Apophatic and kataphatic discourse in Mahaayaana: A Chinese view

·期刊原文

Apophatic and kataphatic discourse in Mahaayaana: A Chinese view

By Robert M. Gimello

Philosophy East and West

volumn. 26, no. 2.(April 1976)

P117-135

(C) bye The University Press of Hawaii

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It is a widely held view, among modern scholars of

Mahaayaana as well as within certain of the

Mahaayaana traditions themselves, that

Praasa^ngika-Maadhyamika of the sort one finds in

such works as Naagaarjuna's Muulamadhya-makaarika

and Vigrahavyaavartanii(1) is the definitive

rendition of the Greater Vehicle's ultimate purport.

T. R. V. Murti, in his classic study, has called

Maadhyamika the "Central Philosophy of Buddhism."(2)

Kenneth Inada has called Naagaarjuna "the giant

among giants" of all Buddhist thinkers.(3) Bimal K.

Matilal has recently argued that "there is a sense

in which the Maadhyamika position may be considered

logically unassailable," thereby raising it to a

status of universal rather than just Buddhist

preeminence.(4) Such judgments abound in the

literature of Buddhist scholarship. Nor is it

surprising that they should, for they only echo the

centuries-old conviction of many eminent Buddhist

that Naagaarjuna's thought is the most perfect

expression of the Buddha's own middle path. The

pride of place accorded to it by Tso^n kha pa and

his dGe lugs pa school is only one of the relatively

more recent traditional examples of this tendency.

There is no doubt excellent reason for such

acclaim as this. The clarity, force, and elegance of

Naagaarjuna's arguments are undeniable. They can

easily over-whelm, and often have. However, the

lavish traditional and modern appreciations of

Naagaarjuna's thought have not been without untoward

consequences for our understanding of other

varieties of Mahaayaana. The Mahaayaana is a far

more various thing than a reading of the Kaarikaas.

or even of their antecedent Praj~naapaaramitaa

scriptures, would indicate; and the Maadhyamika

position has hardly gone unchallenged in Buddhist

intellectual history. Indeed, much of the subsequent

history of Mahaayaana thought may be read as a

cumulative qualification of the `Suunyavaada that

one finds in the Perfection of Insight Literature

and in Naagaarjuna. Such at least was the case with

the Yogaacaara and Tathaagatagarbha traditions: and

when Buddhism found its way to China Chinese

Buddhist thinkers often expressed a clear preference

for the later qualifications or modulations of

Maadhyamika rather than for the severity of an

unadulterated Naagaarjunism. It may well be that our

enthusiasm for Naagaarjuna along with the

comparative complexity and inacessibility of other

traditions have predisposed us to give less

attention than deserved to the alternative forms of

Mahaayaana.(5) Should this be so, the remarks that

follow may be taken as an effort at compensation.

The criticisms, explicit or implicit, that have

been leveled against classical `Suunyavaada are many

and diverse. One might undertake to examine the

question of whether Maadhyamika is normative for the

whole of Mahaayaana by investigating, for

example,the claim of the Madhyaantavibhaaga that an

understanding of emptiness is crude and incomplete

unless tempered by an understanding of the reality

and potency of constructive imagination. For the

Yogaacaara authors of this text, emptiness is always

and ever coincident with the imagination of

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the unreal (abhuutaparikalpa: hsu-wang fen-pieh(a))

and it is only the coefficiency of the two

principles that can wholly account for the way

things really are.(6) It is in recognition of

this--the essential duplexity of reality--that the

Madhyaantavibhaaga may say, as one would not expect

Naagaarjuna to say:

na `suunya^m napi ca`suunyam tasmat sarvvam vidhiiyate

satvad asatvaat satvaac ca madhyama pratipac ca saa

ku shuo i-ch'ieh fa fei k'ung fei pu-k'ung

yu wu chi yu ku shih ming chung-tao i(b)

Therefore it is said that all dharmas

Are neither empty nor nonempty,

Because they exist, do not exist, and yet again exist.

This is the meaning of the "middle-path."(7)

One might choose also to consider the theory of

the "three revolutions of the wheel of the law"

found in the Sa^mdhinirmocanasuutra:

Formerly, in the second period and for the sake

only of those aspiring to practice of the

Mahaayaana--reckoning on the fact that all dharmas

lack own-being, neither arise nor perish, and are

originally calm and essentially of nirvaa.na--the

Lord turned the Wheel of the Law which is

characterized by a hidden intent (i yin-mi

hsiang(c)). [But] this too (i.e., like the first

turning) had [other teachings] superior to it to

which it deferred. It was of a sense still to be

interpreted (yu wei liao-i(d) ; neyaartha). and

[thus] the subject of much dispute.

In the present third period and for the sake of

aspirants to all vehicles-reckoning [again] on the

fact that all dharmas lack own-being, neither arise

nor perish, are originally calm and essentially of

nirvaa.na and have the lack of own-being as their

nature--the Lord has turned the wheel of the Law

which is characterized [this time] by a manifest

meaning (i hsien-liao hsiang(e)). This is the most

rare and precious [of teachings]. There is nothing

superior to this Turning of the Wheel of Law by the

Lord and nothing to which it defers. It is of truly

explicit meaning (chen liao-i(f); niithaartha) and

not the subject of disputes.(8)

The third revolution of the dharmacakra here

described is, of course, the annunciation of what

was to become Yogaacaara Buddhism. The second

Corresponds to the `Suunyavaada of the

Praj~naapaaramitaa canon and, proleptically, to its

Maadhyamika systematization. The implication of this

passage is that although both dispensations of the

law teach emptiness (here called "lack of own-being,

" "nonarising, " etc.), the Praj~naapaaramitaa and

Maadhyamika versions of the doctrine are inchoate,

eliptical, imprecise and a source of controversy,

whereas the Yogaacaara version is definitive,

explicit and not liable to conflicting

interpretations.

