Time and temporality--A Buddhist approach

·期刊原文
Time and temporality--A Buddhist approach

Kenneth K. Inada
Philosophy East and West 24, no. 2, APRIL 1974.
(c) by The University Press of Hawaii
p.171-179

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
.

p.171

This article may create more problems rather than
settling the question of time and temporality. And if
it does, it only points to the fact that these
concepts have not been systematically treated in
Buddhism proper or have not been the central issues
around which schools have developed. There is a
tendency, to be sure, to downgrade these concepts as
"not conducive to calm, to higher knowledge,
enlightenment-nirvaa.na," or to treat them cursorily,
in a very indirect way, which leaves the reader in
suspense or puzzlement. I hope, of course, to present
an approach which is consistent or coherent with the
fundamental structure of Buddhist doctrines.(1) Thus
I have come here to learn just as much as you have
come to question.
I believe it is generally safe to say that
Buddhism falls within the category of process,
philosophies since one of its cardinal principles is
impermanence (anicca/anitya). Any and every item will
have to be accounted for within this context. Yet, as
we all know, explaining or describing the tenets of a
process philosophy is nearly an impossible task,
leaving so much unsaid or unattended that we are left
in a general state of vagueness, if not doubt. It
must be noted that in process philosophy the primary
problem is to perceive the process and its elements
in the proper order and relation. Methodologically
speaking, although we can distinguish between the
dynamic and the static aspects, in the final analysis
(speaking from the standpoint of concrete actuality),
the seemingly static elements must be viewed within
the dynamic nature of things. This is the predicament
we face over and over again.
Now, the concepts of time and temporality have
come to us as a real challenge to view the dynamic
nature of Buddhist reality, for they will show up
that predicament very plainly and, hopefully, lead us
the way to its resolution and to Buddhist reality.
The whole of Buddhist thought is permeated with
the notion that life is transitory, not only in the
fact that life terminates in death, but, more
philosophically, that between birth and death we live
in momentariness. This is the theory known as
kha.na-vaada/k.sa.na-vaada. Life is a series of
experiential moments, each one unique but each is so
infinitesimally small that except by a method of
abstraction and by hypostatization the ordinary mind
is unable to conceive it. A Buddhist sutta,
A^nguttara-Nikaaya, asserts as follows "Arising
(uppaada) is revealed, duration (.thita) is revealed,
and dissolution (bhanga) is revealed. These are the
three marks of the compounding nature of things
(sa^nkhaata)."(2)
The assertion points at several things: (1) The
experiential process is a compounding phenomenon.
Many factors or elements are involved in the so-

p.172

called creative process. (2) The moment of existence
or an experiential event can be referred to or
inferred by way of the three characteristics. (3) The
three characteristics are revealed after the moment
has "transpired," that is, after the compounding
phenomenon becomes a fact. They are characteristics
or afterglows of the moment, so to speak. Thus they
are not the moment per se but visible markers of the
moment for our reference. (4) It points to the fact
that a compounded phenomenon or a moment of existence
is smaller than the conscious moment. Thus it would
take more than the conscious mind to "grasp" the
moment.
We are not normally oriented to this type of
fractional dimension in the nature of a moment of
existence. For the most part, we uncritically accept
the condition that the mind, the conscious mind, can
only function from the standpoint of temporal
parallelism, that is, a parallelism that exists
between a mental phenomenon and a perceptual
phenomenon. An extension of this is, perhaps, the
isomorphic theory of perception. When we become
conscious of an object we tend to conclude that
perception had been a simple and singular event. We
normally do not consider the nature of continuity of
the experiential process in ways which do justice to
the manifold of overt as well as covert factors in
function. The life process, after all, goes on
incessantly whether or not we are conscious of an
object. The process never takes a holiday although
consciousness does. The Buddhist has a term for the
basic life-continuum, bhava^nga. It is the
interminable force of being until physical
dissolution occurs. Thus, consciousness rises and
subsides in bhava^nga, either when the doors of
perception (five sense organs) are opened and various
forms develop "internally" and continue on to the
conscious mind or when the mind arouses itself in
activity, for example, by recollection or by
dreaming. In consequence, the mind is just another
faculty, like other sense faculties, and it is never
really aloof from or transcendent of the experiential
process. Indeed, it plays a vital role in the whole
process. Naturally, I do not mean to deny the mind
its abstractive function and thereby to reject any
so-called power over certain activities we are
engaged in. We loosely call this power
"transcendence."
The Buddhist would have no problem at all in
accepting or incorporating the conventional way in
which we speak of time, that is, in terms of the
three temporal periods--past, present, and future
(atiita paccuppanna anaagata). It is the function of
the mind, after all, to conceive of time in that
order or indeed to give order to the nature of
things. Thus, whether it is simple clock time,
physical time (measurement of movements) , or
psychological time, the mind knows or senses time
because of the abstractive quality. And to this
extent, time is conventional (papo~nca/prapa~nca) but
very useful.
Now, the Buddhist would take the abstractive or
conventional nature of time for what it is. It aids
one to speak about or to analyze events that

