The Harmonious Universe of Fa-tsang and Leibniz

·期刊原文
The Harmonious Universe of Fa-tsang and Leibniz:
A Comparative Study
By Ming-wood Liu
Philosophy East and West
volume 32 no 1
January 1982
p. 61-76
(c) by University of Hawaii Press

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p. 61

I

This comparative study of the metaphysics of
Fa-tsang(a) and Leibniz is done with two objectives
in mind. First, in recent years, Japanese Buddhist
scholars have repeatedly called our attention to the
similarity between the teachings of Fa-tsang and
Leibniz.(1) That Western philosophical concepts and
methods can be fruitfully employed in the study of
Oriental philosophy is amply demonstrated in the
series of highly illuminating works put forth by such
distinguished experts in the field of Chinese thought
as Mou Tsang-san(b) and Cheng Chung-ying(c) .(2)
However, any attempt to draw close parallels between
two philosophical systems of two different cultures
are bound to be misleading, if proper attention has
not been paid to the often very different assumptions
which have gone into the building up of these
systems." (3) One of the most basic principles in the
study of the history of philosophy is that what is
central is not what the philosophers had said, but
the reasons they had given for saying what they said.
This principle has not been observed in the constant
attempt to ally Leibniz' teaching with that of
Fa-tsang. In this article I shall attempt to remedy
that lack.

Second, while it is my contention that Fa-tsang
and Leibniz had very dissimilar reasons for saying
what they said, it is also undeniable that some of
their statements, when taken out of context, sound
strikingly similar. Noting these surface resemblances
while at the same time unraveling their diverse
backgrounds would be of immense help to the
clarification of the basic orientations of the
teachings of both thinkers. A case in point is the
prevalent belief that Fa-tsang has offered us a
picture of Reality which is free from the so-called
negativistic tendency which characterizes Buddhist
metaphysics in general.(4) Even if we grant that it is
the intention of Fa-tsang to construct a metaphysics
which is more affirmative than the original Indian
model, we still have to ask how far he has gone and
can go in this direction, given the basic Buddhist
standpoint that life is suffering and that
enlightenment is a process of transcending the
everyday world of impermanence. For this purpose,
Leibniz' overtly affirmative metaphysics, which
declares that the world as we have it, being the
creation of an all benevolent and all omnipotent God,
cannot but be the best possible world, comes to our
aid, for it can serve as some sort of yardstick with
which we can measure the degree of affirmativeness of
Fatsang's world-view. In other words, in the
discipline of comparative philosophy, the observation
of contrasts is as meaningful and significant as the
observation of parallels, as I hope to show in this
study.
----------------------------------------
Ming-Wood Liu is Lecturer in Chinese Philosophy at
the University of Hong Kong.
Philosophy East and West 32, no. 1 (January, 1982).

p. 62

Since my interest is more on the side of Chinese than
on the side of Western philosophy, the focus of this
study will fall on Fa-tsang, commonly known as the
third patriarch of the Hua-yen school(d) in Chinese
Buddhism. Born in 643, Fa-tsang lived at a time when
the T'ang dynasty'(e) was at the zenith of its power.
With the exception of a short period of reclusion in
his early years, Fa-tsang spent most of his life in
the capital Chang-an(f) under imperial patronage,
where he was so lavishly favored by the Empress Wu(g)
that in recent years there has been much speculation
that the Empress intended to use Fatsang's teaching
as the ruling ideology.(5) Even though this is a
rather far-fetched conjecture, the warm support
Fa-tsang received from the Empress Wu and the next
two emperors undoubtedly enhanced his prestige and
paved the way for the later spread of Hua-yen
Buddhism. Moreover, even though most of the central
concepts in Fa-tsang's teaching can be traced back to
Chih-yen(h), his teacher and the second patriarch of
the Hua-yen school, it was Fa-tsang who developed
these concepts and organized them into a systematic
whole. Thus, both from the historical and the
doctrinal points of view, Fa-tsang can be considered
as the real founder of the Hua-yen school in Chinese
Buddhism.(6)

To understand Fa-tsang's philosophy, it is
essential to stress a point which has often been
passed over in modern works on Hua-yen Buddhism, that
is, Fa-tsang shared with his contemporaries a common
ideal, namely, the ideal of the "round," or in
Chinese, "yuan-jung(i)". " Round" as an evaluative
term in Chinese Buddhism has the double connotation
of "all-inclusiveness'' and "freedom from all
extremes." This idea of the round has its origin in
the doctrine of the middle way, which was believed to
be the first doctrine taught by the Buddha and so was
accepted as authoritative by all Buddhist schools,
Hiinayaana and Mahaayaana alike. In the Sutta of the
Setting-Rolling of the Wheel of the Law, the Buddha
is reported to have said:

Monks, these two extremes should not be followed
by one who has gone forth as a wanderer. What two?
Devotion to the pleasure of sense, a low practice of
villagers, a practice unworthy, unprofitable, the way
of the world [on the one hand]; and [on the other]
devotion to self-mortification, which is painful,
unworthy and unprofitable.(7)

In this passage, the idea of the middle way is
applied to the area of religious practice, that is,
one should avoid the extreme of indulgence in sense
pleasure on the one hand, and the extreme of
asceticism on tke other. When the idea of the middle
way is applied to the area of metaphysical discourse,
we find the Buddha enjoining his followers to stay
free from such extremes as "being" and "non-being,"
"self" and "no-self," and so on. This middle doctrine
is later further developed in the
Praj~naapaaramitaa-suutras and in Maadhyamika
Buddhism in their concepts of "the two truths" and of
"emptiness" as detachment from the making of
essential distinctions.