A third approach might be to follow the

masterful lead of Ruegg, (9) Takasaki, (10) and

Wayman(11) in considering the claims of the

Tathaagatagarbha tradition to superiority over

classical `Suunyavaada. The Tathaagatagarbha, after

all, is a tradition which argues forcefully that the

reality of all things is as much

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"nonempty" (a`suunya; pu-k'ung(g)) as it is "empty"

(`suunya; k'ung(h) (12) and which employs such

un-Maadhyamika terminology in its locutions about

reality as "permanence" (niitya; chang(i)). "purity"

(`subha; ching(j) ) , and even "self" (aatman;

wo(k).(13)

A fourth option, and the one we take here, is to

look at the differences among Maadhyamika and the

other varieties of Mahaayaana through the eyes of

those Chinese Buddhist who, in devising their own

systems of thought, were given the opportunity to

compare and choose. I refer here to the numerous

sixth-and-seventh-century Chinese thinkers who

formulated "division of the doctrine"

(p'an-chiao(l)) and similar schemes in the course of

fashioning new and uniquely sinic schools of

Buddhism. Almost without exception these thinkers

chose to subordinate `Suunyavaada of the sort one

finds in the Perfection of Insight literature and

the Kaarikaas to other kinds of Mahayana, often to

doctrines and texts of Tathaagatagarbha provenance

or association. The Hua-yen p'an-chiao system, for

example, relegated `Suunyavaada to the category of

"incipient'' or "elementary" (shih(m)) Mahaayaana

but held the Tathaagatagarbha tradition to be

representative of an "advanced" or "final"

(chung(n)) Mahaayaana, both of which fell short of

the perfection of its own "rounded" or

"comprehensive" (yuan(o)) teaching.(14)

A theme that unites all of these challenges to

Maadhyamika primacy--the Yogaacaara, the

Tathaagatagarbha. and the Chinese--is a profound

dissatisfaction with the seemingly relentless

apophasis of Naagaarjuna and, to a lesser extent, of

his sources. All are able to acknowledge

Naagaarjuna's caution--that uncritical use of the

constructive language of philosophical views is a

species of intellectual bondage--but they

acknowledge it only as a caution, a corrective to

false views. They insist, however, that the way of

denial and negation, the unremitting distrust of

positive language, is necessary but not sufficient

unto enlightenment. It allows one to fend off error

but does not actively advance one toward the truth

and may even impede the practical religious life by

generating more subtle forms of error and by

inhibiting compassion. Therefore, the various

alternatives to Maadhyamika that we have mentioned

took it upon themselves to reassert the salvific

value of kataphasis, the spiritual utility of

positive and affirmative language. They chose, in

short, eloquence over silence.

In what follows we offer for consideration one

example of the rejection of an exclusive apophasis

in favor of a disciplined kataphasis. We will

examine the argument of a brief but important text

entitled Discernments of thec Dharma-Element of the

Avata^msaka (Hua-yen fa-chieh kuan-men(p) (15)

attributed to Tushun(q) (557-640),(16) the reputed

"first patriarch" of China's Hua-yen (Avatam saka)

school of Buddhism. This very influential text has

been put to many uses in the history of East Asian

Buddhism, both within and without the Hua-yen

tradition. It is, of course, not simply a text

"about Buddhist theories of language." But without

denying the broader range of its meanings we do

suggest that it does serve our particular purpose

well; it offers a significant vision of

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the place of language in the religious life.

The Kuan-men is composed of three general

discernments or kuan, (r) each one of which is

subdivided into several more specific discernments.

The first of the three, entitled "Discernments of

True Emptiness" (chen-k'ung kuan-fa(s) ), is a

straightforward and expert rendering of standard

Mahaayaana teachings on emptiness (`suunyataa;

k'ung) and the relation of emptiness to material

forms (ruupaani; se(t)). Emptiness is shown to mean

first that all constituents of reality, even

material forms, are dependently originated. They

depend entirely on a plurality of causes and

conditions for their ephemeral coming to be and they

are utterly devoid of own-being (svabhaava-`suunya;

tzu-hsing k'ung(u)). In short, all dharmas and all

combinations of dharmas lack substance. Thus, there

are simply no entities anywhere which exist in and

of themselves. It follows from their

insubstantiality that all dharmas are also

indeterminable, since to deter-mine them would be to

assign them fixed substantive identities which, in

turn, would violate the doctrine of dependent

origination, No thing born of causes and conditions

possesses such an identity. This we may call the

transitive import of emptiness. By it we are

informed, even if only negatively, about the nature

of reality. We are told what it is not. But this

negative import does not exhaust the doctrine's

meaning; it has also an intransitive significance.

As dharmas are indeterminable, so emptiness itself

is indeterminative. It is especically emphasized in

the Kuan-men and most other Mahaayaana

interpretations of emptiness not only that all

dharmas are devoid of determinate identity but also

that the statement that they are so is itself not a

determinating predicate. In the technical language

of Buddhism, emptiness is not an ascriptive view

(d.r.s..ti; chien(v)) about dharmas. Rather it is an

expression of the resolute refusal to predicate or

ascribe, indeed, of the impossibility of such

operations. Emptiness, in other words, is the very

principle of denial of determinancy within this

system of Mahaayaana discourse, the cognitive

equivalent of the words "no" or "not" within the

system of discourse known as ordinary English usage.

Admittedly this reflexive function of emptiness--by

which it eludes classification as a determinating

predicate, denies itself ('suunyataa-'suunyataa;

k'ung-k'ung(w)), and so avoids hypostatization--is

puzzling, but it is puzzling in a peculiarly deep

sense. Like the well-known paradox, "everything I

say is a lie." its difficulty may well derive from

some quirk in the structure of language or thought,

perhaps from some problem inherent in the notion of

reflexive negation itself.(17) In any case, it

follows from this understanding of emptiness that

all attempts to formulate determinate views of forms

and emptiness must fail. Just as particular Material

forms lack ontological own-being, so all

predications lack the linguistic equivalent of

own-being--to wit, referential meaning. The Buddhist

ultimate truth of emptiness is ineffable, then, but

in a special sense--not because our words fall short

of describing some transcendent absolute reality

called "emptiness," but because all words are such

that they lack referential content or are "empty" of

substantive meaning (artha-`suunya-`sabda) . This

holds despite appearances and

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the common usage of words. As there are really no

