The Maadhyamika attack on essentialism

·期刊原文
The Maadhyamika attack on essentialism: A critical appraisal

G. C. Nayak

Philosophy East and West 29, no. 4, October 1979.

(c) by The University Press of Hawaii.

p. 477-490

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P.477

Maadhyamika thought presents to us the essence of
Buddhist philosophy; however, Madhyamika is as
difficult to comprehend as the teachings of Buddha
himself as they are revealed to us in various early
Buddhist literatures. Maadhyamika philosophy has also
been misunderstood throughout the ages because of its
critical attitude, which is unparalleled in the
history of philosophy, Indian as well as Western. It
has often been mistaken as monism, absolutism,
nihilism or even as mere, vita.n.daa or wrangling. It
is a deplorable but perhaps a natural and inevitable
fate of all great thinkers that their thought is
misinterpreted and misunderstood both by their
opponents and their professed followers. I will
venture to put forward my own understanding of what
Maadhyamika philosophy really stands for, and
although I cannot claim perfection for my
understanding I will submit for consideration an
approach to this unique philosophy. After much
consideration I have found that the present approach
alone makes Buddhist philosophy in general and
Maadhyamika in particular intelligible and consistent
vis-a-vis its misdirected followers as well as
opponents at whose hands it has very often been
misrepresented.

I. THE CENTRAL THEME OF 'SUUNYATAA

First, I will take for examination the general
contention of the Hindu orthodox thinkers that
Maadhyamika philosophy is out and out nihilistic.
This contention seems to find some justification in
the term 'Suunya, (literally meaning "void") used by
the Maadhyamikas, as well as in the negative
dialectic of Naagaarjuna. In the latter there appears
to be a deliberate effort to eradicate the entire
conceptual scheme which we employ for communication
with each other or for the evaluation of human
conduct and the ideals for which we strive. 'Void'
seems to be the last word in Maadhyamika philosophy;
everything including pratiityasamutpaada (doctrine of
dependent origination) and madhyamaa pratipat (middle
path)is identified with 'Suunya or void as it is
popularly understood. It is thus quite in keeping
with the situation that 'Sa^nkara, the arch opponent
of Buddhism, feels no scruple whatsoever in rejecting
Maadhyamika philosophy outright by declaring that
such a doctrine which is invalidated by all means of
valid knowledge is not even worthy of refutation.(1)
Madhva, another AAcaarya of the Hindu tradition and a
great opponent of 'Sa^nkara, takes 'Sa^nkara to task
on the ground that 'Sa^nkara's "Brahman" is as good
as the 'suunya of the 'Suunyavaadins, (2) meaning
thereby that 'Sa^nkara's Advaita philosophy is, as a
matter of fact, indistinguishable from the
void-doctrine or nihilism of Naagaarjuna. All these
AAcaaryas, howsoever opposed they may be toward each
other, have at least one point in

p.478

common and it is that Maadhyamika philosophy is
nothing but nihilism. And this conception of
Maadhyamika has come to prevail inspite of repeated
warnings by Naagaarjuna and his illustrious
commentator Candrakiirti not to take 'suunva in its
literal sense of "void." Naagaarjuna, for example,
explicitly points out that one should neither call
Reality 'suunya (void) nor should one call it
a'suunya (nonvoid), it is also incorrect to call
Reality both 'suunya and a'suunya or neither 'suunya
or a'suunya; it is called 'suunya only for the
purposes of communication.(3) Aryadeva in his
Catu.hsataka points out that his philosophy cannot be
refuted even if one tries hard to refute it inasmuch
as it has no thesis of its own, neither affirmative
nor negative nor both. Similarly Naagaarjuna in his
Vigrahavyaavartanii explains his stand thus: "If I
have a thesis of my own to prove then I may commit
mistakes. But I have none, therefore, I cannot be
accused." Candrakiirti in the course of his
commentary on Muulamadhyamakakaarikaas states that
"the only result of our deduction is to repudiate the
theory of our opponent. Our acceptance of the
converse theory is not at all therewith implied. Our
master, Naagaarjuna, when combating opposed opinions,
has very often had recourse just to a deduction and
absurdum, without ever admitting positive
counterpart." Shortly before making this statement,
he clearly points out "We have no theory of our own."
Candrakiirti declares this in the context of
defending Buddhapaalita's stand as against the
stricture made by Bhaavaviveka that the repudiation
of a metaphysical (namely, Saa.mkhya) theory
necessarily involves the acceptance of an opposite
theory. This should make it clear that Maadhyamika,
having no thesis of its own, cannot be regarded as a
doctrine of the void either. Maadhyamika philosophy
is out and out antimetaphysical and antispeculative
in its character and whosoever converts 'Suunyataa
itself into a metaphysical doctrine of nihilism or
absolutism or anything of the sort is declared by
Buddha to be incurable, says Naagaarjuna in his
Kaarikaas (XIII, 8). Candrakiirti while commenting on
this kaarikaa refers to Buddha's instructions to
Kaasyapa as follows:

O kaasyapa, it would be better to entertain the
substance view 1), of the magnitude of mount Sumeru
than to hug the 'suunyataa view of the nihilist
(abhaavaabhinive'sin) . I call him incurable who
clings to 'suunyataa itself as a theory. If a drug
administered to a patient were to remove all his
disorders but were to foul the stomach itself by
remaining in it, would you call the patient cured?
Even so, 'suuyataa is an antidote to all dogmatic
views, but if a man were to cling to it forever as a
view in itself, he is doomed.

