Some aspects of the free-will question in the Nikaayas

·期刊原文
Some aspects of the free-will question in the Nikaayas

By Luis O. Gomez
Philosophy East and West
25:1 1975 p. 81-90
(C) by the University Press of Hawaii

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p. 81

The scope of this article is limited to the
tradition of the Nikaayas. Thus, for reasons of time
and space, I have left out for future consideration
the Maadhyamika theories of causation and the
Yogaacaara theories of innate and developed seeds,
both of which have important implications for the
free-will question.(l) This essay, moreover, limits
itself to a cursory examination of one question: in
what ways could the Buddhism of the Nikaayas
conceivably attempt or did in fact attempt to justify
a doctrine of free will?

The reader should also be forewarned of the
unavoidable risk of discovering in Buddhist
scriptures nonexisting theories and problems, which
are often nothing but the distortions caused by our
Western microscope. I would, therefore, like to
underline the fact that we are here also concerned
with speculative arguments that could be developed
from basic Buddhist statements by implication,
whether they were or were not formulated explicitly.

Now, while the question of determinism versus
free will has been considered at several junctions in
the history of Indian philosophy, compared with the
constant and systematic Western preoccupations with
the problem, Indian interest seems rather sporadic.
Perhaps this tells us much about the nature of
"liberation" and about Indian conceptions of the
self, in short, about the specific character of the
categories of Indian thought. Liberation as the
denial of individuality, or complete separation from
the causal realm, seems foreign to the Western
philosopher. The problem clearly could not be
formulated precisely in the terms "determinism" and
"free will," nevertheless, the problem of man's
capacity to freely choose and by his own efforts be
able to escape from the realm of conditioning could
hardly be called anything else but the problem of
free will.(2)

Perhaps the oldest formulation of the problem in
the history of philosophy can be discovered in
speculations that took form in the sixth century B.C.
in India. In those days it seems that wandering
ascetics were classified into two groups depending on
their doctrine of human action, or better, of the
"efficacy of action" (kriyaa).(3) Thus, there were
the kriyaavaadins (or karmavaadins) who claimed that
there would be retribution for human deeds,(4) and
the akriyaavaadins for whom all human effort was
fruitless.(5) The terms also implied that the first
group advised some kind of action or human effort
that would lead to release from sa.msaara, whereas
the second group advised abstention from action.(6)

But, for our purposes, it will suffice to
concentrate on a third aspect of this twofold
classification. As a corollary of the positions
mentioned above, kriyaavaada also implied that our
state of being in the present life was the result of
our deeds in previous lives, whereas the
akriyaavaadin believed that deeds, past, present, or
future, had no effect on the condition of living
beings. Thus, in its more extreme forms the
akriyaavada would say that there is actually no
-------------------
Luis O. Gomez is Associate Professor of Philosophy at
the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

p. 82

causal connection between what a living being does
and what he is or becomes, in this or in another
life.

The Buddhists are often called kriyaavaadins;
they themselves refer to the teaching of Buddha as
kriyaavaada or karmavaada. The Jains, however, seem
to have considered them akriyaavaadins.(2) The reason
is obvious, to the Buddhist what determined the
future was not the act itself but the intention of
the act.(8) This to the Jain seemed to culminate, by
necessity, in moral corruption, for then, they
claimed there would be no objective criteria for
right and wrong. In a certain sense the Jains were
right in claiming that the Buddhist was not a
kriyaavaadin; at least we must grant that Buddhism
does not represent strict karmavaada, that is, it
would not accept a necessary and unqualified relation
of cause and effect between an act and its
retribution. Evidently the Buddhist would consider
certain acts as not retributable.(9) Now, this very
question is central to the problem of determinism:
whether the human condition is or is not necessarily
and absolutely determined. The question whether this
predetermination is of one's own doing is ultimately
irrelevant if the determination is unqualified.(10)
The Buddhist texts, therefore, will often offer a
view of karmic causation that could best be described
as "weak" or modified kriyaavaada: the human
condition is not totally or absolutely determined by
the deeds of the human agent.

At least two ways of formulating this "weak"
kriyaavaada suggest themselves in the Nikaayas.
First, the paali texts tell us that `Saakyamuni himself
did not consider that the cause-effect relationship
implied necessarily strict determination or a
one-to-one correspondence of act and fruit. The
second approach is the classic doctrine of
pratiityasamutpaada.