p. 63

The Praj~naapaaramitaa-suutras and the works of
the Maadhyamika school are among the early Mahaayaana
texts to be translated into Chinese. The middle way
they teach found a ready audience among Chinese
intellectuals, as witnessed by the content of some of
the earliest works on Buddhism written by the Chinese
themselves, such as the Feng-fa-yao(j) by Hsi Chao(k)
and the Treatises of Seng-chao(l). This is, of
course, not surprising, for the Chinese always have
an almost instinctive dislike for all forms of
extremes.(8) Thus, every major Chinese Buddhist
school, such as the T'ien-t'ai school(m), the Hua-yen
school and the Fa-hsiang school(n), has found it
necessary to justify its teaching by evoking the
standard of the "round", and it is to the
construction of a conception of Reality which most
perfectly expresses this ideal of the "round" that
Fatsang devotes most of his labor.

Central to Fa-tsang's attempt to draw up a world
view most fully embodying the ideal of the round is
his classification of the teachings of various main
Buddhist traditions according to how closely they
approach this ideal, an enterprise commonly known in
Chinese Buddhism as "p'an-chiao(o)". P'an-chiao has
as its doctrinal basis in the idea of "skilful means"
in Mahaayaana Buddhism, and is essentially an attempt
to integrate various systems of Buddhist thought into
one unified hierarchy, with the view to reconcile and
to explain away the apparent contradictions which
exist among them. Most Chinese Buddhist schools
consider their p'an-chiao systems to be the core of
their teaching, and it is no exception with the
Hua-yen school, as the title of Fa-tsang's most
important work, the Hua-yen wu-chiao chang(p)
(Treatise on the Five Teachings) , readily
demonstrates. The most inferior among the five
teachings is the Hiinayaana teaching, which Fa-tsang
characterizes as "the teaching of the existence of
dharmas and the non-existence of the self".(9) By
this he has in mind especially the teaching of the
Sarvaastivaadins, who attempt to show the error of
the commonsense belief in the existence of permanent
objects and selves by analyzing them into their
constituents, which they call dharmas. However, even
though the Sarvastivaadins are correct in maintaining
the nonexistence of self-sufficient objects and
selves, they consider the dharmas, which compose
these objects and selves to be not only real but real
eternally. This seems to fly in the face of the
cardinal Buddhist dogma of impermanence, and in
Fa-tsang's opinion, the Hiinayaana teaching is
one-sided in its emphasis on "being."

It is to counteract this realistic and
pluralistic tendency in Hiinayaana Buddhism that the
Praj~naapaaramitaa-suutras declare all entities,
whether simple or composite, to be "illusory, "
"inactive" and "in a state of nonexistence." Fa-tsang
puts the teaching of the Praj~naapaaramitaa-suutras,
together with the teaching of the Maadhyamika school,
under the category of "the elementary teaching of the
Mahaayaana," which he labels as "the teaching that
the conditioned is without self-nature."(10) This
teaching, according to Fa-tsang, is superior to the
Hiinayaana teaching, for it has overcome the latter's
one-sided

p. 64

emphasis on "being.'' However, in instructing that
all entities are illusory as a dream or an echo, it
has gone too far in the opposite direction, and falls
into the extreme of "emptiness."

The merit of "the final teaching of the
Mahaayaana," the third of the five teachings, lies in
the fact that unlike the first two teachings, it has
eschewed the extreme of "being" on the one hand, and
the extreme of "emptiness" on the other, in its
concept of the tathaagatagarbha. The history of the
evolution of the concept of the tathaagatagarbha
constitutes one of the most intricate chapters in the
history of Buddhism, which we cannot dwell on here.
However, it is safe to say that in the case of
Fa-tsang, by "tathaagatagarbha," he usually has in
mind the concept as it is presented in the Ta-ch'eng
ch'i-hsin lun(q), which is roughly equivalent to the
concept of "the transcendental mind" in Western
philosophy. According to the Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun,
the tathaagatagarbha has two aspects, the absolute
and the phenomenal. In its absolute aspect, it is
unborn, imperishable, pure and self-sufficient, and
so can be described as "truly nonempty." However,
since it is devoid of all distinctions and
discriminations, it can also be described as "truly
empty." In this way, the tathaagatagarbha unites in
itself both aspects of "emptiness" and
"nonemptiness."

Furthermore, in the ontological scheme of the
Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun, even though the
tathaagatagarbha is considered as pure in itself, it
is always accompanied by ignorance, under the
influence of which it gives rise to all forms of
phenomenal existence. Based on this understanding,
Fa-tsang further claims that the tathaagatagarbha
doctrine has succeeded in overcoming the dichotomy of
the noumenal and the phenomenal, for phenomena,
considered as the transformation of the
tathaagatagarbha when the latter is permeated by
ignorance, do not and cannot exist apart from the
tathaagatagarbha from which they arise.

We can pass over the "sudden teaching," that is,
the fourth of the five teachings, here, for so far as
Metaphysics is concerned, it does not differ
materially from the final teaching of the Mahaayaana.
Fa-tsang accepts rather uncritically the claim that
both the final teaching and the sudden teaching have
succeeded in bridging the gap between "emptiness" and
the noumenal on the one hand, and "being" and the
phenomenal on the other; and in this respect, they
come closer to the ideal of the round than the
Hiinayaana teaching and the elementary teaching of
the Mahaayaana. Nevertheless, there is still one
distinction which remains unreconciled in these two
teachings, that is, the distinction among the
phenomena themselves, which are still understood in
the final and the sudden teaching as existing
separate from each other. This distinction is only
overcome in "the round teaching," that is, the
teaching of the Hua-yen school, which maintains that
each element of the phenomenal world includes in it
all other elements and pervades the entire totality
in which it exists.