If one understands the significance of this passage
and the earlier kaarikaa, how can he commit the
mistake of taking Maadhyamika as a doctrine of the
void, or 'Suunyavaada in the sense of nihilism?
On the other hand, it is equally dangerous, and
perhaps even more so, to regard Maadhyamika
philosophy as a form of monism or absolutism.
Reacting against the nihilist interpretation of
'suunyataa some modern thinkers have fallen

p.479

into the opposite error of taking it as an Absolute
Reality whose characteristics are beyond the grasp of
human intellect: for them 'suunyataa is an Absolute
which is transcendent to thought, the implication
being that such a transcendent reality does exist,
according to Naagaarjuna, but we should desist from
talking or theorizing about it. T. R. V. Murti. for
example. in his Central Philosophy of Buddhism says
that Maadhyamika philosophy is actually a
noview-about-reality doctrine whereas it has been
mistaken as a no-reality doctrine. 'Suunyata says
Murti, "is negative only for thought, but in itself
it is the non-relational knowledge of the
absolute".(4)
C.D.Sharma similarly points out that according to
the 'Suunyavaadin "Reality is the Non-dual Absolute,
Blissful and beyond intellect, where all plurality is
merged." Here it should be borne in mind that if
Candrakiirti vehemently protests against the
Maadhyamikas being regarded as nihilists, he is no
less opposed to the idea of taking their philosophy
as a doctrine of the affirmation of some Absolute. He
clearly says that the Maadhyamika position transcends
both affirmation and negation. If Naagaarjuna's
critical philosophy is taken as affirming the
existence of a transcendent Reality which is to be
apprehended through a nonrelational intuition, then
his philosophy itself will fall into one of the four
Ko.tis or positions, namely, "Is," "Is not," "both,"
and "neither" (asti, naasti, ubhaya, and anubhaya),
which it so carefully and consistently tries to
avoid. It would be, therefore, a gross error to treat
Naagaarjuna as an absolutist, a transcendentalist, a
monist or as a propounder of any such "ism."
Naagaarjuna's critical insight consists in a
consistent denial of all "isms" in philosophy, and
this is what is known as praj~naapaaramitaa or wisdom
par excellence in Mahaayaana literature. It is the
same as the bodhi or the enlightenment of Buddha. To
accept it is to reject all sorts of assumptions about
the existence of a transcendental Reality, not merely
to reject all thought-constructions about it. An
acceptance of the Maadhyamika position, therefore,
does not leave any scope for letting in a doctrine of
absolutism, monism, or some form of transcendental
mysticism by the back door. Otherwise, the whole
point of Maadhyamika philosophy will be lost. As in
the case of the nihilistic interpretation examined
earlier so also in this case of an absolutist or a
transcendentalist approach to 'suunyataa, one is
reminded of the following warning of Naagaarjuna
which has been so conveniently overlooked and even
forgotten. "Just as a snake caught in a wrong manner
by a dullwitted fellow only causes death to him or as
a magic wrongly employed destroys the magician, so
also 'Suunyataa wrongly seen and understood only ruins
the person concerned." (5) Those philosophers who are
obsessed with the idea of a positive entity or a
reality on the ground or basis of which everything is
declared to be 'suunya are to be compared, according
to Candrakiirti, with those persons who, when told
that they will get nothing, expect that "nothing"
will actually be given to them.(6) Naagaarjuna also
does

p.480

not subscribe to the view that the void is the
absolute truth or reality. We are. therefore, to
steer clear of these two extremes in order to have a
firm grasp on the Maadhyamika philosophy. The
Maadhyamika thinker. it Should he borne in mind, has
no metaphysical axe to grind.
In that case why not regard NaagaarJuna as a
Vaita.n.dika or wrangler having no thesis of his own
and interested only in the refutation of the
opponent's thesis? Vitandaa is a technical term used
in the Indian philosophical literature which is
defined in the Nyaaya Suutras Of Gautama as, sa
[jalpa.h] pratipaksasthaapanaahiino vita.n.daa"
(Vita.n.daa is that jalpa which delights in criticism
for its own sake without propounding any thesis of
one's own); and jalpa in its turn is defined as
vijagisu kathaa jalpa.h (Jalpa is that discussion
which aims at mere victory) or yathokto-papanna
chhalajaati nigrahasthaana saadhanopaalambho jalpa.h
(in jalpa one takes resort to verbal quibbling and
fallacies such as jaati and nigrahasthaana only with
a view to obtain victory over the opponent at any
cost). When two parties engage in discussion only for
the purpose of victory and take resort to all sorts
of unfair and logically fallacious means to achieve
victory, it is called jalpa; and if one is engaged in
jalpa solely for the purpose of refuting the
opponent's view without establishing any conclusion
of one's own, it is called vitan.daa. One who engages
in vita.n.daa is called a vaita.n.dika.
Now while examining the Maadhyamika way of
philosophizing we must first see whether they are
only interested in victory over their opponents or
whether they have some other ulterior motive. If they
have some other motive behind all that they do and if
they are not simply wrangling with their opponents
with a view to achieve an easy victory, then they
cannot be regarded as a vaita.n.dikas even if they do
not have a metaphysical thesis of their own.
Praj~naapaaramitaa or the highest wisdom, which
consists in a critical insight into the exact nature
of concepts as they really are, is the summum bonum
kept in view by the Maadhyamikas throughout their
philosophy. This highest wisdom is possible only in
nirvaa.na, and nirvaa.na cannot be attained unless
the paramaartha satya or the ultimate truth as
distinguished from the lokasa.mv.rti satya or the
truth that hides the ultimate truth is realized. But
what is this ultimate truth or paramaartha satya? It
is the exact significance of concepts as they are
without any distortion which is nothing but
'suunyataa, that is, ni.hsvabhaavata or
essencelessness. It is said to be the highest or the
ultimate (parama) truth also in the sense that it is
the best (uttama) to be realized.
The proper understanding or comprehension of
'suunyataa as the highest good or nirvaa.na is the
message conveyed by Buddha to the suffering
multitude, according to Naagaarjuna. It is described
as a state in which there is quiescence on account of
the inapplicability of thought constructions; it puts
an end to multiplicity created by speculative mind,
and is therefore a state of highest good.(8) The
realization of 'suuyataa results in the cessation of
all essentialist thought-constructions and the
conseque nt speech activity. Being a state of the
inapplicability of the varieties of
thought-constructions, it is quiessence; it is

