreover, in
this very same passage the question of language is
brought up again in a manner reminiscent of the
A.t.tha and not so characteristic of the Paaraayana.

In the first place, the discipline of the path
includes detachment from talk (virato kathaahi)
(1070). In the second place, the goal, the highest
release, is found in the release from apperception
(1072). Lastly, the man who has attained to this goal
is himself beyond the province of language and
conception, he cannot be in any way described or
defined:

"... he who is thus cooled and released, is there for
such a one any ideation (vi~n~naa.na)?"

"As a flame blown out by a gust of wind "ceases" and
cannot be reached by conception, in the same way the
muni, released from name and body, "ceases" and
cannot be reached by conception." (1074)(51)

He who has gone to cessation, is he no more? Or is
he in eternal well being?..." (1075)

"Of him who has gone to cessation there is no
measure, there is nothing in

p. 146

terms of which they could speak about him. When all
dharmas have been uprooted, all the ways of speech
have also been uprooted." (1076)(52)

These lines bring to mind immediately the concluding
lines of the Kalahavivaada:

Some wise men say that the highest here is the
cleansing of the spirit, still others among [the
wise] who call themselves experts on the
"remainderless"(53) say that it is passing away.
(876) But knowing that they rely still, the Muni
knows and examines [the object of] their reliance.(54)
The man who is released does not seek dispute, he
does not give himself to becoming nor to
non-becoming. (877)

According to these passages, the way to the goal
is a way of silence, the goal is beyond words, and
the man of the goal is himself beyond all talk and
speculation. Because an essential part of the
solution to the problem of sorrow and conflict is the
eradication of all "moorings of the mind",
attachments to apperceptions, the path and the goal
can best be described in terms of a nonduality or
middle path. The man of wisdom seeks to abandon the
thirst for nonexistlence as much as the thirst for
becoming (856, 1068, 801). The path is also described
in terms of this nonduality:

Cleansing is not attained by things seen or heard,
nor by knowledge, nor by the vows of morality, nor is
it attained by not seeing or not hearing, nor by not
knowing, nor by absence of morals and vows.
Abandoning all these, not grasping at them he is at
peace, not relying, he would not hanker for becoming.
(839)(55)

It is again significant that the Paaraayana's
formulations of nonduality are often softer.(56) For
instance, instead of speaking of not grasping at any
dharma, as does the A.t.tha, the Paaraayana says that
the man of wisdom (here called bhikkhu in contrast to
braahma.na, which is more common in the A.t.tha) is
an expert in all dharmas (1039, 1112). The A.t.tha is
always very explicit about its radical views:

When a man confined in views puts something first in
the world as "the highest", calling all else "the
lowest," he has not gone beyond dispute. (796) The
experts call a knot (bond) that leaning on which one
regards everything else to be lowly. Therefore the
bhikkhu does not lean on anything seen, heard or
thought, nor no morals and vows. (797)(57)

Those who, grasping at views argue and say: "Only
this is the truth," to them you should say when talk
begins: "There are none here to reply to you in
strife." (832) But those who do follow a path of not
taking sides, who do not oppose views by means of
views, from them who will you obtain, Pasuura, from
them who here do not have a "highest" to grasp at?
(833)(58)

In conclusion, it is obvious then that the
A.t.tha's intention is not to propose a different
view. Nor does it propose a nonview (systematic
rejection of all views). The involved rhetoric of
this short text seems to be aimed at an injunction to
detachment from the tendency of the mind to become
fixed in cognitive and affective extremes, in
immutable mind-made polarities. I do not believe we
could consistently interpret the A.t.tha as the
pronouncement of a self-serving

p. 147

Buddhist who believes that the clash of views is
counterproductive merely because there is only one
correct view and that he who possesses that view
(that is, the Buddhist) can afford not to enter the
ring of dispute, for, after all, he knows that he is
right. No, we have in the A.t.tha a doctrine of
nonduality, found elsewhere in the Paali Canon only
sporadically. Whether the practice of such a doctrine
is humanly possible is another question, which is not
the concern of this article.

The A.t.tha does, however, point at a possible
reason why such a doctrine is necessary:

There are not in fact many and various truths, except
for the worldly apperception of "permanents."
Fashioning arguments on views, they pronounce a
duality of dharmas: `true and false." (886)(59)

The holding on to these apperceptions of
immutable principles or objects is growing roots in
mere figments of the imagination. The stability of
these principles is deceptive, for they are in fact
wrought by an unstable mind:

Who still has principles (dhammaa) fashioned,
constructed, prejudiced and not cleansed, when he
sees advantage in assumption, he is [only] relying on
a "peace" which depends on agitation. (784)(60)

The defender of views, of course. favors his own
views above all others (904), but,

The true brahman does not attach himself to fancies
or concepts, he does not regard any view as all
important, nor is he a friend of knowledge. Yet,
having known the opinions of men at large, he regards
even-mindedly the extremes at which others clutch.
(911)(61)

Whatever opinions are held by men at large, he,
having known, does not form attachment to any of
them. Why should the unattached seek attachment, he
who does not give in to things seen or heard?
(897)(62)

But together with its pronouncements on views and
talk, the A.t.tha weaves in important contemplative
and moral (or, perhaps better, ascetic)
recommendations. Mooring in views, grasping at
apperceptions, is not fundamentally a cognitive
process and it must be stopped by a specific method
of ascetic training.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
One should train ever mindful, driving out whatever
thirst there is within. (916cd)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Touched by multiple forms, he will not make a station
in them fancing himself [as this] or that.(918cd)(63)

He should grow calm in himself, the bhikkhu would not
seek peace from something else.... (919ab)

These lines are followed by specific instructions on
how to attain "calm within himself":

p.148

His eyes do not roll about,(64) he turns his ear away
from village talk, he does not hanker after flavors,
nor does he consider as "mine" anything in the world.
(922)

He does not gather and make store of things to eat,
drink, chew, or wear, nor is he afraid of not
obtaining these. (924)

Let him be intent on contemplation, not loitering
around, let him put a stop to worrying, let him not
be unheedful. He will seek to dwell in a spot where
noises are few. (925)

He would not be led to speaking falsehood, ever
watchful, he is free of sham and malice,(65) he will
not despise others for their way of life, for their
wisdom, for their morals or vows. (931)

But the most characteristic elements in the conduct
of the sage are his nongrasping at the ideas of `me'
and `mine' and the resulting detachment from views,
opinions, and comparative judgments:

He who has no idea of `mine' in all names and forms,
nor grieves at what is not, he loses nothing in the
world. (950)

For whom there is no 'this is mine' or `another's is
that' with respect to anything, he has found nothing
to make into `mine' and never grieves `this is not
mine'. (951)

The muni does not speak of `equal', `low' or `high';
serene, having left all egotism behind, he does not
grasp at anything nor does he reject anything. (954)

This man who does not form a support on anything is
then free from the thirst to become one thing or stop
being another. (856)(66) He is no longer attached to
views and opinions, which are nothing but our attempt
to fashion the world in our own image. Calm. free of
desire to become, of desire to establish himself, he
turns away from talks and disputes (859); he is in
fact beyond talk, for his virtues, his calm, and his
detachment do not belong to the province of talk and
conception (913-914, 876-877, 1076).

The distinctive moralizing tone of many passages
in the A.t.tha cannot be overlooked. At times one
cannot avoid the feeling that the whole discourse is
about the bliss of escaping worldly noise and strife.
One is reminded of the words of Fray Luis de Leon:

iQue descansada vida
la del que huye del mundanal ruido;
y sigue la escondida
senda por donde han ido
los pocos sabios que en el mundo han sido !(67)

But the passages we have quoted above should convince
the reader that the moralizing and the praise of the
hermit's life are, in fact, ancillary to a more
fundamental message. Views and disputes are not
simply abandoned out of the convenience and peace of
la vida retirada; at their roots is a fundamental
error, wrong apperception, and a fundamental moral
wrong, clinging to `I' and `mine'. Views and disputes
are the external signs of passionate apperception;
talking, opinionating, gimmicking are the signs of
inner turbulence and crazy

p. 149

grasping, The path recommended in the A.t.tha is then
a path of detachment, but primarily of detachment
through silence, outer and inner silence.

