Suunyavaada: A Reinterprertation

·期刊原文
Suunyavaada: A Reinterprertation

HARSH NARAIN
Philosophy East and West 13, no. 4, January, 1964
(c) by The University Press of Hawaii
p.311-338

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P.311

PARADOXICALLY ENOUGH, the Maadhyamikas, who were
undoubtedly a most clear-headed group of Indian
philosophers, happen to be the most misunderstood of
them today. A careful scrutiny of original texts of
the the Maadhyamikas, as also of those of their
rivals, confirms the opinion that the Maadhyamika
philosophy, 'Suunyavaada, is absolute nihilism rather
than a form of Absolutism or Absolutistic monism, as
commonly believed today. The burden of this paper is
to reveal and demonstrate the modern mistake of
regarding the 'Suunyavaada as a form of Absolutism
and to throw into relief its real, nihilistic
character.*

I

In the early days of Buddhist studies, scholars
were unanimously of the opinion that 'Suunyavaada was
rank nihilism or negativism, that it countenanced a
view of reality as pure void. Thus, according to H.
Kern, 'Suunyavaada is "complete and pure nihilism, "
and, according to M. Walleser, "negativism which
ralically empties existence up to the last
consequences of negation." H. Jacobi takes it that on
the Maadhyamika view "all our ideas are based upon a
nonentity or upon the Void." A. B. Keith holds that t
he Maadhyamikas' reality
_____________________________________________________

Abbreviations used to refer to frequently cited texts
are as follows:

BCA 'Saantideva, Bodhicaryaavataava, Louis de La
Vallee-Poussin, ed., with BCAP, BI (Vol. 983,
New Series, 1901).
BCAP Praj~naakaramati, Bodhicaryaavataara-pa~njikaa
(BCA ed.).
BI Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of
Bengal, Baptist Mission Press, various dates).
CS The Catu.h-'sataka of AAryadeva, Sanskrit and
Tibetan Texts with copious Extracts from the
Commentary of Candrakiirti (CSV). Reconstructed
and edited by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya.
[Santiniketan: Kishorimohan Santra,
Visva-Bharati, 1931], Vol. XXXIV, p. 308.
CSV Candrakiirti, Cantu.h-'sataka-v.rtti(CS ed.).
CSt Naagaarjuna, Catu.h-stava, Prabhubhai Patel,
ed., Indian Historical Quarterly, VIII, No.
2 (June, 1932), 316-331; No. 4 (December, 1932),
689-705.
MK Naagaarjuna, Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa
(Maadhyamika-suutra), Louis de La Vall俥Poussin,
ed., with MKV, Bibliotheca Buddhica, Vol. IV
(St. Petersbourgh: The Imperial Academy of
Sciences, 1913).
MKV Candrakiirti, Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa-v.rtti
(MK ed.).
VV Naagaarjuna, Vigrahavyaavarttani, K. P. Jayaswal
and Raahula Saa^nk.rtyaayana, eds., JBORS, XXIII
(1937),Part IV (n.d.), first appendix, pp. 1-31.

p.312

is "absolute nothingness." I. Wach characterizes them
as the most radical nihilists that ever existed.(1)
But, exceptions apart, later scholars, viz., those
from Th. Stcherbatsky down to T. R. V. Murti, find in
'Suunyavaada an Absolutism more or less akin to that
of the Vedaanta. Stcherbatsky translates the term
"'suunyataa," used by the Maadhyamika, as relative or
contingent.(2) He hastens to add, however, that it
"means not something void, but something 'devoid' of
independent reality (svabhaava-'suunya'), with the
implication that nothing short of the whole possesses
independent reality, and with the further
implication that the whole forbids every formulation
by concept or speech (ni.sprapa~nca) since they can
only bifurcate (viikalpa) reality and never directly
seize it...."(3) He sums up the Maadhyamika position
thus: "The universe viewed as a whole is the
Absolute, viewed as a process it is the
Phenomenal."(4) Murti has it that the terms "'suunya"
and "'suunyataa" are applied to phenomena as well as
to the Absolute: to phenomena because, being
dependent on and relative to each other, they are
devoid of essence; to the Absolute because it is
devoid of conceptual distinctions.(5) According to
him, the Maadhyamika denies, not the real, but
doctrines about the real(6) Indeed, he regards
'Suunyavaada as "a very consistent form of
absolutism."(7)
Earlier orientalists find ample support from the
Indian tradition, the verdict of which is that
'Suunyavaada is pure nihilism.(8) The consensus of
Hindu opinion is in farer of regarding it as nothing
but nihilism.s The Hindus also find in it an
outright repudiation of all the four conceivable
categories of reality-viz., is, is-not, both, and
neither--and hold it to be thesisless through and
_____________________________________________________

(1) All these references are taken from Th.
Stcherbatsky, The Coception of Buddhist Nirvaa.na
(Leningrad: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR,
1927), p. 37.

(2) Ibid., p. 42.
All documentation and hyphenation follow the
author's preferred style.

(3) Ibid., p. 43.

(4) Ibid., p. 48.

(5) T. R. V. Murti, The Central PhiloJophy of
Buddhism (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
1955), p. 142, n. 1.

(6) Ibid., p. 218.

(7) Ibid., p. 234.

(8) See, for example, Gautama, Nyaaya-suutra, Ganga
Nath Jha, ed. (Poona: Oriental book Agency,
1939), 4.1.37-41, and commentaries, glosses, and
scholia thereon; Kumaarila,
mimaa^msaa'sloka-vaartika (Varanasi: Chowkhamba
Sanskrit Series, 1898), 1.1.5. Niraalambanavaada,
stanza (14); 'Sa^nkara, 'Saariiraka-bhaa.sya,
Mahaadeva 'Saastrii Bakre, ed., and Waasudeva
Laxman 'Saastrii Pa.na'siikar,, rev. (3rd ed.,
Bombay: Nir.naya-Saagar Press, 1934), 2.2.31, pp.
478-479; 'Sa^nkara,
B.rhadaara.nyaka-upani.sad-bhaa.sya (2nd
impression, Gorakhpur: Gita Press, 1355), 4.3.7,
p. 905 Raamaanuja, 'Sri-bhaa.sya Vaasudeva
'Saastrii Abhya^nkara, ed., Bombay Sanskrit and
Prakrit Series Vol. LXVIII (Bombay:
Nit.naya-Saagar Press, 1914), 2.2.30, pp.
495-496; Saa^mkhyapravacana-suutra. AA'subodha
Vidyaabhuu.sa.na and Nityabodha Vidyaaratna, eds.
(3rd ed., Calutta: Vaacaspatya Press, 1936),
1.44-47, and Vij~naanabhik.su,
Saa^mkhyapravacana-bhaa.sya, ad loc. (in the same
publication); Maadhava, Sarvadar'sama-sa^mgraha,
Vaasudeva 'Saastrii Abhya^nkara, ed. (2nd ed.,
Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute,
1951),p. 29.

p.313

though.(9) It will be shown in the sequel that
'Suunyavaada in this respect is nothing but nihilism
in its extremest form. The authors of the
Maa,n.duukyakaarikaa (AAgama-'saastra) and the
Yogavaasi.s.ttha, however, seem to view 'Suunyavaada
as a form of Vedaantism, inasmuch as they tend to
identify "'suunya" with Brabman;(10) but they are
exceptions which only prove the rule. Besides, they
seem to have been actuated by the ambition to effect
a synthesis between Buddhism and the Vedaanta rather
than to interpr et the Maadhyamika system
objectively.
Jaina writers endorse the nihilistic view of
'Suunyavaada taken by the Hindu tradition.(11)
A much more significant fact is that even the
Yogaacaara school of Buddhism shares this view of
'Suunyavaada. The Sarvasiddhaanta-sa^mgraha, ascribed
to 'Sa^mkara, quotes the Yogaacaara as criticizing
'Suunyavaada on the score of its being total
nihilism.(12) Such stalwarts of the Yogaacaara school
as Asa^nga, Vasubandhu, and Sthiramati regard it as a
doctrine of absolute nothingness.(13)
By far the most significant point, however, is
the fact that the Maadhyamikas themselves refer to
Yogaacaaras and others as interpreting them
nihilistically, without taking the least excepti on
to this interpretation. This point will be enlarged
upon in the sequel.(14)
In the face of such an almost unanimous verdict
of tradition, it is difficult to see how the
nihilistic interpretation of 'Suunyavaada can be
rejected as totally false.

II

Franke and Kern note that in early Buddhism there
is already a tendency to idealistic nihilism and
that, according to it, to quote Kern in the words of
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(9) See, for example, Udayana,
Nyaayavaartikataatparya-pari'suddhi,
Vindhye'svariiprasaada Dvivedin and Lak.sma.na
'Saastrii Dravi.da, eds., BI, Work No. 209
(1924), 1.1.1, p. 291.

(10) See Tbe AAgama-'saastra of Gau.dapaada,
Vidhu'sekhara Bha.t.taacaarya, ed. and trans.
(Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1943),
4.83-84; Yogavaasi.s.tha, Vaasudeva Lak.sma.na
'Saastrii Pa.na'siikara and Naaraaya.na Raama
AAcaarya, eds. (3rd ed., Bombay: Nir.naya-Saagar
Press, 1937), 3.5.7, p. 140.

(11) See, for example, Prabhaacandra,
Prameyakamalamaarta.n.da, Mahendra Kumaara
'Saastri (2nd ed, Bombay: Nir.naya-Saagar Press,
1941), pp. 39-98; Hemacandra,
Anyayogavyavacchedadvaatri^m'sikaa, st, 17, and
Malli.se.na, Syaadvaada-ma~njari, the eon, A. B.
Dhruva, ed., Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series,
Vol. LXXXIII (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Institute, 1933), pp. 115-122.

(12) See Sarvasiddhaanta-sa^mgraha, M. Ra^ngaacaarya,
ed. (Madras: Government Press, 1909), p. 12.