p.173

we assign to the past, present, or future. There is
no difficulty here. However, the Buddhist would be
quick to reply that a problem arises when one gives a
strict topological nature to time and manipulates it
as such in the experiential process. The neat
division into past, present, and future (or earlier,
simultaneous, and later) is a mental construction, a
fiction as well as a hindrance, in the final
analysis, when it comes to grasping the dynamic
nature of being as kha.na-vaada. The three periods
are not distinct and different entities however hard
one may try to make them out to be so. This is the
argument used by Naagaarjuna (2-3 A.D.) to reject the
opponent's stand on the hypostatization of the three
temporal periods. For him the three moments or
periods are mutually influencing terms both on the
abstractive and concrete level of things-abstractive
in the sense that all three are mental constructs
which mutually supplement each other's descriptive
nature and concrete in the sense that the
experiential process involves a continuum of being
which includes all three as a unique interlocking
phenomenon. The past (immediate or remote in certain
instances) is in the present, just as the future
(immediate or remote in certain instances) will be in
the present. But the present is not simply a
transference of content from the past, nor is it
simply a stepping stone to the future. The present
does not only have a linear connection or
relationship with the past and future but multiple
factoral relations and conditions in its own making
on the vertical scale.
Naagaarjuna spoke for all Buddhists, both
Mahaayaana and Theravaada I believe, when he resolved
all objectifiable elements in the unique experiential
process termed pratiityasamutpaada/pa.ticcasamuppaada
, translated as dependent` or relational-origination.
The objectifiable elements refer to the abstract or
concrete entities, as the case may be, which the mind
creates and to which it assigns certain realities or
objective contents. These are in the realm of
conventional nature, as stated earlier, and thus
rightly constitute the realm of relative truths
(sa.mu.rti-satya). But in truth, we do live greatly
in the realm of relative truths because it is the
realm of the visible, the tangible, the
manipulatable, the empirical. Yet, the Buddhist would
remind us not to rely too heavily on the relative,
that the relative is not the only realm of existence;
indeed, the relative must seek its raison d'etre in a
wider, purer, nonobjectifiable realm. This is in
reference to the supreme realm of truth
(paramaarthasatya), the goal of all Buddhists.
We shall have to concentrate on the concept of
relational-origination, but before doing so let me
pause to summarize that, from the Buddhist stand-
point, experiential events do not take place or flow
in time. Rather, it would be more accurate to say
that events flow as time, thus denying any primacy to
an absolute status of time. If time is understood in
this way, we are able to appreciate the deeper
dimensions of being because now we must focus on the
process itself, the becomingness of being. Here the
sister concept of

