Time in Patanjalis Yogasuutra

·期刊原文
Time in Patanjali's Yogasuutra
By Klaus K. Klostermaier
Philosophy East & West
V. 34 (1984)
pp. 205-210
Copyright 1984 by University of Hawaii Press
Hawaii, USA

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p. 205

INTRODUCTION
The few scholars who have dealt at any length with the notion of time in Pata~njali's Yogasuutra seem to have been guided by an effort to prove that Pata~njali's ideas are in line with "modern" (that is, contemporary) Western conceptions. Most of them speak of time in one breath with space (and, quite frequently, with causality too) as we are used to speaking in the West today: philosophically since Kant, physically since Einstein.

Sir Brajendranath Seal, writing before Einstein had developed his Theory of Relativity, moved Pata~njali's view of time and space close to Kant's concept of the a priori forms of apperception. [1] Fritjof Capra, a modern physicist, tries to suggest that "Oriental Thought," as he calls it, had developed more than two thousand years ago the idea of a four-dimensional space-time continuum. [2] Both views appear to be mistaken. It is my contention in this essay that the notion of time in Pata~njali's Yogasuutra is not intrinsically connected with the notion of space and can (and should) be treated differently.

The Yogasuutra, as is well known, has much in common with the Saa^mkhya-dar`sana as far as basic concepts are concerned. Now Saa^mkhya is neither "physics" in the modern sense, nor "psychology," nor "metaphysics" -- but it is something of all of them. The Yogasuutra shares this holistic approach, where an overriding interest in the practical goal of emancipation is coupled with great theoretical concern to offer an explanation of reality in terms of an evolutionary hierarchy of real principles.

In Pata~njali's treatment of time, these aspects have to be kept in mind too: he does not distinguish between psychological and physical time, nor does he shy away from extrapolating metaphysical conclusions from a basis of physical observations.

This is not the place to go into the very important question of the relation between the Yogasuutra and Buddhism. [3] In spite of some polemics against some Buddhist schools, both the terminology and the underlying philosophy of the Yogasuutra suggest close connections. An understanding of this interdependence would greatly help to clarify also the notion of time, which Pata~njali accepts or presupposes. Georg Feuerstein, in what might be the most thorough and critical recent study of the Yogasuutra, writes: "It is highly probable that in his metaphysics of time Pata~njali was directly inspired by the high-powered speculations of the Sautraantika Buddhists." [4] Since not enough research is available on this, the attempt undertaken here, to study the notion of time in the Yogasuutra, may in its own way contribute to a clarification of this issue.

An analysis of the "scientific" basis of Yoga is crucial: the success of the method of emancipation depends, on the one hand, on the correctness of the

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scientific explanation of the physical and psychic structures of the universe in which we live, and, on the other hand, on the correctness of the method suggested to transcend this material universe. [5]

THE TEXTUAL BASIS
Several suutra in connection with the classical commentaries, provide information on Pata~njali's view of time. Others yield additional information insofar as they provide insight into the application which this notion of time has in the context of Yoga. Others, again, presuppose the notion of time; the notion of time itself is embedded in a pre-notion of the universality of change and flux.

(a) k.sa^matatkramayo.h sa^myamaad vivekaja^m j~naanam (III, 52) [6]

Vyaasa comments: [7] "Just as the atom (paramaa.nu) is the smallest particle of matter (dravya) so a moment (k.sa.na) is the smallest particle of time (kaala)." He then gives a physical definition of k.sa.na by equating it with the time which a paramaa.nu in motion takes to leave one point and reach another point or, in other words, to move through a space equaling the space it occupies. The continuous flow of these k.sa.nas cannot be combined into a vaastu. What we call "hours" or "days" are mental combinations. Thus time as such (kaala) is not a real thing (vaastu`suu.nya) but is based on changes in the mind (buddhinirmaa.na) and known through verbal connotation.

The moment (k.sa.na), however, is a real thing (vaastu) in itself and constitutive of the sequence (kramavaalambin). The sequence is constituted by an uninterrupted succession of moments. The Yogis, who truly know the nature of time, call this "time" (kaala). Two moments (k.sa.na) cannot exist together because between two simultaneous moments there cannot be a sequence. A sequence arises when a later moment succeeds an earlier without interruption. In the present (moment) no earlier or later (moment) is contained. There is, therefore, no combination of them. The explanation of the (reality) of past and future moments lies in the nature of change. The world which exists in this one moment undergoes change. All dharmas are superimposed on this k.sa.na. By sa^myama on this moment and the sequence (of moments) these are caused to be visibly present.