p.481

'siva or the highest good, says Candrakiirti, as it
consists in the cessation of the speculative mind and
the prolific linguistic habits thereof, and because
it puts an end to all kle'sas, that is, defiling
forces and all vaasanaas or essentialist impulses.
All these descriptions show that Maadhyamika
philosophy does point to a summum bonum which
consists in the realization of what it regards to be
paramaarthasatya as distinguished from
lokasa.mv.rtisatya. It can, therefore, by no stretch
of imagination, be construed as mere vita.n.daa.
Nor is it proper to take Maadhyamikas to task, as
some critics have done, for rejecting the rival
theory or theories without giving any counter theory
of their own. Referring to the criticism of the
Vaibhaa.sika theory. Fukuhara, for example, says that
"though this theory of Vaibhaa.sikas contains many
defects as pointed out by Vasubandhu, we should
acknowledge that it was such a purposeful, religious
theory. If the theory can be replaced with another
faultless theory which fulfills the above
necessities, as done by Vasubandhu, it is better. But
simple rejection of the theory without giving any
counter theory, as done by Maadhyamikas, is not
proper, "(9) This, in my considered opinion, is due
to a gross misunderstanding of the Maadhyamika
program. The Maadhyamikas were interested in pointing
to nirvaa.na, which is devoid of all prapa~nca
(multiple thought-constructions) caused by the seeing
of svabhaava where there is, in fact, absolute
ni.hsvabhaavata or 'suunyataa, that is,
essencelessness. They were not interested in
propounding any theory whatsoever about a Reality,
much less "a purposeful, religious theory" in place
of the Vaibhaa.sika, but by generating a critical
insight into ni.hsvabhaavataa or essencelessness
through a criticism of all theories, their intention
was to point to a summum bonum free from thought
constructions. This summum bonum is nirvaa.na,
according to them, which arises when the dogmatic
clinging to the effect that "this is the very truth"
completely ceases. In that case how can there be a
religious theory to be upheld by the Maadhyamikas?
Moreover, it should be borne in mind that according
to the Maadhyamikas the summum bonum does not consist
in the realization of a transcendent Reality through
a mystic trance or any other method for that matter.
Philosophical wisdom or illumination consists in the
understanding of the exact implications of the
critical philosophy of 'suunyataa which is devoid of
all metaphysical speculations, and it would be a
grave error indeed to suppose that this en
lightenment consists in the realization of a
metaphysical Absolute. The only truth to which
Naagaarjuna points is that there is no metaphysical
entity or reality hidden behind or above this world
of ordinary discourse which is 'suunya or
ni.hsvabhaava.

11. MAADHYAMIKA DIALECTIC---ITS SIGNIFICANCE

Naagaajuna's intention in examining and denouncing
one concept after another was to carry on a
systematic criticism of human thought which would