(13) Asa^nga, Bodhisattvabhuumi, Unrai Wogihara, ed.
(Tokyo: n.p., 1930) p. 44; Sthiramati,
Madhyaantavibhaagasuutrabhaa.sya.tika,
Vidhu'sekhara Bha.t.taacaarya and Giuseppe
Tucci, eds. (London Luzac & Co., 1932), p. 9;
Yuan Chwang, Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi-'saastra,
restored into Sanskrit by Raahula
Saa^nk.rityaayana with the help of Wong Mow Lam,
JBORS, XIX, Part IV (December, 1933), Appendix,
p. 4.

(14) See section IV (infra).

p.314

Keith, "There is nothing internal nor external for
him with true discernment, and a realization of
non-existence is the means to secure a safe crossing
of the tumult of life."(15) The order of planes of
existence on which the Buddha dwelt, as set out in
the Cuulasu~n~nata-sutta of the Majjhima-nikaaya,(16)
lends support to this view. The planes are:
[1] Consciousness of humanity (manussa-sa~n~naa)
[2] Consciousness of forest (ara~n~na-sa~n~naa)
[3] Consciousness of the earth
[4] Consciousness of the infinity of space
[5] Consciousness of the infinity of ideation
[6] Consciousness of nothingness
(aaki~nca~n~naayatana-sa~n~naa)
[7] Consciousness of
neither-consciousness-nor-unconsciousness
[8] Objectless cessation of consciousness
[9] The supreme, ultimate void
(paramaanuttaraa-su~n~nataa)
As will be developed in the sequel,
thesislessness, or repudiation of all views, of all
metaphysics, which is so zealously advocated by the
Maadhyamika, is nihilism carried to its logical
extreme. And it is significant that the Buddha
himself preaches such thesislessness to an ascetic,
Diighanakha, in no equivocal terms.(17) There are a
good many such suggestions in the Suttanipaata,
too.(18)
That the Buddha analyzed the whole of reality
into a fivefold scheme of momentary reals railed
dharmas is common knowledge; that he occasionally
preached their ultimate unreality, so as to prompt
Naagaarjuna, and also Gau.dapaada, to claim that he
preached no dharmas at all,(19) is unknown to many.
Of the five dharmas, he likens sensum (ruupa) to dots
of foam, feeling (vedanaa) to bubbles, perception
(sa~n~naa) to a mirage, impression (sa^nkhaara) to a
banana tree, and awareness (vi~n~naana) to illusion (
maayaa).(20) A more clearly nihilistic teaching is:
"Depending on the oil and the wick does the light of
the lamp burn; it is neither in the one nor in the
other, nor is it anything in itself; phenomena are,
likewise, nothing in themselves. All things are
unreal;
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(15) See A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India
and Ceylon (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1923),p. 47. Quotations from Franke and Kern are
taken from this reference.

(16) See Majjhima-nikaaya, Pa.n.naasaka III entitled
Upari-pa.n.naasaka and constituting Vol. III,
Raahula Saa^nk.rtyaayana, ed. (Naalandaa: Paali
Publication Board, Bihar Government, 1958),
sutta 21 (121 of the whole treatise) entitled
"Cuulasu~n~nata-sutta," pp. 169-173. Cf. Udaana,
Paul Steinthal, ed. (London: Oxford University
Press, 1948),VIII. 1, p. 80.

(17) See ibid., Pa.n.naasaka II entitled
Majjhima-pa.n.naasaka and constituting Vol. II,
sutta 24 (74 of the whole treatise) entitled
"Diighanakha-sutta,'' pp. 193-197.

(18) See, for example, Sutta nipaata, Lord Chalmers,
ed., Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 37
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932),
stanzas 794, 800, 803, 811, 824-834, 839, and
877-914.

(19) MK, 25.24; CSt., 1.4; AAgama-'saastra, 4.99.

(20) See Murti, op. cit., p. 50, n. 2.

p.315

they are deceptions; nibbaana is the only truth.(21)
His rejection of both the existence view and the
non-existence view of reality,(22) too, serves to
align him with the 'Suunyavaadin, broadly speaking.
The Maadhyamika seeks to reconcile the Buddha's
realistic, dharma-positing, with nihilistic,
dharma-denying, sermons by declaring the former as of
a secondary or empirical import and the latter as of
primary or absolute import.(23) Indeed, there are
suggestions in the Buddha himself that the latter is
a highter teaching than the former.(24)

III

The Maadhyamika philosophy is a development of
the amorphous ideas of 'suunyataa contained in the
canonical Mahaayaana Suutras, especially the
Praj~naapaaramitaa texts, which were systematized and
skillfully developed by Naagaarjuna into a
full-fledged doctrine of 'suunyataa.(25) Let us,
therefore, scrutinize these text to determine what
light they can throw on the notion of 'suunyataa.
One of the texts has it that all dharmas, as well
as the soul, are non-existent.(26) Elsewhere, all
dharmas are described as illusory and dreamlike.
Indeed, the text goes to the length of declaring:
"Even the All-Enlightened One (Samyak-sambuddha) is
illusory and dreamlike; even All-Enlightened-One-
hood is illusory and dreamlike.(27)
This interesting statement, which has been put in
the mouth of Subhuuti, who is shown as addressing the
sons of gods, takes the latter aback, and they ask
Subhuuti if he really means what he says. Let us
quote their own words:

Well, Revered Subhuuti, do you say that even the
All-Enlightened One is illusory and dreamlike? Do you
say that even All-Enlightened-One-hood is illusory
and dreamlike?(28)
_____________________________________________________

(21) Majjhima-nikaaya, III, 40, p. 330. Cp.
Sutta-nipaata, sts. 757-758; MK, 13.2.

(22) Majjhima-nikaaya, Pa.n.naasaka I entitled
Muulapa.n.naasaka and constituting Vol. I, P. V.
Bapat, ed. (Naalandaa: Paali Publication Board,
Bihar Government, 1958), sutta 11 entitled
"Cuulasiihadanaada-sutta, " p. 92. Also see
Udaana, vagga 3, sutta 10, p. 33; Itivuttaka,
Ernst Windisch, ed. (London: Oxford University
Press, 1948:), nipaata 2, vagga 2, sutta 12, p.
43; Samaadhiraajasuutra, Nalinaksha Dutt and
Shiv Nath Sharma, eds., Gilgit Manuscripts, Vol.
II (Calcutta: Calcutta Oriental Press,
1941),9.27; MK 15.7.

(23) See MKV, 1.1, pp. 40-44; 15.11, p. 276; colophon
(p. 594).

(24) See Majjhima-nikaaya, Pa.n.naasaka I, sutta 22
entitled "Alagadduupama-sutta, " pp. 179-180,
where dharmas are likened to a raft to be left
off after crossing the stream. Cp. "My
propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who
understands me finally recognizes them as
senseless, when he has climbed out through them,
on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw
away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he
sees the world rightly." Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (4th impression,
London: Rouledge and Kegan Paul, 1949),6.54.

(25) See MKV, p. 3.

(26) A.s.tasaahasrikaa-praj~naapaaramitaa,
Rajendralala Mitra, ed., BI ( 1888), p. 29.

(27) Ibid.

(28) Ibid., p. 40.

p.316

Subhuuti, undeterred by the question, replies:

Sons of gods, even nirvaa.na I declare illusory and
dreamlike, let alone the question of any other
dharma.(29) [The sons of gods are further confused.
But Subhuuti goes on:] "If there were any other, more
peculiar dharma than nirvaa.n, I would declare it
illusory and dreamlike."(30)

These simple, straightforward statements hardly leave
any doubt about the fact that, according to the texts
under consideration, all is pure void.
That the Maadhyamika's is not only a no-doctrine
attitude about reality but literally a no-reality
doctrine is further confirmed by such statements as
the following, contained in other Mahaayaana Suutras:

This all is mere name, subsisting by name alone. The
named as different from the name does not exist.
Those dharmas which are designated by the various
names are simply not there. Such is the dharma-ness
of the dharmas. Nameness is devoid of name. nor does
name subsist by name. All dharmas are nameless though
revealed by name. These dharmas are non-existent and
are brought forth by ideation.(31)

All dharmas are false...illusory... dreamlike...
water-moon-like...(32)

It is wrong to suppose that the Maadhyamika
characterrizes as void only dharmas and not the
ineffable Absolute. Buddhism, the Maadhyamika system
not excepted, analyzes the whole of reality into
dharmas, which are of two kinds--conditioned
(sa^msk.rta) and unconditioned (asa^msk.rta)--and the
Absolute or the ineffable must, if at all, take its
place somewhere in the list of the dharmas. To the
Buddhist, to whatever school he belongs, there is
nothing higher than nirvaa.na, which is a dharma.
Besides, there are clear indications in the
Praj~naapaaramitaa texts that 'sunyataa is not
beyond but identical with dharmas. Lest someone, like
those who read Absolutism into them, should construe
'suunyataa to mean something over and above the
dharmas, these texts are never tired of repeatedly
reminding the reader that 'suunyataa is non-different
from the dharmas. Take, for example, the following:

Sensum is void ('suunya) of sensum. What is voidness
('suunyataa) of sensum is not sensum, nor is voidness
other than sensum. Sensum itself is voidness;
voidness itself is sensum. Feeling is void of
feeling. What is voidness of feeling is not feeling,
nor is voidness other than feeling. Feeling itself is
voidness; voidness itself is feeling.(33)
_____________________________________________________

(29) Ibid. It is significant that even the Buddha and
Buddhahood are accounted dharmas here.

(30) Ibid.

(31) Bhavasa^mkraanti-suutra, restored with
Naagaarjuna's Bhavasa^mkraanti-'saastra in three
recensions, along with the commentary of
Maitreyanaatha, from the Tibetan and Chinese
versions into Sanskrit by N. Aiyaswami 'Saastrii
(Adyat: Adyar Library, 1938), pp. 5-6.