And thus arises metaphysical knowledge (vivekaja^m j~naanam). [8]

(b) atiita anaagata^m svaruupato 'sti adhvabhedaad dharmaa.naam (IV, 12) [9]

Vyaasa comments: [10] "Future is that whose manifest existence is still to come; past is that, whose manifest existence had been experienced; present is that upon which experience now is superimposed. This three-fold reality (vaastu) is the object of knowledge. If they did not have their own forms of existence, knowledge of them would not arise by which they are distinguished. It follows that past and future do exist in their own right." Further, if the results of karman -- either that productive of experience or of liberation -- were without existence of its own, then the actions of the sages with regard to this would be pointless. Efficient causality can render an entity present, not produce it from nothing.

Unlike the present, past and future do not exist in manifest form. The future has as its characteristic its coming-to-be-manifest, the past its having-already-been-experienced. The present alone possesses manifest existence. While one time-form is present, past and future do exist (in their own subtle way) in the suppositum. The three time-forms do not come into existence out of nonexistence.

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(c) tata.h k.rtaarthaanaa^m pari.naamakramasamaaptir gu.naanaam (IV, 32) [11]

Vyaasa comments: [12] "As a result of the rising of the dharmamegha the gu.nas, having served their function, the sequence of changes comes to an end. After they have exhausted their karman and exhausted their sequence they can no longer sustain even a k.sa.na."

(d) k.sa.napratiyogii pari.naamaaparaantanirgraahya.h krama.h (IV, 33) [13]

Vyaasa comments: [14] "a sequence is an uninterrupted series of moments (k.sa.na) perceived as such at the end of a (process of) transformation."

ANALYSIS OF THE TEXTS
The conception of time in these texts appears to be very close to the Buddhist k.sa.nikavaada. [15] By pointing out this closeness to Buddhism it is implied that the notion of time is not, as might seem, marginal to the Yoga system but very central. The attainment of the goal of Yoga depends on the theory as well as the reality of k.sa.na. The Buddhists have defended very vigorously the reality of k.sa.na against the contention of their enemies that, if they were consistent, they would consider the k.sa.na a mere name without any corresponding reality -- as they are wont to do with regard to every other thing. The Buddhists maintain that the shortest time, the mathematical point-instant is something real, since the astronomer makes it the basis of all his computations. It is an indivisible time-particle; it does not contain any parts standing in the relation of antecedence and sequence. The only thing in the universe which is a nonconstruction, a nonfiction, is the sensible point-instant: it is the real basis of all constructions. It is true that it is a reality which cannot be represented in a sense-image, but this is just because it is not a thought-construction. The absolutely unique point-instant of reality, as it cannot be represented, can also not be named. Consequently, it is no name at all; it has no name: reality is unutterable. What is utterable is always a thought construction. Thus it is that the mathematical point-instant is a fiction for the Realist and a reality for the Buddhist, and vice versa, empirical time or "gross time," "substantial time," is a reality for the Realist and a fiction for the Buddhist. Just as the mathematician constructs his velocities out of differentials, so does the human mind, a natural mathematician, construct duration out of momentary sensations.

Though the Yogasuutra does not explicitly mention it, it seems to assume an identity of the k.sa.na that becomes the object of direct experience in sa^myama (constraint) on time and the interval between (and the duration of) individual v.rttis (modifications). There is reason to mention this point because there is a (Hiinayaana) Buddhist theory which calculates the "external-world" k.sa.na to be equal in length to seventeen thought-k.sa.nas. [16]

There is reason, then, to speak in connection with the Yogasuutra's notion of time not only of an (objective) time-quantum (close to ideas of 'chronons' maintained by some physicists today) but also of a consciousness-quantum as unit of change.