Moreover, the goal itself is very appropriately a
state of silence in the sense that the apperceptive
faculty is "calmed into submission." At this stage
the mind rests only on its silent center. Because it
clings now to no apperception, because it is free of
dispersions and fixations, there is no way that it,
the mind itself, can be described or pinpointed by
the way of talk or concept. Thus, the primary purpose
of methodological silence is not disengagement or
solitude but the discovery of the inner silence which
is calm.

With regard to ontological silence, the A.t.tha
does not present a full theory in the sense of a
metaphysical edifice or groundwork for the
ineffability of the ultimate goal. Nor can we
interpret the A.t.tha in terms of a given right-views
theory. In other words, the A.t.tha is not proposing
an indirect or preparatory means of establishing or
cultivating a specific right view, nor a world view
which must be hidden under the mantle of silence or
protected from the worldly by reserving it for only
those who are worthy of it. What is found in the
A.t.tha is (1) a psychology of human friction and
frustration, and (2) a few pointers to a human
condition beyond the present state of friction and
frustration--all of which can be summarized in an
injunction to practice a type of silent mindfulness
and concentration, in which no specific view is to be
sought or upheld.

Thus, the A.t.tha's doctrine of silence in is no
way empty of a theory. There is, certainly, a basic
theory with regard to clinging and the ineffability
of nonclinging. The A.t.tha's doctrine, however, is a
`no-doctrine'' in the sense that someone who accepts
this doctrine is expected to have an attitude with
respect to it which is precisely the contrary of what
we normally expect from someone who espouses a
theory. And this is not the philosophical silence of
skepticism nor the methodological bracketing of the
phenomenologist. It is the simple fact that to be
practically consistent, a theory of the silencing of
the moorings of apperception must be self-abrogating.
Thus, the theory is incomplete without the practice
because theory cannot silence itself by itself. It
must culminate in a practice which will bring its
consummation by consuming it.(68)

COMPARATIVE NOTE

One is of course immediately tempted to compare
the religion without an ultimate concern of the
A.t.tha with the speculative flights of the
Maadhyamika. There too prapa~nca and adhinive`sa
stand out as two of the main enemies.(69) There too
all views (d.r.s.ti) are to be given up for the sake
of a goal about which the Great Sage never pronounced
a single word.

According to the Prasannapadaa (Pras 351),(70)
emptiness is also called nirvaa.na because it is
defined as the stopping of all mental and linguistic
dispersion (prapa~nca). This dispersion is nothing
but talk, the talk that chains men to things (Pras
373, 448); it involves the conflict between the
multiple polarities that define things in the world:

p. 150

knowledge and the knowable, speakable and speaker,
doer and act, cause and effect, jars, clothes, crown
and chariots, form and sensation, women and men, gain
and loss, happiness and sorrow, fame and disrepute,
blame and praise, etc... (350)

When the mind seizes at things there is this
dispersion (350-351) from which results the mind's
uncontrolled fancying (ayoni`so vikalpa: 350-351,374,
452).(71) As part of this mental disorder, mooring
(abhinive`sa) in the ideas of `I' and `mine' grows;
and this is the root of the perturbation of the
kle`sas, which is the cause of rebirth. (351) Only
when seizing at an immutable form for things ceases,
through the vision of emptiness, does the whole
series end. (350-351)

The goal then is to put to rest all seizing or
apprehending sarvopalambhopa`samah: xxv. 24a) ,
putting to rest the dispersions of the mind
(prapa~ncopa`samah: xxv. 24b). This goal is not
defined by any ultimate principle, the Buddha in fact
never taught a single dharma (xxv. 24cd). For what is
sought is the bringing to calm of the harborings of
the mind. The Maadhyamika seeks to stop all
apprehensions of an immutable reality, thing or
principle, all apperceptions of being and not being,
coming to be and ceasing to be. For,

When no being is obtained, which one could imagine
not to exist, then, deprived of all basis, how could
non-being stand before the mind? When neither being
nor non-being stand before the mind, then, having no
where else to go, without support, the mind is
brought to rest.(72)

Thus, the true function of emptiness is to free
the mind of its own harborage and hankering.
Emptiness, then, cannot constitute itself a view, a
principle; it cannot be reified if it is to fulfill
its liberating role:

The non-operation of all views which is the escape
from all grasping and mooring, that is here
emptiness. (247)

Emptiness, wrongly perceived brings destruction....
(xxiv. II)

The conquerors describe emptiness as the escape from
all views, but those for whom emptiness is a view,
they are called `incurable'. (xiii. 8)

The Master spoke of the abandonment of both coming to
be and ceasing to be, therefore, nirvaa.na cannot be
appropriately called neither being nor non-being.
(xxv. 10)

Ultimately, truth is beyond the reaches of knowledge
itself, beyond all speech. (374)

When the mind processes [of fancying and
apprehending] are no more, whence would there be a
superimposition of signs (nimitta), without this
[superimposition] whence would there be the process
of speech. It is therefore firmly established that
the Blessed Buddhas have never taught anything. (364)

A Buddha is free of all fancying and mental
fashioning. He is therefore beyond all speech, He
never preached any dharmas. (366)

Further-more, nothing can be said about the
Buddha. Those who believe that they can come to
understand the Buddha through the prolixity of their
talk and speculation have not seen the Buddha in
truth (xxii. 15). They are like blind

p. 151

men looking at the sun. (448)(73)

The Maadhyamika doctrines referred to above are
all strongly reminiscent of the A.t.tha. Yet, there
are no parallels in the A.t.tha corresponding to the
philosophical groundwork of the Madhyamaka. We miss
the rhetoric of the tetralemma, the ontological
framework of causation and dependent origination, the
double truth, etc. It is true that the analogy does
not break down because of these differences; the
basic elements which we recognized in the A.t.tha are
for the most part in the Madhyamaka: silence as a
part of the way to calming the workings of wrong
apprehension, a goal beyond all talk and the
conqueror of the goal who is beyond all description
or verbal apprehension. And these are, no doubt,
characteristic of and central to the teachings of
both A.t.tha and Madhyamaka. Yet, the differences
that exist are seldom unimportant, though they may be
considered subtle or marginal to the religious quest.

The radical statement of "Buddha's silence" as
found in the Madhyamaka is not to be found anywhere
in the A.t.tha, or, for that matter, in the whole
Paali Canon. One thing is to say that Buddhas do not
cling to views and do not enter into disputes, and
another is to say that from the moment of his
awakening the Buddha never spoke a word. It is not
only a question of emphasis or rhetorical
pyrotechnics. There is an important philosophical
difference. In the first case we are dealing with a
very concrete description of the way to do something
and of the results that follow, in the second case we
are dealing with the ontological explanation and
justification of the experience and its value,

We find agreement on the fact that truth is not
multiple (Madhyamaka xviii.9, A.t.tha 886ab), but the
A.t.tha makes no attempt to define the one truth. The
Madhyamaka, it is true, ends up by declaring that the
one truth is neither truth, nor untruth, etc. (xvii
8), but the point is that while Naagaarjuna seeks to
establish dialectically and ontologically the value
and significance of nonapprehension, the A.t.tha is
taking that very nonapprehension as the point of
departure for practical injunctions. The A.t.tha
requires silence because it contributes to final calm
and release, the Maadhyamika, because all dharmas are
beyond speech, ineffable, empty and from the
beginning pure (Pras. 539).

