Attaa, Nirattaa, and Anattaa in the early Buddhist literature

·期刊原文

Attaa, Nirattaa, and Anattaa in the early Buddhist literature

Biswadeb Mukherjee
Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal
Chung-Hwa Insitute of Buddhist Studies
No.6
P.391-424

---

P.391

Summary

The present article deals with the non-Buddhist

concepts of attaa and their refutation through the

doctrine of anattaa. This article is divided into

five sections.

Section I discusses Nikaaya passages which

states which the attaa is not existent either in the

sphere of the Conditioned or in the realm of the

Unconditioned. It is nothing but a figment of

imagination.

Section II refers to the different opinions held

by scholars as to the proper implications of the

term attaa.Except for the lone voice of E. Conze who

found similarity between the attaa and the Puru.sa

of the Saa.mkhya, all other scholars who cared to

ponder over this problem, seem to be preoccupied

with the relationship that could exist between the

attaa and the Aatman of the Upani.sads. This may be

due to the fact that these two terms-attaa and

Aatman-are philologically identical.The philological

identity led the scholars readily to accept the view

that these terms are also philosophically identical

without making any further investigation into the

exact onnotations of these two terms. The need for a

more objective study of the problem of equation

of attaa and Aatman is obvious, and a suitable

methodology for such a study has been suggesed.

Section III delineates the main features of the

thoughts of the 'Saa'svatavaadins, Ekacasassatavaa-

dins, the ucchedavaadins and the followers of the

Satkaayad.r.s.ti. They were the chief propagators of

the attaa heresies rejected by the Buddha.

Section IV, Part A contations the criticism of

all these heresies meant for the Buddhist monks. The

validity of such a criticism mainly rests on the

Buddha's claim to superior and higher knowledge of

which the heretics know nothing.Part B of the same

Section offers us the following two patterns of

reasonings which

P.392

were ultimately meant for the non-Buddhist ascetics

and employed for the refutation of the different

attaa heresies except the Ucchedavaada: I) To reject

the opponent's view by showing the internal

contradictions, a method which was later followed by

Naagaarjuna with great success; ii) To temporarily

accept a part of the opponent's view in order to

show that the view as such is unacceptable. This may

be taken as an instance of skillfulness of means

praised so much in the Mahaayaana.

Section V comes to the conclusion that the

anattaa doctrine was mainly formulated keeping in

view the 'saa'svatavaada and the Ucchedavaada. This

is in conformity with some statements in the

buddhist texts that the buddha preached the anattaa

doctrine as a middle way between these two extremes.

It is also clear that the attaa concepts of the

'Saa'svatavaadins and the Uccedavaadins cannot be

identical with the Aatman of the Upani.sads. the

Buddhist sages were aware of the fact the that the

attaa rejected by the buddha is

'aha^nkaara-vi.saya.h' whereas the Upani.sadic

Aatman is 'Buddhaanaam vi.saya.h'.

P.393

The doctrine of anataa forms the keynote of the

teachings of the Buddha and leterally means that the

attaa is non-existent. The denial of the attaa finds

expression in the following statement ascribed to

the Buddha in the Samyutta Nikyaaya: "Sabbam

bhikkhave anicca.m/sabbam bhikkhave dukkha.m/sabbam

bhikkhave anattaa" (1). The chapter just preceeding

the one from which we have quoted the three

statements, contains such expressions as "sabbe

bhikkhave jaraadhamma.m..... vyaadhidhamma.m........

mara.nadhamma.m....sa.mkilesadhama.m" etc(2). These

statements leave no doubt that in all these cases we

have to take the term 'sabba' as indicating the

things condition. So we find that 'sabba' is a

technical term and stands for the 'samsk.rta

dharma'. This conclusion of ours is confirmed by the

definition of 'sabba' as given in the Sabbavaggo of

the Salaayatana-sa^myutta(3) : "Ki~n ca bhikkhave

sabba.m/cakkhu ceva ruupaa ca/sota~nca saddaa

ca/ghaana~nca gandhaa ca/jihvaa rasaa ca/kayo ca

pho.t.thabba ca/mano ca dhammaa ca/idam vuccati

bhikkhave sabba.m" According to this definition

'sabba' means eye and the forms, the nose and the

smells, the ear and the sounds, the tongue and the

tastes, the body and the tangible things, the mind

and the mental objects. Here the term 'sabba' means

twelve aayatana. In a more elaborate way the Buddha

explains the same term while giving instructions on

the giving up of the 'sabba'. He states that eye,

form, eye-contact, eye-consciousness and the

different feeling due to eye-contact are to be

renounced. Similarly he preaches with references to

other sense organs.(4) Thus the term 'sabba' fully

covers the category of 'samsk.rta-dharma' and the

statement "sabbam anattaa", means the conditioned is

without any soul

────────────

(1) S.Vol. IV, p.28, XXXV, 43-45 (PTS,London, 1894)

(2) Ibid XXXV, 34-38

(3) Ibid, p.15, XXXV, 23

(4) Katamo ca bhikkhave sabbapahaanaayo dhammo/

cakkhum bhikkhave pahaatabba.m/ruupa

pahaatabbaa/cakkhuvi~n~naana.m pahaatabba.m/cak-

khusamphasso pahaatabbo/yam pida.m

cakkhusamphassopaccayaa uppajjati vedayita.m

sukha.m vaa dukkha.m vaa adukkham asukha.m

vaa/tam pi pahaatabba.m/(Sa^myutta, IV, pp15-16,

XXXV, 24(PTS, London, 1894)

P.394

(soul).

But what about the Unconditioned? Is it also

devoid of attaa? Walpolo Rahulo thinks that it is,

and refers to the three statements from Dhammapada

in support of his contention.(5) These statements

which are very similar to the passage from the

Sa^myutta Nikaaya quoted above are as follows:(i)

sabbe sa^nkhaaraa dukkhaa, ii) sabbe sa^nkhaaraa

aniccaa. iii), sabbe dhammaa anattaa. Rahulo thinks

that while the phrase sabbe sa^nkhaaraa indicates

the things conditioned, the phrase sabbe dhammaa

refers to both the Conditioned and the

Unconditioned. But it is difficult to accept this

interpretation. We may hold that the word 'sabbe'

should have the same meaning as the term 'sabbam'.

viz. the conditioned things, and it is unreasonable

to assume that the scope of the word 'sabba' while

occuring together with the term 'dhamma' is so

extended as to include even the opposite meaning,

the Unconditioned. Moreover the phrase 'sabbe

dhamma' has been used many times in the Buddhist

scriptures to mean only the Conditioned. The

Karatalaratna, a comparatively late work written by

Bhaavaviveks, described 'sarvadharmaa.h' as being of

dependent origin (sarvadharmaa.h.... pratiityasamut-

pannaa.h......ni.hsvabhaavaa.h) (6) Again in the

Culasaccakasutta of the Majjhima Nikaya (7) it is

stated: "ruupa^m bhikkhave anicca^m, vedanaa

aniccaa,...vi~n~naana^m anicca^m, ruupam bhikkhave

anattaa, vedanaa.... sa~n~naa..... samkhaaraa......

vi~n~naanam anattaa, sabbe samkhaaraa aniccaa,

sabbe dhammaa anattaa ti. "Here both the phrases

'sabbe dhammaa' and sabbe samkhaaraa obviously refer

to the five skandhas. That only the conditioned

things are meant here become evident when in the

same sutta (8) we meet with a discussion on things

which are both aniccaa and anattaa. Nibbaana is not

included on this discussion. The Upasivamaanapucchaa

of the Sutta nipaata (9) (1076) states that in case

of nibbaana all dharmas are destroyed (sabbesu

────────────

(5) Rahulo, What the Buddha taught (Grove Press,

INC.New York, 1962) , pp.57-58; Dhammapada,

Chapter 20, verses 5-7.

(6) Swaami Vidyaara.nya, Bauddha Dharma O Darsan,

p.16 ( West Bengal State Book Boards, Calcutta,

1984)

(7) Majjhima, Vol, I, p.280 (Nava Nalanda Ed.),

p.228 (PTS Ed.); also see, Sa^myutta Vol. III,

p.132

(8) Ibid. 282-87 (Nava Nalanda Ed.)

P.395

dhammesu upahatesu) . Sabbe dhammaa has been

explained as skandhas and aayatanas in the

Cullaniddesa,(10) making it clear that nibbaana is

outside the scope of this phrase. In the

Mahaaparinibbaanasutta (11) Aniruddha explains

buddha's parinibbana as 'vimokkho' of consciousness

(pajjotass'eva nibbaanam vimokkho cataso). The term

'vimokkho' has been explained by Buddhaghoso in the

Sumangalavilasini(12) as freedom from all dharmas

(vimokkho'ti kenaci dhemmena anaabara.na). Thus the

testimony of the Suttanipaata and the Mahaa

parinibbaanasutta confirms that the phrase 'sabbe

dhammaa' does not include nibbaana within its scope.

So the things conditioned were definitely held

to be devoid of attaa. But was the nirvana, the

Unconditioned also bereft of attaa? Is the attaa

non-existent with reference to the Unconditioned

also? In the Udaana (13) nibbaana is described as

anattaa which is rightly glossed as attaa-virahita

in Paramatthadii pam. Thus the attaa is non-existent

either as a sa.msk.rta-dharma or as an

asa.msk.rta-dharma. The attaa is nothing but a

figment of imagination.