The preceding is roughly the way Fa-tsang arrives
at his doctrine of universal

p. 65

harmony, which, in its being the most perfect
embodiment of the ideal of the round, is called "the
round teaching" by Fa-tsang. This account, though
sketchily presented,"(11) should be sufficient to warn
us against the drawing of easy parallels between the
teaching of Fa-tsang and those of Western
philosophers. In the West, it is usually logical,
epistemic, or theodicean considerations that dictate
a philosopher's choice of his metaphysical system.
However, to Fa-tsang, his picture of a harmonious
universe is the best picture not because it is
aesthetically the most appealing, nor because it is
logically the most consistent, nor because it brings
forth best the divine design underlying all forms of
existence, but because it approaches most closely to
the Buddhist ideal of the round. In other words,
Fa-tsang's teaching of universal harmony is not a
conclusion which comes with his mediating on such
philosophical problems as the nature of truth, the
status of universals, the relation of body and mind,
and so on, but is rather a consequence of his
p'an-chiao. Equipped with the ideal of the round, he
examines a number of traditional Buddhist theories on
the nature of reality and finds them wanting, which
in turn prompts him to search for a solution of his
own. His round teaching is the end product of his
search.

To illustrate his round teaching, Fa-tsang often
resorts to similes. For example, he sees as
confirmations of his universal harmony the
breathtaking and highly mystical descriptions of the
world of Lotus-Womb and the tower of the bodhisattva
Maitreya in chapter 2 and chapter 34 of
Buddhabhadra's translation of the Hua-yen Suutra.(12)
However, by far his most favorite similes are the
precious mirror of the Buddha Diipa.mkara and the
jewel net of the deva Indra. Fa-tsang compares the
relation between each phenomenon in his harmonious
universe with the rest to the relation between the
precious mirror of Diipa.mkara with the worlds of the
ten directions, all the inhabitants of which are
reflected in the mirror vividly at the same time.
Fa-tsang gives the following description of the jewel
net of Indra:

It is like the net of Indra which is entirely
made up of jewels. Due to their brightness and
transparence, they reflect each other. In each of the
jewels, the images of all the other jewels are
[completely] reflected. This is the case with any one
of the jewels, and will remain forever so. Now, if we
take a jewel in the southwestern direction and
examine it, [we can see] that this one jewel can
reflect simultaneously the images of all other jewels
at once. It is so with the one jewel, and is also so
with each of all the others. Since each of the jewels
simultaneously reflects the images of all other
jewels at once, it follows that this jewel in the
southwestern direction also reflects all the images
of the jewels in each of the other jewels [at once].
It is so with this jewel, and is also so with all the
others. Thus, the images multiply infinitely, and all
these multiple infinite images are bright and clear
inside this single jewel. The rest of the jewels can
be understood in the same manner.(13)

Just as the jewels on Indra's net illuminate and
mirror each other to form a great symphony of light,
the elements in Fa-tsang's universe pervade and
support each other in perfect concord.

p. 66

More interesting philosophically is Fa-tsang's
reinterpretation of the concept of causality to bring
it in line with the general metaphysical orientation
of his round teaching. It represents Fa-tsang's most
unique contribution to the history of Buddhist ideas,
an adequate treatment of which would take tens of
pages. What follows is a greatly simplified and so a
somewhat distorted account of the subject.

To explain Fa-tsang's peculiar understanding of
the concept of causality, we may borrow and slightly
expand upon Fa-tsang's famous analogy of the ten
coins. Suppose that the government of a certain
community issues coins and stipulates that they have
monetary value only when used in groups of ten. Then
each coin strictly speaking is not a coin, for alone
it cannot be used to exchange goods; yet when it is
grouped together with nine other coins, it becomes a
coin, for then it assumes all the characteristics of
a form of currency. The same is true of the nine
other coins, which are associated with this one piece
of coin to form a monetary unit. In this way, the ten
coins are dependent on each other and have their
nature defined by each other. The same is true of the
elements of Fa-tsang's universe. All elements in the
totality become what they are as they are because of
their relation with the other members of the
totality, and would not be what they are as they are
if one element is missing. This relation of
interconditionality, when considered simply as each
element defining as well as having its nature defined
by all other elements in the totality, is called
"mutual determination" (hsiang-chi(r)) by Fa-tsang.
When considered dynamically as each element exerting
its power on, as well as being moulded by, the powers
of all other elements, it is called
"interpenetration" (hsiang-ju(s)).