determinate entities to be referred to, so words do

not actually refer. Their indexical function is

illusory, indeed it is one of the major fabricators

of illusion. What is, and the emptiness thereof,

will simply not submit to the language of

determinateness. On the other hand, what other kind

of language is there? This problem no doubt accounts

for the intractable character of the emptiness

teaching and for its frequent misinterpretation. It

is to this problem that our text gives initial

attention in its first major discernment. Using

terminology and concepts which are derived entirely

from Indian Buddhism and which were well known, if

not always well understood by earlier Chinese

Buddhists, Tu-shun proceeds to explain "true

emptiness'' by refuting the three most common

deviant "views" of emptiness, all of which err in

falsely distinguishing between material forms and

emptiness: (1) forms and true emptiness are

identical, he maintains, precisely because forms are

not to be identified with the false emptiness of

annihilation (pu-chi tuan-k'ung(x)): (2) forms and

true emptiness are identical also because, although

surely there is no determinate form possessed of a

"mark" (hsiang(y)) which is the equivalent of the

principle of emptiness (k'ung chih li(z)), each form

is "devoid of substance" (wu-t'i(aa)), thus there is

no particular existent nor mark thereof which may be

called emptiness; and finally, (3) forms are

identical with true emptiness because when forms are

properly discerned they all "coalesce" (hui(ab)) and

"revert to emptiness" (kuei k'ung(ac) ) , and

therefore emptiness is not an entity apart from

forms. The "views'' or predications here

treated--that emptiness is annihilation, that it

exists as a quality of things, and that it is a

transcendent entity--are thus all averred to be

themselves empty. Such views are devoid, to be

precise, of reference. The "emptinesses" that they

adduce, so to speak, are what Naagaarjuna had called

"misconceived" (durd.r.s.ta) .(18) From these

observations Tu-shun draws the conclusion, again in

essentially Indian terms, that emptiness and forms

are mutually "non-obstructive" (wu-ai(ad)). Since

they are coextensive, since the limit of one is the

limit of the other, forms and true emptiness

together constitute a "dharma of one taste" (i-wei

fa(ae)). Tu-shun ends his treatment of the first

general discernment by eloquently insisting that

finally it eludes even his own attempts to verbalize

it (tzu yu i pu-shou(af)) and by cautioning that the

correct explanation of the identity of forms and

true emptiness may be achieved only while striving

toward the "realm of practice" (hsing-ching(ag)), at

the entrance to which, paradoxically, it must be

relinquished (jo shou chieh pu-she wu i ju tzu

cheng-hsing(ah)).

Up to this point Tu-shun's exposition, though a

model of accurate brevity, contains nothing new. It

is a recapitulation of certain fundamental insights

of Mahaayaana drawn largely, it would seem, from the

Perfection of Insight (Praj~naapaaramitaa) tradition

as refined in the alembic of Maadhyamika analysis.

To be sure, this in itself represents a considerable

advance over the obscured vision of `Suunyavaada

achieved, for example, by most of those Chinese

Buddhists of the fourth and early fifth centuries

who concerned themselves with the

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problem. In Tu-shun's work the lineaments of a

correct `Suunyavaada are lucidly "discerned,'' and

his understanding of it would hardly deserve an

epithet such as "hybrid Buddhism," which has, with

some justice. been applied to those earlier

efforts.(19) Certainly it is free of such mitigating

conceptual preoccupations as those drawn by the

earlier Chinese dispensation from Arcane Learning

(hsuan-hsueh(ai)) or Taoism. In short. the content

of the Kuan-men's first set of discernments is

imitative but authoritative.

The second major division of the work, entitled

"Discernment of the Mutual Nonobstruction of

Principle and Phenomena'' (li shih wu-ai kuan(aj))

is quite different. It initiates in the text a

significant departure from traditionally Indian

forms of conceptualization and expression and

provides us with the first instance of the

phenomenon which is our underlying theoretical

concern--transition to a more kataphatic mode of

discourse. The first thing one notices about this

section of the Kuan-men is its introduction of a new

nomenclature. Rather than continue to dwell on

emptiness, forms. and their ineffable identity,

Tu-shun here treats of principle (li(ak) ) and

phenomena (shih(al)) and of the variety of relations

that may obtain between them--their fusion

(yung-yung(am) ), their coincidence versus their

reciprocal effacement (ts'un-wang(an)), and their

discord versus their concord (ni-shun(ao) ). He

specified ten such relations:

1. Principle pervades phenomena (li pien-yu

shih(ap))

2. Each phenomenon pervades principle (shih

pien-yu li(aq))

3. Phenomena are formed by principle (i li

ch'eng shih(ar))

4. Phenomena can reveal principle (shih neng

hsien li(as))

5. Phenomena are sublated by principle (i li

tuo shih(at))

6. Phenomena can conceal principle (shih neng

yin li(au))

7. True principle is identical with phenomena

(chen-li chi shih(av))

8. Each phenomenon is identical with principle

(shih-fa chi li(aw))

9. True princi is not a phenomenon (chen li fei

shih(ax))

10. Phenomena are not principle (shih-fa fei

li(ay))

We should note that Tu-shun has made the second of

these ten subsections longer than the other nine put

together. thereby indicating that it is the crux of

this major discernment.

What is the significance of this change in

nomenclature? What is gained in choosing to speak of

principle rather than emptiness, of phenomena rather

than forms, and of fusion, pervasion, et cetera

rather than only identity and nonidentity? If

principle is simply a synonym of emptiness and if

phenomena are simply dharmas by another name, then

little indeed would seem to have been gained. Of

course, it is to be noted that the terms li and shih

are free of the sort of technical, Indian Buddhist

associations that bind words like k'ung, se, and fa.

To this extent their introduction into the text may

be partially an attempt at freer translation into a

more idiomatic Chinese. However, the terms li and

shih are not mere idioms; they bear their own burden

of accumulated meaning.

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Their use would suggest. therefore, that the

transition from the first to the second discernment

is not merely formal. It involves not only

substitution of terminology but also a deeper

conceptual change, a new level, and manner of

discourse.

The terms li and shih, especially the former,

have a history of reflective use in earlier Chinese

thought far too long and intricate for us to

summarize here.(20) Even if a summary were feasible,

it would still be left to us to guess how much of

their complex semantic history Tu-shun had in mind

when he chose to adopt these terms. Our only

reasonable recourse, then, is to look to the text

itself with the aid of its commentaries. The

earliest commentator and fourth patriarch of

Hua-yen. Ch'eng-kuan(az) (738-839? ) . provides

several possible reasons for the substitution of li

and shih for k'ung and se. First, because the whole

of the first discernment--that of the identity of

k'ung and se--serves to do no more than clarify an

abstract proposition or principle (li(ak)), namely,

that the "true emptiness consists in the

nonobstruction of emptiness and forms" (se k'ung

wu-ai wei chen-k'ung(ba)). Second, although the

statement of this principle in the older terminology

does succeed in clarifying the truth of emptiness.

it also has the disadvantage of tending to neglect

or diminish the concretely real. In the words of

Ch'eng-kuan, "it does not manifest the marvelous

actuality of suchness" (wei-hsien chen-ju chih

miao-yu(bb)). Third, the insistence on the identity

of k'ung and se is seen as making too much of an

ineffability which our commentator fears would

ultimately "extinguish both principle and phenomena"

(wang li shih(bc)). Finally, the older concepts are

held to be inadequate to the breadth of their own

vision because they "will not broadly display the

marks of nonobstruction" (pu-kuang-hsien wu-ai chih

hsiang(bd)).(21) Tsung-mi(be) (780-841), the fifth

patriarch, offers essentially the same reasons.(22)