II

────────────

(9) PTS, London, 1913,The group of Discourses II,

p.121 (PTS, London, 1992)

(10)Cullaniddesa, (PTS.London, 1988) p.177, also

see, The Group of Discourses II p.376

(11) Diigha, Vol II, p.157. The line "pajjotasseva

nibbaana.m vimokkho cetaso" is translated in

Dialogues of the Buddha, Pt. II, p.176, as "Even

as a bright flame dies away, so was the last

emancipation of his heart'. 'pajjota' is

translated as a lamp while 'nibbaana' is taken

to be blowing out of a lamp'. On the other hand

M.Walche understand 'pajjota' in the sense of

the 'Illumined One' and translate the same line

as 'By Nibbaana the. Illumined's mind is freed'

(Thus Have I Heard, London, 1987; p.271). Both

these translations are not fully satisfactory

PTS translates 'eva' as 'like' while it would

have been better to render it as 'just, surely,

indeed'. Walche omits it. As 'pajjotassa

nibbaana' is compared with 'vimokkho cetaso',it

would be more appropriate to translate as the

'nibbana of the Enlightened One'. So the

sentence may be rendered as follows: 'The

nibbaana of the Enlightened one is, indeed, the

release of mind.'

(12)Suma^ngala-vilaasinii, Part II, p.595 ( PTS,

London, 1971)

P.396

To know the reason behind the denial of attaa we

have first to be clear about the exact implication

of the term attaa. Scholars differ as to the precise

sense in which this term has been used. But before

their views were discussed it is necessary to point

out that the praak.rt word attaa is the same as

aatman in Sanskrit. This philological identification

has led to philosophical misunderstanding among the

scholars. Some scholars automatically take attaa to

be the Aatman of the Upani.sads. They think that

the philosophical implications of these two

termsattaa and aatman-are identical and consequently

the doctrine of anattaa came to mean for them the

refutation of the Upani.sadic Aatman. The scholars

belonging to this

────────────

(13) P.Steinthal in his edition of the Udaana (PTS,

London, 1982) , p.80 adopts the following

reading of the relevant verse:

'duddasam anattam naama, na hi saccam

sudassanam

patividdhaa tanhaa jaanato, passato n'atthi

ki~ncanan ti'.

In his translation F.L.Woodward reads 'anantam'

(infinite) in place of anattam (Verses of

Uplift, The Minor Anthologies of the Canon, Pt.

II, PTS London, 1985, p.98). I prefer the

reading 'anattam' due to the following

considerations: Steinthal gives the variant

reading 'anattam' given in the commentary

(anatatan ti paa.thati) called Paramattha-dii

panii which was copied in Sinhalese script for

the PTS. This transcript which he calls 'C'

often gives right information and corrects the

incorrect readings of the other manuscripts

(see, Stienthal, Udana, p.VIII).This commentary

explains 'anattam' as 'attaa-virahitam'.Another

manuscript which he calls 'B' as well as the

Nava-Nalanda Ed. Of the Udaana follow this

reading. There is no reason why the reading

'ananttam' should not be accepted. On the other

hand it is difficult to agree with Woodward who

accepts the reading 'anantam', as it is found

only in the Nidaana.t.thakathaa of Dhammapaa-

laacariya (Ed. F.L.Woodward, PTS, London, 1977,

P.393) . Nidaana.t.thakathaa explains as

follows: 'niccasvabhavattaa anta-virahitam

amaranadhammam anirodham amatam ti attho'. 'As

nibbana is permanent by nature, it is without

an end, beyond death and cessation; it is

immortal'. It is obvious that this definition

of nibbaana also excludes attaa.

Actually speaking no scriptural evidence is

needed to prove that nibbaana is devoid of

attaa. The concept of attaa is such that it is

automatically excluded from the domain of

nibbaana.

P.397

group have unfaltering faith in the Buddha as the

unique preacher of the True Law, and as such harbour

no weakness for the honoured traditions of the

Upani.sads. the view of Walpolo Sri Rahulo, an

worthy representative of this group, will be

presented later. On the other hand those scholars

who hold both the Buddha and the Upsani.sads in high

esteem do not subscribe to this view. Let us take

note of the opinion of Radhakrishnan (14) who

belongs to this second group of scholars. According

to him the Buddha clearly tells us what the soul

(attaa) is not, though he does not give us any clear

account of what it is. It is, however, wrong to

think that there is no soul according to the Buddha.

In support of his opinion Radhakrishnan (15) refers

to the dialogue between the wondering ascetic

Vacchagotta which, according to him, shows that

something there is, though it is not the empirical

self. In another place (16) he refers to this

empirical self and states that it is the false view

that clamours for the perpetual continuation of this

small self, which the Buddha refutes. This, (17)

according to Radhakrishnan, also agrees with the

statement of the Buddha that the self is neither the

same nor different from the skandhas. He further

states (18): " It is also clear that the reduction

of the self to a number of skandhas is not ultimate.

If the self is merely an impermanent compounded of

body and mind....then when it disappears then there

is nothing which is delivered...Freedom becomes

extinction. But Nirvaa.na is timeless existence and

so the Buddha admit the reality of a timeless self."

Radhakrishanan appers to be of the opinion that

the term 'attaa' which he translates as self has

been used in two different senses. One meaning of

attaa is the small self or empirical self which the

Buddha rejects through the doctrine of anattaa. The

other implication of the term attaa is the ture self

which is same as nirvaa.na and is accepted by the

Buddha. It is the identity of this true self with

other things that the buddha rejects.

We may now discuss the opinion of Rahulo who re-

presents the other group

────────────

(14) Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, P.386 (George Allen

& Unwin, London, 1977)

(15) Ibid. p.386

(16) Ibid. p.388, note 1

(17) Ibid. p.387

(18) Ibid. p.451

P.398

of scholars. While explaining the doctrine of

anattaa Rahulo (19) refers to the different concepts

of aatman, even the concept of Brahman-Aatman of the

Upani.sads and holds that the buddha was unique in

rejecting all such doctrines through the doctrine of

anattaa. " The idea of an abiding, immortal

substance in man or outside, whether it is called

Aatman, I, soul, self, or ego, is considered only a

false belief, a mental projection. This is the

Budhist doctrine of anttaa (20). So it appears that

by the doctrine of anattaa the Buddha was denying

attaa " which was accepted by every other

philosophico-religious system". Rahulo seems to

suggest in not so abmiguous term that even the

Brahman-Aatman concept of the Upani.sads stands

hereby negated.

It is clear that the concept of the Upani.sadic

Aatman acts as a powerful background in influencing

the formulations of both the above-mentioned views.

Conze, (21) on the other hand, propounds a different

theory which is not connected with the Upani.sadic

Aatman in any way. He is not sure what notions of an

aataman were deined by the Buddha, but he believes

that these notions are of two kinds, e.g.i) the

ideas implied in the use of 'I' and 'mine', and ii)

the philosophical opinion of the Saa^mkhya and

Vaisse.sika. The basic formula absence of a self is

confined to the five skandhas, and nothing is said

either way about its existence quite apart from

them. The Buddha never taught that the self is not,

only that it cannot be apprehended.

It is obvious that the solution of this knotty

problem hinges on the proper understanding of the

nature of attaa that was rejected by the Buddha. It

is really strange that none of the scholars who

suggested the equation of attaa either with the

Upani.sadic Brahman-Aatman or with some other

non-buddhist concepts ever tried to clearly

enunciate what this attaa is. Any such suggestion

without first defining the concept of attaa is bound

to be methodologically unscientific and

unconvincing.

To arrive at a more objective conclusion the

following approach may be suggested. On the one

hand we should study those materials from the

Nikaaya and

────────────

(19) Rahulo. What the buddha taught, p.51

(20) Ibid, p.55

(21) The Buddhist Thought in India, pp.38-39 (George

Allen & Unwin, London, 1962)

P.399

Aagama which are more or less descriptive in nature,

Such materials provide us with legends and other

informantions about the attaa philosophy dominant in

the region where the Buddha was preaching his

anattaa doctrine, and so engaged his attention. The

reason for doing so is the justifiable surmise that

the attaa concept or concepts, the negation of which

forms the core of buddhism, should find some mention

in this descriptive type of scripture. On the other

hand we should carefully scrutinise another type of

material contained in the Buddhist scripture which

is more critical and philosophical in nature, and

acquaints us with detailed argumengs justifying the

rejection of the attaa philosophy. Out of such study

will also emerge the atta concept or concepts which

the Buddha was rejecting. The study of these two

types of materials will enable us to form a complete

idea of the different attaa concepts the Buddha

discarded as false views. It is only then we would

be in a position to reliably know whether the

Upani.sadic concept of Aatman-Brahman was rejected

or not.

The major non-buddhist concepts of attaa

criticised in the Nikaayas and Aagamas many be

broadly divided nito four main categories dealing

with a) Satkaayad.r.s.ti, b), 'Sa'svatavaada, c)

Ekaccassatavaada, and d) ucchedavaada. We will

discuss these heresies in the order given here.