Regarding the denial of strict determination,
there is more than one passage in the Paali canon to
prove it. I would like to quote three of these which
illustrate three central aspects of what may be
called "early Buddhist denial of determinism." These
three aspects are: first, the acceptance of the fact
that certain elements of reality are casual, or at
least caused by nonkarmic causes; second, the
acceptance of the fact that a given act will not
always have the same effect, depending on
circumstances; and third, the affirmation of the
efficacy of human effort.

The first aspect is attested in Sa.myutta Nikaaya
IV. 230-231. Siivaka, the wandering ascetic
approaches Gautama with the following question:
"There are, Gotama, some `srama.nas and braahma.nas
who speak thus, who hold this view: 'Whatever a human
person experiences, whether pleasure or pain, or
neither pleasure nor pain, all that is caused by
former deeds.' Now, what says the venerable Gotama
about this?" To this the Buddha replies unhesitantly:
"There are, Siivaka, also feelings experienced here
that arise from bile. You yourself, Siivaka, must
know this, how certain feelings arise from bile. This
is acknowledged by the world to be true.... those
`srama.nas and braahma.nas who speak thus, who hold
this view: 'whatever a human person experiences,

p. 83

whether pleasure or pain, or neither pleasure nor
pain, all that is caused by former deeds,' with
respect to what they themselves know go too far, and
with respect to what the world acknowledges to be
true, go too far."

Gautama then enumerates other similar causes:
phlegm, wind, the humors, the seasons, and lastly,
but of the utmost importance, feelings could arise on
account of untoward circumstances
(visamaparihaarajaani), on account of an accident
(opakkamikaani) or through the maturation of previous
karman (kammavipaakajaani).(11)

The second aspect is attested in another passage
from the Nikaayas, equally pertinent. Here
(A^nguttara Nikaaya I. 249-253) Gautama appears to be
censuring karmic determinism once more, but the
concepts of effective karman vs. ineffective karman,
and the concept of maturation (vipaaka) are now
brought to the fore: "If someone would speak thus,
monks: 'exactly as this man performs deeds, thus does
he experience its [fruit],' if this were so, monks,
one could not live the saintly life, no opportunity
would appear to put a proper end to sorrow. But if
someone would speak thus, monks: 'Exactly as this man
performs a deed that is to have a consequence, thus
does he experience the fruit of its maturation,'if
this were so, monks, one could live the saintly life,
an opportunity would appear for putting a proper end
to sorrow."

There are, therefore, acts that do entail a
consequence (literally: 'acts that are to be
experienced', vedaniiya^m karnma^m), and those that
do not entail a fruit. Moreover, the nature of the
consequence does not necessarily correspond or is not
directly proportional to the nature or intensity of
the act, for the final result depends on the
maturation of the fruit, the vipaaka, and this
maturation depends on the soil in which the act is,
so to speak, planted. Our text does not use the
simile of the seed, which has become more or less
standard in scholastic literature, but uses a simile
that has given the title to this vagga of the
Tikanipaata, the Lo.naphalavagga.(12) Supposing a man
puts a grain of salt into a small cup, says our
simile, the water would become undrinkable. But,
"suppose that a man, monks, would throw a grain of
salt into the river Ganges.... Would this river
Ganges also become salty and undrinkable because of
this grain of salt?... In the same way, monks, a man
could perform here even a slight sinful action the
result of which would lead him to hell. But, again,
monks, a man could perform an equally slight sinful
action the result of which would be experienced in
this very life, and would not appear to be even
light, much less grievous."(13)

The third aspect of the Buddhist denial of strict
determinism is the affirmation of the effectiveness
of human effort. If the human condition were the
exclusive result of previous deeds, then the actions
and experiences of the present would all be
predetermined, effort would be pointless, insofar as
it would be predetermined effort. These arguments are
suggested in the Devadahasutta of Majjhima Nikaaya
(II. 214 ff.), where `Saakyamuni explains to his
disciples how he argued against the niganthas:

p. 84

There are, monks, some `srama.nas and braahma.nas who
speak thus, who hold this view: "Whatever a human
person experiences, whether pleasure or pain, or
neither pleasure nor pain, all this is caused by
former deeds. Thus they claim that by means of
austerities they put an end to past deeds, that they
abstain from performing any new deeds [in the
present], that they are not accumulating [any more
deeds] for the future. Because there is no
accumulation for the future, there will come about
the extinction of all deeds, with the extinction of
all deeds comes about the extinction of sorrow, with
the extinction of sorrow there comes about the
extinction of feeling, with the extinction of feeling
all sorrows will be exhausted.(14)