A still later commentator. the Sung monk

Pen-sung, (bf) adds that the first discernment

"merely inveighs against delusion and discloses a

principle" (tan-shih chien ch'ing hsien li(bg)): it

is pure but useless. "like refined gold which is yet

to be fashioned into an instrument and used" (ju

chin-k'ung wei-wei ch'i yung(bh)).(23)

Each of these three commentators makes

essentially the same point--that the principle of

true emptiness, even when it is properly discerned

as "the coalescence of forms and their reversion to

emptiness" (hui se kuei k'ung(bi)), offers a rather

barren spiritual prospect. However carefully it may

be distinguished from annihilationism (ucchedavaada,

tuan(bj)), discourse in terms of emptiness and forms

seems still to dissolve the world of practical

experience and to derogate its variety. In the

strong light of emptiness, the world of forms seems

pallid and featureless; its particularities

evanesce. In other words, while the cognitive import

of true emptiness is certainly not nihilistic,

Tu-shun and his commentators think that its conative

and practical force, just as certainly, is. The

consequences of this for the Mahaayaana Buddhist

might well be dire. Emptiness can easily become a

dispiriting intellectual barrier (j~neyaavarana,

chih-chang(bk) to his further progress on the

bodhisattva path. Of course, classical

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Indian Mahaayaana also recognizes this danger and,

in its own terms, compensates for it. The fourth of

the six perfections, forbearance (k.saanti;

jen(bl)), has to do especially with enabling the

bodhisattva to cope with the daunting prospect of

emptiness and with its corollary, the fact of

"unarisen dharmas'' (anutpattika-dharma) ;

wu-sheng-fa(bm)).(24) Only if he is able, so to

speak, to "tolerate" its emptiness, can a

bodhisattva hope to act successfully in the world,

for the weal of sentient beings? Tu-shun's own

preliminary recognition of this same problem is

found at the end of the Kuan-men's first section,

where it is urged that the understanding of

emptiness and the explanation of its relation to

forms should not inhibit or replace practice. In

fact, as we have seen, practice is declared the only

possible context for correct understanding of

emptiness. However, even when one takes into account

all of the corrective devices already built into

`Suunyavaada. it appears that Tu-shun is still

concerned that it might remain "like a badly grasped

snake or a flawed incantation which can ruin a

slow-witted person." He is intent upon removing even

the conceptual and verbal "near occasions" of its

misuse.(25)

In contrast then with the first discernment, the

second--of the nonobstruction of principle and

phenomena--offers a quite abundant and heartening

spiritual prospect. In its conative as well as its

cognitive significance it avoids the negativism

suggested by the terms ''emptiness" and "forms," and

thereby permits a more affirmative comprehension of

the diversity of experience. The ''phenomena" of

this second discernment are things and events

themselves. They are to be distinguished from

"forms" precisely because a form (ruupa) is not so

much a thing or an event in itself as it is one of

the finite number of constituents of things and

events. Ruupa, in other words, is a dharma; a shih

need not be only a dharma.(26) One might describe

the transition from ruupa to shih as follows: Ruupa

are dharmas. Dharmas--like the five skandha, the

twelve aayatana, or the eighteen dhaatu--are the

subpersonal components of all that exists or is

dependently originated. Because they are subpersonal

certain early traditions of Buddhism, in respect of

the anaatman doctrine, regarded dharmas as somehow

more real than the things and events they comprise.

Dharmas were judged by some to be ultimately real

(paramaartha) ; the things they comprise only

conventionally (sa^mv.rti) so. Mahaayaana Buddhism

showed, however, that such dharmic components are as

empty of own-being as is anything else; dharmas too

"lack selves" (dharma-nairatmya) and thus do not

exist as discrete entities. The classical

dharma-theory had been developed, primarily in the

Abhidharma traditions, as an explanation of the

fundamental doctrines of dependent origination,

impermanence, and no-self. However, if dharmas

themselves may be shown to be empty, then the

dharma-theory loses any exclusive claim it may once

have had to definitive explanatory or illustrative

power. The way is then clear for the formulation of

new explanatory models of those doctrines, new

theories or conceptual expressions of the teaching

of no-self and its corollaries. The concept of

phenomenal emptiness, as opposed to dharmic

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emptinless, is one such alternative to the earlier

dharma-theory, What, after all, is the advantage of

continuing to be mindful of dharmas rather than of

the things and events which dharmas had been thought

to comprise? What advantage is there in

discriminating subtle instances of

svabhaava-`suunyataa instead of crude and more

obvious instances of that same truth? Both kinds are

equally empty. On the other hand, the Kuan-men and

its commentaries do suggest that there may be some

positive advantages found in reversing the priority

that is in focusing on the more obvious rather than

the subtler embodiments of emptiness. Consider the

difference between a world composed of dharmas like

form, feeling (vedanaa), idea (sa^mj~naa), contact

(spar`sa). et cetera and a world composed of objects

and activities of everyday experience that have

deliberately not been shattered or reduced to their

component dharmas. Surely the latter is more readily

at hand, equally "empty, " and--most

significantly--better suited to the task, emphasized

by Ch'eng-kuan, of "manifesting the marvelous

actuality of suchness." This last, as we shall see,

was a task most appealing to Chinese Buddhists.

As shih is not the exact equivalent of dharma or

ruupa, so li is not the exact equivalent of

`suunyataa Neither, however, is it a denial of

`suunyataa. Emptiness, as it was described in the

first discernment, is one member of a propositional

relation between forms and itself. This holds true

regardless of the nature of that relation, even if

it be the ineffable or indeterminable one of neither

identity nor nonidentity. Li, by contrast, subsumes

that relation, and with it, both of its members. Li

is not so much the principle of emptiness as it is

the principle that all particulars are empty. This

distinction, between a nominative and a

propositional function, is difficult to clarify. It

is a modal, not an essential, difference.

Admittedly, great care was taken in the first

discernment to show that emptiness too is not of the

same order as particulars, that it is not a "thing;"

to see it otherwise would be to adopt one of the

"misconceived views" of emptiness which were there

refuted. Nonetheless, for Tu-shun the term li still

marks an advance over the term `suunyataa precisely

because it makes that difference of order or mode

all the more clear. Principles have noetic, not

ontic, significance. They suggest regularity and

truth but do not imply either substantive existence

or its opposite, nonexistence. They seem proof,

therefore, against the common ontological

misinterpretations to which an abstract, nominative

locution like emptiness is subject because their

primary function is not so much to designate or to

advert as it is to establish rules by which such

activities as designation, and any number of others,

may proceed. Justice, for example. is admitted to be

a "principle" governing many political endeavors,

yet in our attempts to understand or effect justice

we are not normally led to seek a particular "thing"

called justice, unless it be a "thing" in a

suppositional "third world."(27) Nor are we moved to

deny justice simply because no such "entity" is to

be found. So too with the principle that all is

empty or indeterminable. It clearly does not prompt

a search for an ontological something (even an

ineffable something)

P126

called "emptiness" or "the indeterminate." The

"principle that all particulars are empty" is not

the designation of one or the only member of a class

of real things that exist in some supersensible

realm beyond the realm of particulars. If we may

counterfeit a phrase, "principle." in Hua-yen usage,

is always "principle-that" rather than

"principle-of." Such a principle establishes the

rules for successful engagement with particulars: it

is certainly not an alternative to particulars. As

another of Tu-shun's progeny, Fa-tsang(bn)

(643-712), was to say of the Buddhist notion of

"substance (t'i(bo) ) . so we might say of

principle-that "it is not something produced by

productive cause; rather it is something illuminated

by illuminative causes" (fei sheng-yin chih

suo-sheng wei liao-yin chih suo-liao(bp)).(28)

Like the new concepts themselves, the variety of

nonobstructive interrelations between li and shih

also offers a contrast to the first discernment.