III

a) Satkaayad.r.s.ti : In the Sa^myutta Nikaaya

(22) we come across the following description of a

false view which later came to be known as

Satkaayad.r.s.ti: " Those recluses and Brahmanas who

while seeing in various ways see the attaa (soul),

they actually see the five aggregates of attachment

or any of them. Which five? In this connection,

monks, an uneducated ordinary person... envisages

matter as a soul, or a soul possessing matter, or

matter in a soul, or a soul in matter. Or he

envisages, feeling, perception, the gormative

forces, or consciousness as a soul, possessed by a

soul, in a soul, or soul in them. Envisaging thus he

gets a thought "I am"...Being ignorant he thinks

this, or "I am this" or "I shall be" "I shall not

be" or I shall be material "or" I shall be having

perception "or" I shall be

────────────

(22) Sa^myutta, Vol.III 46f; Taisho, vol.II,

p.11b1ff. A.K. Warder,Indian Buddhism, pp.123ff

P.400

without perception (a-samj~nin)" or "I shall have

neither perception nor non-perception. But one who

is educated, abandons ignorance and gets

knowledge... and does not have any of these

thoughts."

The passage quoted above shows that the attaa in

which these recluses and Braahma.nas believed could

be in four different ways connected with the five

skandhas and this connection is constant. The

existence of an attaa without any reference to the

skandhas was unthinkable. This association of the

soul with the skandhas gave rise to certain

ego-centric thoughts in which both these

elements-the soul and the skandhas-are present, e.g.

"I am this" "I shall be material" etc.

Here we have a succinct description of a false

view that draws our attention to its two main

features: 1) attaa refers to an individual soul

whose essence consists of an awareness of 'I' (22a);

2) attaa is invariably connected with the skandhas.

Its existence is always conceived in association

with skandhas. This heresy, as already noted, came

to be known as satkaayad.r.s.ti (Pali:

Sakkaayadi.t.thi). The term satkaaya refers to the

five aggregates of attachment (pa~ncupaadaanakkhand-

haa) (23) and Satkaayad.r.s.ti to a false view that

fails to see the skandhas merely as skandhas, but

always views them through the prism of an attaa. The

most subtle from of satkaayad.r.s.ti is discernible

in the feeling " I am" which lingers in anybody who

is spiritually below the status of an arhat. He may

no longer consciously believe in

────────────

(22a) In the Alagaddupamasuttam of the Majjhima

Nikaaya (PTS), Vol. I, pp.138ff. (Nalanda

Ed.), Vol.I, pp.185 ff. We read that the

feelings of 'I' and 'mine' are interdependent.

And with "I" and "mind" to be really and truly

existing, the possibility of this false view

would also be there: "That is the world, that

is attaa. I shall be after death, everlasting,

abiding eternal, unchanging and I shall remain

as such for eternity". The feeling of 'I'and

'mine' being absent, the possibility of the

false view would not be there. So a staunch

belief in the reality of 'I' and 'mine' is the

fulcrum on which the illusory image of an

eternal soul rests.

(23) Satkaaya or Sakkaaya means pa~ncupaadaanakkhandhaa

or five aggregates of attachment: "Pa~nca kho

ime.... upaadaanakkhandhaa sakkaayo vutto

bhagavataa seyyathidam rupupaadaanakkhandho,

vedanupaadaanakkhandho. Sa~n~nupaadaanakkhandho,

vi~n~naanupaadaanakkhandho, samkhaarupaadaana-

kkhandho (Cullavedallasutta, Majjhima Nikaaya,

Vol.I, pp.369-70(nalanda Ed.), p.299 (PTS).

P.401

it, he may even intellectually refute it, but he is

not yet free from the vestige of this pernicious

heresy.(24)

We may refer to passage in the ko'sa literature

that helps us to understand more clearly the

different modes of relationship existing between the

soul and the five skandhas (Conze, p.33). This

passage, like the Sa^myutta Nikaaya account,

distinguishes between the twenty bases of grasping

at the notion of soul. One regards (1-5) the soul as

the five skandhas, as the flame of a lamp is

identical with its visual appearance; (6-10) the

soul as having or possessing the five skandhas, like

the shadow of a thing; (11-15) the skandhas in the

soul, as the scent in a flower; (16-20) the soul in

the skandhas, as the gem in the casket.(25)

────────────

(24) In this connection we may refer to the episode

of khemaka recorded in the Sa^myutta Nikaaya,

Vol. III, pp.127ff. (PTS Ed.) Some monks ask

Khemaka whether he sees in the five aggreates

of attachment any self (attaa) or anything

pertaining to self (attaniiya). Khemaka replies

in the negative but at the same time admits

that he is not yet an arhat. "I am not an arhat

free from all impurities, Oh friends, with

regard to the five aggregates of attachment. I

have a feeling 'I am' but I do not clearly see

'This is I am'". Then Khemaka explains what he

calls 'I am' is neither matter, feeling,

perception, mental formation (sa^nkhaara) nor

consciousness nor anything without them. But he

has the feeling 'I am' with regard to the five

skadhas, though he could not see clearly 'This

is I am'. He says it is like the smell of a

flower, it is neither the smell of the petals,

nor of the colours, nor of the pollens, but the

smell of the flower. Khemaka further explains

that this feeling 'I am' disappears when one

progresses further, just as the chemical smell

of a freshly washed cloth disappears when it is

kept in a box.

(25) See, E.Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p.33.

It is to be noted that the same comparison of

attaa with smell of a flower also occurs in the

Sa^myutta Nikaaya (see, note no.24). We should,

however, observe that though Khemaka feels 'I

am' he does not treasure this feeling; he wants

to get rid of it as something unreal. But to a

follower of 'Saa'svatavaada this feeling

indicates something real which is the very

essence of his eternal being. The spiritual

experience is same in both the cases, though

the wisdom needed to interpret the experience

correctly is absent in case of the

'Saa'svatavaadins.

P.402

This account of the Sathaayad.r.s.ti acquaints

us with the most basic form of attaa heresy.

Satkaayad.r.s.ti merely postulates a relationship

between the soul and the five skandhas. It neither

advocates the eternity of the soul nor holds the

soul to be co-terminous with the body.

Satkaayad.r.s.ti is neither 'Saa'svatavaada nor

Ucchedavaada. But the following statement recorded

in the Sa^myutta Nikaaya (26) imaa kho gahapati

ditthiyo sakkaayaditthiya sati honti-shows that the

satkaaya d.r.s.ti is the root cause of all other

heresies, including the 'Saa'svatavaada and the

Ucchedavaada. A person believing in a soul and

having desire for existence (bhava-t.r.s.naa)

willingly believes that the soul survies the body

and accepts the false view of its permanetnt

existence (bhava-d.r.s.ti). On the other hand, a

person thirsting for non-existence (vibhava-t.r.s.naa),

willingly believes that death is the ultimate end of

every thing, and comes to believe in the false view

of non-existence (Vibhavad.r.s.ti) the annihilation

of soul after death (Ucchedavaada).(27)

b) 'Saa'svatavaada: The account of the

'Saa'svatvaada as given in the Brahma-jaalasutta

(28) may be abridged as follows:-

There are recluses and Brahmanas who accept the

philosophy of eternalism (sassatavaada) and proclaim

that both the soul and the world are eternal. And

why they do so? Some recluse and Brahmana by means

of exertion and proper mental attention attains to

such a cencentration of mind that they are able to

recall to mind many hundreds of thousands of past

births. And they think: "There

────────────

(26) Sa^myutta, Vol.IV, p.287

(27) Lamotte, Indian Buddhism, pp.35,48,51. In this

connection we may refer to the Sattaasavasutta,

Majjhima Nikaaya, (Nalanda Ed. Vol.I,

pp.12-13), which also states that it is due to

ego-centric thoughts (e.g. atthi me atta etc.)

that such a wrong view arises: "This is my

self, which speaks and feels, which experiences

the fruits of good and bad actions now here,

now there, this self is permanent, stable,

everlasting, unchanging, remaining the same for

ever and ever." This false view is given the

designation of 'Saa'svatavaada in the Sa^myutta

Nikaaya; "That is the self, that is the world

(loka) . He takes rebirth, he is eternal,

stable, unchanging - this is the eternalist

veiw-point." Cf. S. Part III, pp.98-99; 182

(28) Diigha Nikaaya, Vol. I ( PTS Ed. By T.W.Rhys

Davids) London, 1973, pp.13-14; T.W.Rhys

Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha, Part I,

pp.27-28(PTS, London, 1977)

P.403

I was born of such a name (eva.m-naamo), of such a

lineage and caste (eva.m-gotto, eva.m-va.n.no).(29)

My food was such (eva.m-aahaaro) . I was the

experiencer of such pleasures and pains

(evam-sukha-dukkha-pa.tisa.mvedii) and had such a

span of life (evam-aayu-pariyanto). Falling from

there I was born here." (30) Thus they remember

their past existences in full detail. And each of

them says to himself:"sassato attaa ca loko ca

va~njho kuta.t.tho esika.t.thaayi.thito, te ca

sattaa sandhaavanti sa.msaranti cavanti upapajjanti,

atthi tveva sassata-saman ti." (31) T.W.Rhys Davids

translates as follows: "The soul is eternal; and the

world giving birth to nothing new, is steadfast as a

moutain-peak, as a pillar firmly fixed; and that

though these living creatures transmigrate and pass

away, fall from one state of existence and spring up

in another, yet they are (atthi) for ever and ever."