The A.t.tha does not seem to be at all concerned
with the existence of a formed body of Buddhist
--doctrines (if there was one of them), or with the
possibility that these doctrines could be
incompatible with its teachings of nonduality,
whereas Naagaarjuna is patently conscious of the
conflict. On the one hand, he seeks to derive as much
as possible of his doctrine from the rhetoric of
older speculations and dogmas. On the other hand, he
is forced to construct a hierarchy of two levels of
truth, by means of which he will secure a place among
Buddhist "truths" to the specifics of the path as
taught in the suutras.

It is true that the "ultimate truth" of the
Madhyamaka is beyond all words and understandings
(Pras. 493) and is thus placed on a similar position
as the goal of the A.t.tha; but the moment that a
"conventional truth" is posited the situation
changes. This conventional truth or transactional
truth (vyavahaara)

p. 152

is a necessary element in the plan of the path, for
without it one could never reach the ineffable
ultimate (xxiv.l0). Such subtleties are a far cry
from the direct and simple injunction to silence of
the A.t.tha. The "double truth" could imply.
Naagaarjuna's protestations notwithstanding, the
hypostatizing of silence.(74) The A.t.tha is content
with freely jumping from silence to speech,
Naagaarjuna is still concerned with the
inconsistency. In other words, the A.t.tha seems to
have understood effortlessly that silence is not to
be reified, that mystical silence is not literal or
physical silence. The Maadhyamika, on the other hand,
requires the most abstruse rhetoric to wrestle with
the dilemma of words vs. silence.

But the greatest difference between the two
doctrines lies in their points of departure. The
A.t.tha sets out to find (or describe) a practical
solution to human sorrow, not merely the abstract
sorrow of rebirth, but the everyday sorrow of strife
and aggression. Naagaarjuna sets out to prove that
all dharmas lack self-subsistence
(ni.hsvabhaavaadharmaa.h). This leads to a concern
with conduct in the case of the A.t.tha, and, on the
other hand, a concern with dialectics in the case of
Naagaarjuna.(75)

SPECULATIVE NOTE

In conclusion, the A.t.tha's "theory of
no-theory" can be compared rather successfully with
the Praasa^ngika Maadhyamika stand. Parallels between
the two doctrines become more obvious and valuable if
we are willing to concede that the practical
motivations or imperatives behind the Maadhyamika are
close to those of the A.t.thakavagga. Moreover, the
Maadhyamika's opposition to the dharma and
svalak.sa.na theories of the Abhidharmists is
thoroughly consistent, though by no means identical
with the A.t.tha's rejection of all mooring in
dharmas.

At this point several highly speculative
questions arise. First, do we have in the
A.t.thakavagga an early example of a continuous
tradition of apophatic Buddhism? If so, could we be
justified in speaking of a "protomaadhyamika" in the
A.t.thakavagga? Last, what is the historical
connection, if any, of this proto-Maadhyamika and a
possible Indian "proto-Ch'an"? There is more than one
reason why these legitimate historical questions must
remain in the speculative realm. One does not have to
bring back to life the specter of "original Buddhism"
to be able to speak of earlier or latter strata in
the Canon, and the A.t.tha no doubt belongs to the
earliest.(76) The words "earliest" or "quite early,"
however, do not mean much in terms of absolute
chronology, nor do they, in the least, help to
clarify the A.t.tha's doctrinal or historical role in
the development of Buddhist dogmatics. Moreover, the
propriety of the term "protomaadhyamika" depends also
on the establishment of a definite connection between
the A.t.tha and the Maadhyamikas. One first step in
this direction would be to show that Naagaarjuna knew
the A.t.thakavagga or that he belonged to a monastic
or contemplative tradition stemming from a religious
milieu close or identical

p. 153

to that of the A.t.thakavagga. Although the later
seems likely, it is a thesis falsification insofar as
reliable spiritual lineages and hagiographies are
wanting. As to Naagaarjuna's knowledge of the Paali
Canon, it seems quite obvious that he must have known
some form of the Sa.myukta and the Madhyama AAgamas,
and by implication we may conclude that he knew the
other AAgamas, but there is no foolproof way of
determining specifically which were the texts he was
familiar with. Most certainly he believed that the
avyaak.rtaani held much of the key to understanding
the whole of the Buddha's message, but there is no
way of ascertaining whether the A.tt.ha was in anyway
pivotal to his exegesis of the canonical texts.

If the connection with Naagaarjuna is difficult,
or impossible to establish, any connection with the
Ch'an tradition must remain in the realm of pure
speculation. (77) It is somewhat suggestive that some
Indian masters found Ch'an congenial to their view of
the path. It is also interesting to note that as
Maadhyamika turned toward a svaatantrika position,
and its abhidharmic traits became stronger, it
eventually found itself in frank opposition to the
no-doctrine path of Ch'an at the bSam-yas debate
("Council of Lhasa").

In the present state of our knowledge it would be
more reasonable to discard the possibility of a
one-line transmission and assume that the apophatic
teachings of the A.t.tha, the Maadhyamika and,
perhaps, the Ch'an, represent one type of path
theory. It is also more accurate to envision this
type not as a unique and isolated phenomenon, but
rather as one tendency among others that grew among a
complex of doctrinal attempts to define, refine, or
map out the Buddhist mystical path.

Thus, in spite of the differences and
difficulties outlined above, the Maadhyamaka and the
A.t.tha both belong to the same type of Buddhist
tradition with regard to the value of views and the
function of conceptual thought. This is the same type
to which such traditions as the Ch'an belong, and
which is characterized by the rejection of all views:
views are not given up for the sake of right views,
what is to be abandoned is attachment to views.
Because such interpretation of the path presupposes
the goal of complete eradication of the conceptual
harborages of the mind, it is often connected to a
doctrine of jiivan-mukti or "leap theory'' of
release. This class of Buddhist plans of the path
should be contrasted to the "right-views" theories in
which the cultivation of right views and the gradual
transformation of mind is emphasized.(78) There are,
of course, intermediate types, such as we find in the
latter Maadhyamika of the Bhaavanaakramas. While most
Buddhists agree that the goal is beyond words, the
issue is whether the transition from specific verbal
directives or descriptions of the path to its
consummation in the final face-to-face experience of
the goal is best understood as a quantitative
transformation or as a qualitative leap.

The problem for the gradualist is the textual and
philosophic tradition which states that all dharmas,
being interdependent, are empty, therefore
ungraspable and from the beginning at peace. Such
doctrines seem to exclude the possibility

p. 154

or functional value of a gradual path, or of any path
at all.(79) By the same token, the "leap theory" must
explain how it is that specific actions must precede
awakening and the final obtainment of the goal. If no
specific steps are called for how is it that not
everyone is immediately liberated?(80)

The Madhyamaka attacks the problem by using the
traditional abhidharmic understanding of the middle
path as pratiitya-samutpaada. Causal connection
guarantees the specificity of the path. However,
Naagaarjuna is forced to bring in his double-truth
theory to save this very causal connection after he
has undermined it through his critique of
self-subsistence (svabhaava). The A.t.tha, on the
other hand, never considers these problems. Perhaps,
if we had to get an answer from the A.t.tha, we could
assume that the answer is to be found in the fact
that true nonclinging to views includes the negation
of all hypostases of negation: neither attached to
passion nor attached to dispassion (A.t.tha 795, 813.
et al.). In the end, in spite of all his scholastic
efforts, Naagaarjuna would probably agree with the
A.t.tha, for neither of the two is proposing calm and
silence as a reifiable absolute but as a
self-abolishing directive to nonclinging. In
principle, the problem of the function of the path in
emptiness never should have arisen, but precisely
because negation is in no way univocal, it had to
arise. The fundamental illusions which are at the
root of samsaric bondage belong to the realm of
language and conceptualization. But silence by itself
leads nowhere, first, because the process of
conceptualizing is indissolubly connected with a
basic state of thought and speech dispersion
(prapa~nca) which is affective as well as cognitive,
and second, because silence itself belongs to the
realm of speech.