p.174

temporality seems to appear almost naturally.
Temporality at least moves us in the right direction
and seems to permit us to have glimpses of what the
Buddhist calls reality. It has a profound meaning in
that it runs across but retains or contains the
multiple set of conditions and factors at play in the
experiential process. It is intimately tied up with
the concept of relationalorigination.
It is significant to note that
relational-origination is a hyphenated term. It
depicts a total arising or origination (sam-uppaada)
within the matrix of a complex of relations or
conditions (pa.ticca/pratiitya) . The complex of
relations, more specifically, refers to the term,
paccaya/pratyaya, which may differ in numerical
accounting with respect to the different Buddhist
schools, (3) but, essentially, it describes the
multifaceted, multirelational factors and conditions
involved in the development of the experiential
process. While these factors seem to be graphic
structural descriptions of the process, it should be
emphasized that they are vital factors in the
"internal" ontological development of the process or
even of consciousness itself. Again, we are
dealing with a microscopic process, infinitely
smaller than the process of conscious play. As a
matter of fact, we are dealing with so-called
preconscious units of movement. It is interesting to
note that the Abhidhamma claims that the duration of
thought is one-sixteenth of the duration of a moment
of matter.(4) Yet, however fractional the thought
duration is said to be, the conscious mind with
thought as the goal takes seven units of movement to
mature or fruit from the initial opening of the sense
doors.(5) In these microscopic processes, the various
paccayas are operative; for example, in a simple
perception of an object, there are the objective
relation (dramma.na-paccaya), the proximate relation
(anantara-p.), contiguous relation (samanantara-p.),
antecedent relation (purejaata-p.) , consequent
relation (pacchadjaata-p.) , resultant relation
(vipaaka-p.) , etc.--all minutely describing the
"internal" development that leads to consciousness
or, as the case may be, it may not lead to
consciousness. In other words, perceptual forms
(rape) are involved from the moment the eye organ is
in contact with the outside realm of object and on to
the consciousness of the object. Although these
factoral or relational movements take place very
rapidly, still, it is possible to speak of
preconscious (not particularly subconscious)
developments. Incidentally, the relations are
directed, ultimately, to the understanding and
fulfillment of the way to the enlightened state. This
would involve analysis of the elements within the
meditative exercise or discipline, but that is
another technical accounting for another time.
In sum, the paccayas amplify the conditions
involved in the experiential process called
relational-origination. As such, there is no simple
but are invariably complex occurrences. There are
successive events, to be sure, but they do not follow

p.175

one another in a trainlike procession. The events
themselves cannot be broken up into separate or
disparate entities simply because there is nothing
that separates or isolates them into clear and
distinct realms. In fact, the rapidity of the events
in the nature of interlocking phenomenon prevents one
from holding such a view, although it is common
practice to look upon these events as separable for
our own view, understanding, guidance, and
anticipatory action. From the Buddhist standpoint, as
seen earlier, any arbitrary separation is in the
nature of abstraction and therefore relegated to the
conventional nature of truth. Thus, the uniqueness of
experiential events does not lie in the separable and
independent nature but rather lies in the truly
dynamically dependent nature of things.
To use an old metaphor, events are taking place
like waves in the vast ocean. In mid-ocean the myriad
waves are appearing and disappearing as if each is
independent of each other but in truth there are many
factors and conditions at play which make it possible
for each wave to appear and disappear thus and so.
Such is also the nature of the rise and subsidence of
consciousness.
All this goes to show that relational-origination
is a conditioning or compounding phenomenon; it is
exhibiting the complex but unique way in which an
experiential event transpires. Most of us fail to
fathom its meaning, much the less its actual
occurrence, because we are caught up in the elements
of convention. We do not perceive the rise or
subsidence of events properly because we are in a
bind with the elements, though unconsciously for the
most part. But it is heartening at least to know that
despite the conventionality of things the
life-continuum moves on as usual. Herein lies the
truth of existence and perhaps the way out.
There is a famous Buddhist saying, "He who
discerns relational-origination discerns the Dhamma
(Buddhist Truth), and he who discerns the Dhamma
discerns relational-origination."(6)
If I read the saying correctly, it is asserting
that we who are conventionally caught up in the
elements of the process of relational-origination,
though unknowingly, can still perceive the Buddhist
nature of reality within that self-same process. In
other words, the path to the enlightened realm is
always open; it is never closed. In fact, the closure
is of one's own making. That is to say, various types
of hindrances or obstacles are created over a period
of time and these become parts of one's experiential
process. For example, there are obstacles that arise
based on the three basic "ills," that is, greed
(raaga), hatred (dosa), and delusion (moha), or based
on the four "overpowering forces," that is, forced
being (bhava), wrong or dogmatic view (di.t.thi),
sensuality (kaama), and general ignorance (avijjaa).
One is usually influenced by any or all of the above
grounds of forced living, from which it becomes
increasingly difficult to disengage oneself as time
goes on, if one