p.482

demonstrate the impossibility of metaphysical
speculations. Language as a form of expression is
alright for practical purposes, but when it is
extended beyond its legitimate limit it simply breaks
down; it can no longer accomplish its normal
function. Naagaarjuna, for example, goes on examining
various metaphysical theories of causation one after
the other and finds each one of them to be untenable.
Also he examines various concepts such as "motion,"
"substance, " "attribute, " "individual self, "
"origination," "existence" and "destruction," the
five skandhas or sheaths, and so on, pointing out the
internal inconsistency in these concepts when they
are taken in their exclusive metaphysical
significance. The categories of thought, taken in an
absolute sense, cannot stand up to the scrutiny of
philosophical analysis, although they may be
practically applicable.
Moreover, if we want to pinpoint an exclusive or
a definite meaning of these ideas we will fail to do
so. We simply use them indiscriminately in our
language; we cannot find any essence or svabhaava in
them which we can catch hold of. That is why they are
called sa.mv.rti satya. Candrakiirti, in his
Prasannapadaa, subscribes to the same view;
sa.mv.rti means that which is conventionally true or
is of practical use (loka vyavahaara.h). All this is
conventionally accepted by people, and that is all.
Another meaning of sa.mv.rti is also given by
Candrakiirti as follows: "Aj~naana.m hi samantaat
sarvapadaarthatattvaa-vachhaadanaat sa.mv.rtir ity
ucyate." This passage may be translated as "Ignorance
is called sa.mv.rti as it covers on all sides the
tattva or the true significance of our categories of
understanding." (Tattva, it may be noted here, does
not refer to any transcendental Reality; it simply
means the true or the real nature of our ordinary
discourse) Tattva is hidden by the conventional use
of language. Language misleads us and creates a false
picture in our minds of there being a fixed svabhaava
or essence of everything to which the concept is
applied. Svabhaava according to Candrakiirti, is what
is unchangeable, uncreated, and permanent and the
assumption of such a svabhava or essence in the
dharmas or the elements of existence is what is
vehemently criticized by the Maadhyamikas. When
ignorance vanishes along with its consequent
misleading picture of the essence of things, one
realizes the tattva, which is nothing other than
'suunyataa or essencelessness. Naagaarjuna does not
spare a single well-known concept; even the
tathaagata does not escape his onslaught. Both
tathaagata and the world are devoid of svabhaava or
essence, that is, a fixed nature of their own. (10)
Nothing has a fixed nature of its own, not even
tathaagata or, to put the same idea in the
contemporary philosophical terminology, concepts or
words of our ordinary discourse do not have a fixed
meaning or use, an immutable significance. Such a
thoroughgoing attack on essentialism can only find a
parallel in Wittgenstein's criticism of essentialism
in contemporary Western philosophy, although it will
be well to remember that both the problem at hand and
the procedure adopted by these two masters were far
from being the same.(11)

p.483

III. PRATIITYASAMUTPAADA, MADHYAMAA PRATIPAT AND
'SUUNYATAA

Naagaarjuna bows down to Buddha for having taught
pratiityasamutpaada (dependent origination) which,
according to him, is the same as 'suunyataa
(essencelessness) and madhyamaa pratipat (middle
course).(12) pratiityasamutpaada is a central concept
of Buddhism which has been subjected to various
interpretations at the hands of various Buddhist
scholars. Whereas according to the Hiinayaanist
version, it implies the causal law according to which
the evancescent momentary things appear, Maadhyamika
philosophy gives an entirely different interpretation
of this concept. Candrakiirti thus rejects the
Hiinayaanist interpretation of pratiityasamutpaada as
pratipratirityaanaa.m vinaasinaam samutpaada.h or
"appearance of evanescent momentary things" and puts
forth his own version as follows which he considers
to be the most appropriate-- "Hetupratyayaapek.so
bhaavaanaamutpaada.h pratiityasamutpaadaartha.h, "
that is, 'pratiityasamutpaada' does not imply a
temporal sequence of the entities between which there
is a causal relation: it points to the dependence of
one concept on another. This interdependence of
concepts is, according to Naagaarjuna, the same as
the 'suunyataa or ni.hsvabhaavataa, that is,
essencelessness of all these concepts. If every
concept is dependent on another for its
intelligibility it cannot be said to have a fixed
essence of its own. One who understands
pratiityasamutpaada, the mutual dependence or
parasparaapek.saa of concepts, therefore understands
that they are all 'suunya or ni.hsvabhaava, that is,
they do not have an independent and permanent essence
of their own. This also is what Buddha means by
madhyamaa pratipat (middle course) in as much as the
realization of 'suunyataa steers clear between the
extremes of metaphysical speculations about the
svabhaava or fixed nature of things and makes one
adopt a middle course from the contending
metaphysical doctrines. And once this is realized
there is no further scope for talking about the
existence of a transcendent Absolute in 'suunyavaada,
which strictly speaking is not a vaada or "ism" at
all, but is simply a model of philosophical activity
leading to the critical insight into the nature and
function of concepts which in its turn gives us
nirvaana or freedom from all sorts of kalpana or
thought-constructions.

IV. TATTVA AND PARAMAARTHA IN MAADHYAMIKA PHILOSOPHY

It should have been clear from the preceding
discussion that pratiityasamutpaada taught by the
Buddha is itself the tattva, that is, the exact or
the real nature of the case for the Maadhyamikas.
Pratiityasamutpaada itself is described in negative
terminology by Naagaarjuna as "anirodham anupaadam
anuccedam a'saa'svatam, anekaartham ananaartham
anaagamam anirgamam."(13) This passage may be
translated as follows: "It is without impediment,
without origination, without destruction, neither
having an end nor eternal, neither one nor many,
neither does it come in nor does it go out." Being
the tattva or the true