Whereas the mutual nonobstruction of emptiness and

forms amounts to but the one relation of identity

(chi(bq) ) Or nondifference (pu-i(br) ) , the

nonobstruction of principle and phenomena assumes no

less than ten specific forms. In addition to being

identical with each other. the two also

simultaneously pervade, constitute. reveal. conceal,

and cancel each other. Further, these relations

occur not only between principle and the totality of

phenomena but also between principle and each

phenomenon. Herein lies the comparative abundance of

the second discernment. In its new conceptual

expression, the truth of indeterminability has

become multifaceted and may now be appreciated from

a liberal variety of perspectives, each

complementing the others. This has fruitful

consequences as well for the practice of Buddhism

because the practitioner now has a more diverse

repetoireof themes for contemplation than the first

discernment had offered him.

However, before we can fully understand the

second discernment we have still to determine what

it really means to say. for example, that "each

phenomenon pervades principle." If phenomena are not

the dharmas of traditional Buddhism but are instead

the empirically available things and events of this

world, and if principle is simply the principle that

these things and events are indeterminable, then

what possible sense can it make to say that the one

pervades the other? Tu-shun was obviously aware of

this problem since he included in his exposition

several questions like: "If principle in its

totality pervades a single mote of dust, why is it

not small?" (li chi ch'uan-t'i pien i-ch'en ho-ku

fei hsiao(bs)) and "If a single mote of dust

completely encloses the nature of principle, why is

it not large?" (i-ch'en ch'uan-yu li-hsing ho-ku fei

ta(bt)). In other words, one is initially puzzled to

know if and how qualities like size, which are

perfectly suited to physical particulars like motes

of dust, can be ascribed to principle. How can a

principle be either large or small, except in the

most figurative sense? And yet how can it not be one

or the other if it is said to be pervaded by

phenomena? The assertion that phenomena pervade

principle would seem then to involve what certain

modern Western philosophers

P127

have called a category mistake.(29) A phenomenon, in

common parlance. is a "thing" or an "object of

experience." Principle, as we have seen, is actually

a proposition. How can one say that a thing

"pervades" a proposition or vice versa? The terms of

this statement seem incompatible because they

inhabit different categories of use. Would not such

a sentence be of the same sort as the statement that

"Saturday is an amphibious biped''? Our languages do

not normally permit us to link such subjects with

such predicates. What special warrant then does

Tu-shun have for linking them in the Kuan-men?

His warrant, I would suggest, is a strong one

and is derived from the earlist teachings of

Buddhism. Tu-shun is justified in violating our

normal categories of linguistic usage precisely

because the destruction and replacement of such

categories is the very purpose for which he composed

the Kuan-men. To Buddhists, after all, unlike

certain Wittgensteinians, our normal language

categories have no inherent authority. They are not

inalienable "forms of life;" they are merely part of

the equipment of ignorance with which all men are

endowed. Therefore. when one succeeds despite such

categories in discerning that phenomenon pervades

principle, one has actually revised his estimation

of phenomena radically. One has done so, to be

specific, by freeing himself of the constraints

imposed by conventional language. Phenomena are no

longer simply discrete, opaque elements of

experience of the sort that fit comfortably into the

categories of speech. Rather. each has become also

an emblem of Buddhist truth. All particulars,

Tu-shun insists, are not only indeterminable; they

also exemplify the truth of indeterminability. Thus

the Kuan-men can say that because a phenomenon

embraces principle, "the phenomenon is emptied and

principle is solidified" (shih hsu erh li shih(bu));

because the phenomenon is emptied, "the principle

within the whole of it is distinctly manifest''

(ch'uan shih chung chih li t'ing-jan lu-hsien(bv)).

In other words, a particular thing or event is

dependently originated or empty of own-being and

precisely thereby is--at least

analogically--"filled" with-the principle that all

particulars are empty. Phenomena, in fewer words,

instantiate principle.

This, of course, is by no means to be construed

as a kind of monism in which all plurality and

particularity is swallowed up in principle. The

phenomenal world, the world of religious practice

especially, is not deprived of its rich diversity

because. as the Kuan-men also says, "although the

totality [of phenomena] is wholely principle, yet

the marks of phenomena are as distinct as ever" (chu

t'i ch'uan li erh shih-hsiang yuan-jan(bw)). One

might maintain, then, that the discernment that each

phenomenon pervades: principle involves not a

category mistake, but a category revision. Things as

such may be categorially incompatible with

propositions, but it is not at all clear that the

same may be said of the relation between emblematic,

revelatory things and propositions, Despite their

differences, both perform the function of signifying

or revealing. In fact, the principle that all is

indeterminable must be compatible with any

particular phenomenon that signifies that same

truth; they actually share a common

P128

identity. The principle or proposition is the

"meaning" of the significant phenomenon, and the

phenomenon is essentially a particular expression or

vehicle of the principle. Tu-shun expressed this

point in typically laconic Buddhist fashion when, in

answer to the question quoted above about dust

motes, he said, "principle and phenomena, when

compared, are each neither identical nor different"

(li shih hsiang-wang ko fei i i(bx)).

