Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism

·期刊原文
Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism
By Frank J. Hoffman.

Mary Bockover

Philosophy East and West

1989.04

39:2

Pp.214-216

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P.214

Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism is an insightful book by Frank J. Hoffman which investigates the "Buddhism of the five Nikaayas," the earliest (Pali) source of material for studying Buddhism. More specifically, Hoffman demonstrates that Early Buddhism is indeed a rational, "accurate and non-trivial" school of thought, the value of which is elucidated, not diminished, by philosophical analysis. The sort of analysis Hoffman ultimately provides shows how Early Buddhism bears on issues central to the philosophy of mind. To begin, though, the first three chapters of his book argue against criticisms that Early Buddhism is methodologically, logically, and emotively flawed (chapters 1, 2, and 3, respectively). To state the goal of this book more generally, it is to demonstrate the rationality of Buddhism through the effort to understand it.

Chapter 1, "Understanding Early Buddhism," explains the method that should be used for this task. Going to the Pali texts is essential, but it is also methodologically necessary to look at certain commentaries, given the more specific goal of understanding how Early Buddhism can be taken to bear on pertinent issues of mind. And examining the Pali source will show that Early Buddhism is "internally consistent and linguistically precise" in itself, while outside commentaries provide philosophical criticism. In sum, both a "sympathetic understanding" of the text as well as a critical

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philosophical analysis is necessary to understand issues of mind in Early Buddhism, or to provide the methodological framework for such an investigation.

Chapter 2, "Rationality and Logic," goes on to argue that Early Buddhism is logically intelligible or not self-contradictory. In particular, Hoffman argues against the claim that the third part of the fourfold logic embodies a contradiction that confused Early Buddhists in virtue of its logical impossibility. However, he does this by showing that the internal coherence in fact characteristic of Early Buddhism is not governed by a formal logical system as some have suggested. Rather, a "heuristic" principle of noncontradiction served as the basis for the Early Buddhist's rejection of selfcontradictory utterances. HofEman shows that the error of thinking that the fourfold logic embodies a contradiction results from the inaccurate translation of certain Pali terms into the language of formal logic, for example, to confuse the meaning of the Pali term for "utterances" with the strictly logical notion of propositions.

Chapter 3, "Rationality and Pessimism," further defends the rationality of Early Buddhism by arguing against the claim that it is "wholly pessimistic," to the point of being irrational. Briefly stated, Hoffman cites that the "first noble truth" of Buddhism is that life is dukkha or (physically and mentally) "painful," but he goes on to explain that Buddhism most fundamentally offers a way of being liberated from this pain, and for this reason it is inaccurate to think of it as irrationally pessimistic. A world view that offers no alternative to suffering may be called irrationally pessimistic, but this is contrary to the very goal of Buddhism, which is liberation from dukkha or "suffering."

While the first three chapters are concerned with defeating objections about the rationality of Early Buddhism, the last three chapters turn to issues central to the philosophy of mind. Chapter 4, "Mind and Rebirth," focuses on the problem of reidentification across lives in the attempt to make sense of the question: "What is reborn?" Hoffman explains that this question has not yet been answered in any meaningful way, for "neither memory, bodily continuity, nor self-awareness will work" as the medium through which the same being or person could be reborn, in accordance with Early Buddhist thought. However, while the idea that "there is rebirth" is philosophically problematic, it is not logically incompatible with the Buddhist "no soul" doctrine, for, as Hoffman argues, a "rebirth link" is all that is needed to provide the continuity for rebirth, that is, for a changing mental entity.

Chapter 5, "Mind and Verification," then goes on to refute the view that the problem of reidentification of persons across lives can be solved by appeal to the thesis that Early Buddhism espouses a form of empiricism (the Buddhist empiricism thesis). Hoffman systematically examines the roles of saddhaa ("confidence," "faith") and abhi~n~naa("higher kinds of knowledge and psychic powers") as evidence of religious belief, which led in turn to the refutation of the Buddhist empiricism thesis itself. The upshot basically is that the nature of "verification" appropriate to Buddhism is that of a religious experience (for example, of past lives) which can not be falsified empirically, in the same way that we would verify (and, at least in principle, be able to falsify) a scientific belief.

And finally, the last chapter, called "The Deathless," argues that "the deathless" is not a transcendental state of consciousness, but rather refers to the destruction of that which defiles--passion, hatred, and confusion. For if one has achieved liberation from dukkha by faithfully following the appropriate spiritual path, then he is no longer

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"limited" by death. He is "deathless" in the sense that he lives a life independent of death: a life that is no longer vulnerable to change and that is free from the cycle of death and rebirth.