p. 484

significance of the concepts, pratiityasamutpaada
cannot cannot meaningfully be analyzed with respect
to its origination, destruction, and so forth. When
this is realized there is an absolute freedom from
essentialist thought-constructions and the cravings
of the mind, and that is why the tattva is said to be
the "aparapratyayam 'saanta.m prapa~ncair
prapa~ncitam,"(14) that is, it is to be realized
within ourself as quiescence, being free from
multiple thought-constructions.
My argument here is that these descriptions are
not applied in Maadhyamika philosophy to an Absolute
transcending thought; they are only the descriptions
of the state of affairs when one realizes the
'suunyataa or ni.hsvabhaavataa, the essencelessness
of all our ideas or concepts. It is said to be
bhuutapratyavek.saa or "perception of the real nature
of the fact." ni.hsvabhaavataa or essencelessness;
there is no indication of the perception of a
transcendent Reality. It is called tathataa suchness
or thusness, because it is the true state-of-
affairs, or bhuutatathataa, that is, the real nature
of the case as it obtains. It is also called
yathaabhuuta, "the fact as it is," dharmaa.naa.m
dharmataa or "the inherent character of the elements
of existence." This is said to be the tattva which
does not lie in an Absolute outside or immanent in
the phenomena. C. D. Sharma comes near the truth when
he says that "if rightly understood 'suunyataa itself
is nirvaa.na," but when he refers to a "nondual
Absolute in which all plurality is merged" or speaks
of "a reality which is to be directly realised
through spiritual experience,"(15) he seems to have
deviated from the right track.
Moreover, it should be borne in mind that if the
world is regarded as svabhaavasuunya or ni.hsvabhaava
(devoid of essence), prapa~nca'suunya (devoid of'
thought-construction) is not an epithet ascribed to a
reality over and above this world. Prapan~nca'suunya
simply means devoid of metaphysical
thoughtconstructions. Tattva is said to be
prapa~nca'suunya and nirvikalpa, that is, devoid of
all speculations in the Maadhyamika literature. And
what is nirvaa.na but a state-of-affairs where there
is absolute cessation of metaphysical
thought-construction because of the realization of
svabhaava-'suunyataa or essencelessness of all
concepts? It is therefore evident that tattva, which
is said to be prapa~nca'suunya (devoid of
thought-construction) , does not refer to a
transcendent reality over and above the realization
of the svabhaava-'suunyaataa (essencelessness) of all
concepts. Once nai.hsvaabhaavya or essencelessness of
all concepts is crystal clear to us, the tattva is
not farther away, for prapa~nca'suunyataa or
cessation of thought-constructions immediately and
inevitably follows from the realization of
svabhaava'suunyataa or essencelessness. And that is
why pratiityasamutpaada itself is said to be
prapan~copa'sama (a state in which all
thought-constructions cease) and 'siva (the highest
good) by Naagaarjuna. Candrakiirti's remarks in this
connection are quite illuminating: "
Yathaavasthitapratiityasamutpaadadar'sane sati
aaryaa.naam abhidheyaadilak.sa.nasya prapa~ncasya
sarvathoparamaat prapa~ncopa'sama itycyate."(16)

P.485

Pratiityasamutpaada (dependent origination) is it
self said to be devoid of thought-constructions
inasmuch as by seeing or understanding this the
aarvas or the enlightened abstain altogether from all
thought-constructions. Stcherbatsky very rightly sees
that in the preceding passage Candrakiirti identifies
the realization of pratiityasamutpaada with
nirvaa.na. His translation runs as follows. "it is
also called Nirvaana, the Quiescence or equalisation
of all plurality, because when it is critically
realised there is for the philosopher absolutely no
differentiation of existence to which our words and
concepts could be applied."(17) The tattva, that is,
the exact or the true nature of the case in question,
therefore, lies in pratityasamutpaada (dependent
origination) which is the same as 'suunyataa in the
sense of svabhaava'suunyataa (essencelessness) the
realisation of which alone gives rise to
prapa~nca'suunyataa or freedom from
thought-constructions. As long as we are unable to
realize the ni.h svabhaavataa (essencelessness) and
as long as we are under the wrong impression because
of entertaining an essentialist picture of concepts
in our mind that things have a permanent and
independent nature of their own, prapa~nca or
conceptual construction continues to be there. The
truth or tattva, however, is that neither is there
any independent nature or svabhaava of things as
conceived by the unenlightened nor is there any scope
for conceptual construction, that is, prapa~nca. The
realization of this truth is praj~naapaaramitaa or
wisdom par excellence. There is no implication in the
Maadyamika philosophy of Naagaarjuna of praj~naa
(wisdom) as consisting in the knowledge of an
Absolute Reality; when one realizes the 'suunyataa or
nai.hsvaabhaavya (essencelessness) of all concepts
and desists from indulging in all sorts of
thought-constructions, that is the state of praj~naa
or wisdom. This praj~naa (wisdom), in the sense of
realization of 'suunyataa (essencelessness), alone is
considered to be the highest end or paramaartha
according to the Maadhyamikas.
T. R. V. Murti seems to come near the realization
of this truth about the Maadhyamikas when he says
that "in the Maadhyamika it is truer to speak of the
Intuition (praj~naa) itself as the Absolute," but his
profuse reference to "an Absolute as incommensurable
or the Real as nondual, transcendent to thought,
inexpressible, etc." are highly misleading. There is
no Absolute which, as Murti suggests, "is the reality
of the apparent (dharmaa.naa.m dharmataa) or their
real nature (vaastavika.m ruupam)." Nor is it a fact
that "phenomena are the veiled form or false
appearance of the Absolute (sa.mv.rtam ruupam)."(18)
For Maadhyamikas the fact appears in its true light
when we realize essencelessness (nai.hsvaabhaavya) of
concepts which lead to the cessation of
thought-constructions (prapa~nca'suunyata) while, if
we take concepts as possessing an essence of their
own to which we can cling, we only see their veiled
form (sa.mv.rta.m ruupam), as it were. It is not that
a Reality of an altogether different order hidden
behind the appearance is grasped in wisdom
(praj~naa), but it is like something getting revealed
in our understanding which was all the while there
unnoticed in front of us. It is our understanding
which