This then is the primary significance of the

second major discernment. Its regnant concepts, li

and shih, are new and unheralded in the Indian

Mahaayaana tradition, yet they do not contradict the

fundamental Mahaayaana tenet of the emptiness of all

dharmas. Rather, they amplify it; they render

explicit certain consequences and applications of

that teaching which had been left largely implicit

in its classical Praj~naapaaramitaa and early

Maadhyamika formulations.(30) The term li reveals

the true modal status of the concept of emptiness

or indeterminability more clearly than did the word

`suunyataa and without its negative collative

impact. The Chinese word is freer of substantive

ontological con-notations and thereby is better able

to show that emptiness is neither the name of a

metaphysical entity nor the designation of

nothingness; rather, it has the form and function of

a regulative principle. The term shih, on the other

hand, offers an alternative to the dharma theory

which had found its way into early Mahaayaana via

Abhidharma. Shih is the term designating all

particular elements of the world of experience in

their immediately empirical forms and is not limited

in its application to the seventy-three, or however

many, subpersonal dharmic constituents of those

phenomena. This alternative, in turn, liberates one

to discern the truth of emptiness and

indeterminability "writ large," to see it as it

operates in the realm of conventional experience and

not only as it occurs in the rarefied dharmic realm.

Finally, the assertion that li and shih are mutually

nonobstructive has the culminating effect of

validating and enhancing the worth of the phenomenal

world. This it can do because it shows that each

phenomenon is not only a thing or event but is also

an emblematic instance of the most valuable of

Buddhist truths.

Once even these points are made, however, there

remains to be treated one final step in the process

of change from an apophatic to a kataphatic mode of

discourse that is epitomized in the development of

the Kuan-men. This last step is taken with the

introduction of the third and final major division

of the text---the "Discernment of Total Pervasion

and Accomodation" (chou-pien han-jung kuan(by)).

Like the preceding this section too is divided into

ten specific discernments:

1. Principle as phenomena (li ju shih(bz))

2. Phenomena as principle (shih ju li(ca))

3. Each phenomenon subsumes the mutual

nonobstruction of principle and phenomena

(shih han li-shih-wu-ai(cb))

4. The diffuse and the local are mutually

non-obstructiveive (pien chu wu-ai(cc))

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5. The broad and the narrow are mutually

non-obstructive (kuang hsia wu-ai(cd))

6. Pervading and including are mutually

non-obstructive (pien jung wu-ai(ce))

7. Containing and entering are mutually

non-obstructive (she ju wu-ai(cf))

8. Interpenetration is without obstruction

(chiao-she wu-ai(cg))

9. Coexistence is without obstruction

(hsiang-tsai wu-ai(ch))

10. Universal interfusion is without obstruction

(p'u-yung wu-ai(ci))

One notices immediately that, unlike the second,

this third discernment introduces no fundamentally

new terminology. There are, it is true, several

terms that were not used earlier in the work like

"broad and narrow," "containing and entering," but

these are clearly just complements to the basic

operative concepts of phenomena, principle, and

nonobstruction. Wherein, then, lies the conceptual

difference between the second and the third

discernment?

The text seems to provide a clue in the fact

that while most of the ten specific discernments

listed earlier obviously overlap in significance,

one among them stands out as quite distinct in form

and substance. This is the third--the discernment

that each phenomenon subsumes the mutual

nonobstruction of principle and phenomena. The

crucial insight expressed here is both simple and

profound. It is simple because it follows:

necessarily, almost obviously, from premises

established earlier in the work. It is profound in

that it marks the ultimate point reached in the

Kuan-men's conceptual developmentof the emptiness

teaching. Essentially, the conceptual change

undertaken at this point consists in a shift of the

primary focus of meditative attention away from

principle and toward phenomena.

The second discernment, as we have said, had the

intention of validating and enhancing the phenomenal

world by showing that phenomena are not merely the

mute things and events in which we are enmeshed by

reason of our ignorance and craving. Rather they are

all eloquently significant, charged with meaning by

the liberating principle that all things are

indeterminable. A particular phenomenon, after all,

is above all else an instance of that truth. Up to

this point, which is as far as the second

discernment takes us, the enhanced status of the

phenomenal appears to be a conferred status.

Phenomena are endowed with value by principle and it

is to principle that we must credit the "marvel"

(miao(cj)) of their "existence" (yu(ck)). However,

if it is discernible that phenomena are "pervaded"

or "filled" with principle, then it should also be

clear that one may justifiably dispense with

principle-as-such as an autonomous meditative

notion. This, in fact, is exactly what happens in

the Kuan-men. After the third specific discernment

(the third subdivision of the third major section),

the term li is dropped. Phenomena are hence

perceived as quite sufficient unto themselves. Their

validation is no longer something conferred upon

them by virtue of their relation with principle; is

inherent. Phenomena.

P130

then, are self-validating and what we are offered in

this third general discernment of our text is

actually a vision of the aseity of particular

things. Once this is appreciated it will be

difficult to continue to speak, as is still often

done, of phenomena having their "ground" in the

"absolute" or of their being "supported" by the "one

reality.'' This is not even the general Mahaayaana

claim, much less the claim of Hua-yen. Phenomena are

seen in Hua-yen to depend on no ultimate reality but

their own for the wonder of their presence. They

have no noumenal base; they are their own "ground"

and "support." A problem arises here, however. Is

not this extraordinarily high estimation of

phenomena a reversion to the ignorant view that

things possess substantial own-being and are

therefore independently originated? I think not. The

aseity ascribed to any one phenomenon by the

Kuan-men consists precisely in that phenomenon's

radical interrelatedness with all other phenomena.

Phenomena are not independent of each other; they

possess svabhaava. They are independent only of any

absolute, unitary reality conceived of as

undergirding or supporting them, as somehow more

real than they. A contemporary Western philosopher

of religion has recently defined religion as "one's

way of valuing most intensively and

comprehensively."(31) In terms of this quite useful

definition, the final discernment. of the Kuan-men

allows the Hua-yen Buddhist to regard the phenomenal

world in all of its variety, not as a place to be

fled, but as the very arena of his religious

practice. He need not deny or depart from the

richness of "this world" in order to pursue release

because each and every phenomenal element of of

"this world" becomes a source and an object of

intensive and comprehensive religious value.(32)

There is, however, an even more profound

consequence of the climactic insight that each

phenomenon subsumes the mutual nonobstruction of

principle and phenomena. If principle and phenomena

were first seen as interfused and if each phenomenon

is now seen as comprehending their very interfusion,

then each phenomenon also somehow comprehends or

implicates all other phenomena. We have finally a

vision, not only of the aseity of particular things,

but also of their total repletion. According to this

vision, the emptiness of things is shown actually to

entail their plenitude. The Kuan-men itself states

the progression in resolutely simple terms: First

"one is in one" (i chung i(cl)), then "one is in

all" (i-ch'ieh chung i(cm)), then "all are in one"

(i chung i-ch'ieh(cn)), and finally "ail are in all"