(32) Ratnakuu.ta-suutra, quoted in MKV, 1.1, pp.
52-53.

(33) 'Satasaaharikaa-praj~naapaaramitaa,
prataapacandra Gho.sa, ed., BI (1902), Part I,
p. 554.

p.317

The same remarks have been made in the text as
regards the remaining three complexes (skandhas),
viz., perception (sa^mj~naa), impression
(sa^mskaara), and awareness (vij~naana).
We shall see in due course that this view is
fully shared by Naagaarjuna.
Murti is of the opinion that "Praj~naapaaramitaa
as non-dual intuition is the Absolute."(34) The
difficulty in determining the meaning of the term
"Absolute" apart, the statement is misleading. The
definitions of "praj~naapaaramitaa"--literally,highest
wisdom--available in the texts under consideration
lend full support to the nihilistic interpretation of
the Maadhyamika system. Says one of these texts:
"What is non-apprehension of all dharmas is called
Praj~naapaaramitaa. When there is no feeling,
ego-consciousness, experience, practice, then there
is Praj~naapaaramitaa--so is it said."(35)
A more emphatic assertion of the non-difference
of 'suunyataa from the phenomenal world and,
consequently, a repudiation of the non-Absolutistic
character of praj~naapaaramitaa, is contained in the
same text a bit earlier, as follows:

Praj~naapaaramitaa should not be taken to be over and
above the complexes, seats (aayatasus and bases
(dhaatus). What is the reason for it? Because,
Subhuuti, the complexes, seats, and bases themselves
are void ('suunya), abstract (vivikta), and quiescent
('suunta) is praaj~naaparamitaa.(36)

Here the significance of the emphasis represented by
the expression "themselves" (eva) cannot go
unnoticed.
Elsewhere, All-Enlightenment is defined as "where
nothing is cognized.(37) In elucidation of this
remark of his, Subhuuti says to the Buddha without
being refuted:

On account, Lord, of the nihility ('suunyatva) of all
dharmas, there is no dharma which could be cognized.
That is to say, Lord, all dharmas are 'suunya. Those
dharmas, Lord, for the cessation of which
righteousness is preached are non-existent; likewise,
he who experiences the ultimate All-Enlightenment,
that which is to be experienced, he who knows, that
which is to be known--all these dharmas are
'suunya.(38)

These texts list many kinds of 'suunyataa, among
which are included 'suunyataa of the conditioned,
'suunyataa of the unconditioned, transcendental
'suunyataa, absolute 'suunyataa, and 'suunyataa of
'suunyataa,(39) which leave no doubt that there is
_____________________________________________________

(34) Murti, op. cit., p. 228.

(35) A.s.tasaahasrikaa-praj~naapaaramitaa, p. 177.

(36) Loc. cit.

(37) Ibid., p. 313.

(38) Ibid., pp. 313-314.

(39) See, for example,
'Satasaahasrikaa-praj~naapaaramitaa, part I, pp.
191-192. The concept of 'suunyataa-'suunyataa is
explained in the sequel.

p.318

absolutely no room for the postulation of an Absolute
in the Maadhyamika system.
To sum up: According to the early formative texts
of the Mahaayaana discussed above, all dharmas
without exception are 'suunya. 'Suunyataa is nothing
over acid above the dharmas, so that one cannot
install it as the Absolute over against the dharmas.
The highest wisdom consists in the non-apprehension
of any dharmas, of anything whatsoever. Since there
is nothing to apprehend, non-apprehension of anything
can alone be the highest wisdom. Were there something
like the Absolute, the apprehension of it would be
said to be the highest wisdom. Hence, the question of
there being an Absolute simply does not arise.
Accordingly, the philosophy taught by these texts is
pure and simple nihilism.

IV

Now we come to the Maadhyamika philosophical
literature proper. Earlier(40) we noted that the
Maadhyamikas themselves refer to the nihilistic
interpretations of their philosophy without a word to
indicate that they should be interpreted on
Absolutistic lines. Let us enlarge upon this
proposition by producing negative evidence for the
thesis that the Maadhyamika philosophy is nihilist
par excellence.
The whole of Naagaarjuna's Vigrahavyaavartanii
seems to accord tacit approval to the critics'
ascription of nihilism to him. The imaginary critic
in the work proceeds on the assumption that
'Suunyavaada is absolute nihilism and raises the
objection that, if all is void, the Maadhyamika's
proposition that all is void is itself void and hence
devoid of validity.(41) This argument of the
imaginary critic is developed by Naagaarjuna in 20
stanzas of the 72-stanza work. It is strange that
this work, small in size but great in merit, has
received little consideration by those favoring an
Absolutistic interpretation of 'Suunyavaada. Even
Murti, who is probably the most serious student of
the Maadhyamika system today, makes almost negligible
use of it. Naagaarjuna nowhere in this work
repudiates the ascription of nihilism to him. On the
other hand, his reply, that he does not find any
reality whatever to postulate Or deny,(42) serves to
confirm the truth of the ascription.
_____________________________________________________

(40) See section II (supra).

(41) VV, st. 1. The discussion of this issue
contained in this small work will be found
interesting reading by those having an idea of
the examples of systematic ambiguity cited and
discussed by Bertrand Russell in connection with
his theory of logical types developed in his
Logic and Knowledge, Charles Marsh, ed. (London:
George Alien & Unwin, 1956), pp. 59-102.
Russell's thesis is ably discussed in F.
Waismann, "Language Strata, " in Logic and
Language, Second Series, Antony Flew, ed.
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), pp. 16-18.

(42) VV st. 30.

p.319

Such implicit confirmations of the ascription of
nihilism to the Maadhyamika way of thinking are not
lacking in the later Maadhyamika works as well.
Bhaavaviveka's reference to the Yogaacaaras ascribing
nihilism to the Maadhyamika without the least concern
on his part to correct them is a case in point.(43)
He also raises the question, as raised in the
Vigrahavyaavartanii, that, if all is void, the very
proposition that all is void is itself void and hence
devoid of sense.(44) Chapter X of AAryadeva's
'Sata-'saastra(45) is devoted entirely to this
problem. In his Catu.h-'sataka, too, the problem is
raised at one place.(46) The La^nkaavataara-suutra
contains the remark: "The essence of all entities is
unreal, and this proposition, too, is unreal."(47)
'Saantideva discusses the question of universal
nihility vis-?vis the question of the validity of
the means of knowledge (pramaa.na) thus: "If the
means of knowledge is false then what is known by it
is false, and hence the essential non-being of
entities fails to be established."(48) He purports to
say that on the Maadhyamika view the means of
knowledge, being 'suunya (false), no longer remain
true means of knowledge, and, in the absence of any
valid means of knowledge, the knowledge that all is
'suunya, or false, is itself false. His reply to this
objection is not much to the point, an d so we ignore
it here. We have adverted to this question, first, to
bring home to the reader the significant fact that,
in whatever context the imaginary objector raises
objections to the doctrine of 'suunyataa, he proceeds
on the assumption that 'suunyataa is nothing but pure
void, and, second, to note that the Maadhyamika
nowhere takes exception to such an assumption.
The Maadhyamika invokes his thesis of
thesislessness to answer such arguments.(49) That,
however, this thesislessness springs from the
consciousness of absolute void or, what is the same
thing, the non-apprehension of anything whatsoever,
is made abundantly clear by Naagaarjuna, AAryadeva,
and Candrakiirti.(50) Indeed, the Maadhyamika thesis
of thesislessness is nothing but absolute nihilism in
disguise.
_____________________________________________________

(43) See, for example, Bhaavaviveka, karatalaratna,
restored from Huen Tsang's Chinese version into
Sanskrit by N. Aiyaswami 'Saastrii
(Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1949),p. 57.

(44) Ibid., pp. 45-63, passim.

(45) AAryadeva, 'Sata-'saastra, English rendering
from the Chinese version by G. Tucci,
Pre-Diisnaaga Buddhist Texts on Logic from
Chinese Sources, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Vol.
XLIX (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1929), pp.
26-89.

(46) See CS, 8.9 and CSV thereon.

(47) La^nkaavataara-suutra, Bunyiu Nanjio, ed.,
Bibliotheca Otaniensis, Vol. I (Kyoto: Otani
University Press, 1923), gaathaa 265, p. 300.
Advayavajra, Advayavajra-sa^mgraha, Haraprasaad
Saastrii, ed., Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Vol.
XL (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1927), p. 26.

(48) BCA, 9.139.

(49) VV, st. 29.

(50) See note 42 (supra); CS, 16.25; MKV, 1.1 pp. 44,
55-58. The following words of Candrakiirti are
especially noteworthy: "Sages find nothing which
could be false or true." (Naiva tvaaryaa.h
ki~ncid upalahante yan m.r.saa am.r.saa vaa
syaad iti.) MKC, 1.1, p. 44.

p.320

V

Now about positive evidence of Maadhyamika
philosophical literature proper.
Naagaarjuna unequivocally expresses the view that
objects, being essenceless, do not exist.(51) He
openly declares, "Essencelessness of objects is
proved by the phenomenon of change. And there can be
no object without essence. Hence the 'suunyataa of
objects.(52) According to him, the fact of change
presents an insoluble problem, a veritable dilemma,
to the realist.