p.176

remains unmindful. So, in the Socratic manner, the
worst type of ignoramus is the one who does not admit
his ignorance. Only the Buddhist would make certain
that the nature of ignorance has another dimension, a
dimension which has to do with the ontological nature
of the experiential process, that is, so long as
one's experiential process does not take into
consideration all the factors involved the ignorant
status remains. The experiential process is an
inclusive total process, one that includes the
epistemological realm. Thus even the domain of reason
must be subsumed under the larger context of
experience. We all readily admit this much, but our
experiential data are by and large controlled and
influenced by what reason assigns.
The concept of relational-origination depicts the
dynamic coming together or a gathering of the
factoral conditions into a whole, that is, a becoming
of an event. It is the real concrete nature of the
experiential process "seen" long enough before it
moves on to the next coming together process. In a
sense, we may say that a single
relational-origination "takes time" for its fruition
but not in the usual sense of the phrase. I believe
the Buddhist would use the term, samaya, to describe
the temporal nature of that single process.(7) This
term presents a temporal dimension or temporality to
the reality of experience. Perhaps, we may say that
Buddhist temporality means a kind of "arresting to
see" phenomenon of the experiential process. We are
all in the process and yet we do not "see clearly"
because we are in bind with the elements of the three
basic "ills," the four "overpowering forces," general
defilements (kilesa/kle'sa) , etc.--all of which
compel us to repeat or engage ourselves in the
conventional conditioned ("veiled") realm of
existence. This is in general called sa.msaara, the
famous spinning of the Wheel of Life or Birth-Death
Cycle of Being. As long as we force the wheel to
spin, we cannot see, much less realize, the
enlightened path and realm. As all Buddhists know,
the realms of sa.msaara and nibbaana/nirvaa.na are
not mutually distinct and exclusive. Their realms of
function are coterminous. we find this idea clearly
expressed in the thoughts of such Buddhists as
Naagaarjuna and Buddhaghosa (5 A.D.), that is, that
relational-origination functions equally in both the
samsaaric and nibbaanic realms. If it did not, then
nibbaana would be a mysterious concept, a never to be
realized realm of existence; it would be a fiction, a
myth, a castle-in-the-sky concept. But as Buddhist
doctrines are empirically grounded, at least the
fundamental ones, the nibbaana content must find its
source or basis accordingly.
At this point, the logical question is, what
makes it possible for relational) origination to span
both realms? Or, how could the two realms have the
same basis of being? We have arrived at the crux of
Buddhist experience or reality. Naagaarjuna, for
example, says that it is because of suuyataa
(voidness) that everything is possible.(8) By this
remark he means, if I read him correctly, that the
experiential process with all its contents or
elements is

p.177

held together in virtue of 'suunyataa as a kind of
"voidal being," or, from another standpoint, that
'suunyataa is the basis of the undifferentiated
nature which gives substance to the differentiations.
Thus, 'suunyataa is a supreme experience of
ontological togetherness. It holds our experiences
together because it is not limited to the
differentiated (conventionalized) realm. It is the
"substance" with which one "ferries" oneself to the
other shore, so to speak.
Buddhaghosa, coming a few centuries later,
asserts in a similar vein that relational-origination
("The Wheel of Becoming") reveals no known beginning,
no maker, no experiencer; it is void (su~n~na) with a
twelvefold voidness (that is, reference to the sense
faculties and the sense objects, including the mind
and its objects) and spins on and on.(9) Again, we
note the central role of 'suunyata ("voidness") in
the ordinary experiential process. 'Suunyataa is what
makes the two realms coexistent, not side by side,
but as two sides of the same reality. Thus
relational-origination spans the sa.msaaric and
nibbaanic realms, because it is in essence a voidal,
undifferentiated process.(10)
I venture to say then that
relational-origination, in its unique sense of
voidness, refers to a Buddhist notion of temporality.
In this sense, temporality is that experience which
is coterminous with the reality of things as they
are. It is to catch the Wheel of Becoming as it
really is. Perhaps, Buddhist temporality is just
another bridge-concept in amplifying the tenets of
meditative discipline, for one of the most important
steps in samaadhi (concentration) is the development
of the state of rest (samatha) or tranquillity
(passaddhi). As I see it, rest or tranquillity must
somehow be relatable to the concept of temporality.
The achievement of rest is necessary for one to
perceive things in their proper.natures, that
is, within the process of relational-origination
Temporality offers a dimension of rest, a coolness of
being, to our experiential process. It is a way of
being with the life-continuum, comprehending it in
its natural flow, and living in the unhindered
heightened sense. Temporality is "lived time" and
from which the sense of the eternal issues forth.(11)