But this doctrine the Buddha rejects outright. Among
the reasons he offers for his position, Gautama
argues: "...when you have eager undertaking, eager
effort, do you then experience a sharp, severe and
painful feeling associated with that undertaking? Or,
again, when you do not have eager undertaking, eager
effort, do you then not experience a sharp, severe
and painful feeling associated with undertaking?" To
this, of course, the niganthas assent, whereupon,
Gautama presents the necessary implications: if this
is so, then how could the niganthas possibly claim
that "whatever a man experiences is caused by former
deeds"? Only if the opposite were true, that is, if
intense effort and the nigantha austerities were not
accompanied by equally intense pain, only then would
it be true that whatever a man experiences is the
result of previous deeds. For if the intense effort
and application, which austerities require, bring
about a correspondingly painful feeling here and now,
that very fact proves that one does have experiences
brought about by one's own effort in this very life.

The Buddha then proceeds to ask the niganthas
whether they accept the possibility of changing the
outcome of karman by effort: the possibility of
forcing deeds that are to mature in the present to
mature in a future life, of converting the outcome of
deeds that are to mature in painful sensations so
that they will mature as pleasant feelings, etc. The
niganthas deny the possibility of altering karman in
anyway.(15)The Buddha then points out, that if this
is so, "all undertaking is fruitless, all effort is
fruitless." Moreover, if this thesis of the niganthas
were true, Gautama continues in a passage of obvious
irony: "If the pleasure and pain that living beings
experience is caused by previous deeds, then, monks,
the niganthas must have been in previous lives doers
of evil deeds, for now they undergo such sharp,
severe and painful sensations [in their austerities].
If the pleasure and pain that living beings
experience is caused by the creation of a god, then,
monks, the niganthas must have been created by an
evil god.... If... by chance... [they] must have been
the fruit of ill-fortune..."

The Buddha thereupon explains the way in which
his monks practice fruitful effort (saphalo
upakkamo).(16) "A monk does not soil with pain an
otherwise unsoiled self, and he does not abandon the
happiness pertaining to the Dhamma, nor does he
become attached to this happiness. He discerns thus:
`If I were to

p. 85

oppose the formation of the cause of sorrow, by
opposing this formation I would become dispassionate.
Also, if I were to become evenminded in respect to
this cause of sorrow, if I were to develop this
evenmindedness, I would become dispassionate."(17)
The text goes on to describe in detail the Buddha's
path to salvation, which, like the lines quoted
earlier, is based all on the notion of dispassion or
detachment. For the Buddhist, the central element in
the process of the origin of suffering is of course
the attached mind, and the mind can be subjected to
control.(18)

But all of the previous considerations would not
be analyzed by a Buddhist without reference to the
doctrine of dependent origination. Any consideration
of the problem of determinism in Buddhism would have
to take into account this conception, in spite of the
fact that, as we have seen earlier, many a passage
will discuss the problems of human action and
determinism without even mentioning the doctrine of
dependent origination.