If there be no essence, what would undergo
change? If [,again,] there be an essence, what would
undergo change? The same object cannot undergo change
(viz., cannot become another object), nor can another
object do so; for the youth does not age nor does
the aged one age. If the same object becomes another,
milk itself would become curd. [If you say that something
else becomes curd,] what other than milk can become
curd?(53)

The Maadhyamikas are never tired of describing
the world as pure illusion, but in so doing they
never suggest that they see anything non-illusory
behind it.(54)
Naagaarjuna's method is to consider the various
modes of being countenanced by common sense as well
as by philosophies in general and to repudiate all
of them by showing that they lack law, lack logic,
and hence are a chaos rather than a cosmos. This is a
chaotic or irrationalistic conception of reality, as
it were, Hegel, who is in a way the most
thorough going rationalist ever born and whose cosmic
or rationalistic conception of reality can perhaps
never be surpassed, declares that the real is
rational and that the rationalist real. The
Maadhyamika is prepared to grant this proposition,
that only the rational can be real; but his finding
is that there is nothing rational is which premise he
concludes that there is nothing real. In sum: Hegel
takes it that the real is rational; the Maadhyamika
that the apparently real is the irrational, and hence
at bottom unreal.
So, the only conclusion that can be drawn from
the Maadhyamika's method is that he endeavors to
drive at the thought that all is pure void. The modes
of being examined by him are: causality, motion,
matter, space, existence,
_____________________________________________________

(51) MK, 1.10.

(52) Ibid., 13.3.

(53) Ibid., 13.4-6.

(54) See ibid.,, 7.34; 23.8; CSt. 1.14; 2.4. 18, 34;
3.5, 17, 31; Bhavasa^mkraanti (first recension
of Bhavasa^mkraanti-'saastra), st. 6;
Cittavi'suddhi-prakara.na, Prabhubhai Patel, ed.
(Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1949), st. 19.
Such statements abound in the Praj~naapaaramitaa
and other Maadhyamika Suutras as well. Cp.
Udaana, VIII. 1, p. 80.

p.321

non-existence, qualificans and qualificand, light and
darkness, soul, substance, relativity, time, change,
relation, essence, value or morals, etc. What he
seems to be concerned to drive at through his
examination of such modes or categories of being is
to demonstrate that the universe is a chaos and not a
cosmos, that nothing can be said to be in any of the
states conceivable by man, and that, this being so,
nothing whatever exists.
As noted above, according to Buddhism, reality is
divisible into the conditioned and the unconditioned.
Naagaarjuna argues: "There being no proof of
emergence, endurance, and extinction, the conditioned
does not exist; and, in default of the establishment
of the conditioned, how can there be the
unconditioned?"(55) The logical corollary from this
proposition is that, there being neither the
conditioned nor the unconditioned, there is no
reality whatever.
Naagaarjuna takes enormous pains to demonstrate
that nothing possesses absolute being, that all is
relative. Reality is characterized by
interdependence. Nothing exists in its own right,
independently of other things. The existence of each
object is borrowed from its relationship to other
objects. This is the doctrine of what may be called
universal relativity. It rejects all thought of an
Absolute as the ground of the realm of relativity.
According to it, all is relative
(pratiitya-samutpanna). "No Absolute
(apratiitya-samutpanna) real whatever existx."(56)
'"There is no non-relative subsistence of anything
anywhere at any time."(57)
Naagaarjuna remarks in two of his works that,
since this world is non-existent, the other world is
non-existent also.(58) This will also be found
significant in this connection.
What we wish to drive at vis-?vis the position
of the Maadhyamika is best illustrated by the very
interesting discussion of the relativity of dharmas
with reference to fire and fuel given in the
Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa (Maadbyamika-kaarikaa).
Naagaarjuna writes:

If the fire is relative to the fuel, or the fuel
is relative to the fire, which of the two came first,
to which the fire [or] the fuel is relative? If an
entity becomes possible in and through its relation
to that entity which itself owes its existence to its
relationship so the former, which entity can exist on
account of which? The entity which owes its existence
to anoter is non-existent; how, then, can it need the
latter? If, on the other hand, it so needs when it is
existent, the question of needing simply does not
arise.(59)
_____________________________________________________

(55) MK, 7.33.

(56) Ibid., 24.19.

(57) CS, 9.2, with CSV.

(58) Bhavabheda-'saastra (third recension of
Bhavasa^mkraanti-'saastra), p. 21;
Bhavasa^mkraanti, 4. Cp. Udaana, VIII. 1, p. 80.

(59) MK, 10.8, 10-11.

p.322

Naagaarjuna's suggestion(60) that his denial of
the world should not be take to imply belief in
another order of reality like the Absolute, immanent
in or transcendent to phenomena, is quite in
conformity with the spirit of the Praj~naapaaramitaa
texts, which refuse to set 'suunyataa over against
the dharmas and to acknowledge the positive knowledge
of any such reality in the highest wisdom conceived
by them. As already shown, the Maadhyamika holds that
'suunyataa is non-different from the dharmas and that
there is total non-apprehension of any reality
whatsoever in the highest wisdom. This is the tone of
the whole gamut of Maadhyamika literature.
Naagaarjuna goes to the extent the Tathaagata and
nirvaa.na, thereby making it indisputably clear that
there is nothing like the Absolute over and above the
relative. He says, "Where there is no superimposition
of nirvaa.na, nor elimination of sa^msaara
(phenomena), what can there be conceived like
sa^msaara and nirvaa.na?"(61)
Candrakiirti comments that such superimposition
and elimination are ruled out on account of the
non-being of both nirvaa.na and sa^msaara.(62)
Naagaarjuna establishes complete equipollency between
sa^msaara and nirvaa.na thus:

This world is of the same essence as the
Tathaagata, and, since the Tathaagata is essenceless,
this world, too, is essenceless.(63)

Sa^msaara has nothing to distinguish itself from
nirvaa.na. Nirvaa.na has nothing to distinguish
itself from sa^msaara. Sa^msaara belongs to the same
category as nirvaa.na. There is not the minutest
difference between the two.(64)

That which constitutes this process of births and
deaths due to causes and conditions constitutes
nirvaa.na without causes and conditions.(65)

Elsewhere Naagaarjuna expresses the view that
'suunyataa is nothing other than existents, nor is
there any existent without 'suunyataa.(66) These
words occur in the Advayavajra-sa^mgraha as well.(67)
Praj~naakaramati has expressed himself
categorically against the attempt to install
'suunyataa over against the realm of being. His words
are: "'Suunyataa is not different from being, for
being itself is of the nature of that; otherwise, in
the event of 'suunyataa's being different from being,
there would be no essencelessness of dharmas."(68)
_____________________________________________________

(60) See notes 55-58 (supra) and 64-66 (infra).

(61) MK,, 16.10. Cp. CSt, 1.5.

(62) MKV, 16.10, p. 299.

(63) MK, 22.16.

(64) Ibid., 25.19--20. Cp. CSt, 1.5;
Cittavi'suddhi-prakara.na, st. 24.

(65) MK, 25.9.

(66) CSt, 3.41.

(67) Advayavajra-Sa^mgraha, p.24.

(68) BCAP, 9.34, p. 416.

p.323

The doctrine of universal relativity
(pratiitya-samutpaada) is the stepping stone to the
doctrine of 'suunyataa. The knowledge of the former
at once leads to the knowledge of the latter. Their
relation is so intimate that Naagaarjuna does not
hesitate in identifying the two. He says, "What is
relativity we call 'suuyataa. It ('suunyataa) is
relative being (upaadaaya-praj~napti). It is the
middle path."(69) This proposition is pregnant with
implications. The Maadhyamika turned
pratiitya-samutpaada (relativity or, literally,
dependent origination) into pratiitya-samutpaada
(dependent or relative being).(70) In this sense, he
expressed pratiitya-samutpaada otherwise as
upaadaaya-praj~napti (relative being). In fact, his
pratiitya-samutpaada is tantamount to a denial of
causation altogether. Indeed, in another work,
Naagaarjuna has remarked that what has come into
being through causes and conditions has, in fact, nor
come into being at all. And, since it has not come
into being, it is 'suunya, or void, pure and
simple.(71) It is significant that Candrakiirti
interprets pratiitya-samutpaada to mean
"non-origination by nature" (sva-
bhaavenaanutpaada.h).(72)
The Maadhyamika system is an extension of the
Buddha's theses of soullessness, universal
evanescence, and the quietude of nirvaa.na.(73) His
doctrine of soullessness and denial of substance or
abiding reality led to the denial of a reality
subjacent to phenomena. From the position that the
changing phenomena have no underlying, changeless
reality, it was only a short step to the position
that phenomena have no underlying reality at all. The
former position made short work of the latter. The
Naiyaayikas, Puurva Miimaa^msakas, Lokaayatas, and
Buddhist realists like the Sarvaastivaadins and
Vaibhaa.sikas hold that appearances are real. The
Advaita Vedaanta and the Vij~naanavaada hold that
appearances are unreal, and posit a reality
underlying them. Early Buddhism dismissed substance,
including the soul (pudgala-nairaatmya or
pudgala'suunyataa), but postulated two orders of
reals called dharmas, personal and non-personal,
which come out of nothing, endure for just a moment,
and then rela pse into nothing, thanks to the law of
discontinuous continuity (pratiitya-samutpaada). The
Satyasiddhi and Maadhyamika schools went a step
further and dismissed the dharmas (dharma-nairaatmya
or sarva-dharma-
_____________________________________________________

(69) MK, 24.18. Also see CSt, 2.20; 3.38.

(70) We remember having read it somewhere.

(71) CSt, 3.3. Also, Naagaarjuna, Yuktii.sa.s.tikaa,
referred to in Murti, op. cit., p. 89, n. 2.
Also, Advayavajra-sa^mgraha, p. 25.

(72) MKV, 24.18, p. 503 ? La^nkaavataara-suutra
(gaathaa 582, p. 337), however, says: "All this
is uncreated. But it is not that things do not
exist. Things do exist, but they do so without
sufficient reason, like fata morgana, dream, and
illusion."