(i-ch'ieh chung i-ch'ieh(co)). The first of these

steps corresponds to the commonsense principle of

identity which seems, hut is not really, in

violation of the anaatman doctrine. The second

expresses the Kuan-men's "reversion of forms to

emptiness." The third is synonymous with its

"pervasion of principle by each phenomenon." The

last is obviously the culminating discernment of

"total pervasion and accommodation.'' The first

three of these, it should be noted, are implicit in

the fourth. Other Hua-yen texts will wax more

lyrical and compare the world of total pervasion and

accommodation, the world of "all in all," to Indra's

net, at each knot of which

P131

is placed a jewel so faceted as to be able to

reflect not only the whole net but also each and

every other jewel in the net, each of which in turn

does the same, ad infinitum. Considering that all of

this begun in an appreciation of emptiness, the

Kuan-men would seem indeed to bear out Naagaarjuna's

dictum that "all is fitting for him to whom

emptiness is fitting" (Sarva^m ca yujyate tasya

`suumyataa yasya yujyate).(33)

In their most general and least technically

theological senses the terms apophasis and

kataphasis mean, respectively, discourse which

proceeds by negations and discourse which proceeds

by affirmations.(34) It is the Maadhyamika's

apophatic view of language, prefigured in the early

Praj~napaaramitaa literature, that only negative

locutions can be of definitive meaning (niitaartha)

and ultimate truth (paramaartha). Any attempt to

positively characterize reality --if made on the

expectation that by so doing one will have verbally

or conceptually "captured" the truth of things--is

bound to fail and, worse, may generate new and more

virulent species of error. All positive locutions

therefore are, if not false, merely of conventional

(sa^mv.rti) truth.(35) On such principles it would

follow that the only legitimate employment of

language that is: to be credited with definitive

meaning is finally that of reflexive denial. We may

speak only in order to command silence; we may use

language only in order to disabuse ourselves and

others of the error implicit in language.

The kataphasis of Tu-shun and of other varieties

of Mahaayaana alternative to `Suunyavaada not a

simpleminded and complete rejection of Naagaarjuna's

sound distrust of word and concept. Neither Tu-shun,

nor the authors of the Madhyaantvibhaaga and

Sa^mdhinirmocanasuutra, nor most Tathaagatagarbha

thinkers believed,(36) for example, that there are

positive locutions and conceptualizations which can

provide accurate, descriptive purechase on the utter

reality of things. None have reverted to an ignorant

confidence in the referential capacity of language.

However, both Tu-shun and these other Mahaayaana

thinkers did hold that there are certain positive

and affirmative uses of language which may perform

salvifically necessary tasks that negation cannot

perform, and which may even be better than denial

and apophasis at those very tasks of dissolving

error and destroying false views that Naagaarjuna

had assigned only to denial and negation.

It is this very claim that Tu-shun has made in

his ascent through the three levels of discernment

that comprise the Kuan-men. The emerging pattern

within that work is one of the substitution of

relatively kataphatic terms and propositions for

relatively apophatic ones, for example, "principle"

for "emptiness," "phenomena" for "material form,"

"universal interfusion of particulars" for

"coalescence of forms and their reversion to

emptiness." As Tu-shun describes the uses to which

these new concepts are put, we see it claimed for

them that they can do all that the terms of

`Suunyavaada apophasis can do in the destruction of

error as well as something that `Suunyavaada itself

cannot do, namely, thwart the potentially nihilistic

conative impact of the emptiness

P132

teaching and encourage appreciation of the infinite

value of particular things.

Moreover, it can do these things without falling

victim to the error of undisciplined kataphasis.

These discernments of Tu-shun's, it must be

recalled, are instruments of meditation. It is

surely not the purpose of any form of Buddhist

meditation simply to construct conceptual models of

the world, nor are the kataphatic locutions of

Hua-yen the components of such constructions. Quite

to the contrary, their ultimate aim is to disabuse

the meditator of his attachment to any and all

concepts. Liberation, after all, is "inconceivable"

(acintya; pu-ssu-i(cp) ) . However, it is the

attachment and not the concepts that one must be rid

of. That very process of conceptual disenchantment,

so felicitiously described by Buddhists as a

"rinsing" (hsi-ch'u(cq) ) of the mind in "the waters

of insight" (chih-shui(cr) ) (37) is in fact a

homeopathic therapy. Cure of conceptual illness

requires precisely the expedient and disciplined use

of well-chosen conceptual remedies. The "principle,"

"phenomena," and "nonobstruction" which comprise the

Kuan-men's "discernments" are such remedial

instruments. They are to be used, by collected and

one-pointed minds, without attachment, and are

particularly designed so as not to occasion or

incite attachment. Consider how difficult it would

be, even in practical terms, to focus one's

tendencies toward conceptual attachment on Tu-shun's

notions of "principle" or "phenomena." Their "mutual

nonobstruction," by denying the mind any static

point of focus, stifles the impulse to attach one's

mind to them. Their "interpenetration" results in a

continuous, kaleidoscopic shifting of intellectual

focus--from "the diffuse" to "the local," from "the

broad" to "the narrow, " from "pervading" to

"including," et cetera. The mind is never given the

opportunity to make hard and false discriminations,

nor is it allowed to dwell in or depend upon any one

perspective on any discrete object. These meditative

concepts and the rather special sort of analysis

they permit are to be sharply distinguished from

conventional concepts--from notions like selfhood,

permanence, cause and effect, and the like--wihch

Buddhists are wont to call vikalpa (fen-pieh(cs) or

ssu-wei(ct)) or sa^mj~naa (hsiang(cu)). Conventional

concepts are regarded by Mahaayaana Buddhists as the

flawed instruments of unstilled minds and they are

thought to be too readily susceptible to dangerous

misuse. First of all, they imply false

discriminations and are therfore held simply to be

in error. But, even more serious is the assumed

likelihood of their becoming mental fixations,

objects of a kind of intellectual craving that is

far more difficult to extinguish than mere emotional

craving. Such concepts as are used in meditative

discernment, however, are not at all the deceptively

safe harbors or lulling abodes of thought wich the

Buddhists, in their "homeless" (aniketa; wu-chu(cv))

wisdom, must avoid. Tu-shun's concepts of principle

and phenomena are varieties of "correct concept"

(samyaksa^mkalpa, cheng-ssu-wei(cw)) or of "notion

associated with insight"

(praj~naasa^mprayuktasa^mj~naa; chih-hui hsiang-ying

hsiang(cx) ) .(33) Their validity is a function

especially of the sort of use to which they can be

put. They are not used, as conventional vikalpa or

sa^mj~naa are, in such spiritually

P133

inexpedient activities as differentiation or

dichotomous discrimination. They produce instead, as

we have seen, visions of coalescence and mutual

permeability. They are so defined as to actually

"disarm" themselves, as they are being used, of the

snares of craving and delusion with which

conventional concepts are equipped. In their

perpetual and total commutability li and shih offer

no sedative dwelling place for the mind. They

therefore do not tether the mind to ignorant views

but propel it further along its liberating course.