P. 486

makes all the difference. And that is why Naagaarjuna
points out in very clear terms that there is not even
the slightest difference between the worldly state
(sa^msaara) and the state of liberation
(nirvaa.na) .(19) The world does not change in
nirvaa.na, there is only a change in our
understanding and the manipulation of the
concepts.(20) It is, therefore, misleading to say, as
does Murti that "the Absolute is that intrinsic form
in which things would appear to the clear vision of
an AArya (realised saint) free from ignorance."(21)
The intrinsic form in which the fact would appear to
the clear vision of an aarya is nai.hsvaabhaavya or
essencelessness of concepts, and this is the only
truth which is not dependent on anything else. But to
call it an Absolute would be hypostatizing a truth
about the concepts to an ontological being which does
not find any justification in the writings of
Naagaarjuna and Candrakiirti.
Maadhyamika does make a distinction between the
highest truth (paramaarthasatya) and the conventional
truth (lokasa.mv.rtisatya) and lays utmost emphasis
on the knowledge of their difference.(22) "Those who
do not know the distinction between these two
truths," says Naagaarjuna "cannot understand the deep
significance of the teachings of Buddha."(23) But
this, it should be borne in mind, is not a
distinction between a transcendental Reality and the
world. Paramaartha may mean the highest or the
ultimate truth, the highest good, the final goal to
be realized or whatever else one may want to speak of
it, but to describe it as an Absolute will be
subscribing to an ontology of the absolutistic type
which would never be acceptable to Naagaarjuna. It
will be committing a mistake against which
Naagaarjuna has given a thoroughgoing critique
throughout his work. The ultimate truth is that every
concept is 'suunya in the sense of being essenceless,
and when one is firmly entrenched in this truth he is
said to have realized the highest truth
(paramaarthasatya) as distinguished from the
conventional truth (lokasa.mv.rti-satya), and that is
all. That is why it is said to be tathataa, that is,
thusness or suchness. If anything beyond 'suunyataa
is adhered to it will itself amount to an incurable
"ism" which Buddha had taken much pain to overthrow.
As all "isms" are out of place here and as all
thought-constructions are to be carefully avoided if
one wants to be a true adherent to the Buddhist
ideal, the highest good or the highest end for the
enlightened one trained in philosophical wisdom lies
in silence in face of contending metaphysical
theories, says Candrakirti. (paramaartho yaaryaa.na.m
tuus.nim bhaava.h) Here again silence itself has been
described as paramaartha or the highest good and
therefore let not anyone think that here Candraki
irti refers to a reality about which one can at best
be silent. This mistake has been committed, however,
by the most learned scholars of Buddhism.
Stcherbatsky, for example, translates the statement
of Candrakiirti as follows: "About the Absolute the
saints remain silent."(24) But it is really
astonishing why and how Stcherbatsky smuggles in the
concept of an Absolute in a context where it is
entirely out of place. The question that is raised by
the oponent in this context is: "Ki.m

P. 487

khalu aaryaa.naa.m upapattir naasti; that is, "is
there no argumentation for the enlightened"? The
Maadhyamikas insist that they do not have any
assertion of their own, but how is it that, the
opponent asks, they seem to make a definite
assertion, namely, that entities arise neither out of
themselves, nor out of something different, not out
of both nor at random and so on ? To this the
Maadhyamika replies as follows. This appears to be a
definite assertion to the simple folks who try to
understand it according to the arguments familiar to
them, but not to the AAryas or the enlightened, that
is, the philosopher. To this the opponent again
raises the objection just mentioned. Is there no
argumentation for the enlightened?, Do they not
believe in argumentation? To this question the final
answer given by Candrakiirti is: Who can say, whether
they have arguments or not? For them the highest good
lies in silence in face of unending metaphysical
controversies. Here the question was about argument,
definite assertion, and so on, the point at issue
being the argument advanced by Naagaarjuna regarding
the untenability of a number of contending essen-
tialist conceptions of casuality and the statement by
Candrakiirti that it does not amount to a definite
assertion. Hence, it is quite evident that the
Absolute is not at issue nor does it come into the
picture here until and unless one smuggles it in.
Candrakiirti's answer is simply meant to point
out that silence is the highest end for a
philosophically enlightened person. It has absolutely
no implication that there is a reality over and above
this world which is to be realized through silence.
One is again reminded here of the warning of
Candrakiirti that if someone says that he has nothing
to sell, let it not be understood that this very
'nothing' or the absence of everything is going to be
sold. Pears' observation in connection with
Wittgenstein's Tractatus, concerning the
impossibility of transgressing the boundary of
factual discourse with the illusion created in the
mind of the transgressor that perhaps there is some
reality outside the discourse, seems quite relevant
here and may profitably serve as a reminder as well
as a check to all those who would venture to posit a
world of reality over and above this world of
ordinary discourse. Pears writes:

The logical space of actual discourse is curved, and
outside it there is a supervoid, which is not even a
matrix of possibilities. But the transgressor is a
man who is never satisfied with this explanation. He
always imagines that if he cannot cross the outer
boundary, that must be because there is something on
the other side which stops him. His idea is that this
necessity that he should stay within the boundary if
he is going to produce factual sense, must have some
sort of factual backing outside the boundary. He
thinks that what creates the necessity must be
something on the otherside of the boundary which the
philosopher ought to be able to describe to him. But
the philosopher's point is that he can not describe
any such thing, because description belongs to
factual discourse, and beyond its own outer boundary
factual discourse must cease. So he can only tell the
transgressor that the explanation of the necessity is
to be found in what lies within the boundary.(25)

P. 488

Similarly one may say that the justification for
silence on the part of the philosophically
enlightened person lies not in the inscrutable nature
of some absolute outside the world of our ordinary
discourse; the explanation lies in the
essencelessness or 'suunyataa of the concepts which
are only conventionally useful or sa.mv.rti satya. A
philosopher with the critical insight of 'suunyataa
is noncommittal with regard to contending
metaphysical thought-constructions; this constitutes
his tuu.s.nimbhaava or silence. As a matter of fact
here also there is nothing but a super void beyond
the world of ordinary discourse. That is why, as
pointed out earlier, Naagaarjuna emphatically
declares that there is not even the slightest
difference between the world and the nirvaa.na. In
nirvaa.na one is not transmitted from one world to
another transcendental order of reality, one does not
cross the boundary of our concepts to have a vision
of some nonconceptual absolute. There is simply a
dead stop to the essentialist thought-constructions
which cause endless misery. One realizes the
conventional to be conventional or sa.mv.rtisatya and
no longer clings to it as having a fixed nature of
its own, and that is the end of it. This is
praj~napaaramitaa or wisdom par excellence and this
is also nirvaa.na or liberation, But to arrive at
this understanding one must take the help of what is
conventionally true, that is, sa.mv.rtisatya. One
cannot teach paramaartha or the highest truth, says
Naagaarjuna, without taking recourse to the
pragmatic truth.(26) It is only through one's deepest
acquaintance with and the comprehension of the
ordinary discourse that one is able to understand the
logic of such concepts as 'suunya. And again it is
only when we understand perfectly the logic of the
'suunyataa or essencelessness of the concepts and how
concepts do not have fixed essence of their own that
we come to realize nirvaa.na, or the state of
liberation which is devoid of all
thought-constructions. That is why Naagaarjuna says,
'"paramaartha.m anaagamya nirvaa.na.m
naadhigamyate,"(27) Nirvaa.na or liberation cannot be
attained without the knowledge of the highest truth,
that is, 'suunyataa. Being firmly entrenched in
'suunyataa and realizing that language has only a
conventional use, an aarya or a philosopher regards
silence or noncommittment as the highest good or
paramaartha. And the attainment of paramaartha in
this sense, not in the sense of a transcendental
reality, constitutes an essential feature of
nirvaa.na or liberation.

V. THE MAADHYAMIKA NIRVAA.NA--ITS IMPLICATION

What then are the various implications of this
nirvaa.na which is freedom from all
thought-constructions? Freedom from all sorts of
metaphysical vagaries is the ideal for the
Maadhyamikas. One concept leads to another, one idea
leads to the other, and this is alright in its
sphere. But metaphysicians make an illegitimate use
of these concepts, thereby falling into the trap of
absolute confusion and inconsistencies. Philosophical
insight consists in avoiding these extreme
metaphysical positions by a perfect u nderstanding of
these concepts as being 'suunya or ni.hsvabhaava,
that is, as devoid of essence. That all sorts of