III

This vision of a universe of great harmony made
up of mutually determining and interpenetrating
elements has invited comparison with the thought of
such famous Western philosophers as Plotinus(14) and
Whitehead,(15) but the Western thinker which this
teaching most readily brings to mind is undoubtedly
Leibniz (1646-1716) , the well-known German
rationalist whose vast learning and cosmopolitan
outlook represented the spirit of the Enlightenment
at its very best. This is the way Leibniz depicts his
universe of preestablished harmony, a universe
consisting of basic units known as monads which are
eternally in harmony with each other, for all of them
represent in their essence the same cosmos:

I believe that every individual substance
expresses the whole universe in its own way... but as
all substances are a continual production of the
sovereign Being, and express the same universe or the
same phenomena, they agree exactly with each
other.(16)

Leibniz explains what he means by "expresses in
the preceding quotation as follows:

p. 67

One thing expresses another (in my language) when there
is a constant and ordered relation between what can
be asserted of the one and what can be asserted of
the other. In this sense a projection in perspective
expresses its ground plan.(17)

So, each monad, like each element in Fa-tsang's
totality, reflects the entire world from its own
"perspective":

And just as the same town, when looked at from
different sides, appears quite different and is, as
it were, multiplied in perspective, so also it
happens that because of the infinite number of simple
substances, it is as if there were as many different
universes, which are however but different
perspectives of a single universe in accordance with
the different points of view of each monad.(18)

Furthermore, similar to Fa-tsang's universe, in
Leibniz' universe, nothing can happen to one element
without its consequence being felt either distinctly
or confusedly by all other elements:

The nature of the monad is representative, and
consequently nothing can limit it to representing a
part of things only, although it is true that its
representation is confused as regards the details of
the whole universe and can only be distinct as
regards a small part of things;... Consequently every
body is sensitive to everything which is happening in
the universe, so much so that one who saw everything
could read in each body what is happening everywhere,
and even what has happened or what will happen, by
observing in the present the things that are distant
in time as well as in space....(19)

Even the language used by the two thinkers are
reminiscent of each other:

Furthermore, every substance is like an entire
world and like a mirror of God, or of the whole
universe, which each one expresses in its own way,
very much as one and the same town is variously
represented in accordance with different positions of
the observer. Thus the universe is in a way
multiplied as many times as there are substances, and
in the same way the glory of God is redoubled by so
many wholly different representations of his
work.(20)

The "mirror of God" in this passage calls to mind
the precious mirror of the Buddha Diipa.mkara, and
the talk of the multiplication of images in the
substances reminds us of the multiplication of images
in the jewels of the net of Indra, the standard
symbol of the Hua-yen teaching of great harmony.

IV

After having identified the points of similarity
in the systems of thought of Fa-tsang and Leibniz, we
should ask if these similarities are established on
common grounds and so are similarities in the strict
sense of the term or are merely surface similarities
which carry different connotation and significance
when understood in their proper context. In this
respect, I would like to argue that even though the
pictures Fa-tsang and Leibniz give of the universe
may resemble each other in many aspects, the reasons
they give for proposing these pictures as well as the
lessons they intend to derive from them are miles
apart, so much so that any elaborate attempt to draw
close parallels between

p. 68

them would only confound our understanding of both
thinkers. What follow are some of the basic
differences which argue against the drawing of easy
parallels between the world views of Fa-tsang and
Leibniz.

To begin with, we should observe that Leibniz is
very specific regarding the ontological status of the
constituents of his harmonious universe. Monads,
according to Leibniz, are "spiritual substances,"
"primitive forces," and "metaphysical points," which
are distinguished from each other by their
perceptions and appetitions rather than by their
spatial and temporal positions:

Monads, having no parts, cannot be made or
unmade. They can neither begin nor end naturally and
consequently they last as long as the universe, which
will be changed but not destroyed. They cannot have
shapes, otherwise they would have parts. Therefore
one monad, in itself and at a particular moment, can
only be distinguished from another by internal
qualities and activities, which can be nothing else
but its perceptions (that is to say, the
representations in the simple of the compound or of
that which is outside) and its appetitions (that is
to say, its tendencies to pass from one perception to
another), which are the principles of change.(21)

Furthermore, being perfectly simple and
immutable, monads are the "true things" which
participate in the world of the real, whereas all the
other entities of our cosmos are "beings by
aggregation" dependent on the monads for their being
and nature:

You doubt whether a simple thing is subject to
changes. But since only simple things are true
things, and the rest are beings by aggregation and
therefore phenomena, existing, as Democritus put it,
by convention but not by nature, it is obvious that
unless there is change in the simple things, there
will be no change in things at all.(22)

Fa-tsang, on the other hand, never defines the
elements of his harmonious universe in precise
philosophical terms. Thus far as is suggested by his
writings, these elements include the tathataa,
truths, wisdom, masters, students, ordinary objects,
and in fact, practically anything we can set our mind
on. Also to be noted is that, in Fa-tsang's
ontological scheme, most of these elements come into
being as a consequence of the permeation of the
tathaagatagarbha by ignorance. As such, they belong
to the realm of the phenomenal, and so are
metaphysically more akin to Leibniz' monadic
aggregates than to the monads themselves.

Second, we have seen that Fa-tsang attempts to
illustrate what he means by "harmony" by analyzing
the concept of causality into the two relations of
interpenetration and mutual determination; and in
Fa-tsang's system of thought, "harmony" is perceived
as some sort of balance of power among the elements
of the universe themselves. This way of conceiving
"harmony" Leibniz would call "the way of influence,"
a way which, in Leibniz' opinion, is philosophically
totally untenable. Leibniz has considered three
possible explanations for the agreement among monads,
and concludes that the only acceptable solution is
the way of preestablished harmony:

p. 69

Their agreement or sympathy will also arise in one of
these three ways. The way, of influence is that of
ordinary philosophy; but as it is impossible to
conceive of either material particles, or immaterial
species of qualities, as capable of passing from one
of these substances to the other, we are obliged to
abandon this view. The way of assistance is that of
the system of occasional causes. But I hold that this
is bringing in the deus ex machina for a natural and
ordinary thing, where reason requires him to
intervene only in the way he concurs with all other
things in nature. Thus there remains only my
hypothesis, that is to say the way of pre-established
harmony-pre-established, that is, by a Divine
anticipatory artifice, which so formed each of these
substances from the beginning, that in merely
following its own laws, which it received with its
being, it is yet in accord with the other, just as if
they mutually influenced one another, or as if, over
and above his general concourse, God were for ever
putting in his hand to set them right.(23)