(73) These are said to be seals in Naagaarjuna,
Mahaapraj~naapaaramitaa-'saastra, cited in
Junjiro Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist
Philosophy, Wing-tsit Chan and Charles A. Moore,
eds. (1st Indian ed., Bombay, etc.: Asia
Publishing House, 1956), p. 140.

p.324

'suunyataa), too. The Maadhyamika, in effect, calls
appearances unreal without positing a reality behind
them. Dasgupta is right when he says:

The Maadhyamika view has no thesis of its own which
it seeks to establish, for it does not believe in the
reality or unreality of anything or in the
combination of reality or unreality. Thus there is no
ultimate thesis in Naagaarjuna. It is, therefore,
neither idealism nor realism nor absolutism, but
blank phenomenalism which only accepts the phenomenal
world as it is but which would not, for a moment,
tolerate any kind of essence, ground or reality
behind it.(74)

It is in this vein of blank phenomenalism that
Naagaaarjuna says: '"This all is groundless, and
groundless has it been called."(75) '"This all is
supportless, and supportless has it been called."(76)
Murti is of a different opinion. He observes,

The Tattva, however, is accepted by the Maadhyamika
as the Reality of all things (dharmaa.naa^m
dharmataa) , their essential nature (prak.rtir
dharmaa.naam). It is uniform and universal, neither
decreasing, nor increasing, neither originating nor
decaying. The Absolute alone is in itself (ak.rtrima
svabhaava). The Absolute is that intrinsic form in
which things would appear to the clear vision of an
AArya (realized saint) free from ignorance.(77)

Murti seems to have the following statements of the
Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa and Candrakiirti's comments
thereon in mind: "self-being is inartificial and
nonrelative to other [being]."(78) "Not realizable
through other, calm, inexpressible through words,
exempt from conceptualization, of not many
meanings--this is the definition of tattva."(79)
There is reason to believe that Murti is wrong in
taking it for granted that these statements of
Naagaarjuna make him an Absolutist. It is true that
Naagaarjuna appears to argue as if he believed in so
many laws of thought and being, so many truths. He
wields logic as skillfully as others, as though he
were demonstrating that at least logic contained the
whole truth and that it was an exception to the
theory of absolute nihility propounded by him. At
first sight, it appears that for him the law assumed
in his argument is unquestionably real and that it is
not a non-entity, not an illusion. But the actual
position is that he employs popular notions to refute
poppular theses, thereby trying to demonstrate that
our notions of things are self-contradictory. It is
not that he really believes, for example, that what
is self-subsistent alone can cause another. He simply
means to say that on the realist's own logic what
does
_____________________________________________________

(74) S. N. Dasgupta, Indian Idealism (Cambridge:
University Press, 1933), p. 79.

(75) Bhavasa^mkraanti, st. 10.

(76) Bhavasa^mkraanti-parikathaa (2nd recension of
Bhavasa^mkraanti-'saastra), st. 8.

(77) Murti, op. cit., p. 235.

(78) MK, 15.2 Cp. CSt, 3.35-39,42.

(79) MK, 18.9.

p.325

not exist cannot make others exist. So, when he
defines tattva or svabhaava, he does not mean to suggest
that there is a reality conforming to his definition.
What he does mean to suggest is that it follows from
the realist's own way of thinking that reality, if
there were a reality, should be such.
Candrakiirti has made a categorical statement in
this direction which should settle the matter once
and for all. He states a possible objection against
the Maadhyamika's thesis thus: If the Maadhyamika has
no thesis of his own, he is far from justified in
propounding the thesis that things are caused not by
themselves, nor by other things, nor by both, nor by
neither. To this, Candrakiirti's reply is that the
thesis in question is, as a matter of fact, not a
thesis of the Maadhyamika at all and that the
Maadhyamika's method is to meet the realist on the
latter's own ground by facing him with the
difficulties arising out of the latter's own
logic.(80)
Moreover, it can also be shown that Naagaarjuna's
definitions of tattva and svabhaava are fully
applicable to his void ('suunya). Murti remarks:
"Tattva as Dharmataa or Bhuutako.ti is accepted by
the Maadhyamika as the underlying ground of
phenomena."(81) But the question is, What is there to
warrant the assumption that tattva, dharmata, and
bhuutako.ti cannot be identified with the void?
Naagaarjuna says, "On cessation of the object of
consciousness, the object of speech ceases to exist.
For dharmataa is, like nirvaa.na, uncaused and
imperishable."(82) Candrakiirti's explanation is:
"Dharmataa is the essence of dharma, the nature of
dharma, which neither originates nor perishes, like
nirvaa.na."(83) Giving an alternative explanation, he
writes that in this verse Naagaarjuna explains the
proposition, made in an earlier verse,(84) that all
speech (prapa~nca) ceases in 'suunyataa: "... how
then can speech cease to exist in 'suunyataa? The
reply is, on cessation of the object of speech,
etc...."(85)
In another connexion, Candrakiirti tries to give
a third, clearer definition of dharmataa in these
words:

What is this dharmataa of the dharmas? The character
(svabhaava) of dharma. What is this character? Nature
(prak.rti). What is this nature? It is what is this
'suunyataa. What is this 'suunyataa? Essencelessness
(ni.hsvabhaavya). What is this essencelessness? Such-
ness (tathataa). What is this suchness, So-being
(tathaa-bhaava), changelessness, everlastingness."
(86)

Lest someone should be misled by the word
"everlastingness," Candrakiirti
_____________________________________________________

(80) MKV, 1.1, p. 57; MK, 24.10; VV, st. 28.

(81) Murti, op. cit., P. 237.

(82) MK, 18.7.

(83) MKV, 18.7, p. 364.

(84) MK, 18.5.

(85) MKV, 18.7, p. 365.

(86) Ibid., 15.2, pp. 264-265.

p.326

adds that, being non-relative and inartificial, only
the non-origination of things is called their
nature.(87) He also suggests that this
non-origination is identical with non-being.(88) It
is significant that, in explanation of the verse
quoted as footnote 84, Candrakiirti makes it
perfectly clear that "'suunyataa itself is called
nirvaa.na on account of its being characterized by
the cessation of all speech."(89)
Besides, in another work, Naagaarjuna has made
the significant remark that dharmataa is 'suunya,
like space.(90) In fact, according to him, all
essence is like space.(91) As a matter of fact, as
indicated in the Advayavajra-sa^mgraha,(92) dharmataa
is nothing other than dharmas, which are at bottom
'suunya, nothing.
The Absolutist interpreter of 'Suunyavaada sets
much store by its concept of dharmataa, as well as
tathataa. We have seen that dharmataa is nothing
mysterious like an Absolute and that it is but
another name for 'suunyataa, or void; We have now to
examine the concept of tathataa.
We have seen how Candrakiirti uses "dharmataa"
and "tathataa" interchangeably. Bhaavaviveka's
observations on the nature of tathataa will, however,
be found decisive. He writes:

If it be contended that the Tathataa, although it is
foreign to words (abhilaapa, vyavahaara-vivikta)
(sic) is nevertheless a reality (tattva): in that
case, the expression Tathataa refers only to the
AAtman of the Tiirthikas under another name. Just as
the Tathataa, although it is a reality, is
nevertheless from the point of view of exact truth,
beyond the concepts of being and not-being, it is the
same with AAtman. The Tiirthikas think that the
AAtman, which is real, omnipresent, eternal, agent,
enjoyer, is nevertheless foreign to every concept
(beyond the pale of conceptions). As it transcends
the domain of words, and as it is not the object of
the dealing-with-ideas intellect (vikalpa-buddhi), it
is said to be foreign to concepts. The doctrines of
the Tiirthikas say: "The words do not go there; the
thought does not realize it, therefore it is named
AAtman." The AAtman being such, is it reasonable to
assert that "the knowledge (j~naana) which takes the
Tathataa as its object leads to deliverance, while
the knowledge which takes the AAtman as its object
does not'-? (sic) But what is the difference between
the Tathataa and the AAtman, since both are ineffable
and real? It is only by esprit de parti
(pak.sa-graha.na) that it is so said.(93)

This emphatic repudiation of identity between
tathataa and the Absolute should set at rest all
speculation about the meaning of tathataa. Tathataa,
_____________________________________________________

(87) Ibid., 15.2, p. 265.

(88) Ibid., Cp., however, note 72 (supra).

(89) MKV, 18.5, p.351.

(90) Bhavasa^mkraanti, st. 2.

(91) Ibid., st. 3. Cp. BCA, 9.155.

(92) Advayavajra-sa^mgraha, p. 44.

(93) See Louis de La Vall俥-Poussin, "The Maadhyamika
and the Tathataa," Indian Historical Quarterly,
IX, No. 1 (March, 1933), 30-31. Bhaavaviveka's
work quoted from is mentioned by La
Vall俥-Poussin as Jewel in Hand or Gem in Hand.

p.327

dharmataa, nirvaa.na, and 'suunyataa are more or less
synonymous terms, used to designate the void in
various ways. It is difficult--rather, impossible--to
convey the true idea of the void. But some name or
other has to be given to it to make discourse about
it possible. This exigency of discourse is
responsible for the invention or employment of the
aforesaid terms, be they ever so imperfect.
Candrakiirti remarks that, though the fire is
essenceless, it has to be spoken of as an entity, and
some essence has to be superimposed upon it just to
guard against the auditors" being frightened.(94)
Dharmataa, etc., are born of such
superimposition.(95)
Bhaavaviveka's position is clearly summed up by
Louis de La Vall俥-Poussin as follows: "Buddhism is
alien to every metaphysical interest, being merely a
path leading to final rest by an unconscious and
objectless contemplation.(96)
Thus, Absolutism is quite foreign to the
Maadhyamika way of thinking.