Thus, our picture of the Middle Path would be
incomplete and unfaithful if we were to overemphasize
the cognitive aspect (avidyaa) at the expense of the
affective (t.r.s.naa), or if we were to take the
directive to silence as an injunction to live in the
bliss of the deaf and the mute. The wrongly directed
minding (ayoni`so manasikaara), which is at the base
of the agitation of becoming, must be uprooted by a
complete bringing to rest of clinging, affective and
cognitive. The pitfall of mystical ineffability is
that the directive to silence, if understood at a
purely cognitive level, could be reified and
transformed into a new apprehension of speech, a
source of further dispersion of thought and wordiness.
The directive of the A.t.tha thus comes close to that
of the Maadhyamaka: to take the pronouncements on
emptiness as the true view is to moor in emptiness as
if it were another object for clinging. But, unlike
the Maadhyamaka, the A.t.tha very aptly emphasizes
the connection between conduct (abstention from
strife, dispute, and frivolous talk) and meditation
(mindfulness, contemplation) on the one hand, and the
abandonment of clinging to views, on the other. That
is, the A.t.tha clearly sees the interconnectedness
of the various levels of silence. The Madhyamaka
lacks such a perception; but Naagaarjuna's masterwork
is an attempt at grounding the practice in a
philosophical rhetoric, it is not a guide to
practice. We should not make too much of its silence
with respect to the affective and practical side of
nonclinging, or assume that Naagaarjuna was ignorant
of this

p. 155

important aspect of Buddhism as a path of liberation.

In conclusion, one should not be too harsh with
Naagaarjuna. Many of the passages from the A.t.tha
that we have discussed above cannot be harmonized in
any way with much of what is found in the abhidharma
tradition of the Hiinayaana, against which, no doubt,
Naagaarjuna was reacting in the spirit of a tradition
close to that of the A.t.tha. In his study on
prapa~nca and sa~n~naa, ~Naa.naananda makes it a point
to criticize the Madhyamika for its excessive
dialecticism.(81) I tend to agree with his stance in
this regard, something of the spirit of the
Tripi.taka is lost among so much dialectical
flourish, but I cannot avoid feeling that
~Naa.naananda has chosen the wrong man to pick on. It
is true that both the Prajnaapaaramitaa and the
Maadhyamika (and later, in a similar spirit, even
Ch'an) tend to fall (almost addictively) into
formulistic word games and overlook the simple,
practical recommendations of some of the passages in
the Paali Canon, especially in the Nikaayas. But,
then, the same accusation could be made against the
whole of Buddhism, much of the Tripi.taka included.
The religion which rose out of the Buddha's silence
is no doubt one of the most verbose, abstruse and
pedantic of them all. And this applies in particular
to the abhidharma that Naagaarjuna was attempting to
refute. In many ways, Buddhism has failed to follow
the advice of the A.t.thakavagga: to keep away from
contentions and disputes by not grasping at views.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Early Buddhist views on the role of language and
theorization do not contain anything comparable to a
theory of language. With the exception of the older
parts of the Suttanipaata (A.t.thakavagga and
Paaraayana) and scattered passages in the Nikaayas,
the Paali tradition has adopted a view of avidyaa
which suggests a condemnation of specific theories or
views, rather than an outright rejection of the
clinging to theorizing and opinionating. The
ineffability of the goal is not taken to imply the
impossibility of theorization (as in the
Maadhyamika) , and theorization is not seen as
inextricably connected to clinging (as in the
Suttanipaata) . Nevertheless, the Paali tradition
preserves, in the Suttanipaata and elsewhere, several
important passages in which one could perhaps
discover some kind of "proto-Maadhyamika."(82) These
classic lines suggest, however, several
interpretations. not all of which lead necessarily to
a Maadhyamika position.

The Paali tradition contains in the first place
(and in a considerable majority of the cases)
passages which approach the question of languages
from a variety of ontological angles, namely: from a
moral perspective (slander, falsehood, etc., as
generators of unwholesome roots) , from the
perspective of the prophylaxis of meditation
(frivolous talk destroys calm and concentration),
from the point of view of established doctrinal truth
(one should not adopt or promulgate false teachings),
etc. But the least frequent passages are of greater
interest. These we have placed into two basic
categories: (1) goal-silence (the goal is

p. 156

utterly undescribable) and (2) path-silence (talking
and theorizing are obstacles in the path).

The various levels at which these views on language
and conceptualization are developed do not
necessarily meet in the texts and conceivably could
be considered or accepted separately and
disconnectedly, as they often are. However, they
could all fall into one pattern built around the
ineffability of the goal. And this happens in the
A.t.thakavagga, where the root of suffering and
becoming is discovered in the mind's tendency to
passionately cling to its own fancies: its own
prolific conceptualizations, rooted in wrong
apperception (sa~n~naa). This view of the position of
the conceptual process in the plan of the path is
theoretically close to Naagaarjuna, and in this sense
one could easily interpret most of the authentic
works of Naagaarjuna as consistent with at least one
non-Mahaayaana tradition.(83) Or one could propose a
type or tendency common to both the A.t.tha and
Maadhyamika surviving also in isolated passages in
the Nikaayas, such as some canonical interpretations
of the `indeterminables' (avyaak.rtaani).

However, one all important difference subsists
between the tone of the A.t.tha and that of the
Madhyamaka. Some key passages from the A.t.tha could
be called "proto-Maadhyamika" passages in the sense
that they anticipate some of the axial concepts of
the Maadhyamika. The A.t.tha, however, contains
explicit directives, consonant with its moralizing
tone, for the eradication of clinging and the
abandonment of theorization, and clearly makes way
for a corresponding contemplative and ascetic
practice. References to this practice are absent in
the Madhyamaka and scarce in the other works of
Naagaarjuna.(84)

Moreover, the theoretical framework of the
Maadhyamika is totally absent from the A.t.tha. The
twofold truth, emptiness, causation, and dependent
origination, the indeterminables, the tetralemma, the
equivalence of sa.msaara and nirvaa.na, are
conspicuous by their absence.

But then, perfect correspondence would be just
that, and not anticipation. Whether one is willing to
bestow the honorific of "proto-Maadhyamika" on the
A.t.tha depends mainly on whether one is willing to
recognize the practical core around which
Naagaarjuna's dialectical edifice has been built.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Note: References to Paali texts are all to the Paali
Text Society editions. by volume and page numbers
unless otherwise indicated.

Abbreviated References

Abhidharmako`sa: . references by ko`sasthaana and
kaarikaa numbers in P. Pradhan, Abhidharm-
Koshabhasya of Vasubandhu (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal
Institute, 1967)

A.s.taada`sa: referred to by folio of the Gilgit
Manuscript as edited by Edward Conze. The Gilgit
Manuscript of the A.s.taada`sasaahasrikaapraj~naa-
paaramitaa, Serie Orientale Roma, 26 and 46,
(Rome: ISMEO, 1962, 1974).

p. 157

Bhaavanaakramas:
G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts, Part II Serie
Orientale Roma, IX. 2, (Rome: ISMEO, 1958) .
Sde-dge xylograph. Tohoku No. 3926.
G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts, Part III Serie
Orientale Roma, 48, (Pome: ISMEO, 1971).

Bodhicaryaavataara: references to chapter and stanza
nos. in L. de la Vallee-Poussin's, ed., in
Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta, 1901-1914).

Bodhicaryaavataara Pa~njikaa: references to page in
the edition mentioned above.