Thus, in Leibniz' philosophy, harmony is not a
matter of mutual exchange of influences among the
monads themselves, but is a state preestablished by
God.(24) Once a monad comes into being, not only will
there be no intervention on its working from God, but
it is also free from the interferences of all other
monads. All changes that occur to it happen by
internal principle only:

Each of the substances contains in its nature a
law of' the continuation of the series of its own
operations and everything that has happened and will
happen to it. Except for its dependence upon God, all
its actions come from its own depths....The union of
the soul with the body, and even the operation of one
substance on another, consists only in this perfect
mutual accord, explicitly established by the order of
the original creation, in virtue of which each
substance, following its own laws, agrees with the
demands of the others, and the operations of the one
thus follow or accompany the activity or change of
the others.(25)

If Leibniz still retains the vocabulary of cause
and effect in his discussions, he makes it very clear
that he does so as a concession to the way of
everyday expression, (26) whereas in reality, the
monads "have no windows, by which anything could come
in or go out."(27) So he concludes: It could
therefore be said in a way, and in a perfectly good
sense (although remote from ordinary usage), that one
particular substance never acts on another particular
substance, nor is acted on by another, if one
considers the fact that what happens to each is
simply a consequence of its complete idea or notion
alone, for this idea already contains all its
predicates or events and expresses the entire
universe.(28)

If Fa-tsang and Leibniz do not agree on how
harmony is achieved in their universe, the rationales
they offer for maintaining the thesis of universal
harmony also differ. As we have observed, Fa-tsang's
doctrine of universal harmony is the end product of
his critique of the teachings of his predecessors and
is taught as an exemplification of the idea of the
round. Leibniz, on the other hand, comes to this
conclusion mainly by way of a number of assumptions
on the form of proposition and the nature of truth.
The second half of the last quotation hints at how
Leibniz arrives at the conclusion that each monad in

p. 70

his universe mirrors all the other monads from its
own standpoint. "What happens to each is simply a
consequence of its complete idea or notion alone, for
this idea already contains all its predicates or
events and expresses the entire universe" is Leibniz'
own formulation of the so-called
"predicate-in-notion" principle, which has been
restated by Charlie D. Board as follows: "In every
true affirmative proposition, whether it be necessary
or contingent, universal or singular, the notion of
the predicate is contained either explicitly or
implicitly in that of the object."(29) Since
according to Leibniz, "that what happens to each is
simply a consequence of its complete idea or notion
alone, " each monad has a notion, and on the
predicate-in-notion principle, this notion is "a
notion so complete that anyone who fully understood
it could infer from it all the predicates, down to
the minutest detail, which will ever belong to that
substance."(30) Moreover, since Leibniz also
maintains that there are no "absolutely extrinsic
denominations in things,"(31) he does not distinguish
between essential and accidental predicates, so that
any predicate which comes to be associated with the
monad would be as necesarry to its essence as any
other predicate. With this in mind, it is not
difficult to conceive how Leibniz comes to conclude
that each monad is a world by itself and that "all
the things that can ever happen to us are only
consequences of our being,''(32) for every monad is
related either directly or indirectly to all monads
past, present, and future, and since all these
relations are part of the notion of the monad and, as
predicates of the notion of the monad, are considered
to be equally essential to the substance of the
monad, each monad can be what it is as it is only if
all other monads are what they are as they are. In
this manner, each monad "mirrors" all other monads in
the universe even though they do not act on each
other, for its substance includes in relations with
all other monads.

The next question to ask is why Leibniz maintains
the predicate-in-notion principle and does not
distinguish between essential and accidental
properties. Many explanations have been offered by
Leibniz and his interpreters, of which we need only
to mention one here, that is, Leibniz' firm
conviction in the principle of sufficient reason,
which he has once described as "the great principle
.... which holds that nothing takes place without
sufficient reason, that is to say that nothing
happens without its being possible for one who has
enough knowledge of things to give a reason
sufficient to determine why it is thus and not
otherwise."(33) As a rationalist, it seems
self-evident to Leibniz that "there is nothing
without a reason... that there is no truth for which
a reason does not subsist."(34) This principle,
together with the assumption that every proposition
about existence is of the subject-predicate form or
reducible to such a form, explains why Leibniz
upholds the predicate-in-notion principle, and
obliterates the difference between accidental and
essential properties:

It is very true that when several predicates are
attributed to one and the same subject, and this
subject is not attributed to any other, one calls
this subject an individual substance. But this is not
enough, and such an explanation is

p. 71

only nominal. It is necessary, therefore, to consider
what it is to be truly attributed to a certain
subject. Now, it is agreed that every true
proposition has some basis in the nature of things,
and when a proposition is not identical that is, when
the predicate is not contained expressly in the
subject--it must be contained in it virtually....The
subject-term, therefore, must always include the
predicate-term, in such a way that a man who
understood the notion of the subject perfectly would
also judge that the predicate belongs to it. That
being so, we can say that it is the nature of an
individual substance, or complete being, to have a
notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain,
and render deducible from itself, all the predicates
of the subject to which this notion is
attributed.(35)