(32)

Though this translation tallies with the

traditional Buddhist explanation, it is difficult to

accept it, as it raises some problems. From the

legend we have seen that the living beings in this

world could only remembers the details of their past

lives here. And an awareness of an unchangeable 'I'

(cf. I was born with such a name etc.) links all

these past lives together and gives rise to the

notion of an eternal soul (attaa). The same soul was

thought to be born again and again as different

individuals. The attaa and sattaa are not identical.

The skandhas are admitted to be different in each of

these births, though the attaa characterised by the

awareness of an'I' remains unchanged.

The above translation from Rhys Davids of the

stock description of 'Saa'svatavaada is not in

aggreement with the implications of the

'Saa'svatavaada legend. In this translation not only

the two verbs of motion ( sandhaavanti and

sa.msaranti) indicating repeated deaths and rebirths

and so underlining changes are connected with the

sattaa but also the verb of existence (atthi)

indicating permanency becomes associated with the

same sattaa. If we accept this translation we have

to admit that the 'Saa'svatavaadins thought the

concept of eternity to be compatible with the

────────────

(29) In the Mahaapadaanasutta we have evam-jaati in

place of evam-vanno. Both the terms mean social

class or caste. (Diigha Nilaaya, Vol. II.p.8)

(30) Diigha Nikaaya, Vol.I,p.13 (PTS,London, 1975)

(31) Ibid, p.15

(32) Dialogues of the buddha, Part I.p.28(PTS,

London, 1977)

P.404

notion of change. The soul's enternity was not at

variance with its identity with the changeable

skandhas. But there is no reason to believe that the

'Saasvatavaadins were so unrealistic as to support

such an unreasonable view. We have seen that

according to the 'Saa'svatavaada the eternal soul

characterised by a sense of 'I' was different from

the changing individuals. Moreover, other religious

groups contemporary of the 'Saa'svatavaadins were

also not supporters of such a view. The

ucchedavaadins (33) took the soul to be identical

with the skandhas, and consistent with this view

they held that the soul is destroyed together with

the body. The Ekaccasassatavaadins (34) believed the

Mahaabrahmaa to be eternal as they did not appear to

have known that the Mahaabrahmaa was also identical

with the skandhas, created, and subject to death.

All the religious groups including the

'Saa'svatavaadins thus seem to have held the view

that the soul to be eternal must have an existence

independent of the skandhas. So the translation

making the sattaa eternal cannot be accepted. The

only other possibility is to take 'atthi' in the

sense of a singular number and to connect it with

'attaa'. Then we get the following translation: "The

soul is eternal; and the world giving birth to

nothing new, is steadfast as a mountain-peak, as

pillar firmly fixed; and these living beings move on

and on, transmigrate, fall from one state of

existence, rise up in another, but (the soul) exists

for eternity."

For our purpose it is, however, important to

know how the buddhists would understand this

philosophy. From our discussion of the

Satkaayad.r.s.ti it is clear that according to the

Buddhist's interpretation of the false view the soul

must be either identical with or closely related to

the Skandhas. This relation is such that the

existence of a soul apart from the skandhas is

unthinkable. The changes which the skandhas undergo

even during one's lifetime are obvious. Moreover the

acceptance of the repeated deaths and rebirths

shows that the skandhas do not remain unchanged. In

short, according to the buddhist interpretation, the

'Saa'svatavaadins admitted the changeable nature of

the skandhas, accepted the close relationship

existing between the soul and the skandhas, and yet

held the soul to be eternal (sassato). This also

seems to be the opinion of Buddhaghosa (35) as

────────────

(33) Diigha Nikaya, Vol I, see, p.34; also see, p.12

(34) See, p.10 ff.

P.405

expressed in the Suma^ngalavilaasinii, But, as

already shown, Buddhist presentation of the

eternalism is not the same as the original

philosiophy of the 'Saa'svatavaadins. The

'Saa'svatavaadins themselves regarded 'attaa' to be

independent of body and mind, i.e. of the skandhas,

to use the Buddhist terminology. This seems to be

reason why the 'Saa'svatavaadins themselves did not

relate the soul to any of the skandhas in the stock

description of their own philosophy. Even the

logicians and thinkers (takkii, viima^nsii) (36)

among them have nothing to say about the

relationship existing between the soul and the

skandhas.

Whatever may be the case, it is of no

consequence for our present study that the Buddhist

presentation of the attaa of the 'Saa'svatavaadins

does not tally with the original concept. What

really matters is the idea the Buddhists had of such

a concept. For when they reject a concept of an

eternal soul, they do so in the light of their own

understanding of it. So it is important to take note

of their idea of the attaa concept which may be

described as follows: The attaa is an eternally

existent indiv idual soul which is either identical

with the skandhas or so closely attains liberation

nor gets annihilated.

C) Ekaccasassatavaada: A concept of attaa

different from that of the eternalists has been

recorded in the Brahmajaalasutta of the

Diigha-Nikaaya.(37) This is the concept of an

eternal soul unique to the Mahaabrahmaa as held by

the followers of the Ekaccasassatavaada. The Buddha

in order to explain the origin of the

Ekaccasassatavaada relates the following legend

about the past lives of the upholders of this

philosophy:

When the world system dissolves the beings are

reborn in the Aabhassara world. They are made of

mind. Now the world system begins to come into

exitence and an empty Braham-vimaana (Brahma-palace)

appears. One of the beings at the end of merits or

span of life falls from the Aabhassara world and is

reborn in the Brahma-palace. There he lives, made of

mind (manomayo), feeding on joy (piiti-bhakkho),

radiating light. Etc. and thus does remain there for

a

────────────

(35) Suma^ngalavilaasinii, Vol.I, p.105(PTS, London,

1968)

(36) Diigha Nikaaya, Vol.I,p.16

(37) Ibid.pp.17-19; Dialogues of the Buddha, Part I,

pp.30-32

P.406

long time. And the feels lonely and longs for

companions. Just then some beings die in the

Aabhassara world and are born in the Brahma-palace.

They are just like the being who was first born. As

these beings were born after he desired for company,

he thought himself to be Brahmaa Mahaabrahmaa,

Creator, Father of all that are and are to be. And

the other beings also thought that they have been

created by Mahaabrahmaa. Their lives are of shorter

duration than that of Mahaabrahmaa. They die in the

Brahma-palace and are reborn here in this world.

Here one of them leads a religious life and can

remember his past existence in the Brahma-palace,

but not beyond that. He thinks of Mahaabrahmaa as

creator permanent, fixed, eternal, of a nature which

is not subject to transformation (nicco, dhuvo,

sassato, aviparinaamadhammo) while he regards

himself and other beings as created by Mahaabrahmaa,

impermanent, not fixed, eternal, and having the

nature of dying (ancicaa, addhuvaa, appayukaa,

cavanadhammaa).

The last part of the above account seems to be a

stock description which formed a part of the

original philosophy of the Ekaccasassatavaadins.

According to their philosophy only the uncreated is

eternal while the created is impermanent. Only

Mahaabrahmaa is eternal and the other beings are

impermanent. The information that Mahaabrahmaa was

made of mind were most probably not included in

their philosophy, for it is not mentioned in the

utterance of him who remembers his past existence.

Otherwise we have to assume that according to the

Ekaccasassatavaadins mind can be both created and

uncreated. So it appears that this extra bit of

information has been added in accordance with the

Buddhist dogma. Thus as per the understandings of

the Buddhists, the followers of the

Ekaccasassatvaada believed in an eternal soul only

in case of mahaabrahmaa and this soul was made of

mind, uncreated and immortal.

Two other groups of the Ekaccasassatavaadins

(38) believed in many eternal individual souls. But

the eternity is not absolute in these cases; it may

be lost either due to the lack of self-controll or

due to envy. The fourthe group of the

Ekaccasassatavaadins (39) were comprised of the

logicians and the thinkers who concluded by

reasoning that there are two souls, one impermanent

and the other

────────────

(38) Diigha Nikaaya, Vol.I, pp.19-21

(39) Ibid, p.21

P.407

permanent. The soul consisting of ear, nose tongue

and body is impermanent, not fixed, not eternal and

having the changeable nature. But the soul which is

thought or mind or consciousness (cittan ti va mano

ti va vi~n~naanan ti va) is permanent, eternal etc.

d) Ucchedavaada: the seven groups of

Ucchedavaadins (40) identified an individual soul

variously with physical body, or sensual desire, or

mind, or infinite space, or infinite consciousness,

or nothingness, or neither perception nor not

perception. The first group believed in one soul

made of gross matter while the other groups believed

in more than one souls. And all these groups upheld

the doctrine that the soul is annihilated with the

destruction of the body. It appears that even before

the Buddhists the Ucchedavaadins denied the belief

in an eternal individual soul (attaa) which was

identical with one of the skandhas. Therefore this

philosophy came to be known as the doctrine of

nirattaa.

So far we have discussed the Satkaayad.r.s.ti,

'Saa'svatavaada, Ekaccasasvatavaada and the

Ucchedavaada, and these are the only dominant

heresies regarding attaa and relevant to our study

that have been recorded in the Aagamas and Nikaayas.