Chalmers: R. (Lord) Chalmers, Buddha's Teachings,
Harvard Oriental Series, No. 37 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1932).

Da`sabhuumika: Ryuko Kondo, Da`sabhuumii`svaro naama
Mahaayaanasuutram (Tokyo: Daijyo Bukkyo Kenkyo-kai
[sic], 1936).

Ga.n.davyuuha: ed. P. L. Vaidya (Darbhanga: Mithila
Institute, 1969).

Hare: E. M. Hare, Woven Cadences, Sacred Books of the
Buddhist, 15 (London, 1948).

Ka`syapaparivarta: ed. (Baron)A. von Stael-Holstein
(Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926).

Lalitavistara: S. Lefmann, Lalita-Vistara, Leben und
Lehre des Caakya-Buddha, Vol. 2 (Halle, 1902,
1908).

Madhyamaka: references to chapter and karika in L.
de la Vallee-Poussin, Muulamadhyamakakaarikaas de
Naagaarjuna avec la Prasannapadaa Commentaire de
Candrakiirti, Bibliotheca Buddhica, No. 11 (St.
Petersburg, 1903-1913).

Madhyaantavibhaaga-.Tiikaa: ed. Susumu Yamaguchi
(Nagoya: Librairie Hajinkaku, 1934).

Mahaavastu: ed. Emile Senart, 3 vols. (Paris, 1882--
1897).

Neumann: K. E. Neumann, Die Reden Gotamo Buddhos aus
der Sammlung der Bruchstucke Suttanipaato des
Paali Kanons, (Leipzig, 1911).

Nyanaponika: annotated German translation of
Suttanipaata, (Konstanz: Verlag Christiani, 1955).

Pa~ncavi.m`sati: Pa~ncavi.m`satisaahasrikaapraj~naapaaramitaa,
ed. Nalinaksha Dutt, Calcutta Oriental Series, No.
28 (London, 1934).

Prasannapadaa: ref. to pages in Madhyamaka, above.

Vajracchedikaa: Vajracchedikaapraj~naapaaramitaa, ed.
E. Conze, Serie Orientale Roma, XIII, 2d ed.
(Rome: ISMEO, 1974).

NOTES

1. The stanza is from St. John's poem "Coplas del
mismo hechas sobre un extasis de harta
contemplacion", pp. 410-412 in Ruano's edition:
Crisogono de Jesus, Matias del Ni~no Jesus, y
Lucinio Ruano, Vida y obras de San Juan de la
Cruz, Doctor de la Iglesia Universal, (Madrid:
Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1972). The lines
can be prosaicly translated: "He who truly arrives
there, will loose consciousness of himself;
whatever he used to know now seems insignificant
to him, yet his science grows so much that
afterwards he remains knowing, even beyond all
science.'' The gulf that separates the Christian
mystic's view of silence and ignorance as
conditions of the mystic path and goal from that
of the Buddhist can be fully appreciated by
perusing St. John's remarks in Noche oscura, I. 10
ff., II.11 ff., these chapters are analyzed in
Leonard A. McCann, The Doctrine of the Void in St.
John of the Cross (Toronto: Basilian Press, 1955).
Compare also, St. John's comments on the lines "
... la musica callada, la soledad sonora..." in
Cantico espiritual, canciones 14 y 15, sec. 25-26,
in Ruano. Also, Dichos de luz y amor, 131, and
Federico Ruiz-Salvador, Introduccion a San Juan de
la Cruz (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos,
1968), pp. 99-104, 429-442.
2. Wu-men-kuan, case xxxvi. Furuta Shokin, Mumonkan,
(Kyoto: Kadogawa Bunsho, 1968) , p. 124. The
problem of words and silence is repeatedly taken
up in the Ch'an tradition, confer, for example,
the locus classicus in Yuan-wu's comments on the
Pi-yen lu's case lxv (pp. 269-278 in Asahino
Sogen's edition, Hekigan-roku (Tokyo: Iwanami
Shoten, 1937). In this passage the simplistic
stereotype of Ch'an's aversion to words is exposed
for what it is. There is a parallel case in
Wu-men-kuan xxxii; also compare case xxiv.
Yuan-wu, by the way, chastises Vimalakiirti for
his superficial "answer" to Ma~njusri's question.
Important desiderata in this area of Ch'an are
studies

p. 158

of the mo-chao ch'an and k'an-hua ch'an conflict
and, of course, on the yen-ch'uan kung-an (gosen
koan).
3. Majjhima Nikaaya, I. 426-432.
4. The Paali Canon never used such a strong formula
to express the ineffability of the Buddhist
message. The stronger form is clearly Mahaayaana.
The classical statement is found in Prasannapadaa,
p. 366, a passage quoted by Bu-ston to show that
sectarian and school differences in Buddhism are
"ultimately" meaningless.
5. See our comments on Suttanipaata 1076, below. The
"roads of speech" are also mentioned in the
Ka`syapaparivarta, section 125: "He does not moor
in Dharma even in terms of dispassionateness, how
much less then by the utterances of the roads of
speech!" (vaakpathodaaharena). Compare A^nguttara
Nikaaya, II. 9, where the Tathagata is said to be
vaadapathaativatta. Also compare, Ga.n.davyuuha
(Vaidya) pp. 17, 21, 22 and 184, Da`sabhuumika
(Kondo) p.14, Pa~ncavi.m`satii, p. 212, and A.s.
taada`sa, folio 253a.
6. Cf. the interpretation of prapa~nca as "delay" or
"obstacle" in the Pali Text Society Dictionary,
s.v. Also, compare, Pa~ncavi.m`sati pp. 200,
491-492, and A.s.taada`sa f. 250a.
7. Itivuttaka, p. 34; Abhidharmako`sa, III. vs. 27 -
29 and VI. vs. 3 (corresponding to L. de la
Vallee-Poussin, III. pp. 69-72, 88-91, and VI.
pp. 136-139.
8. E. Cornelis, in his Valeurs chretiennes des
religions non chretiennes (Paris: Ed. du Cerf,
1965), p. 162, mentions the fact that Jaspers
considers "que la secheresse meme des
nomenclatures de l'abhidharma est un procede
stylistique exactement adapte aux necessites d'une
propedeutique au silence mystique." Unfortunately
no reference is given.
9. The distinctions we have drawn here seem to be
purely a priori or, better, formal, and
similarities on this point do not contain
necessary material implications. Some of these
distinctions are made explicitly by St. John in
Subida del Monte Carmelo, III.II.I, "... para que
el alma se venga a unir con Dios en esperanza, ha
de renunciar toda posesion de la memoria, pues
que, para que la esperanza sea entera de Dios,
nada ha de haber en la memoria que no sea Dios; y
como (tambien hemos dicho) ninguna forma, ni
figura, ni imagen, ni otra noticia que pueda caer
en la memoria sea Dios ni semejante a El, ahora
celestial, ahora terrena, natural o sobrenatural....
de aqui es que, si la memoria quiere hacer alguna
presa de algo desto, se impide para Dios..."
Similar considerations appear in, op. cit., III.3.13,
5.3, and passim. For mystical silence, cf. Llama
de amor viva, 2.21, and Dichos de luz y amor,, 27,
99, and, on the anagoge, 138. On ascetic silence,
see Subida, III.3.4, 5.1-2, and 9; Dichos, 117,
121, 155, 179, and St. John's letter of 22
November 1587 to the nuns at Beas,in Ruano, p. 371.
In some of these passages ascetic and eremitic
silence are not separated in any way, as is to be
expected.
10. Regarding the age of the Suttanipaata and the
"Arthavargiiya" see the summary of the question
in Yamada Ryujo, Daijo Bukkyo Seiritsu Ron
Josetsu, Shiryo Hen: Bongo Butten no Shobunken,
(Kyoto: Heirakuji, 1959) , pp. 54-55 (on
Arthavargiiya), 25-27 and 48 (on Suttanipaata).
11. In the scholastic literature, the Suttanipaata is
quoted extensively only in the paracanonical work
Nettipakara.na (canonical in Burma). There is,
however, one full commentary attributed to
Buddhaghosa, the Paramatthajotikaa (the first part
of which is dedicated to the Khuddakapaa.tha), and
commentaries to books IV (A.t.thakavagga) and V
(Paaraayanavagga), the Mahaa- and Cuu.la- Niddesa,
respectively (both canonical).
12. Sn, 908, 911. Henceforth all references to
Suttanipaata will be given with the abbreviation
Sn followed by the stanza number, according to the
Paali Text Society edition, or simply with the
stanza number when the context leaves no doubt
about the source.
13. Sn 905 and passim.
14. On the traditional d.r.sti-`siilavrata-paraamar`sa,
cf. Abhidharmako`sa, V. 7-8. But also compare
A^nguttara-Nikaaya (henceforth, AN), II., p. 42:
"kaamesanaa bhavesanaa brahmacariyesanaa saha iti
saccaparaamaaso di.t.thithana samussaya"; AN, III.
p. 377, Majjhima-Nikaaya (henceforth, MN), I., p.
433. Digha-Nikaaya (henceforth, DN), III., p. 48,
etc. Compare the use of upaadaana in MN, I., pp.
50-51: "kaamupaadaana.m di.t.thupaadaana.m
siilabbatupaadaana.m attavaadupaadaana.m", also,
MN.I., pp. 95-97. Detachment from all virtues and
convictions is also prescribed by St. John.
Confer, for example. Subida del Monte Carmelo,
Book II, i.2, xxix.8, and III, iii.3 and ix.3, but
contrast Book II, xvii.4 and also Cautelas, 3, and
Cantico Espiritual, iii.3, the inconsistencies in
St. John clearly are due to reasons quite
different from the ones behind similar
inconsistencies in Buddhism,