Since every proposition true of a monad is of the
subject-predicate form, all that can be said of a
monad are predicates of the monad. Furthermore, since
according to the principle of sufficient reason,
nothing can be true of a monad that is not supported
by sufficient reason, there must be something in the
substance of the monad which explains completely why
it comes to be associated with some particular
predicates and not otherwise. Thus, it follows that
anyone who understands the nature of the monad
perfectly can deduce from its notion all its
predicates a priori, and there is no distinction
between what is accidental and what is essential.
Thus, to God who knows the reasons of all things, all
truths regarding particular substances are true a
priori:

On the other hand, an accident is a being whose
notion does not include all that can be attributed to
the subject to which this notion is attributed. Take,
for example, the quality of being a king, which
belongs to Alexander the Great. This quality, when
abstracted from its subject, is not sufficiently
determinate for an individual and does not contain
the other qualities of the same subject, nor
everything that the notion of this prince contains.
God, on the other hand, seeing the individual notion
or haecceitas of Alexander, sees in it at the same
time the foundation of and reason for all the
predicates which can truly be stated of him--as, for
example, that he is the conquerer of Darius and
Porus-- even to the extent of knowing a priori, and
not by experience, whether he died a natural death or
died by poison, which we can know only from history.
Therefore, when one considers properly the connexion
between things, one can say that there are in the
soul of Alexander, from all time, traces of all that
has happened to him, and marks of everything that
will happen to him--and even traces of everything
that happens in the universe--though no one but God
can know all of them.(36)

Discussion on the principle of sufficient reason
brings us finally to the point where Leibniz
definitely parts way with Fa-tsang, that is, his
almost unabated optimism. Underlying the principle of
sufficient reason is the belief that to be rational
is a perfection, and that God, being the most perfect
being, must be, by necessity, the most rational
being. Thus, there is nothing which God creates whose
rationale of existence cannot be sought in the
ultimate wisdom of the Creator himself(37):

Now as there is an infinite number of possible
universes in the ideas of God, and as only one can
exist, there must be a sufficient reason for God's
choice, determining him to one rather than to
another.

p. 72

And this reason can only be found in the fitness, or
in the degrees of perfection, which these worlds
contain, each possible world having the right to
claim existence in proportion to the perfection which
it involves. And it is this which causes the
existence of the best, which God knows through his
wisdom, chooses through his goodness, and produces
through his power.(38)

Since everything possible has a claim to
existence, God's choice to actualize one possible
world rather than the rest must be based on the
principle of fitness, that is, "in the degrees of
perfection, which these worlds contain."(39) It
follows that our world, being the world God chooses
to create, cannot but be the most perfect world
possible:

It follows from the supreme perfection of God
that in producing the universe. He chose the best
possible plan, containing the greatest variety
together with the greatest order... the most power,
the most knowledge, the most happiness and goodness
in created things of which the universe admitted. For
as all possible things have a claim to existence in
the understanding of God in proportion to their
perfections, the result of all these claims must be
the most perfect actual world which is possible.
Otherwise it would not be possible to explain why
things have happened as they have rather than
otherwise.(40)

Furthermore, every entity in this most perfect
universe, being a member of "the City of God" and an
indispensable component of this best possible order,
has absolute value:

Since each mind is as a world apart and
sufficient unto itself, independent of every other
created being, enveloping the infinite and expressing
the universe, it is as durable, as subsistent, as
absolute as the universe of creatures itself. We must
therefore conclude that it must always play such a
part as is most fitting to contribute to the
perfection of the society of all minds, which is
their moral union in the City of God.(41)

Such unreserved glorification of the goodness of
earthy existence is foreign to the spirit of Buddhism
that considers the mundane world to be "a mass of
ills" and life a burden which one has to reconcile
with rather than revel in. Indeed, Fa-tsang sincerely
believes that his round teaching has transcended the
so called one-sided emphasis on emptiness in
Maadhyamika Buddhism. Moreover, by adopting the view
of the Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun that the phenomenal is
the transformation of the talhaagatagarbha and
through his doctrine of causality conferring on all
elements of his harmonious universe the function of
determining and penetrating each other, Fa-tsang's
metaphysics does sometimes sound highly affirmative.
For example, in the Wang-chin huan-yuan kuan(t), he
talks of a single particle of dust pervading the
entire dharma-realm, embodying all forms of existence
and including in itself both aspects of being and
emptiness.(42) Yet, in this same work, we find him
declaring that a particle of dust (dharma) is
"without self essence" and "without substance." And
despite the enthusiasm he so often displays in his
portrayal of his universe of great harmony, when he
finally gets down to contemplating the ontological
status of its elements, he writes, "Since dusts
(dharmas) come into being depending

p. 73

on conditions, all of them are without self-essence.
Even though there are myriad forms of beings and
teachings, all of them are merely one single taste of
emptiness."(43) Enlightenment, in Fa-tsang's opinion,
consists in the comprehension of the unreal nature of
phenomenal objects: "Those who are deluded say that
dusts originate from somewhere, come into
existence and then disappear. That is a delusion.
Now, it is understood that dusts are without
substance. That is awakening."(44)

V

This brief study naturally cannot do full justice
to the teachings of these two profound thinkers of
East and West. Nevertheless, I hope that it has
accomplished to some extent the objectives outlined
at the beginning of this study, and that in
pinpointing where the similarities and
dissimilarities of the metaphysics of these two
thinkers lie, it has helped us to better comprehend
the basic orientation of both of them. As for the
degree of affirmativeness of Fa-tsang's Metaphysics,
a full answer to the question would involve detailed
examination of Fa-tsang's doctrine of "origination
from essential nature" (hsing-ch'i(u)), which again
would entail discussions of the historical and
theoretical connection between Hua-yen Buddhism and
the tathaagatagarbha doctrine and some of the dubious
features of the latter, which would carry us too far
afield. Still, it is of significance to observe that
even though Fa-tsang's world-view does seem to
exhibit some affirmative features, it is not
affirmative in the same way as Leibniz' world-view is
affirmative. To understand this is a step, if only a
beginning step, toward a correct appreciation of this
problem.