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This again has a twofold function. In the application of sa^myama on "the point of time" the yogin is enabled to perceive that which is vaastu (a real thing) in time -- a mutual corroboration of the reality of consciousness and its object, which is responsible for it. In the stage of dharmameghasamaadhi the quantum-nature of time again offers the explanation for the possibility of totally transcending it. Because it is a dharma, it is at one and the same time an "ultimate" on the level of sense-perception and cognition derived from it and also nonultimate on the level of the reality which emerges after the gu.nas (qualities) collapse into themselves. This seems to suggest that time in the form of the moment (k.sa.na) is fundamental in the physical universe which rests on the interaction between the gu.nas. [17]

It would follow then, that it is intrinsic to sa^msaaric existence to consider kaala (gross time) as vaastu -- whereas in reality it is an "imagination," a creation of the buddhi (intellect), based on the constantly changing v.rttis. To perceive the emptiness (vaastu`suunya) of time in that sense and to realize the vaastu-character of the three modes of the existence of k.sa.na is at one and the same time indication of a high degree of insight into the true nature of things and also a means of transcending sa^msaaric existence. The insight into the true nature of time, so it seems, is the borderline insight: since k.sa.na is the dharma which is most elementary (all other dharmas presuppose it and inhere in it, and beyond it -- in the process of resolution of dharmas -- there are, as it were, the gu.nas in their "raw" forms) its dissolution, or the recognition of its dharma-character, forms the essential breakthrough and is both result of, and generating, viveka (discernment). When vivekaj~naana arises, it leads to dharmameghasamaadhi, which almost by itself glides over into the condition of kaivalya ("isolation," namely, of the spirit). Although the term dharmamegha has not yet been studied properly in this context, it would fit into the picture to translate megha not as cloud (as is usually done) but as "field" in the sense of modern physics. [18] It would then be a condition in which the dharmas, which on a lower level of consciousness have been perceived as differentiated into a great number of specific dharmas, now are perceived in their (unified) dharma-character: as a "field" surrounding ultimate reality rather than as "things." Again, the crucial function would be given to the k.sa.nadharma.

In the worldview of the Yogasuutra, the irreversibility of time, a problem which has greatly troubled modern physics, would find a plausible explanation. The whole cosmic process (sa.msaara) can be seen -- after it has come to an end -- as a krama: a sequence of k.sa.nas. The constituents of krama, the k.sa.nas, have -- amongst themselves -- an irreversible order: the k.sa.na of the past is once and forever characterized by its having been experienced. [19] That means it can never revert to a mode of existence of a moment to be experienced (future) nor to a mode of being experienced just now (present). It is inherent in the irreversibility of order itself, order being constitutive of time-experience. Also in the kaivalya state, the state of freedom from the bondage of sa.msaaric existence, when the

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gu.nas have collapsed into prak.rti without differentiation, there is no reversal of time: it is an existence outside the dharmas altogether, and therefore a timeless existence. But also here sa.msaaric past and future are not interchangeable.

That would also serve another problem. The yogin is, by the development of siddhis (extraordinary attainments), capable both of looking into the past (coming to know his own past births) and of looking into the future (divining things to come). Since all k.sa.nas are differentiated by the difference to the present k.sa.na, there is no danger of confusing past with future, or vice versa. It is only given to the yogin to have insight into the vaastu that are the k.sa.nas: insofar as he knows a k.sa.na, he also knows its position in the sequence which is established by them.

Furthermore, the key function of dharmameghasamaadhi as zero-time experience would appear. If kaala is said to be vaastu`suunya, that seems to suggest not a mere negation but a transition: corresponding to the function of zero as transitional rather than terminal in the differentiation of experience and reality. [20] The vaastu`suunya realization is essential as point of transition between a buddhi-centered consciousness and the puru.sa-awareness. Since kaala is the most basic of the forms created by buddhi, the realization of its emptiness implies a radical reversal of the direction of activity of the buddhi and a withdrawal of all support for buddhi-based dharmas.

NOTES
1. Sir Brajendranath Seal, The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, (reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass: 1958), p. 18ff.

2. Fritjof Capra, The Tao of Physics (Berkeley, California: Shambhala Publications. 1975), p. 161ff.

3. In a general way the question of the relation between the Yogasuutra and Buddhism had been treated already by Louis de la Vallee Poussin in his essay "Le Bouddhisme et le Yoga de Pata~njali," Melanges chinois et bouddhiques 5 (Louvain: Institut Belge des Hautes Etudes Chinois, 1936/37): 223ff.