(41) Presumably these were the four main type of

heresies that attracted the attention of the Buddha

and the early Buddhists. It is obvious that the

attaa concepts discussed in the Ucchedavaada and

Satkaayad.r.s.ti can in no way be connected with the

problem of attaa's identity with the Upani.sadic

Aatman. It is only ths 'Saa'svatavaada and

Ekaccasassatavaada concept that deserves to be

considered in tis connection.

In course of our discussion we have noted the

following characteristics of an eternal soul as

envisaged by the followers of the 'Saa'svatavaada

and Ekaccasassatavaada. The first group of

Ekaccasassatavaada believed that only the

────────────

(40) Ibid, pp.34-35

(41) I have not mentioned the other attaa heresies

described in the Brahmajaalasutta, as they are

not radically different from what we have

discussed in the present article. All these

heresies are also based on the Satkaayad.r.s.ti

and so share the characteristics of the

Satkaayad.r.s.ti. These heresies must also be

partially similar to the 'Saa'svatavaadins or

the Ekaccasassatavaadins. I could not trace any

other sutta devoted to the rejection of any

of these heresies. The Buddhists themselves, it

seems, did not think it necessary to discuss

these false views separately and elaborately.

P.408

soul of Mahaabrahmaa, who is uncreated, is eternal.

But the 'Saa'svatavaada and the other groups of

Ekaccasassatavaada recognise numerous, eternal,

individual souls who are either identical with the

skandhas or so closely related to them as to be

dependent on them for their very existence. The

second and third groups of the Ekaccasassatavaadins,

however, are of the opinion that the eternity is not

absolute, for the beings die if they indulge in

sensual pleasures or are afflicted with jealousy.

The first type of Ekaccasassatavaada explicitly

states that the souls, including that of the

Mahaabrahmaa, are made of mind. This view seems to

have been accepted by the second and third groups of

the Ekaccasassatavaadins who made the eternity of

the individual souls dependent on the purity of

mind. According to the fourth group of the

Ekaccasassatavaadins which consists of the logicians

and the thinkers, the individual soul is identical

with citta or manas or vij~naana. Thus we find that

the Ekaccasassatavaada concept of soul belonged to

the sphere of mind and at least in most cases could

not rise beyond the Ruupaloka. Moreover the eternal

souls are confined within space and time and are

characterised by the subject-object split.

The Upani.sadic Aatman, on the other hand, is

not an individual soul. The Aatman is the supreme

reality, the only Being that is beyond speech,

beyond the reach of mind and the notion of space.

And such an Aatman can by no strech of imagination

be equated with any of the skandhas. In short, the

sassato attaa of the Buddhist scriptures and the

Aatman of the Upanisads are two diametrically

opposing points of view.

So long we have discussed scriptural materials

which are more or less descriptive in nature. Now we

pay attention to a more critical type of

Aagama-Nikaaya passages which acquaint us with the

reasons for the rejection of different types of ataa

heresies, and thereby provide us with some extra

details regarding these heresies.

IV

We have seen that four kinds of relationship

between the attaa and the skandhas were recognised.

Out of these only one type of relationship viz. that

of identity between the attaa and the skandhas,

finds prominent mention in the Nikaayas and the

Aagamas. This appears to have been the dominant

heresy at the

P.409

time of the Buddha. Only in a few cases the early

buddhist canon takes note of other types of

relationship, viz. attaa has skandhaka or attaa is

not a particular type of skandhaka. Again the nature

and contents of such a criticism of attaa heresy

vary depending on the type of persons for whom it

was meant. The discourses which are held for the

benefit of the Buddhist monks are quite different

from those meant for non-Buddhist asceties.

With these preliminary remarks we will proceed

to arrange the relevant materials according to the

type of heresies criticised and the type of persons

addressed.

A: Criticism of heresies meant for the Buddhist

monks

i) Rejection of Satkaayad.r.s.ti: The sa^myutta

passage referred to above is a plain form of

instruction discarding the heresy of

Satkaayad.r.s.ti. the Buddha points out that some

recluses and Brahmans by erroneous observations of

the skandhas give rise to the false notion of a

soul, but those who are wise never make this

mistake. Here the talk is about the mere existence

of a soul with reference to the skandhas, and not

the eternity or impermanence of soul. It is apparent

that the Buddha is rejecting the Satkaayad.r.s.ti.

The Buddha does not find it necessary to offer any

extra argument in favour of his view, as he

addresses his own disciples who have absolute faith

in his wisdom.

ii) Criticism of 'Saa'svatavaada: In the account

of the Brahmajaalasutta which we have already

discussed, the Buddha gives critical description of

the heresy of 'Saa'svatavaada in the form of a

legend. He points out that some recluses and

Brahmanas believe in eternal individual soul for

they can remember their past lives in this world.

The sutta implies that the memory of the past lives

is genuine though the interpretation of such

experiences is wrong. In this passage no logical

argument is advanced justifying the rejection of

this heresy. It will, however, be clear later from

our discussion of another passage from the same

sutta that the Buddha rejects this view on the basis

of his more extensive knowledge and higher

knowledge.

iii) Criticism of Ekaccasassatavaada: Like the

legend about the 'Saa'svatavaada, the legend

concerning the Ekaccasassatavaada in the

Brahmajaalasutta implicitly contains the criticism

of the concept of an eternal soul. The legend states

that

P.410

the beings who died in the Brahmaa world were born

in this world. While in this world they could

remember their past birth in the Brahma-vimaana, but

had no knowledge of their still earlier birth in the

Aabhassara world, nor could they know that

Mahaabrahmaa is also subject to death. This legend

suggests that the incomplete experience coupled with

imperfect knowledge led these beings to interpret

wrongly their genuine spiritual experiences.

Consequently they came to believe in the false

notion of an eternal Mahaabrahmaa who is made of

mind. So the Buddha is here criticising

Ekaccasassatavaada on the basis of his more

extensive knowledge.

iv) Criticism of heresies in general: There is

no legend criticising the Ucchedavaada. This is

because the Ucchedavaada tradition most probably did

not record any legend justifying this philosophy.

The Ucchedavaada philosophy only recognised the

present life and denied the existence of any life

before birth and after death. So there was no scope

for the development of any such legend.

In the Brahmahaakasyttam however, we come across

a general criticism of all the false views noted in

this sutta.(42) Here the criticism is based on the

more extensive knowledge and higher knowledge of the

Buddha. The passage in question states that the

Buddha knows of all these false views and also knows

of into what sort of future existences fall those

who grasp at and become attached to such views.

Knowing this and knowing (other) higher things (ta~n

ca Tathaagato pajaanaati, tato ca uttariitaram

pajaanaati ) the Tathaagata does not get involved,

he knows about extinction; and having truly known

the rising and passing away of sensations

(vedanaanam samudaya~n ca atthamagama~n ca), their

taste, danger, their not being the refuge,

Tathaagata, due to the non-attachment, is free

(vimutto).

These are those other things, profound,

difficult, to understand.. not to be grasped at by

mere logic, which Tathaagata having himself realised

and seen face to face, has set forth."

The higher knowledge which is profound and

beyond logic is different from the knowledge of

future existences and past lives of the beings. The

phrase-"knowing this and knowing(other) higher

things"-clearly shows that two different types of

knowledge are referred to. The higher knowledge

refers to the

────────────

(42) Diigha Nikaaya, Vol.I, pp.16-17, 21-22, 24, 28,

29 etc.

P.411

rising and passing away of vadanaa (sensation or

feeling),i.e.the knowledge of the pa.ticcasamuppaada

which only the Buddha possessed. That the statement

reggarding 'vedanaa' refers to the truth of the

dependent origination is confirmed by another

passage of the same sutta (D. 1.3.71). all the false

views are rejected because they are contradicated by

the law of dependent origination. Of all the links

of the Pa.ticcasamuppaada, Vedanaa is specially

mentioned, for the awareness of 'I' is directily

dependent on vedanaa.

In corroboration of the the conclusion reached

above we may take note of another sutta where the

rejection of a false view on the basis of pa.ticca-

samuppaada is explicitly mentioned.

V) Rejection of the Ekaccasassatavaada:The Buddha

in his instruction to his disciple Keva.t.taputto

Saati is rejecting the Ekaccasassatvaaada on the

basis of pa.ticcasamuppaada.(43) Saati gave out that

it is the self-same vij~naana that passes from one

existence to another. Here Saati is speaking in

favour of 'Saa'svatavaada. This statement is

elaborated in the Papa~ncasudani (44) to bring out

its full significance: 'That which speaks,

experiences now here now there, the fruits of his

good and evil actions is that consciousness

(vij~naana) that I am speaking about.' The same

vij~naana is enjoying the fruits of his actions.