NOTES

1. For some examples, refer to. Kametani Seikei(v),
Kegon taikyo no kenkyuu(w) (Tokyo: 1931), pp.
218-220; Murakami Shunko(x), "Raibunittsu-shi to
Kegonshuu(y)" in Kegon shiso(z), ed. Nakamura
Hajime(aa) (Kyoto: 1960), pp. 453-483.
2. For example, see the former's Li-shi che-hsuueh(ab)
and the latter's "On Zen (Ch'an) Language and Zen
Paradoxes," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 1, no. 1
(1973): 77-102.
3. Edward Conze has observed:

When we compare Buddhist and European thought, it
happens quite often that the formulations agree,
whereas considerations of their context, of the
motives behind them, and of the conclusions drawn
from them suggest wide discrepancies. Verbal
coincidences frequently mask fundamental
divergences in the concepts underlying them.
("Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy, "
Philosophy East and West, 13, no. 2 [1963]: 105.)
4. Francis H. Cook certainly has something of that
kind in mind when he contrasts the Indian Buddhist
view of Reality with that of the Chinese Buddhists
in his recent article "Causation in the Chinese
Hua-Yen Tradition":
While both Indian and Chinese Buddhists understood
emptiness as being synonymous with
interdependence, the Indians emphasized the point
that, because of the pervasive interdependence,
things lack any ultimate reality and are unworthy
of attachment. For the Indians, emptiness as

p. 74

the absence of any enduring permanence,
substantiality, and value was of paramount
importance. The Chinese chose to stress the point
that emptiness is the interdependent relationship
of real phenomenal events. The Indian view tends
to be negative in its devaluation of events, and
reduces them to the level of insignificance and
triviality. The Chinese view tends to raise all
events to a common level of supreme value by
seeing their crucial roles in the nexus of
interconditionality. (Journal of Chinese
Philosophy 6, no. 4 [1979]: 368)

Professor Cook goes on to declare that Fa-tsang's
teaching reflects most clearly this "crucial
shift of emphasis" in Chinese Buddhism, with its
"respect and appreciation for the many transient
things of the natural world inasmuch as each of
them played an important role in the nexus of
interdependence" (Ibid., p. 371).
5. Refer to Kamata Shigeo(ac) , Chuugoku kegon
hisoshi no kenkyuu(ad) (Tokyo: 1965), pp. 120-124,
144-148. Also consult Stanley Weinstein, "imperial
Patronage in the Formation of T'ang Buddhism," in
Perspective on the T'ang, ed. Arthur F. Wright and
Denis Twitchett (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale
University Press, 1973), pp. 297-306.
6. The problem of the founder of the Hua-yen school
is much debated. For a short and orthodox account
of the subject, see Kamata Shigeo, op. cit., pp.
50-58.
7. Sa.myutta-nikaaya LVI 47. F. L. Woodward, trans.,
The Book of Kindred Sayings, Part V (London: Pali
Text Society, 1930), pp. 356-357.
8. David E. Mungello writes thus in his article "The
Reconciliation of Neo-Confucianism with
Christianity in the Writings of Joseph de
Premare": "In fact, this stress on unity as
opposed to discord had become so ingrained into
Chinese nature that one could probably speak of it
as a cultural ideal, if not a trait." Philosophy
East and West 26, no. 4 (1976): p. 395.
9. Fa-tsang, Yu-hsin fa-chieh chi(ae) , Taisho
shinshuu daizokyo(af) henceafter cited as T), vol.
45, p. 642c.
10. Ibid.
11. For a more detailed account of Fa-tsang's
p'ain-chiao system and the concept of the round,
refer to my article "The P'an-chiao System of the
Hua-yen School in Chinese Buddhism", T'oung Pao
62, 1-2 (1981): 10-47. Some of the remarks in this
study are drawn from that article.
12. A beautiful description of the Tower of Maitreya
can be found in Daisetz T. Suzuki, Essays in Zen
Buddhism, 3d series (New York: Samuel Weiser Inc.,
1976), pp. 120-141.
13. T, vol. 45, p. 647a-b.
14. See Nakamura Hajime, "Kegongyo no shiso-shi teki
igi(ag)," in Kegon shiso, pp. 127-134.
15. Refer to. Garma C. C. Chang, The Buddhist
Teaching of Totality (University Park,
Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1974) , pp. 122-124: Francis H. Cook,
Hua-yen Buddhism (University Park, Pennsylvania:
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977),
pp. 4, 44, 73, Francis H. Cook, "Causation in the
Chinese Hua-Yen Tradition." For an article
stressing dissimilarity rather than similarity,
see Winston L. King, "Hua-Yen Mutually
Interpenetrative Identity and Whiteheadean Organic
Relation," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 6, no. 4
(1979): 387-410.
16. Bertrand Russell, A Critical Exposition of the
Philosophy of Leibniz (London: George Allen &
Unwin Co. Ltd., 1951), p. 263.
17. Mary Morris and George H. R. Parkinson, trans.,
Leibniz: Philosophical Writings (London: J. M.
Dent & Sons Ltd., 1973), pp. 71-72.
18. Ibid., pp. 187-188.
19. Ibid., pp. 188-189.
20. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
21. Ibid., p. 195.
22. Leroy E. Loemker, trans., Philosophical Papers
and Letters (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel
Publishing Co., 1969), p. 531.
23. Morris and Parkinson, op. cit.. p. 131.
24. Leibniz conceives of creation as a choice from
among possibles, and he considers it a sign of the
greatness of the Creator that he needs only to
produce the monads once, and then all of them will
work together in perfect accord forever: The
nature of every simple substance, soul, or true
monad being such that its following state is a
consequence of the preceding one, here now is the
cause of the harmony found out. For God