4. Georg Feuerstein, The Philosophy of Classical Yoga (Manchester University Press, 1982), p. 95.

5. An observation by Tilman Vetter is quite pertinent here: One is getting out from the world only by going to the ground of things, and not by going anywhere else. One is not getting to the ground of things by an analysis of any kind of stupidity, but by an analysis and a transcendence of the most important concepts and truths which can be found about the world... "Zum Problem der Person in Naagaarjuna's Muula-Maadhyamaka-Kaarikaas." In Walter Strolz and Shizuteru Ueda, eds., Offenbarung als Heilserfahrung im Christentum, Hinduismus and Buddhismus (Freiburg-Basel-Wien, Herder, 1982), p. 171.

6. James Haughton Woods, The Yoga System of Pata~njali, Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 17 (Harvard University Press, 1914), p. 287, translates: "As a result of constraint upon moments and their sequence (there arises the intuitive) knowledge proceeding from discrimination." I. K. Taimni, The Science of Yoga (Wheaton, Illinois: Theosophical Publishing House, 1967), p. 368, translates: "Knowledge born of awareness of Reality by performing sa^myama on moment and (the process of) its succession" (in his ed. III, 53). It is presupposed here that the reader knows (or is being informed about it in some other section of this book) what the basic term sa^myama (translated by Woods as "constraint") means.

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7. The edition used is that by Swaami Vij~naanaa`srama (Ajmer: Madanlal Laksmiinivaas Chandak, 1961) which, besides the Vyaasa-bhaa.sya, also contains the Bhojav.rtti. For convenience sake, one-word English translations have been added to the technical Sanskrit terms. For more detailed information on the meaning of these notions and the various translations adopted by Western scholars see Feuerstein, Philosophy, especially on gu.na: 33ff; v.rtti: 61ff.; sa^myama: 104ff; kaivalya: 51ff; siddhis: 101ff.

8. My translation of vivekaja.m j~naanam as "metaphysical knowledge" should indicate that it is considered to be true and certain knowledge but not yet identical with the objectless awareness characteristic for the condition of puru.sa in kaivalya.

9. Woods, Yoga, p. 315: "Past and future as such exist; (therefore subconscious-impressions do not cease to be). For the different time-forms belong to the external-aspects." I. K. Taimni, Science, p. 403: "The past and the future exist in their own (real) form. The difference of Dharmas or properties is on account of the difference of paths."

10. Op. cit., pp. 449f. (relevant portions only).

11. Woods, Yoga, p. 343: "When as a result of this the aspects (gu.na) have fulfilled their purpose, they attain to the limit of the sequence of mutations.

12. Op. cit., p. 505.

13. Woods, Yoga, p. 343: "The positive correlate to the moment, recognized as such at the final limit of the mutation is a sequence." Taimni, Science, p. 439: "The process corresponding to moments which become apprehensible at the final end of transformation (of the gu.nas) is krama.h."

14. p. 507.

15. In the following exposition of the k.sa.nikavaada I am closely following Theodore Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic (Reprint. Dover, 1962), vol. 1, pp. 78ff.

16. See Shwe Zan Aung, Compendium of Philosophy (London: Pali Text Society, 1972). p. 26.

17. Also according to the Bhaamatii the nityaanityaviveka is the most crucial adhikaara for brahmajij~naasa.

18. G. Feuerstein, Philosophy (p. 98ff), after examining a great many suggested translations for dharmamegha, adopts the view of J. Hauer, who wrote: "The meditator is in this state enveloped by the supporting primal power of the world, he has become a dharma-kaaya like 'the great Muni'. This is an expression for the Buddha who has entered Nirvana." Feuerstein goes on, stating that "the concept of dharmamegha does not appear to be mentioned by any Hindu authority prior to Pata~njali, though it is evidently an integral part of early Mahaayaana-Buddhism."

19. P. C. W. Davies, in The Physics of Time Asymmetry (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1974) discusses the peculiar phenomenon that observation in quantum physics introduces a time asymmetry into natural processes. Could the difference between macroscopic and quantum physics be set in parallel to the ancient Indian laukika and vivekaja j~naanam? (This is not to suggest, of course, the possibility of observation of subatomic processes, but the possibility of a development of a corresponding theoretical framework.)

20. See Betty Heimann, "The Discovery of Zero and Its Philosophical Implications in India" and "Counter-Tension of the Zero-Point," in Facets of Indian Thought (London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1964), pp. 95-104.