I would like to consider two key passages from
Sa.myuutta Nikaaya which bring together the concepts
of karman and nonself with the doctrine of dependent
origination. In the first one of these--from the
Natu^mhasutta (Sa.myutta Nikaaya II. 64-66), the
notion of nonself is explained in what is obviously
one of its oldest formulations, the intention being
not to formulate a metaphysical theory on the absence
of a self but rather to offer a foundation or
justification for the doctrine of detachment by means
of an analysis of what is not of the self. That is,
the question is not the existence or absence of a
self, but the problem of what belongs to the self
(pariggaha, mamakaara, or mamatta) .(19) Gautama
explains to his monks: "This body, monks, is not
yours, nor does it belong to others. It should be
known, it should be considered, monks, as former
deeds purposefully performed and thought out.(20) In
regard to it, monks, a well-instructed noble disciple
practices well centered attention (yoniso
manasikaara) only on dependent origination: 'When
this is, that is; from the arising of this, that
arises; if this is not, then that is not; from the
stopping of this, that is stopped.'" The text follows
with the complete formula in its classical
twelve-member version. But what is truly significant
in this passage is that if its concluding statement
is taken as a law of universal application, it would
seem to contradict openly the texts we have
considered earlier in this article. It would seem to
affirm rather explicitly a law of total
determination. But the concluding statement is not
complete without the twelve links, and the chain they
form is reversible; the twelve links are not meant to
represent absolute determination. Our text seems to
be clarifying precisely this point when it states
that former deeds, "purposefully performed and
thought out" and not just any deed, are the
conditioning factors.

In the Acelakassapasutta, also from Sa.myutta
Nikaaya (II. 19-22), the pratiityasamutpaada is put
to a different use. avoiding the "eternalist" and the
"annihilationist" extremes. Although the questions
asked do seem to be parallel to the problems
considered in the Devadahasutta, in the end we are

p. 86

disappointed. For the intention here seems not to be
an explanation of the possibility of fruitful human
effort, but rather to deal with a strictly
cosmological issue. Kassapa enquires whether it is
oneself who is responsible for one's suffering or
whether someone else is the cause, whether both
oneself and another are the cause, whether neither is
the cause. To all questions he receives a negative
answer: "Whoever says: 'He who performs [the deed] is
he who experiences its [fruit]', Kassapa, implies the
eternalist view that suffering has been caused by
oneself. Whosoever says: `One performs [the deed],
another experiences [its fruit]', Kassapa, implies
the annihilationist view that suffering has been
caused by another. Avoiding both extremes, the
Tathaagata teaches Dhamma by the middle [way]:..." By
way of conclusion Gautama then recites the
pratiityasamutpaada in anuloma and pratiloma
sequences.(21)

In both these passages from the Sa.myutta Nikaaya
the implications for the free-will question have to
be drawn out with great care. The Buddhists evidently
want to secure continuity while avoiding the pitfalls
of an unchanging self.(22) Since their prime interest
is thus to establish firmly a type of "moral
responsibility" without a self-existing substratum,
which would operate within a system of strict moral
causation, the pratiityasamutpaada, in underlining
causal concatenation, overlooks the pitfalls of
strict determination. If the self were unchanging, it
is true, the case for free will and moral
responsibility would be lost, but an ever changing
self is not sufficient guarantee for free will. For
if the change were constant and regular, this process
itself would become the new 'unchanging self'.

The deterministic ring in the theory of nonself,
when it is explained in terms of its sister theory of
dependent origination, is rather transparent in the
famous stanzas from the Selaasutta (Sa.myutta Nikaaya
I. 134). Maara appears before the nun Selaa and asks:

By whom was this puppet (bimba) made?
And where is the puppet's maker?
Wherefrom, again, does it arise?
And where will it cease?

Selaa's reply is classic:

This puppet is not made by itself,
Nor are its misfortunes made by another.
Conditioned by causes it arises,
Upon the destruction of its causes it ceases.

The question is how much of the puppet is
conditioned, or what is the extent of its
predetermination if no other cause for the arising of
phenomena is accepted aside from previously
conditioned causes. And again, is there much meaning
in asking for the degree of the puppet's
determination if "it" does not exist beyond its
causes and conditions?(23)

The Buddhist, of course, will always insist on
the desirability and possibility

p. 87

of release; he is convinced that the causal series
can be stopped, in this conviction is the very ground
for all Buddhist hope. Because this is repeated so
often, Buddhism could not be accused in any way of
pessimism or fatalism. But it is not at all clear how
the Buddhist can wriggle out of the deterministic
quagmire into which his much cherished theory of
conditioning could draw him. If he were to make a
distinction between a 'strong' and a `weak'
conditioning, and choose the latter, that is, if he
were to accept an open system, which would allow for
the occasional intervention of forces beyond or at
the root of the causal structure, as the passages
quoted in the first part of this article seemed to
indicate, then the Buddhist position would still
present difficulties but would not suggest so
strongly a deterministic vein. But to allow a system
open, in this sense, would evidently invite in a
"self-existent" principle. Call it "the will," call
it "the mind," it nevertheless looks too much like a
"self" and therefore appears as a solid support for
attachment.