p.75

needs only to make a simple substance become once
and from the beginning a representation of the
universe according to its point of view, since
from thence alone it follows that it will be so
perpetually and that all simple substances will
always have a harmony among themselves because
they always represent the same universe. (Leroy
E. Loemker, op. cit., pp. 711-712.)
25. Ibid., p. 360.
26. Leibniz explains what he understands as causality
as follows: From the notion of an individual
substance it also follows in metaphysical vigour
that all the operations of substances, both
actions and passions, are spontaneous, and that
with the exception of the dependence of creatures
on God, no real influx from one to the other is
intelligible. For whatever happens to each one of
them would flow from its nature and its notion
even if the rest were supposed to be absent, for
each one expresses the entire universe. However,
that whose expression is the more distinct is
judged to act, and that whose expression is the
more confused is judged to be passive, since to
act is a perfection and to.be passive is an
imperfection. Again, that thing is thought to be a
cause from whose state a reason for changes is
most easily given. (Morris and Parkinson, op.
cit., p. 79.)

Causality in Leibniz' system is defined entirely
in terms of monadic perceptions. In actuality, no
created substance receives or exerts forces on
another monad. Nevertheless, if we prefer to
describe the "agreement" between two monads in
causal terms, then the one whose perceptions of
the common transaction are clearer, is the active
one (that is, the cause), while the other is the
passive one (that is, the effect):

Action is attributed to that substance, whose
expression is more distinct, and one calls this
the cause. For instance, when a floating body
moves through water, there is an infinity of
movements of the parts of the water, such as are
necessary so that the place which the body leaves
may always be filled by the shortest way. Hence
we say that the body is the cause of these
movements; because by its means we can explain
distinctly what happens. But if we examine what
is physical and real in the motion, we can as
well suppose that the body is at rest, and that
everything else moves in conformity with this
hypothesis, since all motion is in itself nothing
but a relative thing, namely a change of
situation, such that we cannot know to what to
attribute it with mathematical precision.
Actually we attribute it to a body by whose means
everything is explained distinctly.... (Ibid.,
pp. 63-64.)
27. Ibid., p. 179.
28, lbid.,p.27.
29. Charlie D. Broad, "Leibniz's Predicate-in-Notion
Principle," in Leibniz, ed. Harry G. Frankfurt
(New York: Doubleday and Co., 1972), pp. 1-2.
Similar passages can also be found in Leibniz'
own writings. For example, in a treatise written
in 1686, he states:
In every universal affirmative truth the
predicate is in the subject: expressly in the
case of primitive or identical truths, which are
the only truths which are known per se, but
implicitly in the case of all the rest. This
implicit inclusion is shown by the analysis of
terms, by substituting for one another
definitions and what is defined. (Morris and
Parkinson, op. cit., p. 75)
30. Board, op. cit., p. 2.
31. Morris and Parkinson, op. cit., p. 78. In another
instance, Leibniz writes: It also follow that
there are no purely extrinsic denominations,
which have no foundation in the things
denominated. For the notion of the subject
denominated must involve the notion of the
predicate: consequently, as often as the
denomination of the thing is changed, there must
be some variation in the thing itself. (p. 89)
32. Ibid., p. 26.
33. Ibid., p. 199.
34. Ibid., p. 172.
35. Ibid., p. 18.
36. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
37. Leibniz repeatedly criticizes the Cartesian
view that things are good not by any rule of ex-
cellence but solely by the will of God: For why
praise him for what he has done if he would be
equally praiseworthy in doing exactly the
opposite? Where will his justice and wisdom be
found if nothing is left but a certain despotic
power, if will takes the place of reason, and if,
according to the definition of tyrants, that
which

p. 76

is pleasing to the most powerful is by that very
fact just? Besides it seems that every act of
will implies some reason for willing and that
this reason naturally precedes the act of will
itself. This is why I find entirely strange,
also, the expression of certain other
philosophers who say that the external truths of
metaphysics and geometry, and consequently also
the rules of goodness, justice, and perfection,
are merely the effects of the will of God, while
it seems to me that they are rather the
consequences of his understanding, which
certainly does not depend upon his will any more
than does his essence. (Loemker, op. cit., p.
304)
38. Morris and Parkinson, op. cit., p. 187.
39. Leibniz understands by "perfection" the attaining
of the maximum effect with a minimum of
expenditure:
Hence it is seen to be most evident that out of
the infinite combinations of possibles, and the
infinite possible series, that one exists by
whose means the greatest possible amount of
essence or possibility is brought into existence.
There is always to be found in things a principle
of determination which turns on considerations of
greatest and least; namely, that the greatest
effect should be produced with (if I may so put
it) the least expenditure. (Ibid., p. 138)
40. Ibid., p. 200.
41. Loemker, op. cit., p. 458.
42. T, vol. 45, pp. 637c-638a.
43. Fa-tsang, Hua-yen i-hai pai-men(ah), T, vol. 45,
p. 629a.
44. Ibid., p. 636a.