p. 159

see, for example, Subida II, vi,l ff. and Noche
Oscura, I, vi.8. The relinquishment of virtue is
not to be construed as antinomianism; in Buddhism
the number of texts substantiating this point are
legion. Perhaps one of the most apposite loci
classici is the Sama.nama.n.dikasutta (MN, II.,
pp. 22-29).
`siila-vrata (siilabbata or siilavata) could be
read as a determinative or a copulative compound,
but in Sn 839 the word is broken up as a
copulative. The word `siila, incidentally, is also
closer to the etymological meaning of our words
moral and morality (mores) than to the
contemporary usage of these terms.
15. In quotations, the stanza number will follow each
stanza being quoted.
16. A number of difficulties arise in translating
this passage. Purekkharoti seems to mean "prefer"
(as per 794 and 859), as it does sometimes in
classical Sanskrit, but it also suggests the idea
of "prejudging" or "predetermining." Also, neyya
(as in 846) could mean "to be followed" or
"imitated," that is, "to be copied, pin pointed or
figured out" by means of his habits (`siila) and
convictions (vrata).
17. Here atta (apta) is clearly "what is adopted or
assumed (cognitively and affectively)," compare,
787 and 790ff. Hare translates "assumption" and
Nyanaponika, not so gracefully, "das einst
Geglaubte," implying that there is a new `belief'
to be adopted once the past (non-Buddhist) beliefs
have been abandoned.
I am translating ni-`sri and its derivatives
(nissaya, nissito, etc.) with various forms of the
verb "to rely." Hare uses "trust" or "have
recourse," which is quite alright, but I prefer to
preserve something of the literal meaning of
"leaning on."
18. "Sa ve viyattesu na vaggasaarii" (800c).
19. Henceforth A.t.tha will stand for A.t.thakavagga.
20. The first line, "Yassuubhayante pa.nidhiidha n'
atthi," is rendered by Hare: "Who here directs his
thoughts to neither course"; Nyanaponika, "Der
kein Verlangen hat nach beiden Enden," Neumann.
"Nach beiden Enden wer da nimmer hinspaht";
Chalmers, "When pray'rs for future life... cease."
Basically, the problem seems to be pa.nidhi,
Neumann and Chalmers take this world in its ]ate
meanings, but it is more appropriately construed
in its literal meaning of "placing down [-forth],"
hence, "direct" or "fix" [the mind]. Hare and
Nyanaponika are both acceptable, but Nyanaponika's
rendering fits the context better. As usual, be
follows Mahaa-Niddesa closely, where the word is
glossed (p. 109), "ta.nhaa...abhijjhaa, lobho...."
But, in this passage the inclination (pa.nidhi)
being described is something more than mere
longing; the word obviously refers to inclination
in general, and the two extremes could be
emotional, moral, or conceptual.
21. Kappa and pakappayati: "form [in the mind],"
"fancy," the process by means of which the
apperception (sa~n~naa) is formed, this gives rise
to the multiplicity of fancies or imaginings
(vikappa). The dividing factor is the papa~nca,
the fixation factor is the sa^nkhaa. The kappa is
the active function of the "moulding" (Hare) of
the sa^nkhaara. See the pertinent notes of
Nyanaponika in pp. 266 (on Sn 209), 281 (on Sn
373), 293 (on Sn 530), 257-258 (Sn 148), and 293
(on the key stanza 538). However, his comments on
sa^nkhaara, p.305. are not as apposite, since he
fails to see the closeness of the Sn usage to
another, related term: abhisa^nkharoti. His
interpretation of sa~n~naa in the Kalahavivaada
also seems to be a bit off the mark, for he still
feels that the term is being used there in the
context of the classical four samaapatti schema,
which is obviously not the case. Nyanaponika,
however, does take the term as we do in a latter
part of his note on stanza 874, where he
translates papa~ncasa.mj~naasa^nkhaa with
"Vorstellung und Begriff der Vieiheitswelt, "
(p.332). But his translation of 874d is weak:
"Denn vom Bewusstsein stammt die Vielheitswelt in
ihren Teilen," this in spite of his commentary
notes.

Muta has also been variously interpreted; I
take it to belong with the root man (thus, with
muni, etc.). Compare sa.mmuti and stanzas 714,
798-799, 846, and, especially 839. Nyanaponika's
"Erfahrendes' seems to me a good compromise
between the commentatorial derivation from m.r`s-
and the derivation from man-; he takes it, though,
correctly to be cognate to mata. (Also, compare,
Cuu.la-Niddesa, p. 298, and Mahaa-Niddesa, pp.
87-89.)

It would seem pertinent at this point to
mention two important passages from the Nikayas in
which nonattachment to things seen, heard, etc. is
formulated in the succint manner of the A.t.tha,
but in obvious reference to mindfulness. The
Bahiya-sutta (Udaana I. 10) is the most condensed
of the two and makes no explicit reference to
craving for sense objects. This aspect of the
doctrine is