This is the same as preaching 'Saa'svatavaada as it

will be clear from a passage of the Sabbaasavasutta

of the Majjhima Nikaaya and a passage from the

Sa^myutta Nikaaya. The Majjhima passage runs thus

(45): Atha va pana assa evam di.t.thi hoti: yo me

ayam attaa vado vedeyya tatra tatra kalyanapapakanam

vipaakam patisa.mvedeti so kho pana me ayam attaa

nicco dhuvo sassato aviparinamodhammo sassatisamam

tath'eva thassati' 'Or a wrong view occurs to him

thus: the soul of mine that speaks, experiences now

here and now there the fruits of his good and evil

actions is indeed that soul of mine that is

permanent, stable, not subject to change, that will

stand firm for eternity.' The Sa^myutta passage (46)

states: One and the same person both acts and

────────────

(43) M.I, Mahaata~nhaasa^nkhayasutta, pp.256ff. idam

vi~n~naana^m sandhaavanti, sa.msaranti

ana~n~nam. Ibid. p.256

(44) Papa~ncasuudanii, Vol.II, p.305 (PTS, London,

1979)

(45) Majjhims, Vol.I,p.8(PTS, London, 1976)

(46) Sa^myutta Nikaaya, Vol.II, p.20

P.412

experiences (the results). This Kassapa which you

called at first'suffering self-wrought' ammounts to

the Eternalist theory.(47)

It is also to be noted that Saati is identifying

the eternal soul with the vij~naana only. This

reminds us of the view of the logicians among the

Ekaccasassatavaadins who held that indriya etc. are

impermanent while the citta (thought), or manas

(mind), or vij~naana (consciousness) is eternal. So

the eternalism which Saati is preaching actually

ammounts to the Ekaccasassatavaada of the logicians.

To reject this view the Buddha refers to the law of

dependent origination (pa.ticcasamuppaada). The Bud-

dha condemned the view of Saati and corrected him by

pointing out that vij~naana can only originate

through cause and conditions (a~n~natra paccayaa

na'tthi vi~n~naanassa sambhavo ti) (48) and so

cannot be eternal.

In the preceding pages we have dealt with such

criticisms of the false views regarding attaa as

were meant for the loyal disciples of the Buddha.

For his disciples the unquestionable veracity of

these criticisms ultimately rests on their

unflagging faith in the claim of the Buddha to the

more extensive and higher types of knowledge. It was

not necessary for the Buddha to analyse critically

the different heresies in order to expose the flaws

in them, or to adduce extra reasons to justify their

rejection. The approach, however, changes when the

discourses are meant for the non-Buddhist ascetics.

B : Criticism of heresies meant for non-Buddhist as-

cetics

i) Rejection of Ssaa'svatavaada: (49) The

Anattaa-lakkhana-sutta of the Sa6myutta Nikaaya (III

XXII, 59) (50) while giving a clear exposition of

the anattaa doctrine,

────────────

(47) Kindred Sayings, Vol.II, p.16 (PTS, London,

1982)

(48) Majjhima, Vol.I, p.259. It appears that Saati

misunderstood the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth.

It is said in the Sa^myutta Nikaaya (I, 122;

II, 67, 103) that it is only when vi~n~naana

obtains a footing on something (aarammana) that

there is the possiblity of the birth of a

being, and not otherwise, and the moment the

vi~n~naana ceases (cuti), one is regarded as

dead. Also see, Nalinaksha dutt, Early Monastic

Buddhism, Vol.I,P.255 (Calcutta, 1941).

(49) Sa^myutta, Vol.II, pp.66-68 (PTS.London, 1960);

Vinaya, Vol.I, p.13-14 (PTS,London, 1964)

P.413

adduces reasons for the denial of attaa in the

following manner: From (ruupa) is not soul (attaa).

If it were, this form could not turn oppressive, and

with regard to form it would be possible to achieve

the intention that "let my body be thus, let my body

be not thus". And so with vedanaa, sa~n~naa,

sa^mkhaara, and vi~n~naana. "What do you think is

form permanent or impermenet?" "It is impermanent,

Oh Lord". "But is the impermanent ill (dukkha) or

ease (sukha)?" "It is ill, Oh Lord". "But is it

fitting to consider that which is impermanent linked

to suffering, doomed to reversal as 'this is mine, I

am this, this is my soul"'. "No, indeed, Oh Lord".

And so for vedanaa, sa~n~naa ect. Therefore whatever

form there is, past or future, inner or outer, gorss

or subtle, low or exalted, near or far away, would

be seen by right wisdom as it really is, i.e. "all

this form is not really mine, I am not really this,

this is not my soul (attaa)." And so vedanaa,

sa~n~naa etc. Seeing this the well-disciplined holy

disciple become disgusted with the skandhas."

From a careful study of the passage quoted above

the concept of the attaa rejected here clearly

emerges. The ruupa and other skandhas cannot be

attaa for they turn oppressive and cannnot be

changed according to one's liking. So it follows

that the attaa or the individual soul enjoys

complete self-mastery and remains ever happy.

Moreover the five skandhas are not attaa for they

are impermanent and subject to change and suffering.

This shows that the attaa concept rejected here was

believed to be identical with the skandhas,

permanent, changeless, happy and characterised by an

awareness of an 'I' and 'mine'. So the concept of

attaa which emerges wholly conforms to the

Ssaa'svatavaada.

Two opposing trends of thought are discernible

in this sutta. One represent the viewpoint of the

'Saa'svatavaada as presented above. The other trend

shows the Buddha's acceptance of the notion of I and

mine as a basis for further argumentation in order

to disprove the soul's identity with the skandhas.

The line of reasoning, partly explicit and partly

implicit, may be presented thus: the idea of 'I' and

'mine' is the characteristic feature of attaa and

implies complete self-mastery of oneself. Wha t one

refers to as 'I' and 'mine' must be its own master.

Moreover the individual soul is permanent. But the

body (ruupa) is beyond one's control.

────────────

(50) Diigha Nikaaya, Vol.I, pp.179, 182 ff, ;

Dialogues of the Buddha, Part I, p.246ff. Also

see, A.K.Warder, Indian Buddhism (Motilal

Banarasidas, Delhi, 1991) pp.124ff.

P.414

It grows, becomes old and ultimately dies without

anybody being able to do anything to arrest this

process. In short this philosophy upholds the

self-mastery and permanency of an individual soul

but advocates in the same breath the identity of the

soul with the five skandhas which are impermanent

and lack self-mastery. Thus it is clear that the

viewpoint of the 'Saa'svatavaadins suffers from

internal contradiction and cannot be accepted.

It should be noted that the Buddha did not

criticise this philosophy on the basis of any

Buddhist doctrine. The impermanence of body etc, is

a matter of common experience and no higher philophy

is needed to prove it.The Buddha neither referred to

the skandhas constituting a being nor to the law of

pa.ticcasamuppaada in order to deny the existence of

a permanent ego-centric entity. Rather he made use

of the notion of 'I' which is taken to be the

tell-tale sign of an individual soul to refute the

'S aa'svatavaada. This approach appears to be all

the more intriguing as the Buddha is preaching to

his own disciples, and not to the non-Buddhist

ascetics. And from the dialogue between the Buddha

and his disciples it is obvious that his disciples

has not turned into supporters of this false view,

but had remained faithful to his teachings. Moreover

it would be preposterous to hold that the Buddha

actually supported the existence of a permanent

individual soul, although he denied its identity

with the five skandhas. What, then, is the reason

for this particular mode of preaching? We can

reasonably surmise that he was instructing his

disciples how to meet the challenges of such an

erroneous view. The inadvisability of trying to

discard this false view by referring to the Buddhist

doctrine is obvious, for the non-Buddhists cannot be

expected to have any faith in the teachings of the

Buddha. So the Buddha was teaching his disciples how

such false doctrines could be successfully countered

even while basing one's argumants on such articles

of faith as forming an integral part of the

philosophy they were criticising. He was trying to

show how the logical implications of one aspect of

this false doctrine would render null and void

another aspect of the same doctrine. In other words

the Buddha was teaching his disciples to expose the

contradictions inherent in the doctrines of the

'Saa'svatavaadins in such a way that even the

upholdres of this philosophy would be forced to

admit the justification of the criticism. In the

Anattaa-lakkhana-sutta the point which the Buddha

drives home is that the logical implications of the

notion of 'I'

P.415

which were acceptable to the protagonists of this

philosophy, would contradict the other part of the

philosophy, viz. the identity of the individual soul

with the skandhas. It is also clear that the sutta

was ultimately meant for the 'Saa'svatavaadins

themselves.

ii) a)The Po.t.thapadasutta and the rejection of

Satkaayad.r.s.ti: this sutta starts with a

discussion of the rising and the cessation of

perception (sa~n~naa or abhisa~n~na) and then

follows it up with a judgement about the problem of

identity between the soul and perception. We will

just have a glimpse of the discussion as it will

help us to understand the nature of perception. The

Buddha gave a gradual discoures on the higher and

higher stages of perception leading to the summit of

perception ( sa~n~naggam) and then to the cessation

of perception (nirodha). Except the final stage, at

every other stage a perception of a lower type is

replaced by a perception of a higher type. The

Buddha showed that a certain type of perception

arose due to a cetain type of thinking, a cetain

type of mental training. When the thinking ceased,

the perception also ceased. With the cessation of

all thoughts, the possibility of the rising of any

new perception comes to an end.

Next Po.t.thapaada raises the question of a

soul. "Is perception the soul of a man, Sir, or is

perception one thing and soul another?" The Buddha

asked, "What, now, Po.t.thapaads, do you assume a

soul?" "I presume a gross soul sir, material, made

of four great elements, feeding on solid food". "Yet

if your soul were gorss, Po.t.thapaada, material,

made of four gross elements feeding on solid food,

in that case for you perception would be one thing,

soul another. Just let this gross soul be, Po.t.th-

apaada, for then a man's perception occurs as one

thing, ceases as another thing". Po.t.thapaada next

proposes to assume a mental soul, with perfect

faculties, complete in its faculties. The Buddha's

objection remains the same: perception would then

occur as one thing but cease as another thing.