But there is a positive element in the doctrine
of causation, an element which probably was central
to its original formulation. The notion that
dependent origination is the way to avoid the
eternalist and the annihilationist views has
important implications for the free-will question.
For the eternalist view also means the view that
there will be no end to sa.msaara. This is in a
certain way the determinist position, or at least one
important aspect of it. The annihilationist view, on
the other hand, could imply that the world lacks
continuity, that all is the product of pure chance.
Both extremes of course are fatal to any doctrine of
salvation. And both pitfalls the Buddhist is trying
to avoid. Thus, if causation is presented only as an
explanation of continuity-without-fatalism, there is
no problem, at least no immediate or obvious
difficulty.(24) But once causation is introduced as
the only explanation for the human condition, then we
are, in a subtle way back to the eternalist view, at
least back to its great defect: too much regularity.
Purportedly, causation should introduce the elements
of variety and change into the universe, but in fact,
quasi-mechanistic causation could turn into the
Buddhist nightmare.(25)

Now, would there be anyway in which the theory of
conditioned production could be conciliated with the
nondeterministic statements of the passages quoted in
the first part of this article? If one were to try to
harmonize both doctrines, it would be necessary to
regard the statement "if this is, then that comes to
be" as referring to one given realm of reality; that
is, in no way can this be a statement of universal
validity, if we are to avoid determinism. The need to
conciliate dependent origination with the possibility
of universal release, with the possibility that every
living being can become free from conditioning not be
mere chance, nor by inexorable necessity, but by a
freely undertaken effort to become free, this
fundamental need, no doubt, must be seen as an
essential part of what must have motivated the
formulation of the theories of double truth. Thus, a
"realm" was secured in which causation would not
obtain, or rather, a perspective from which
conditioning does not entail

p. 88

suffering.(26) Another possible conciliation could
take place by accepting the possibility that
salvation not be universal and thus release could be
explained in terms of the necessary force of specific
causal elements within the universe of causation,
which would be capable of generating, or contain in
themselves, the root of liberation.(27)

The basic dilemma could be stated thus: "if there
is control, then there must be a controlling power
which must be 'self-existing' or 'independent'
(self-acting)," but this to the Buddhist seems too
close to the self to be acceptable. On the other
hand, if there can be no control, since no-control
implies total dependence on external conditions, then
there is determinism.(28) The Buddhist answer is, of
course, neither of the two horns, but a middle way.
Considering the Buddhist identification of
"independent" with "self-existing," "substantial,"
and "permanent," it is evident that their assertion
to the effect that, in fact if there were independent
agency, there would be a self, and then there would
be determinism, is in a certain way justified. And an
unchanging agent is not only a predetermined cause,
it is a contradiction in terms.(29) The question is
then, does the Buddhist middle way solve the problem,
and the answer again is obvious, if by causation is
meant "weak" conditioning, then perhaps it does solve
it, but if total conditioning of the series is
intended, then the Buddhist would be no better than
the AAjiivika.(30)