p. 160

brought out in the Maalu^nkya-sutta (or Maalukya)
of the Sa^myuttra Nikaaya (hence-forth, SN), IV.,
pp. 72-74, where mindfulness is presented not only
as the antidote to lust, but also as the final
condition of the mind, beyond all dualities and
moorings of the mind (Saara.t.thapakaasinii,
however, interprets differently). Compare, also,
Theragaahaa, stanzas 794-817.
22. "Sandhi.t.thiraagena hi te `bhirattaa."
23. I take upadhi literally (upa-dhaa), but there is,
of course a certain sense of "cover up," "sham."
The poet is playing here with the idea of
foraneous matter (a~n~nena) piling up as
"additives" or "agglutinants" to build up a
semblance of a self. An upadhi is a "substratum"
only in the sense that it is a base we build in
order to have something to lean on, but it is not
a real base, it is something added to the true
nature of things, not something underlying them or
giving any real support to illusion.
24. "Fashioning", pakubbamaano. Compare, abhi(ni)sa^m-
kharoti.
25. Pp. 85-86. Followed by Nyanaponika in 789 and
790.
26. This passage could not be more reminiscent of the
Maahdyamika. Compare, also, Sn 795d, 813d, and
860d.
27. "Rest," nibbuti.
28. "Naatumaanam vikappayan ti.t.the." An equally
acceptable rendering: "Though touched my multiple
forms, he would not make a station [in them]
fancying himself [to be this or that]." Evidently,
vikappayan is to be taken in the sense of
"separating and contrasting" oneself with respect
to the multiple forms of the world. Thus,
Nyanaponika, "Nicht moge man sein Selbst
vergleichend unterscheiden." The word ruupa,
however, encompasses much more than the "Tugenden"
of Nyanaponika's rendering.
29. Nyanaponika takes samuggahiita as a noun meaning
"dogmas," but it is clearly a participle of much
broader meaning, and interchangeable with
uggahita, "that which is grabbed, grasped, or
clutched." The change from the third person plural
of 794 to the singular of 795 is in the original
text.
30. Sec note 21, herein. Also see Bhikkhu Nanananda's
excellent study on papa~nca and
papa~ncasa~n~na-sa^nkhaa: Concept and Reality in
Early Buddhist Thought (Kandy: Buddhist
Publication Society, 1971). Our interpretation of
sa~n~naa (sa^mj~naa) is also confirmed by the
scholastics: see, for example, Abhidharmako`sa, .
II. stanza 47ab, and commentary to II. stanza 24
and I. stanza 14cd; Visuddhimagga chapter XIV,
par. 130.
31. "Muula.m papa~ncasa^mkhaayaa / mantaa asmiiti
sabbam uparundhe / yaa kaaci ta.nhaa ajjhatta.m /
taasa.m vinayaa sadaa sate sikkhe //"Compare, Sn
1111: "ajjhatta~n ca bahiddhaa ca vedana.m
naabhinandato / eva.m satassa carato vi~n~naa.na.m
uparujjhati //"
The doctrine of no-self is not presented
explicitly in the Sn. There are, however, two
important passages that could be interpreted as
statements of such a doctrine. In the classical
passage at Sn 1119, the Buddha is attributed the
words: "su~n~nato loka.m avekkhasu... sadaa sato
attaanudi.t.thim uuhacca...." ("regard the world
as empty... always mindful, uproot views about
[the / your] self"). Whether we construe these
lines as an example of anattavaada in the
classical sense or as an example of the A.t.tha's
teaching advising the monk not to fancy himself as
being this or that, being or not being (918, see
note 28, herein), is truly not as important as the
fact that this passage brings out the important
connections: `emptiness-mindfulness-selflessness'.
The other passage which seems to contain a
pronouncement on the self question is Sn 756:
"anattani attamaanam passa loka.m... nivi.t.tham
naamaruupasmim, `ida.m sacca.m' ti ma~n~nati."
("See that the world has thoughts of self with
regard to that which is not [the] self, mooring in
name and form, the world thinks "this is the
true". )
32. Compare note 31, herein, and Sn 1070-1072
(discussed below), also, 855, 1041, 1055-1056,
1105-1111. Less important, but of some interest
are 933, 1026, 1035-1036, 1039, 1062, 1119 (see
note 31, herein). Notice that most passages on
mindfulness are from the Paaraayana.
33. In the practice of mindfulness, no doubt one must
find the first irreconciliable difference between
Christian and Buddhist mysticism. A few passages
in St. John's Subida seem, for a moment, to be
speaking of something close to mindfulness (and
there is, to be sure, a certain minimal point of
contact). Thus, Subida, II. 12. 3, II. 14. 11, and
III. 2. 14, emphasize the importance of
withdrawing from the fruit of the "imiginative
faculties" and emptying the mind of everything
except the "memory" of God. But the true nature
and purpose of this withdrawal (olvido, in
contrast to

p. 161

sm.rti) comes through transparently in II. 8-9,
II. 12. 4ff., II. 14. 10, and III. 11-14, Llama
3. 19-21 and of course in the whole edifice of
the noche pasiva del espiritu in Noche oscura. A
careful perusal of these passages shows how
superficial any attempt would be at reducing one
type of mysticism to the terms of another, as
attempted by so many (see, for example, George
Grimm in his "Christian Mysticism in the Light of
the Buddha's, " Indian Historical Quarterly 4
(1928): 306-338).
34. On the basis of 872 we must surmise that in 873-874
ruupam stands for naamaruupa. Equivalent, no doubt,
to the naamakaaya of 1074. Compare, 530, 736, 756.
35. This is the only way I can interpret what is
described in 874, discussed below. Compare, the
Po.t.thapaada-sutta (DN I.178 ff.), where (p.181)
the idea of control, rather than suppression, is
clearly suggested.
36. "Sa~n~nanidaana hi papa~ncasa.mkhaa." Compare
916, also 530, 886, and 1041. Compare Itivuttaka,
pp. 53-54, but contrast Udaana, p. 77.
37. DN I.276-277.
38. Compare also the causation "series" in the
Dvayataanupassanaa-sutta, Sn, pp. 139 ff.
39. The Paali is here less active: "form... ceases,"
"vibhoti ruupam."
40. On this refreshingly different use of the term
aaki~nca~n~na, confer, Sn 976, 1063, 1091, 1098-
1100, 1115. Also, Compare, aki~ncana, in 490,
501, 620, 645, and, of less value, 176, 455.
41. "Anaanuyaayii": Hare, "untrammelled," Nyanaponika,
following Cuula-Niddesa, "nicht weiter-wandern."
Perhaps better, "not having anything else to follow,"
that is, he is an asaik.sa.
42. Also, "perception." By Nyanamoli, for instance,
in his Path of Purification. Confer, note 21,
herein.
43. Confer, notes 30 and 36, herein.
44. Confer notes 34 and 39, herein. The context of
the sutra itself does not allow a literal
interpretation, that is, "making body and mind to
cease completely." The cessation is to take place
in this life. Confer the ditthaddhammaabhinibbutaa
of 1087. But, perhaps this is to be interpreted
like the di.t.the dhamme aniitiham of 1053, or in
the light of the twofold typology of nirvaana
(sopaadisesa and nirupaadisea).
45. There is no place here for the reduction of this
passage to the meditational stage of the eighth
aruupa-samaapatti (nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naa) .
Compare, Nyanaponika pp. 331-332). Mahaa-Niddesa
considers the person who has gone through the
path described here as an aruupa-magga-sama^ngii
(pp.279-280) and does not seem to appreciate the
ascending and dialectic nature of the four steps.
It also seems to ignore the fact that the
Kalahavivaada is explicitly talking about the
complete ending of becoming and sorrow. At any
rate, the meaning of the four (or five)
samaapattis is not at all clear, particularly if
we insist on nevasa~n~naanaas~n~nasamaapatti and
the nirodhasamaapatti as mental states "without
perception" or "without feeling." It is difficult
to see how the sa~n~naavedayitanirodha, which is
beyond the state of nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naa,
could be a simple return to "na sa~n~naa." The
key to the term is no doubt in the word vedayita.
But a clarification must await further research.
The canonical literature is not always very
helpful. Passages where the highest samaapatti is
praised and recommended without a clear
definition are abundant (see, for example, AN IV.
429-432, 433-434, and MN I 159-160). In other
places the canon seems to confirm interpretations
like those of Buddhaghosa with words such as
those of MN III. 45: "ayam, bhikkhave, bhikkhu na
ki^mci ma~n~nati, na kuhi~nci ma~n~nati, na
kenaci ma~n~nati." But, then, contrast MN 111.
28: "puna ca param, bhikkhave, saariputto sabbaso
nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naayatana^m samatikkamma
sa~n~naavedayitanirodha^m upasampajja viharati /
pa~n~naaya cassa disvaa aasavaa parikkhiinaa
honti / so taaya samaapattiyaa sato vu.t.thahati
/ so taaya samaapattiyaa sate vu.t.thahitvaa ye
dhammaa atiitaa niruddhaa viparinataa te dhamme
samanupassati `eva^m kirame dhammaa ahutvaa
sambhonti hutvaa pa.tiventi' ti / so tesu
dhammesu anupaayo anapayo anissito appa.tibaddho
vipamutto visa^myutto vimaariyaadikatena cetasaa
viharati / so `natthi uttari nissaranam ti
pajaanaati / tabbahuliikaaraa natthitvevassa hoti
/".
Also, compare, the analysis of the jhaanas
and samaapattis in the Cuulasu~n~nataa-sutta of
the MN (III. pp. 104 ff.).
Release is not always attained by way of
the samapattis (a fact well known to the
defenders of the satipa.t.thaana or vipassanaa
meditation system) . Confer. for example,
Mahaasatipatthaana-sutta, DN II., pp. 290ff., and
Sama~n~naphala-sutta, DN I., pp. 75ff. Compare,
also, the analysis of the samaapattis in DN I.,
pp. 178ff. (Potthapaada-sutta). In the traditional
account of the Buddha's enlighten-