Lastly Po.t.tapaada proposes an immaterial soul,

consisting of perception. The objection of the

Buddha is still the same.

The denial of the identity between the soul and

perception is based on the following pattern of

reasoning. If the soul is material like body, then

the soul cannot be identical with perception. For in

that case the perception would be rising as one

thing and ceasing as another. It means that as long

as the perception is in existence, it can be assumed

to be soul (as body). But when it ceases to be, it

P.416

can no longer be equated with the soul, for the

living material soul would be still in existence.

Hence the statement about the perception as rising

as one and ceasing as another. This reasoning also

holds good while showing the difference between the

perception and soul as mind, for the cessation of a

particular perception does not mean the annihilation

of mind. But this type of reasoning is not valid

when one assumes the soul to be made of perception.

In this case the cessation of perception will auto-

matically mean the annihilation of soul, and con-

sequently the argumant that the perception ceases as

another is no longer tenable. This part of the

discussion appears to be a later mechanical

addition.

Whatever may be the case, it is obvious that

Po.t.thapaada is equating attaa with a skandhaka. In

his query about the identity of the soul with

perception as well as in his suggestion that the

soul may be made of four gross elements, or of mind,

or of perception, Po.t.thapaada is equating soul

with one of the skandhakas. He is not concerned

about the eternity of the soul or otherwise. In

other words we are dealing here with the

Satkaayad.r.s.ti, the root cause of all other false

views.

In rejecting the Satkaayad.r.s.ti the Buddha is

not denying the existence of attaa on the basis of

pa.ticcasamuppaada as he did while instructing his

own disciples. He is even accepting-for the sake of

argument, or we may say as a skillful

means-Po.t.thapaada's point of view regarding the

existence of soul or the constitution of soul, and

then rejecting the suggested identity by exposing

the logical inconsistencies involved in the

suggestion. He is showing that the acceptance of the

view that the soul is made of mind or four gross

elements contradicts the other aspect of the

suggestion, viz. soul is identical with perception.

b) Mahaanidaanasutta and the rejection of a dii-

ierent type of Satkaayad.r.s.ti (51)

Mahaanidaanasutta ( 52 ) rejects a new type of

Satkaayak.r.s.t.i which may be formulated as soul

possessing feelings. The relevant passage is given

below: "Herein, again, Aaanada, to him who affirms:

'Nay, my soul is not feeling, nor is it non-

────────────

(51) For Sanskrit parallels to different attaa

concepts discussed in the Mahanidaanasutta,

see, Nidanasa^myukta, C.B.Tripathi, Deutsche

Akademie der Wissenschaften Zu Berlin, IO,

1962.

(52) Diigha nikaaya, Vol.II, XV.31, p.67(PTS London,

1982), Dialogues of the Buddha Part II, p.64

(Pts, London, 1977)

P.417

-sentient; my soul has feelings, it has the property

of sentience '--answer should be made: -'My friend,

were feelings of every kind to cease absolutely,

then there being, owing to cessation thereof, no

feeling whatever, could one then say: --"I myself

am'?"

'No, lord, one could not.'

'Wherefore, Aananda, it follows that this

aspect: -'Nay, my soul is not feel feeling, nor is

it non-sentient; my soul has feelings, it has the

property of sentience'-does not commend itself".

Here the Buddha is teaching Aananda how to

refute the heresy of Satakaayad.r.s.ti. The view

that the soul is not feeling, but possesses feelings

shows that the feeling is not intrinsic to attaa but

external to it. It, therefore, follows that the

presence of absence of feeling should not at all

affect the basic nature of soul. But, as the Buddha

points out, our daily experience shows that in the

absence of all feelings there cannot be any

I-awareness which is the very essence of attaa. So

the feeling is not external to soul; soul cannot be

regarded as having feelings. The accepted idea that

attaa essentially means I-awareness goes against the

view that attaa has feelings.

The attaa heresy under discussion is concerned

with the relationship existing between the soul and

the skandhakas, and so falls under the category of

satkaayad.r.s.ti.

It is by way of expediency that the Buddha

accepts I-awareness as the very core of an assumed

attaa and thereby shows that the present heresy

suffers from internal contradiction. It is also to

be noted that the Buddha's instructions, though

addressed to Aananda, is ultimately meant for the

non-Buddhist ascetics.

iii) The Mahaanidaanasutta and the rejection of

the Ekaccasassatavaada

The Mahaanidaanasutta (53) also contains

passages rejecting the heresy that the soul is

feeling. The relevant part of the sutta runs as

follows: -"Herein, Aananda, to him who affirms' My

soul is feeling'-answer should be thus made: -'My

friend, feelings is of three kinds. There is happy

feeling, painful feeling, and neutral feeling. Of

these three feelings, look you, which do you

consider your soul is?'

────────────

(53) Dialogues of the Buddha, Part II, pp.63-64;

Diigha Nikaaya, Vol. II, XV.28; 29, pp.66-67

P.418

'When you feel a happy feeling you do not feel a

painful feeling or a neutral feeling, you feel just

a happy feeling. And when you feel a painful

feeling, you do not feel a happy feeling or a

neutral feeling, but just a painful feeling. And

when you feel a neutral feeling, you do not feel a

happy feeling or a painful feeling; you feel just a

neutral feeling.'

"Moreover, Aananda, happy feeling is

impermanent, conditioned (sa~nkhata), the result of

cause or causes, liable to perish, to pass away, to

become extinct, to cease. So too the painful

feeling. So too is neutral feeling. If when

experiencing a happy feeling one thinks-'this is my

soul'-when that same happy feeling ceases, one will

also think-'my soul has departed'-So too when the

feeling is painful or neutral. Thus he who say-'My

soul is feeling'-regards, as his soul something

which, in this present life, is impermanent, is

blended of happiness and pain, and is liable to

begin and end. Wherefore, Aananda, it follows that

this aspect-'My soul in feeling'-does not commend

itself."

The passage in question rejects the view that

the individual soul is feeling. The daily experience

of people shows that the feeling is impermanent, a

blending of happiness and pain, and subject to

origination and destruction. This characterisation

of feeling will be, in the main, also acceptable to

the Ekaccasassatavaadins, for they as we have

already noted, accepted the idea that the created is

impermanent. The feeling so characterised is

different from soul. The soul thus appears to be

permanent, beyond origination and destruction, and

experiencing unmixed happiness. It is identical with

one of the skandhas.

This concept of attaa is, in all its essential

features, identical with that held by the logicians

among the Ekaccasassatavaadins who also believed the

individual soul to be eternal, and identical with

one of the skandhas belonging to the sphere of mind.

It is to be noted that the Buddha is denying the

Ekaccasassatavaada not on the strength of the law of

pa.ticcasamuppaada or any other Buddhist dogma. It

is obviously because his invoking of the higher

knowledge would cut no ice with the non-Buddhists.

He is, on the other hand, showing that the

philosophy under criticism suffers from internal

contradiction, and hence untenable. He shows that

the Ekaccasassatavaada concept of feeling is

diametrically opposed to the Ekaccasassatavaada

concept of soul, and so the view that the soul is

identical with feeling

p.419

is to be discarded.

The Mahaanidaanasutta passage supports our

conclusion that the Buddha also taught his disciples

how to defeat the upholders of the attaa heresy in

debate. Here the Buddha is teaching Aananda how to

refute the view of the Ekaccasassatavaadins. In

other words his teaching is ultimately meant for the

followers of the Ekaccasassatavaada.

iv) The mahaanidaanasutta rejects an atypical

attaa heresy: In the Mahaanidaanasutta (54) we come

across a heresy which does not conform to any of the

types mentioned before. The relevant passage

recording a negative formulation the heresy is given

below:-

"Herein, Aananda, to him who affirms: 'Nay, my

soul is not feeling, my soul is not sentient' -

answer should thus be given " 'My friend, where

there is no feeling of anything, can you there

say: 'I am?' 'You cannot, Lord,' 'Wherefore,

Aananda, it follows that this aspect: 'Nay, my

soul is not feeling, my soul is not

sentient'-does not commend itself."

The view that the individual soul is not feeling

and sentient is rejected because there cannot be any

aareness of 'I' without feeling and sentience. Hence

there cannot be any soul without feeling and

sentience. Here the criticism is based on the

assumption of 'I-awareness' as the essence of the

individual soul. The proposition admits of the

existence of an individual soul, asserts the soul's

difference from feeling and sentience, and is silent

about the question whether the individual soul is

eternal or not. This is now type of attaa heresy

which is neither 'Saa'svatavaada nor Ucchedavaada.

Strictly speaking this negative formulation is not

even all illustration of Satkaayard.r.s.t.ti, as it

denies instead of affirming, the relationship

existing between the soul and the skandhas.

Against our contention one may argue that the

formulation-attaa is not feeling -was merely used to

imply that the soul is identical with some other

skandha. In this case this implication should be

treated as the main proposition, which is different

from the given proposition. If this were so, the

Buddhist criticism

────────────

(54) Dialogues, Part 11, p.64; Diigha Nikaaya Vol.II,

XV.30,p.67

P.420

would have been directed against a proposition

asserting the identity of soul with skandhaka and

not against the formulation of the soul not being

feeling. But as this is not the case, we have to

take the given proposition as the main proposition.