VI

So far we have tried to show how the Maadhyamika
is a repudiator of being. We Shall see presently that
he is concerned as much with repudiating non-being as
with repudiating being. His repudiation of non-being
has been a source of much distortion of his
standpoint.
In Naagaarjuna, the negation of the world is so
complete that it ceases to be mere negation and
becomes the sole substitute for reality, so to speak.
All naming is determination, and, when there is
negation, pure and simple, with no existence besides
it--that is to say, when there is absolute or
indeterminate negation--even calling it negation is
not justified, since it will become determinate in
the process of being named. Naming is intended to
mark something out of its context, the group of its
co-existents, and, when there is negation alone, the
question of marking it out by naming is entirely
ruled out. Naagaarjuna observes: "The negation of
being and non-being is called nirvaa.na."(97) '"They
who see the being and non-being of things do not see
the quiescent good worth seeing."(98) "Being and
non-being are both phenomenal (conditioned or
sa^msk.rta)."(99)
Against the concept of non-being, Naagaarjuna
argues like this: When there is no being, how can its
non-being be thought of?(100) If being is not proved,
_____________________________________________________

(94) MKV, 15.2, p. 264.

(95) See ibid.

(96) La Vallee-Poussin, "The Maadhyamika and the
Tathataa," p. 30.

(97) Naagaarjuna, Ratnaavali, G. Tucci, ed., JRAS,
1934, p. 316, chap. 1, st. 42.

(98) MK, 5.8.

(99) Ibid., 25.13.

(100) Ibid., 5.6.

p.328

non-being is not proved, either; for what people call
non-being is but the opposite of being.(101) The
Buddha himself repudiated both being and non-being in
the Kaatyaayana dialogue. If existence is there by
nature, its negation cannot be; for there can be no
change in nature.(102) If there is no being, there
can be no non-being, since without one there can be
no many.(103) Praj~naa-karamati argues against
non-being in the same vein. According to him, non-
being is something subjective and unreal. When there
is nothing to deserve the name of being, it is simply
foolish to talk of non-being as the negation of
being.(104) 'Saantideva says:

When there is no being which would be negated,
non-being becomes supportless, and hence there can be
no presentation of it. When neither being nor
non-being is presented to consciousness, there being
no other alternative, the intellect ceases to
operate.(105)

Without positing being, a figment of imagination, its
non-being cannot be grasped. Therefore, the non-being
of being, which is false, is, evidently, false
itself.(106)

Thus, non-being is doubly unreal. Candrakiirti
remarks in the same vein:

"The son of a barren woman" is nothing but words. No
objective counterpart of the expression is found of
which positivity or negativity could be predicated.
Therefore, how is it possible to think of "no-object"
in terms of being and non-being?(107)

If something existed, its repudiation would lead to
negativism and hence to a false view. When we find
nothing whatever, what can be stolen (lost) there?
Non-being is nothing whatsoever....(108)

The position is that being and non-being are
correlatives, so that the one cannot be thought of
save in relation to the other. If, therefore, there
is no object, how can there be a non-object or
non-being?
From the foregoing account it is evident that the
Maadhyamika's denial of non-being is a semantical
rather than an ontological proposition. He does not
deny that all is reducible to non-being or that all
is non-being; he simply demurs to calling the
negation of being by the name of non-being.
It will thus be appreciated that, shorn of verbal
formulation, there is in effect hardly any real
difference between the Maadhyamika and the
Satyasiddhi school founded by Harivarman. Takakusu
has sought, however, to make a fine distinction
between the two thus:

Analyzing those five objects the school [the
Satyasiddhi school] reduces them to molecules, and
further reduces them to even finer atoms, and by thus
repeating the
_____________________________________________________

(101) Ibid., 15.5.

(102) Ibid., 15.7-8.

(103) Ratnaavalii, 1.71.

(104) BCAP, 9.2, p. 358.

(105) BCA, 9.34-35.

(106) Ibid., 9. 140.

(107) MKV, 25.8, p. 528.

(108) Ibid., 13.2 p. 239.

p.329

process the school finally attains the finest element
which has an entirely different nature from the first
objects. Going one step further, the school attains
the Void. Thus the nihilism of this school is a
"destructed" or abstracted Void. In other words, the
non-entity asserted in this school is simply an
abstraction from entity, or merely an antithetic Void
as against existence. And this is not the synthetic
Void or transcendental Void advanced by the Sanron
[Maadhyamika] School.(109)

Takakusu's distinction does not really hold good.
The process by which he says the Satyasiddhi school
reaches its void is nothing peculiar to that school.
It is shared by the Maadhyamikas as well. 'Saantideva
has urged it as an argument against the reality of
dharmas.(110) In the Catuh-'sataka, AAryadeva employs
a similar argument in refutation of the atom.(111)
His Hastavaala-prakara.na is wholly devoted to a
similar argument.(112) According to Advayavajra, such
an argument is to be met with in "western"
Vaibhaa.sikas as we11.(113) It is suggested in the
La^nkaavataara-suutra, too.(114) Besides, the
recurrent recourse in Maadhyamika literature to
likening reality to a banana tree, which, when all
its skins are peeled off, has nothing left as its
kernel, indicates a similar frame of reference.(115)
Hence, while Buddhism in general and the
Satyasiddhi school in particular tend to make
approximations to 'Suunyavaada by means of the
foregoing argumentation, it is the Maadhyamika alone
who enjoys the credit of presenting 'Suunyavada as a
systematic philosophy.
The Buddha preached that all comes out of nothing
and relapses into nothing; Harivarman contends that,
if all comes out of nothing and relapses into
nothing, all is nothing; the Maadhyamika argues that,
if things are not there, nothing is not there also,
because the absence of one member of the pair of
opposites is bound to mean the absence of the other
member as well. When, however, the Maadhyamika
expresses his disapproval of the tendency to identify
his 'suunyataa with non-being, he means to say only
that "nothing" is meaningless without the duality of
being and non-being, and that, since being is not
there, nothing is not there also. So, between
Harivarman and the Maadhyamika the issue is merely a
semantic one rather than ontological.
The burden of the Maadhyamika dialectic is to
show that all is void, nothing. The Maadhyamika,
however, is not satisfied with the words "void" and
"nothing." "Void" presupposes a filler thereof.
Likewise, "nothing"
_____________________________________________________

(109) Takakusu, op. cit., p. 78.

(110) BCA, 9.86-87.

(111) See CS, 13.5-6, with CSV.

(112) AAryadeva, Hastavaala-prakara.na, F. W. Thomas
and H. Ui, eds., JRAS, 1918, pp. 277 and 281,
sts. 1 and 3.

(113) See Advayavajra-sa^mgraha, p. 15.

(114) La^nkaavataara-suutra, gaathaa 583, p. 337.

(115) See, for example, Ratnaavali, 2.1; BCA, 9.151.

p.330

presupposes some "thing." Hence, he finds these terms
inadequate to express what he actually means.
So, the Maadhyamika repudiates being and
non-being, the former on ontological and the latter
on semantic grounds. There is, however, a third
alternative, viz., both being and nothing rolled into
one (ubhaya-sa^mkiir.naatmataa), and a fourth one,
viz., a category exclusive of both being and nothing
(ubhaya-prati.sedha-svabhaavataa).(116) What does the
Maadhyamika say about these two categories?
Praj~naakaramati's reply is:

Not that, in the event of both being and non-being
having been negated as shown above, the mixture of
both of them or negatedness of both is the real state
of affairs. Since the idea of being is the ground of
all ideation, after its repudiation all of these
ideations stand repudiated with one stroke.(117)

Out of the four categories (ko.tis) of reality that
can be conceived by man, viz., being, non-being,
both, and neither, the first two are basic or primary
categories, while the latter two are derivative from
these. And, when the Maadhyamika has his reasons to
repudiate the basic or primary categories, the
derivative ones stand repudiated of themselves.
The Maadhyamika is also inclined to distinguish
between non-being (abhaava) and 'suunyataa, (118)
which, as should be manifest from the foregoing
account, is quite in keeping with his basic position.

VII

We have seen how Naagaarjuna rejects being and
non-being. Now note that he rejects 'suunyataa, too.
In Chapter XV of the Muulama-dhyamaka-kaarikaa will be
found self-essence, existence, and non-existence all
repudiated with the felicity characteristic of
Naagaarjuna. We have shown that his rejection of
non-being is semantic rather than ontological.
Similarly, his rejection of 'suunyataa, too, is
semantic rather than ontological.
He says, "Were there something non-'suunya, there
would be something, 'suunya, too. But, since there is
nothing non-'suunya, where will the 'suunya be?"(119)
It is obvious that here Naagaarjuna has risen to
a height of imagination at which he finds inadequate
even the concept of 'suunyataa, not, however, on
ontological but on purely semantic grounds, as was
the case with his repudiation of non-being. What is
left after negating everything conceivable is
characterizable neither as non-being nor as 'suunya,
for the simple reason that
_____________________________________________________

(116) See BCAP, 9.2, p. 358.

(117) Ibid.

(118) See MK, 13.2, with MKV, p.239.

(119) MK, 13.7. Cp. Yogavaasi.s.tha, 3.10.14.

p.331

there is nothing in opposition to which these
concepts could logically observation: '"The Buddhas
preach 'suunyataa as the exclusion of all
[ontological] theses. We declare incurable those who
tend to erect 'suunyataa itself into a particular
thesis.(120)
The residue after the negation of everything
whatsoever is truly ineffable. All description
proceeds by relating one thing to another. Without
this process, there can be no speech at all. And,
when there is nothing at all in relation to which the
so-called residue is to be described, it is nothing
but indescribable or ineffable (prapa~ncopa'sama),
where language loses all its utility and efficiency.
They who erect this 'suunyataa into a particular
theory, or convert it into a veritable being, as is
the case with those who read Absolutism into the
Maadhyamika system, are incurable. Candrakiirti says,
"Those who see being even in 'suunyataa are not such
as we talk with. He who, in reply to the remark, 'I
shall give you no money,' says, 'Well, let me have
the no-money, cannot by any means be convinced of the
non-existence of money."(121)
Of the Buddha, the highest being, Naagaarjuna
declares: "He cannot be called 'suunya, nor can he be
non-'suunya, nor both, nor neither. He is called so
[viz., 'suunya, non-'suunya, both, and neither] for
empirical purposes."(122) Our interpretation of
Naagaarjuna's refutation of 'suunyataa is fully borne
out by the following passage of Candrakiirti:

If there were something like 'suunyataa [lover and
above the objects], the essence of objects would
depend upon it. But this is not the case. Here
'suunyataa is propounded as the generic
characteristic of all reals. There is no non-'suunya
real, and non-'suunyataa itself does not exist. [That
is to say, all reals being 'suunya, there is no
non-'suunya real; and hence 'suunyataa, in default of
its opposite, simply does not exist.] And, when there
are no non-'suunya objects and there is no
non-'suunyataa, it follows that, in the absence of
its opposite, 'suunyataa, too, like the garland of
sky-flowers, is not there.(123)

As a matter of fact, there is hardly any real
difference between non-being and 'suunyataa. By the
former, the Maadhyamika seems to mean determinate
negation, while, by the latter, indeterminate
negation. Otherwise, both the terms denote one and
the same fact. That is to say, when he speaks
generally, he defines 'suunyataa such as in these
statements: "That is called 'suunyataa which is
non-existent by nature."(124) "'Suunyataa is the
essencelessness of all reals, characterized by
non-cognition."(125)
_____________________________________________________

(120) MK, 13.8. Cp. note 137 (supra).