p. 162

ment it is said that Sakyamuni learnt the third
and fourth samaapattis from his teachers Kalama
and Ramaputra, realized that these did not lead to
emancipation, and proceeded to develop his own
method. The nirodhasamaapatti is not presented as
the culmination of the new path. See references in
Andre Bareau, Recherches sur la biographie du
Buddha, Premiere Partie (Paris: Ecole Francaise d'
Extreme Orient, 1963). See also, Buddhacarita,
Canto XII.
The Nettipakara.na (pp. 76, 100) enumerates five
samaapattis with terms reminiscent of the Sn:
sa~n~naa, asa~n~na, nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naa,
vibhuutasa~n~naa, nirodhasa~n~naa. Dhammapaala,
commenting on this unorthodox list, is obviously
at a loss as to its meaning. Compare, Nyanaponika,
pp. 331-332.
46. SN III.,p.9.
47, Notice the contrast between the person who is
sa~n~na-ratta and the one who is pa~n~naavimutta
and, therefore, sa~n~naaviratta.
48. "Sabbasa^mkhaarasama thaa sa~n~naaya uparodhanaa,"
compare, the passages in note 27, herein.
49. It is interesting to note that a person's views
are here taken to be in some way the basis and
cause of the view others take of him. Could we say
that a person's "own thing" and "gimmick" is that
by which others and he himself identify his own
being?
50. The vi~n~naana of the Sn is closer to the
vij~napti (active) of Yogaacaara psychology, than
to the fundamental awareness of consciousness. It
is the active graha.na and upalabdhi of the mind
(Abhidharmako`sa I. vs. 16a.), the act of notation
by means of which the sa~n~naa operates
(Abhidharmako`sa II. vs. 34ab.).
51. I am not at all satisfied with my rendering,
"ceases," for atta.m paleti (gacchati). This is a
standard idiom for the setting of the sun, and, as
pointed out by Nyanaponika in his note (p. 355),.
it has been purposefully chosen to avoid both the
idea of annihilation and the idea of a permanent
blissful abode, a duality about which Upasiva will
question the Buddha in the next stanza (1075).
Compare also, 876-877.
The simile of fire is also used to avoid both
extremes: fire, one of the basic elements, does
not cease to exist, it simply becomes imperceptible
or ungraspable when it runs out of fuel. On this
point, confer, E. Frauwallner, Geschichte der
indischen Philosophie, vol. 1(Salzburg: Otto
Muller Verlag, 1953) , pp. 225ff., and his
important reference to Mahaabhaarta XII.187.2, 5-6
in note 131, p. 470. Also, to the question "so uda
vaa so n'atthi udaahu ve sassatiyaa arogo" (1075),
the answer is: "... na pamaa.nam atthi," etc.
(1076) translated below.
52. Compare, note 5, herein. Also the stock phrase for
many of the passages on the indeterminables
(avyaak.rtaani), where the topic is the uprooting
of the thirst and the grasping of the skandhas, by
means of which one could pinpoint a person of the
world, but not a Buddha who has uprooted them.
Confer, for example, SN IV., pp. 373-380, 384,
401-403, (compare, SN IV., p. 52). On the viannana
of the man who is released, compare the
Upaya-sutta of SN III. 53-54.
53. "Remainderless" : anupaadisesa!!
54. The idea that the Buddha "sees through" those who,
believing themselves experts in release, are still
deeply rooted in attachment, reminds me of
Kierkegaard's ironist, who sees through the
inauthenticity of the pious. Compare, for example,
the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. D.
F. Swenson and W. Lowrie, (Princeton, N. J.:
Princeton University Press, 1941, pp. 537-544.
Another interesting, but also partial parallel is
found in St. John's remarks on those who cling to
the mental images of meditation without letting go
into the void of contemplation (Subida del Monte
Carmelo,II.xii.6)
55. The question is not the metaphysical validity of
any theory, of any of the extremes, but rather the
deceit and destructiveness of clinging. The
problem is mooring in views; 785ab,
"di.t.thiinivesaa na hi svaativattaa / dhammesu
niccheyya samuggahiita.m." Both extremes are a
bond (801), whether it is becoming or nonbecoming
makes no difference (776, 856, 786, 877, 1068).
56. The differences between Paaraayana and A.t.tha
are mostly differences of emphasis. Both texts are
very close, especially when compared with the rest
of the Sn. But differences in approach, language,
meter, and style suggest different origins for
A.t.tha and Paaraayana.
57. Notice that no view is to be the considered the
highest. As we will point out below, this
"choicelessness" creates a problem for the
formulation of directives in the path. This is the
"nondual bind" which has important philosophical
and practical implications, especially in the
Mahaayaana. I have considered some of these
implications in an article on the Buddhist
"absolute" to appear shortly in the special volume
on Buddhism of Estudios de Asia y Africa del Norte
(Mexico, DF)

p. 163

58. A "highest" could also be a "beyond" (param). How
far off the mark is the Mahaa-Niddesa at times
will be appreciated from its gloss of the word
visenikatvaa: "senaa vuccati maarasenaa /
kaayaduccarita.m maarasenaa, vaciiduccarita.m
maarasenaa, manoduccarita.m maarasenaa...
sabbaakusalaabhisa.mkhaaraa maarasenaa / yato
catuuhi ariyamaggehi sabbaa ca maarasenaa sabbe ca
patisenikaraa kilesaa jitaa ca paraajitaa... tena
vuccati visenikatvaa ti..." (pp. 174-175).
59. This is one of the most doubtful passages in the
A.t.tha, it is also one of the few with evident
metaphysical implications (possible parallel to
Maadhyamika ontology, too). The Pali reads: "na
h'eva saccaani bahuuni naanaa /a~n~natra
sa~n~naaya niccaani loke." Chalmers: "Apart from
consciousness, no diverse truths exist." Hare:
"Indeed there are not many divers truths, Save
from surmise on `lasting' in the world."
Nyanaponika: "Nicht gibt es Wahrheit vielerlei,
verschieden, Von ew'ger Geltung in der Welt, es
sei denn bloss im Dunken." Neumann: "Verschieden
vielfach kenn' ich keine Wahrheit, Bloss
wahrgenommen die da ewig bleibe...." Only Hare
comes close to an acceptable rendering. The word
sa~n~naaya must be construed verbally with
niccaani as its object. The Chinese (Taisho 198,
p. 182-b-14) is unclear.
60. "Kuppapa.ticcasanti.m