Thought the negative formulation states that the

individual soul is not the same as feeling, it

should not be interpreted to mean that the soul is

not connected with any of the five skandhas. For the

Sa^myutta Nikaaya passage quoted above shows that

the negative formulation of this type is also the

result of the Satkaaya.r.s.ti.

To sum up, the attaa concepts held by the

followers of the 'Saa'svatavaada, Ekaccasassatavaada,

Ucchedavaada, and Satkaayad.r.s.tti mainly have been

criticised and rejected in the Nikaayas and Aagamas.

None of these concepts are identical with the

Upani.sadic Aatman-Brahman.

Except the Ucchedavaada, all other concepts

regarding attaa have been criticised in two

defferent ways. When the criticisms rejecting the

attaa heresies were addressed to his own disciples,

the Buddha referred to his more extensive knowledge

that could see farther into the past and future

lives of the beings, and his superior knowledge of

the law dependent origination (Pa.ticcasamuppaada).

But when the criticisms were meant for the

non-Buddhist ascetics all references to these two

types of knowledge were avoided. The Buddha by way

of expediency makes use of a part of the opponent's

proposition for the sake of further argumentation,

and thereby lays bare the internal contradictions

involved in the proposition. This method of reductio

ad absurdum which the Buddha introduced, was later

applied by Naagaarjuna with great success.

The Ucchedavaada was criticised only on the

basis of the Buddha's extensive knowledge and

superior knowledge but not on logical grounds, as

the Ucchedavaada philosophy does not suffer from any

logical inconsistencies.

V

We have shown that the early Buddhist scripture

rejected any notion of attaa which was either

identical with the skandhas or dependent on them for

its very existence. The Buddha specially took great

paints to discard the 'Saa'svatavaadins and the

Ucchedavaadins who preached the philosophy of attaa

and nirattaa respectively. The Buddhists were aware

of this fact and gave expression to it in

P.421

canonical and non-canonical texts. We will cite a

few quotations from the Buddhist texts in support of

our view. In the Du.t.tha.t.thakasutta (No.8) of the

Suttanipaata we read the following verse; (55)

"attam nirattam na hi tassa a.t.thi adhosi se

di.t.thimidha sabbaa"

Here the belief in attaa and nirattaa are

counted among the false views (di.t.thi) which a

follower of the Buddha has given up. Again the

following two verses from Lalitavistara (56) and

Madhyamikakaarikaa (57) while confirming the

Buddhist rejection of both attaa and nirattaa give

some extra information regarding these heresies:

i) astinaastivinirumktamaatmyanairaatmyavarjitam

prak.rtyaa jaatinirde'sam dharmacakram ihocyate.

ii) astiiti 'saa'svatagraaho nastiityucchedaa-

dar'sanam tasmaadastivanaastitve naa'sriyeta

vicak.sana.

From the verses quoted above it is evident that

the existence of an eternal indireidual soul (attaa0

was preached in the philosophy of the

'Saa'svatavaada and term 'asti' in its vocabulary

did not convey the ordinary meaning of mere

existence but acquired the special sense of eternal

existence. On the other hand the Ucchedavaada which

preached the philosophy of nirattaa (nairaatmya),

coined the term'nasti' to signify simultaneous

annihilation of the temporarily existing attaa and

the physical body. It is in these special senses

that the Pali Buddhist texts use these two terms

'asti' and 'nasti' while recording the dialogues

between the Buddha and the non-Buddhist ascetics.

Any lack of awareness of the special imports of

'asti' and 'naasti' may result in drawing wrong

conclusions from such dialogues.

As the ego-centricity and absolute dependence on

the Skandakas-the two

────────────

(55) PTS, London, 1913; also see, The Group of

Discourses, II(PTS, London, 1992) p.304

(56) Leffman, Lalitavistara, p.426

(57) Maadhyamikakaarikaa, 15.10

P.422

hallmarks of the concept of attaa-can be no means by

associated with the Upani.sadic Aatman-Brahman, it

is but natural that the Nikaaya criticisms do not

contain any reference to the Upani.sadic concept.

The post-canonical early Buddhist texts also never

confused attaa with the Aatman-Brahman of the

Upani.sads. In the Vajracchedikaa Praj~naapaaramitaa

(58) aatman is used together with such terms as

jiiva, sattva and pudgala. All these terms are put

in the same category and are used to denote

different aspects of the same ego-centric entity.

'Sacet Bodhisattvasya sattva sa.mj~naa pravarteta na

sa bodhisattva iti vaktavya. Tat kasya hetoh? na sa

Subhuute bodhisattvo vaktavyo yasya aatma-sa.mj~naa

pravarteta, sattva-sa.mj~naa vaa jiivasa.mj~naa vaa

pudgala-sa.mj~naa va pravarteta'.'If in a Bodhisattva

the perception of a being should take place, then he

could not be called a Bodhisattva. And why? He is

not to be called a Bodhisattva in whom the

perception of a soul, or a being, or a living being,

or a person would take place'. (59) Similary in the

early Maadhyamika literature we read:'Ko 'yam aatmaa

yo 'ha^nkaaravi.saya.h', which may be translated as

follows: What is this aatman that is the domain of

ego? (60) Here aatman(Pali: attaa) is characterised

by aha^nkaara. In this context we may refer to the

definition of 'upadhi' in sopadhi'se.sanirvaa.nam as

given by Candrakiirti(61) in the Prasannapadaa:

tatra upadhiyate asminn aatmasneha ity upadhi.h,

upadhi 'sabdenaatmapraj~napti-nimittaa.h pa~ncop-

aadaanaskandhaa ucyante'. Here the concept of aatmaa

is held to be caused by the five aggregates of

attachment. The same idea is expressed by

Buddhaghosa (62) while defining 'attabhaava'.

'Attabhaavo vuccanti sariiram. Khandha-pa~ncakam eva

vaa, tam upaadaaya pa~n~natti-matta sabhaavato'.

Conze translates: 'Personal existence means the

body, or the five Skandhas together, because

dependent on them this mere concept cones about.'

(63) Thus it is clear that these early Buddhist

texts while discussing the concept of attaa never

thought about the Upani.sadic Aatman, but remained

faithful to the Nikaaya

────────────

(58) Vajracchedikaa Praj~naapaaramitaa (E.Conze,

Rome, Is.M.E.O. 1957)p.29

(59) Also see, ibid.pp.66-67

(60) Poussin, Muula-Madhyamaka-Kaarikaas, Ch.18,

p.340

(61) Conze, ibid. p.94;Poussin, ibid. p.519-520

(62) Visuddhimagga (h.c.Warren, 1950) IX,54

(63) Vajracchedikaa Praj~naapaaramitaa, p.100

P.423

characteristics of attaa, viz. the ego-centricity

and its invariable relationship with the skandhas.

This point has been clearly stated by Vasubandhu. In

his Vi.m'satikaa-v.rtti Vasubandhu(64) states: 'Yo

baalair dharmaanaam svabhavo graahyagraahakadi.h

parikalpitas tena parikalpitenaatmanaa te.saam

nairaatmyam, na tv anabhilaapyenaatmanaa yo

buddhaanaam vi.saya.h 'It is because of that

imaginary aatman which the ignorant people think to

the things' self-being consisting of subject and

object etc., that the things are devoid of aatman,

not because of the ineffable Aatman which is the

domain of the Buddhas'. The attaa rejected by the

Bhaddhas is "aha^nkaara-vi.saya.h" whereas the

ineffable Upani.sadic Aatman is 'buddhaanaam

vi.saya.h'.

────────────

(64) Vi.msatikaa-v.rtti(Ed. S.Levi, paris. 1925)p.6

Key words :

1.Attaa 2.Nirattaa 3.Anattaa 4.Upani.sad

P.424

　　　　提要

　　本文共分五节，讨论外道持的 attaa( 我 )观究竟如何

，佛教又如何用 anttaa (无我 )论来破它。

　　第一节引《阿含》和《尼柯耶》，肯定在有为界与无为

界都没 attaa，它只不过是想象的产品。

　　第二节介绍近代学者对 attaa 一词函义的种种看法。

其中只有 Conze 一人发现，佛教讲的 attaa 和数论所谓的

puru.sa 有相似处。其它所有思考过此一问题的学者或许

由于 attaa、aatman 二词对等，单单关心 attaa 与奥义书

aatman 有何关联，而未经系统的研究，确信二者之间有关

系。此一观念显然有必要重新评估。本节则提出较客观、适

当的研究方法。

　　第三节简要叙述持 attaa 见的常论者和持 nirattaa

见的断论者主要思想。

　　第四节分析佛教如何破 attaa 的信念。在反驳 attaa

的基础上分别拟构出常论者和断论者所持的论点，并发现佛

教用三种推理方式来破 attaa。尤其破常见及身见者的方式

显示辩论的两种重要特色: 一、以揭发对方说法内在矛盾来

驳斥。这个方法后来的大乘佛教用得非常成功。二、先接受

对方部分说法，把它当做进一步显示该说法谬误的基础。这

或许可以看做大乘教所推崇的 [ 方便 ]。

　　第五节指出，佛陀提 anattaa 的中道是针对常论者和

断论者的极端见解。同时证明常论、断论所谓 attaa，并非

奥义书的 aatman。