(121) MKV, 13.8, pp. 247, 248.

(122) MK, 22.11. Cp. CSt, 4.10.

(123) MKV, 13.5, p. 246. Cp. Ratnaavalii, 2.4-5.

(124) MKV, 20.18, p. 403. It is significant that
"naasti," "abhaava," "asat," etc., used in this
connection are illustrated by space, etc.

(125) BCAP, 9.54, p. 447.

p.332

The following words of Candrakiirti serve to sum
up the Maadhyamika's position admirably well: "The wise
who have attained the truth do not find anything
whatsoever which could be false or otherwise."(126)
Stanza 30 of the Vigrahavyaavartanii suggests the
same position.
Unlike the Hegelian dialectic, which has three
moments or stages--thesis, antithesis, and
synthesis--the Maadhyamika dialectic tends to have
five moments (ko.tis)--thesis, antithesis, synthesis,
anti-synthesis, and super-synthesis. The well-known
dialectical formula of Hegel is [1] being, [2]
nothing, and [3] becoming; that of the Maadhyamika,
[1] being (sat), [2] nothing, (asat), [3] both
(ubhaya), [4] neither (anubhaya), and [5] quietude
(tuu.s.nii^mbhaava), (127) non-apprehension
(anupalambha), (128) the inexpressible
(prapa~ncopa'sama), the essenceless (ni.hsvabhaava),
or beyond-the-four-moments
(catu.sko.tvinirmukta).(129) There is, however, this
difference, that, while Hegel affirms the reality of
all the three moments, the Maadyamika denies that of
his first four moments. His reality, or, rather, his
apology for one, is beyond the four moments. This
beyond-the-four-moment category, suggested by the
Maadhyamika, must not be construed, however, to mean
a fifth moment along the lines of the fifth moment
predicated of Brahman by 'Sriihar.sa and certain
other Advaitists.(130) The word "'suunyataa," which
is often used to denote the second moment of
"nothing," is also used to denote this so-called
fifth moment.(131) However, this moment is not found
mentioned as such in Maadhyamika literature. This is
out innovation offered here to facilitate the
understanding of the Maadhyamika standpoint.
That things are existent is the thesis; that they
are non-existent is the anti-thesis; that they are
both existent and non-existent is the synthesis; that
they are neither existent nor non-existent is the
anti-synthesis; and that they are none of these is
the super-synthesis. The first four moments
constitute what is called the expressible
(prapa~nca), while the fifth moment is the
inexpressible (prapa~ncopa'sama).
There are philosophers of being who maintain that
the ultimate reality is of the nature of Being. There
is also at least one philosophy of nothing--that of
Harivarman-maintaining that the ultimate reality is
of the nature of nothing. Jainism is the philosophy
of being-cum-nothing, so to speak. Skeptics
_____________________________________________________

(126) See note 50 (supra).

(127) MKV, 1.1, p. 57.

(128) See, for example, notes 35 and 42 (supra); MK,
25.24; BCAP, 9.45, p. 437; 9.54, p. 447.

(129) Advayavajra-sa^mgraha, p. 19. Also, see ibid.,
pp. 46, 54, 57.

(130) See 'Sriihar.sa, Nai.sadhiya-carita, Haragovinda
'Saastrii, ed. (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit
Series Office, 1954), 13.35. Cp. Appaya
Diik.sta, Siddhaantale'sa-sa^mgraha,
Muula'sa^mkara Vyaasa, ed (2nd ed., Varanasi:
Acyuta-granthamala Office, Vikramii 2011, 4.6,
pp. 516-517). Also see Murti, op. cir., p. 161,
n.

(131) Cp., for example, MK, 13.8.

p.333

like Sa^mjaya Bela.t.thiputta and Pyttho expressed
their inability to say whether the ultimate reality
was being, nothing, or both. That it is neither
being, nothing, nor both would be the fourth
alternative. The Maadhyamika system maintains that
the real is devoid of all these four categories.
'Sriihar.sa, taking his cue from the Maadhyamika,
regards his Brahman as belonging to a fifth category,
as shown above.
However, as pointed out earlier, the Maadhyamika
posits no category of his own. He examines the
categories posited by others with a view to showing
up their hollowness. Candrakiirti writes, "We do not
postulate the non-being of it. What then? We simply
repudiate the being conceived by others. Likewise, we
do not postulate its being. What then? We simply
repudiate the non-being of it as conceived by
others."(132)

Five stages are discernible in the Maadhyamika's
treatment of the ultimat truth. First, things are
shown to be essentially chaotic and hence
non-existent. Then, second, non-existence, too, is
demonstrated to be false, together with things. That
is to say, both being and non-being are rejected as
false. In the first stage, 'suunyataa is presented as
non-being. In the second stage, it is said to be
beyond both being and non-being. Third, even
'suunyataa is rejected on the ground of there being
no non-'suunya, and essencelessness
(ni.hsvabhaavataa) is established. Fourth, the
doctrine of non-apprehension (anupalambha or
apraaptatva)(133) is Set forth. Finally, rejection of
all ontology is the result.
As suggested above, one is bound to arrive at the
conclusion, after a scrutiny of the hybrid and
seemingly conflicting utterances of the Maadhyamikas,
that being and nothing are the only really
fundamental positions, the rest enjoying only a
derivative status. "Is" and "is-not" are the only
positions that one can possibly take with regard to
ultimate reality. The other hypotheses are only
semantic hypotheses. Strictly speaking, the
ontological issue is between the first two hypotheses
only. And the Maadhyamika adheres to the hypothesis
of non-being to the last. In effect, the
Maadhyamika's seeming objection to non-being is
directed, not toward non-being as such, but toward
styling it as non-be1ing. Non-being cannot be thought
of save as opposed to being, and, he argues, if there
is no being, how can there be--or, what is the same
thing, how can anything be styled as--non-being? At
bottom, both the Satyasiddhi and the Maadhyamika
schools hold the same position: blank phenomenalism
without a reality subjacent to phenomena.
The Maadhyamika's method is something like this.
He first seeks to show that all is relative, hence
chaotic, hence essenceless, and hence void. Lest
undiscerning people should erect his void into a
positive reality like the
_____________________________________________________

(132) MKV, 20.3, p. 393. Also see note 80 (supra).

(133) See Takakusu, op. cit., p. 104.

p.334

Brahman of the Vedaanta or the Absolute of the
Western idealists, as has been done by those trying
to see the Maadhyamika through Vedaantic or
Absolutistic eyes, he later refuses to admit even the
void, saying that the void can be there only when
there is a non-void. This leads him to affirm the
doctrine of non-apprehension, ending in the
repudiation of all metaphysics.
This interpretation of the Maadhyamika's method
may sound novel, but it is based on definite
indications in Maadhyamika writings. For examp le,
one relevant verse of Naagaarjuna suggests that in
the first instance all is declared imaginary and that
then imagination itself is dismissed as false.(134)
Elsewhere, he contends that even the conception by
which 'suunyataa is conceived is itself 'suunya(135)
'Saantideva writes in the same vein: "By
contemplation on 'suunyataa, the conception of being
vanishes. By contemplation on the idea that there is
nothing whatsoever, that, too, vanishes
afterwards."(136)
In fact, the Maadhyamika literature abounds in
such suggestions.(137)

VIII

Praj~naakaramati has discussed an interesting
question as to the raison d'坱re of the beneficent
bodhisattvas involving themselves in such activities
as almsgiving, etc., which are, according to the
Maadhyamika, 'suunya, or false. His reply is that
they do so spontaneously, involuntarily, or
unpremeditatedly (avicaarata.h).(138) If he held any
other view of 'suunyataa than as void, his immediate
reply would be that, his 'suunyataa not being
identifiable with the void, the objection was
pointless.
Some people are inclined to the view that the
Maadhyamika's emphasis on nihilism springs from his
extra concern for the attainment of renunciation, and
that, otherwise, his thesis of the void need not be
taken seriously on ontological grounds. There are
those who tend to take even the 'Sa^mkarite's
world-negating attitude in this light. A casual
utterance of a Kumaarila (vis-?vis Buddhist nihilism)
or a Vi.t.thale'sa (vis-?vis Advaitism) is their
main support.(139) But their interpretation is
demonstrably false and far-fetched. Here we confine
ourself to the clarification of the Maadhyamika's
position. Now, it is not difficult to discover the
true character of the Maadhyamika's emphasis on
nihilism. AAryadeva has raised the issue and answered
it un-
_____________________________________________________

(134) CSt, 3.34.

(135) See Bhavasa^mkraanti-parikathaa, st. 12.

(136) BCA, 9.33.

(137) Also see note 105 (supra).

(138) BCAP, 9.4, p. 372.