CONCLUSION
In the preceding brief discussion I have attempted to
present a single approach in order to focus on the
question of time and temporality. I have shown that
the concept of time (kaala) is a general concept
which is used in the ordinary conventional sense,
such as, variations of clock time or the
psychological nature of time. However, this usage is
really an abstraction and a limitation, without the
unsuspecting mind really knowing. Thus the Buddhist
would not place much emphasis on this type of time
since it is not conducive to the development of the
path of enlightenment. As a consequence, in
discussing the Buddhist concept of reality or
experience, we turned to the concept of temporality
to give us a fuller accounting of our experiential
pro-

p.178

cess. That process was analyzed to be
relational-origination (pa.ticcasamuppaada), which in
its essential way reflects the nature of temporality
(samoya) , the coming together of an event.
Temporality is, in a sense, the fruition of a wave in
the ocean. It clearly describes a durational moment
or rest to exhibit itself, but it also has the nature
of voidness ('suunyataa), which permits a wave to
rise and subside in the waters. The experiential
events are then never separate or discrete for the
experiencer always describes his own lifecontinuum,
his own wheel of becoming, within the matrix of
totality. Temporality becomes an important ingredient
in the Wheel of Becoming because it expresses that
capture of rest which not only gives an eternal
flavor to becomingness but an overview on the course
of things.
_____________________________________________________

1. I view late Buddhist developments, especially in
the Mahaayaana, as only expansions or extensions
of the fundamental thought of Buddhism and not a
deviation in any drastic sense. If some do appear
deviant, for example in tantric or esoteric
types, they were so in terms of differing times
and circumstances, but the basic thoughts wee
"secretly" guarded all along.

2. I, 152 (PTS trans., Cradual Sayings, I:135). It
is interesting to note that the same paragraph
goes on to say cryptically that the three marks
are not revealed.

3. The Abhidhamma philosophy offers twenty-four
types of paccayas which an later abstracted into
four principal ones:aaramma.na-paccaya (objective
relation a condition), upanissaya-p. (sufficing
relation) , kamma-p. (actional relation), and
otthi-p. (presence relation). The Sarvaastivaada,
on the other hand, introduces the ten relational
"causes," six of which are more causal in nature
(kaara.na-hetu, sahabhuu-h., sabhaaga-h.,
samprayukta-h., sarvairaga-h, and vipaaka-h.) and
four more relational in nature (hatu-pratyaya,
samanantara-p., alambana-p., and adhipoti-p.).
While the first six are new, the last four are
identical with four of the Abhidhamma's poccayas.

4. E.R. Sarathchandra, Buddhist Psychology of
Perception (Colombo: The Ceylon University Press,
1958) , p.43. Cf. also Nyanaponika Thera,
Abhidhamma Studies (Kandy, Ceylon: Buddhist
Publication Society, 1965), p. 112. Shwe Zan
Aung, in his introductory essay to the Compendium
of Philosophy (London: Luzac & Co., 1972), p. 26,
says: 'The Buddhists have cane to speak of matter
as lasting for seventeen thought moments."

5. Op. cit., Compendium of Philosophy, pp. 27-30.

6. Majjhima-Nikaaya: I, 191. (PTS trans., The Middle
Length Sayings. I:236-237.

7. Samaya is to be distinguished from the term,
kaala, which describes the general or
conventional nature of time. Samaya is closer to
the actual becoming nature of being because it
gives the sense of gathering coming together,
arising, a kind of "durational passage."

8. Muulomadhyamakakaarikaa, XXIV, 14.

9. Visuddhimagga, XVII, 273.

10. This voidal undifferentiated process is "greater"
and "wider" in dimension than the differentiated
realm of existence. Therefore, it is accommodative
or inclusive of the latter. In a sense, the
undifferentiated is the unlimited a nonconfining
realm. Time does not permit me to develop further
the interplay or interfusion of the two realms,
but suffice it to say that the Hua-yen School in
China handled the situation beautifully in the
concept of dharmadhaatu. Its treatment of the
nonobstructiveness of the ten periods of time is
an extension of the above concept.

11. Doogen Zenji (1200-1253), the great Sootoo Zen
master, made the following observations:
"Temporality (uji) means that time is existence
and existence time" "As different entities do not
obstruct one another, so do different moments not
obstruct one another." "Passage (experiential
process) is like spring with all its
manifestations, i.e., spring

p.179

comes to pass without any external elements
intervening." [Shobogenzo Chapter on Uji
(Tamporality or Temporal Reality) , passim.
Shobogenzo Chuukai Zensho, 11:1-66 (Tokyo:
Mugs Sanboo 1912)]. Dogen's thoughts seem to be
a crystallization of Hua-yen philosophy which was
touched upon lightly in footnote 10. However, to
sum up and amplify his words, we might assert:
"Flowers do net bloom in the spring. Flowers in)
bloom are spring!"