P. 489

metaphysical speculations are to be consistently
avoided is clear from the following statement of
Buddha "Asiiti naastiiti ca kalpanaavataam eva.m
carantaana na duhkha 'saamyati,"(28) that is, those
who speculate about existence and nonexistence will
never realize the cessation of suffering. Commenting
on this, Candrakiirti enumerates all sorts of
contending metaphysical theories available in his
time, those of Jaimini, Ka.naada, Kapila, the
Vaibhaa.sikas, the Sautraantikas, the Yogaacaara and
so forth, which, according to him, are not conducive
to the cessation of misery. This shows that freedom
from these contending metaphysical theories is one of
the essential features of nirvaa.na or liberation
which is nothing but philosophical enlightenment,
according to the Maadhyamikas. But this is possible
through a realization that there is no essence to
hang upon or to cling to in our ordinary discourse,
which is merely conventionally useful. Once this
dawns upon the philosopher he desists from committing
those errors which an essentialist or
svabhaavavaadin is likely to commit. He, for example,
would not side with any of the opposing theories of
'saa'svatavaada (eternalism, the doctrine of eternal
soul) . ucchedavaada (annihilationist theory,
materialism) and the like. An essentialist becomes an
easy prey to such metaphysical vagaries. Considering
that things of the world have a fixed svabhaava or
nature of their own, they are misled by metaphysical
pictures of reality. Rival pictures then hold sway on
their minds which keep them in bondage. "A picture
held us captive,"(29) we may say with Wittgenstein;
however, remembering all the time that Naagaarjuna's
approach to this problem is not the same as that of
Wittgenstein. Wisdom or praj~naa consists in freedom
from this captivity or bondage of essentialist
picturethinking and that is all. There can be no
question here of applying concepts like "is" or "is
not" to nirvaa.na itself inasmuch as that would again
be committing an essentialist mistake. In this very
sense there is no nirvana, says Candrakiirti. If
someone thinks that nirvaa.na is an entity or a
positive state which can be obtained as one would
obtain oil out of oil seeds or butter out of milk he
is absolutely mistaken, according to
Candrakiirti.(30)
Nirvaa.na is thus nondifferent from critical
insight par excellence which is free from all
essentialist picture-thinking. This I consider to be
the unique contribution of the Buddhist thought in
general and of the Maadhyamika philosophy in
particular to world philosophy, The practical
implication of subscribing to this antiessentialist
'suunyataa view is not strictly within the scope of
such a philosophical writing as this. The
implication, however, is evident; there is little
scope for indulging in a rigidly self-centered
existence arising out of a desperate clinging to
immutable essences on the part of one, be it an
individual or a nation as a whole, who simply takes
'suunyataa seriously, not to speak of one who has
realized the truth of 'suunyataa in nirvaa.na, that
is, has been firmly entrenched in this truth.
Theoretically speaking, Maadhyamika thought will
remain as a towering specimen of critical philosophy
devoid of all essentialist picture-thinking and
metaphysical commitments, being a standing

P. 490

challenge to all those who sneer at Indian philosophy
as mystical. dogmatic, metaphysical, theologically
biased, or even as obscuranist, and whatever.
Practical implications apart, freedom from an
all-pervasive essentialist illusion is itself an
achievement of the highest order of which the human
mind is capable and which is worth having for its own
sake.

NOTES

1. See his Brahmasuutrabhaa.sva 2.2.31.

2. Confer "Yat 'suunyavaadina.h 'suunya.m tad eva
Brahma-maayinah," as quoted in C. D. Sharma, A
Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy (London:
Rider & Company), p. 372n.

3. Confer '''Suunyam iti na vaktavyam a'suunyam iti
va bhavet, ubhaya.m nobhayam ceti
praj~naaptyartha.m tu kathyate" In Maadhyamika
'sastra, Chapter XXII, Kaariika, 11.

4. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London,
1955). p. 160. See also p. 234: "The Maadhyamika
rejects every view as falsification of the real.
The rejection is. however. a means, the only
means open to absolutism."

5. Muulamadhyamakakaarikas, 24. 11

6. Confer "Yo ki~ncid api pa.nya.m
daasyaamiityukta.h, sa ced dehibhostadeva mahya.m
na ki~ncin naama pa.nyam iti bruuyaat, sa
kenopaayena 'sakya.h pa.nyaabhaava.m graahayitum"
In Prasannapadaa. A student of contemporary
Western philosophy would be reminded here of
Wittgenstein's remarks in Blue and Brown Books
about an imaginary expression. "I found Mr. No
body in the room" instead of the usual expression
"I found no body in the room."

7. Confer Bodhicaryaavataarapa~njikaa by
Praj~nnnkaramati: "Parama
uttamaartha.hparamaartha.h, ak.rtrima.m
vasturuupam, sarvadharmaa.naam ni.hsvabhaavataa".

8. Maadhyamika'saastra, 25.24.

9. R. Fukuahara, "On Svabhaavavaada," in Buddhist
Studies in India, edited by R. C. Pandeya (Delhi,
1975), p. 90.

10. Confer Maadhyamika'saastra, "Tathaagato
ni.hsvabhaavo, ni.hsvabhaavam idam jagat."

11. Confer for example, Wittgenstein's remarks on a
statement about Moses: Has the name "Moses" got a
fixed and unequivocal use for me in all possible
cases?--Is it not the case that I have, so to
speak, a whole series of props in readings, and
am ready to lean on one if another should be
taken from under me and vice-versa? Philosophical
Investigations,, sect. 79.

12. Confer "Ya.h pratiityasamutpaadah 'suunyataa.m
taa.m pracak.smahe, saa praj~naaptirupaadaaya
pratipat saiva madhyamaa," Maadhyamika 'Saastra,
Chapter 24, Kaarikaa 18.

13. Confer Maadhyamika'saastra, 1.1.

14. Muulamadhyamakakaarikas, 18,0.

15. Sharma, op. cit., p. 87.

16. Prasannapadaa, Chapter I, Kaarikaa 2.

17. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist
Nirvaa.na, p. 134.

18. Murti, op. cit., p. 232.

19. Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa, 25, 19,

20. Ibid., 25.9.

21. Murti op. cit., p.

22. Confer Maadhyamika'saastru, 24.8.

23. Maadhyamika'saastra, 24.9.

24. Stcherbatsky, op. cit.

25. David Pears, Wittgenstein (Fontana/Collins,
1971), pp. 101-102.

26. Muulamadhyamakakaarikaas, 24. 10.

27. Ibid.

28. Samaadhiraajasutra, 9.26. as quoted in
Prasannapada of Candrakiirti.

29. Philosophical Investigations, Sect. 115.

30. Prasannapadaa, 25.24.