(139) See N. K. Devaraia. An introduction to
'Sa^nkara's Theory of Knowledge (Varanasi:
Motilal Banarsi Dass, 1962), pp. 205-206.

p.335

equivocally. He says,"It is not that the non-'suunya
is shown to be 'suunya simply by the desire to attain
nirvaa.na; for the Buddhas do not describe nirvaa.na
as attainable through false vision."(140)
Candrakiirti comments: "Are these objects
noh-'suunya, but shown to be 'suunya for the
attainment of renunciation? Or are they demonstrated
to be 'suunya by nature? It is said in reply [here he
quotes the above verse of AAryadeva, and then says,].
.. entities are known to be 'suunya by nature."(141)
The Maadhyamikas are serious thinkers and do not
believe in make believes like the ones read into them
by the interpreters just criticized. Otherwise, they
would have broken down over such a fundamental
question.
By the Absolutist interpreter of 'Suunyavaada
much is made of Naagaarjuna's rejoinder to the
objection: "If all this is 'suunya, there is neither
origination nor decay, and the negation of the four
Noble Truths will become chargeable against
you."(142) On behalf of the objector, Naagaarjuna
refers to the chain of negations which will follow of
themselves in the wake of the negation of the four
Noble Truths, and concludes that such a state of
affairs will lead to chaos. His reply is:
To this we rejoin,

You do not appreciate the purpose of 'suunyataa,
'suunyataa, and the meaning of 'suunyataa; that is
why you raise this objection. The Buddhas preach the
dharma with reference to two truths--the empirical
truth and the transcendental truth. Those who do not
know the division of the two truths do not know the
great essence in the Buddha's teaching. The
transcendental is not preached save vis-?vis the
empirical, and, without recourse to the
transcendental, nirvaa.na is not attained. Wrongly
apprehended, 'suunyataa destroys the unintelligent,
even as a wrongly caught serpent or wrongly practiced
science... If, then, you criticize 'suunyataa, it is
not our fault, for the criticism does not apply to
the 'suunya.(143)

What Naagaarjuna seems to mean is that there are
two truths, one for the higher souls and one for the
lower, and that the highest doctrine, that of
'suunyataa, is not meant for the latter, who must be
taught to adhere to the four Noble Truths as also to
all other canons of righteousness taught by the
Buddha. According to AAryadeva, the truth is preached
in three steps. In the first step, the seeker is told
that there is such a thing as sin which attaches to
and pollutes the self and that, therefore, one should
beware of sin. In the second step, he is told
that not only the sin but the self itself does not
exist. In the third and final step, it is revealed to
him that all is nothing, void.(144)
_____________________________________________________

(140) CS, 8.7.

(141) CSV, 8.7, p. 7.

(142) MK, 24.1.

(143) Ibid., 24.7-10, 11, 13.

(144) CS, 8.15.

p.336

Candrakiirti expounds the idea of Naagaarjuna
thus:

'Suunyataa is preached with a view to putting an end
to all speech; therefore, the purpose of 'suunyataa
is cessation of all speech. You, on the other hand,
who construe 'suunyataa to mean non-being (naastitva)
and thereby only enlarge the net of speech do not
know the purpose of 'suunyataa.... Hence, how can
there be non-being in 'suunyataa, which is of the
essence of cessation of all speech? So, you do not
know even 'suunyataa.... What pratiitya-samutpaada
means is also meant by 'suunyataa, but what
non-being (abhaava) means is not what is meant by
'suunyataa.(145)

We take it that Candrakiirti purports to say that
'suunyataa is neither being, not non-being, nor both,
nor neither; that it would therefore be incorrect to
identify it with non-being; and that it is only this
wrong identification that gives rise to the objection
that it will strike at the root of ail practice, all
righteousness.
In this connection, Naagaarjuna makes another
observation which deserves notice. He says, "All
fares well with him with whom 'suunyataa fares well;
nothing fares well with him with whom 'suunyataa does
not so fare."(146) Candrakiirti tries to bring out
the idea of this pithy remark thus:

With him with whom this 'suunyataa fares well,
pratiitya-samutpaada, too, fares well; with him with
whom pratiitya-samutpaada fares well, the four Noble
Truths fare well. How so? Because suffering is
phenomenal (pratiitya-samutpanna), not
non-phenomenal. And, being essenceless, it is
'suunya. Suffering being there, its origination,
its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation
fare well with him.(147)

Thereafter, Candrakiirti goes on recounting the
tenets of Buddhism the uselessness of which was
apprehended by the imaginary objector to the
'suunyataa doctrine and which would be reinstated by
the proper appreciation of 'suunyataa.
Naagaarjuna continues:

By seeking to lay your faults at our doors you have
forgotten the very horse you are riding. If you
regard objects as essentially existent, then, by
doing so, you see objects without causes
and conditions. Thereby you fail to explain effect,
cause, doer, means, action, origination, cessation,
and consequence. Pratiitya-samutpaada is called
'suunyataa by us. It is relative being, it is the
Middle Path. There is no non-relative [or uncaused]
dharma, and, therefore, there is non-'suunya dharma.
If all this is non'suunya, there is neither
origination nor decay, and denial of the four Noble
Truths becomes chargeable against you. How can there
be uncaused suffering? For suffering is said to be
non-eternal, which would not be possible if it had
essence. If it is existence by nature, then what is
there to originate? Therefore, there is no
origination for one
_____________________________________________________

(145) MKV, 24.7, p. 491.

(146) MK, 24.14.

(147) MKV, 24.14. p. 500.

p.337

who rejects 'suunyataa. If suffering exists, it will
not cease. By upholding its essence, you speak
against its cessation.(148)

Thereafter Naagaarjuna recounts the theses of
Buddhism, which will, in his opinion, lose their
significance on the non-'suunyataa doctrine, and thus
lays the same charges at the doors of the
non-'suunyataa-vaadin as the latter sought to do at
his.
It is obvious that here Naagaarjuna purports to
define 'suunyataa in its empirical aspect alone.
Candrakiirti has it that "pratiitya-samutpaada" as
used by Naagaarjuna in the present context means
emergence of things through causes and conditions
(hetupratyayaanapek.sya praadurbhaava.h) or,
conversely, non-emergence of things without causes
and conditions, of themselves
(svabhaavenaanutpaada.h).(149) So, the denial of
'suunyataa in its empirical aspect is tantamount to
the belief in the immutability of things, which
precludes all possibility of oringination or
elimination of suffering, thereby rendering the
doctrine of the four Noble Truths altogether
meaningless. Therefore, 'suunyataa in its empirical
sense alone seems to be in question here.
Naagaarjuna has elsewhere, too, suggested that
belief in the being of things is tantamount to belief
in their eternity. He has, accordingly, characterized
the realist as an eternalist in these words: "If
there were being in the nature of things, it would
not be non-existent; for the negation of nature
cannot be established."(150) As a matter of fact,
according to him, "To say [it] is' is eternalism, to
say '[it] is not' is the philosophy of cessation.
Therefore, the wise should not adhere either to [the
doctrine of] 'it is' or to [that of] 'it is not.'
For what is by nature, of that it can never be said
that it is not; to say 'it is not now, it was before'
means [belief in the doctrine of] cessation."(151)
Indeed, as suggested above, the Maadhyamika
denies not only being but also non-being--in fact,
even being-cum-non-being and
neither-being-nor-non-being.
The last difficulty in giving credence to the
nihilistic interpretation of the Maadhyamika's
standpoint is the religious fervor shown by him as a
Mahaayaanist. If all is void, how can this fervor be
explained? The best course for a nihilist would be to
be unruffled by emotions and sentiments, rather than
to be so devoted to the Buddha as to erect him into a
veritable Godhead. The reason, though slightly
difficult to appreciate, is not far to seek. The
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(148) MK, 24. 15-23.

(149) MKV, 24.18, p. 503.

(150) MK, 15.8.

(151) Ibid., 15.8-11. Also see CSt, 3.21. Elsewhere,
however, Naagaarjuna remarks: "Isness without birth
and death is simply unthinkable (prasajyetaasti
bhaavo hi na jaraamara.na^m vinaa). MK, 25.4. At
a third place, again, he remarks: "Being is
either eternal or non-eternal" (...bhaavo hi
nityo'nityo'thavaa bhavet). MK, 21.14. It is
difficult ot reconcile the three statements.

p.338

Maadhyamika does not present a much greater problem
on this score than the Advaitin, who claims not only
consubstantiality but veritable identity with the
Absolute and declares the world to be illusory, but,
nevertheless, does not lag behind others in his
devotion to gods and goddesses. As a matter of fact,
they both share the common Indian trait of
dichotomizing truth into the transcendental and the
empirical, in effect wholly unconnected with each
other. While contemplating the transcendental truth,
the Maadhyamika considers everything as illusory and
void and goes to the extent of declaring the
Tathaagata himself, the object of his devotion, to be
nothing better than illusory. But, while
contemplating the empirical truth, he distinguishes
between his gods and their devotees and behaves as if
he were as much a realist as others.(152) This is the
case with the Advaitin as well. Indeed, the Indians
have never been able to reconcile the empirical with
the transcendental, and one need not be surprised if
the Maadhyamika fares no better.

IX

Is the Maadhyamika's thesislessness tantamount to
an admission of failure on his part to fathom the
mystery of the ultimate reality? His tone does not
disclose any such defeatist mentality.(153) He does
not seem to regret the fact that he is not in a
position to talk about the real. As a matter of fact,
he is not at all a skeptic. We does know, but cannot
express. He believes in the void, pure and simple.
But he is not in a position to explain to others what
the state of affairs would be like in the absence of
all that we can perceive or conceive as real.
Language can operate only in the world of being.
Where there is absolutely no being whatsoever, its
operation is bound to come to a standstill.
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(152) Cittavisuddhi-prakara.na, st. 83.

(153) MKV, 1.1, p. 56.