NOTES

1. The development of the latter Abhidharma,
Maadhyamika and Yogaacaara aspects are merely
hinted at in the article, for example, see notes
23, 27, and 29.
2. The classical distinction between libertas and
liberum arbitrium should be kept in mind (cf.
Augustine, Enchiridion XXXII, and Op. imperf.
contra Julian. VI. 11). Augustine, however, sees
the will as totally free from the contingent (De
libero Arbitrio I. 1-3, II. 4-5), his main problem
being God's foreknowledge; but, the opposite is
true of modern Western philosophy after Locke.
What is offered above as a general
characterization of Indian notions of freedom
(libertas) is nothing but a simplification:
"denial of individuality" can hardly describe the
Nyaaya, it would be inaccurate to speak of a
complete breakage with sa.msaara in the
Mahaayaana, etc.
3. The sources are by no means clear. Cf. H. Jacobi,
Jaina Sutras, Part II (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1884) , pp. 309, 316-319, 385 (note 1) .
`Siilaa^nka's comments on these passages are
classical, but late; see Suutrak.rtaa^ngasuutra
with the Commentary Niryukti of Bhadrabhu and the
added commentary of `Siilaa^nkaacaarya (Bhavnagar:
Sri Godiparsva Jaina Granthamala, 1950) , pp.
194b-195a, 210b-212a. Evidently the commentators
are not following any historical tradition in
their interpretations: cf., op. cit. pp. 214a ff.,
229a ff. See also A. L. Basham, History and
Doctrines of the AAjiivikas (London:. Luzac,
1951), pp. 226-227, and the comments on these
passages by K. N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist
Theory of Knowledge (New York: Humanities Press,
1963), pp. 140-141, cf. pp. 261,444-446, and 469.
4. See D. I. 115 and Vinaya I. 71. Also, S. II. 33
ff. All references to the Paali canon are made to
the Paali Text Society eds., the Nikaayas are
represented by the first letter of their title.
5. The locus classicus is D. I. 52 ff. The
fruitlessness of human effort does not necessarily
imply a denial of the law of karman as seen in the
threefold classification of akiriyaa found in A.
I. 173-175; the belief that the human condition is
the exclusive result of previous action, that it
is the result

p. 90

of creation by a god, or that it is the result of
sheer chance. See our consideration of the
Devadahasutta below.
6. This the way the terms are interpreted when the
Buddha declares himself to be both a kiriyaa
vaadin and an akiriyaavaadin, for he advises
abstention from evil and practice of virtue, A.
I. 62.
7. Jacobi, loc. cit., the question is by no means
clear. The Buddha is explicitly accused of this
doctrine in A. II. 232, by So.nakaayana, but his
allegiances are not mentioned.
8. See Jacobi, Jaina Sutras, pp. 414-415. The locus
classicus for this question is, of course, the
Upaalisutta (M. II. 371 ff.) . Cf.
`Srii-Suuyaga.daa^mga-sutta (Dvitiiyaa^mgam)
(Suutrak.rtaa^nga-suutra, the Second A^nga of the
Jain canon with commentaries in Sanskrit by
Siila^ngaacharya (`Siilaa^nka) and Harshakula...
)(Bombay: Nirnayasagara Press, 1879), pp. 323,
927-928.
9. See below our consideration of A. I. 249-253. See
also A. I. 134-136, specially section 2, p.135
"Ya^m bhikkhave alobhakata^m kamma^m alobhaja^m
... lobhe vigate eva^m ta^m kamma^m pahiina^m
hoti ucchinnamuula^m? taalaavatthukata^m
anabhaavakata^m aayati^m anuppaadadhamma^m. ..."
etc.
10. This is clearly the position of some passages in
the Nikaayas, such as the Devadahasutta,
discussed later, and the text referred to in note
5. But I am not too sure that all Buddhists would
concur: cf., for example, Bodhicaryaavataara and
Pa~njikaa, IX. 71-73, and the key passages in VI.
30-32.
11. This passage should be compared with A. II. 87,
where it is explained that the enlightened are
able to overcome even these roots of sorrow.
According to Buddhaghosa's Saaratthapakaasinii,
the wise are able to convert these unpleasant
feelings into kusalavedanaa (Vol. II, pp. 154-155
of the Syaamara.t.tha edition, Bangkok, 1920).
The meaning of opakkamika is problematic and
Buddhaghosa's explanation highly questionable
("aya^m coro vaa paradaariko vaa ti gahetvaa
jannukakapparamuggaraadii hi
nippo.tana-upakkama^m paccaya^m katvaa uppannaadi
...").
12. Lo.nakapaaliavagga in the Naalandaa edition.
13. On vedaniiya^m kamma^m, cf. note 9, herein. On
vipaaka, see also S. 1. 92, II. 128 and A. III.
410 ff. On the possible implications for the
freewill question found in the connection between
the initiating javana and the vipaaka see
Manorathapuuranii (II. 360 in the paali Text
Society edition) and a parallel explanation in
Visuddhimagga XIX. 14 (p. 601 of the paali Text
Society edition).
14. This caricature of Jainism somehow sounds like a
description of Buddhism, but the Devadhasutta
makes a clear distinction, which is reinforced by
passages such as D. II. 230, A.I. 134-136,
249-253 (discussed earlier), II. 230-232, and M.
I. 93.
15. This doctrine does not seem to correspond to
classical Jaina teachings. Cf. Jacobi, Jaina
Sutras, pp. 297-301, also 257 ff. On the efficacy
of effort for the Buddhists, one cannot overlook
the important section on the aarabha-dhaatu found
in A. III. 337-338, explained rather cursorily by
Manorathapuuranii (II. 132 in the Syaamara.t.tha
edition) . Cf. also Papa~ncasuudanii
(Syaamara.t.tha, II. 4 1 7) on the initial lines
of the Devadaha.
16. The term padhaana which I have translated above
as 'effort' when it was found beside upakkama
("endeavor, undertaking"), reappears below as a
verb and verbal noun, the meaning there is "to
fight against, strive against."
17. The phrase "bhikkhu na heva anaddhabhuuta^m
attaana^m dukkhena addhabhaaveti" translates
rather clumsily into English, but should not be
taken as an affirmation of an ego, the adjective
is to be construed in apposition with the
reflexive.
18. See, for example, the Upaalisutta.
19. But according to the orthodox tradition "self"
and "possession" are inseparable, thus the
Saaratthapakaasinii comments on this sutta:
"attani sati attaniya^m naama hoti. attaayeva ca
natthi. asmaa na tu^mhaakan ti aaha."
(Syaamara.t.tha edition, III. 79.).
20. The paali terms are abhisa^nkhata and
abhisa~ncetayita, cf. S. II. 39-41, III. 86-91.
By itself, however, abhisa^nkhaara can refer to
the mere accumulation of karman, thus
Buddhaghosa's Saaratthapakaasini, Vol. III. p.
80. (Bangkok: Syaamara.t.tha edition, 1920).
21. The anuloma is the antidote to annihiliationism,
the pratiloma to eternalism.
22. This is the function of the notion of santaana.
23. Again, if the conditioning is reciprocal and not
lineal, the very concepts of conditioning and
determination will change meaning radically--to
the point of self-negation in the Maadhyamika.
But, the question of freely exerted effort would
still be far from solved.
24. The fundamental paradox of free agency in a
conditioned world still remains. Two Western

p. 90

treatments of this metaphysical question, which
should someday be compared with the typology of
the Buddhist problem, are Schelling's
Philosophische Untersuchungen uber des Wesen der
menschlichen Freiheit and Schopenhauer's Uber die
Freiheit des menschlichen Willens. In these
works, however, the opposition absolute-facticity
is, unfortunately for our comparison, rooted in
very different presuppositions.
25. I here follow closely Peirce's definitions of
necessitarianism in "The Doctrine of Necessity
Examined" (The Monist 2 (1892): 321-337; see also
Collected Papers, vol. 6). The possibility of
freedom within necessity is defended by Hume
(Treatise, Bk. II, Pt. II, Sec. 2) and the
tradition that descends from him down to Ayer and
Nowell Smith. An important aspect of Hume's
position is brilliantly examined and criticized
by Philippa Foot in "Free Will as Involving
Determinism" (The Philosophical Review 46, no. 4
(Oct., 1957): 439-450).
26. This would be the solution suggested by the
Maadhyamika. See, for example, the references in
note 10, above, and the highly poetical stanzas
IX. 32-35 and 142-154 of the Bodhicaryaavataara.
Their position, however, is not and was not
intended to be (at least explicitly) an
explanation for the possibility of free will or
free agency, but rather as an explanation for the
possibility of a state of freedom (libertas).
27. But, this is, of course, a form of determinism.
In regard to the problems which the Buddhists
encountered with this theory, see D. S. Ruegg, La
theorie du tathaagatagarbha et du gotra (Paris:
Ecole Francaise d'Extreme Orient, 1969), pp. 175
ff.
28. Or causalism, with similar implications for the
religious path.
29. Thus Bodhicaryaavataara VI. 27-31.
30. Paraphrasing Kamalasiila who considers the view
that Buddhism teaches the giving up of all action
as a reduction of Buddhism to aajiivikism. Third
Bhaavanaakrama, pp. 14, 20-21 in G. Tucci's
edition (Minor Buddhist Texts, Part III, Rome:
ISMEO, 1971)