A host of problems have been left untouched in

our consideration of the Kuan-men, notable among

them the question of whether Tu-shun's preference

for kataphasis is an expression of Chinese values,

an organic development within Mahaayaana, or both.

We have also not explored the relation of the

Kuan-men to the Hua-yen p'an chiao system. We hope,

however, that we have at least shown Tu-shun's

appreciation of the value of positive and

affirmative language to be a worthy and no less

Mahaayaanist alternative to Naagaarjuna's

unrelenting nay-saying.

NOTES

1. I do not assume that these two works are

typical of Naagaarjuna's thought in general. A

consideration of all works validly attributable to

him might yield a quite different picture of

Naagaarjuna's Buddhism. See, for example. D. S.

Ruegg, "Le Dharmadhaatustava de Naagaarjuna," in

Etudes tibetaines dediees a la memoire de Marcelle

Lalou (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1971) . pp.

448-471.

2. T. R. V. Murit, The Central Philosophy of

Buddhism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955).

3. Kenneth K. Inada, trans., Naagaarjuna: A

translation of His Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa with an

Introductory Essay (Tokyo: Hokuseido, 1970), p. 3.

4. Bimal K. Matilal, Epistemology, Logic, and

Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis. Janua

Linguarum, Series Minor, III (The Hague: Mouton,

1971), p. 146.

5. One is reminded, for example, of the comment

of Edward Conze, a partisan of the less complex

forms of Mahaayaana, about a key doctrine of

Yogaacaara He called the aalayavij~naana doctrine "a

conceptual monstrosity." See Edward Conze. Buddhist

Thought in In.dia (London. Allen and Unwin, 1962),

p. 133.

6. Nagao Gadjin, ed.,

Madhyaantavibhaaga-Bhaa.sya (Tokyo: Suzuki Research

Foundation, 1964), p. 17 and T1599: 31.451a15-17.

The Chinese is Paramaartha's version.

7. Ibid., p. 18 and T1599:31.45a25-26.

8. T675:16.697a28-b9.

9. David Seyfort Ruegg. La theorie du

Tathaagatagarbha et du Gotra (Paris: EFEO, 1969);

and several other publications.

10. Jikido Takasaki, A Study of the

Ratnagotravibhaaga (Uttaratantra), Being a Treatise

on The Tathaagatagarbha Theory (Rome: ISMEO, 1966).

11. Alex and Hideko Wayman. trans., The Lion's

Roar of Queen Srimala (New York: Columbia,

University Press. 1974).

12. T353:12.221c16-18 and T1666:32.576a24-26.

13. T353:12.222a4-b3.

14. T1867:45.509a24-513c18.

P134

15. T1878:45.652b12-654a28. The authenticity of

this text is much disputed but in an as yet

unpublished study I have found reason to accept its

attribution at least to Tu-shun's period, if not to

him.

16. Principal biography: T2060:50.653b15-654a13.

17. Robinson's description of emptiness as "a

surd within a system of constructs" seems apt here.

See Richard H. Robinson, Early Maadhyamika in India

and China (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,

1967) , p. 49. See also Bimal K. Matilal,

Epistemology, Logic. and Grammar in Indian

Philosophical Analysis. Janua Linguarum, Series

Minor, III (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), pp. 146-167.

On the logical problem of reflexive negation see

Robert L. Martin, ed., The Paradox of the Liar (New

Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970).

18. Muulamadhyamikakaarikaa, 25: 11;

T1564:30.32a.

19. Eric Zurcher, The Buddhist Conquest of

China, 2d ed., Sinica Leidensia, Vol. II (Leiden: E.

J. Brill, 1972), 1: 12. One could argue as Robinson

does (Early Maadhyamika, pp. 123-144), that there

were exceptions to the rule of hybridization,

Seng-chao (374-414) being a most notable example.

But he is notable precisely because he is so

exceptional.

20. Attempts at such summaries have been made,

for example, Wing-tsit Chan, "The Evolution of the

Neo-Confucian Concept Li as Principle." Tsing Hun

Journal of Chinese Studies, NS4 (1 964): 123-148,

and Paul Demieville, "La penetration du bouddhisme

dans la tradition philosophique chinoise," Cahiers

d'histoire mondiale 3 (1956): 28--31, but neither of

these treats of the word's evolution during the

fifth and sixth centuries which is the time-span

most pertinent to Hua-yen usage. The most useful

study of this problem that I have yet seen is

Kaginushi Ryokei(cy), Kegon kyogaku josetsu: shinnyo

to shinri no kenkyuu(cz) (Kyoto: Bungakudo shoten,

1968), especially pp. 182-213 in which the author

examines the use of the term li in the Chu

Wei-mo-ching(da) , in the translations of

Paraamaartha(db) (d.569), and in the writings of

Hui-yuan(dc) of the Ching-ying temple(dd) (523--92).

21. Hua-yen fa-chieh hsuan-ching(de), ch. 1,

T1883:45.676a13-6.

22. Chu Hua-yen fa-chieh kuan-men(df),

T1884:45.687b6-8.

23. Hua-yen ch'i-tzu-ching-t'i fa-chieh kuan

san-shih-men sung(dg), T1885:45.701a13-4. According

to the introductory remarks to this work

(T1885:45.692c12--21), It was written in K'ai-feng

in 1088 at the request of a group of eminent laymen.

It is regarded as an explanation from the meditative

perspective (hsien-ch'u ch'an-men yen-mu(dh)).

24. Anutpattikadharmak.saanti, the tolerance of

the truth that "all dharmas are originally unborn"

(i-ch'ieh fa pen-lai wu-sheng(di) ) , is an

accomplishment of the bodhisattba who has advanced

to the eighth or "Immovable" (Acalaa; pu-tung(dj))

stage of his career. It is a faculty which allows

him to avoid the mental distraction and dismay that

a preoccupation with emptiness can engender. For a

full account of it see chuan 10 of Vasubandhu's

Da`sanhuumivyakhyaana (Shih-ti ching-lun(dk) )

(T1522: 26.179 c). That veritable encyclopedia of

Mahaayaana, the Ta-chih-tu lun(dl), also offers a

brief but apt explanation of the closely related

concept of dharmak.saanti: "BY the power of wisdom

one variously perceives that among all dharmas there

is not one that can be grasped. To patiently accept

this teaching. without doubt or dismay (pu-i

pu-hui(dm) ) ---this is call

dharmak.saanti(fu-jen(dn)." (T1509:25.171c18-20).

25. Muulamadhyamikakaarikaa, 25:11,T1564:30.33a9.

26. It is true that the Kuan-men does

occasionally use the compound shih-fa(do), but this

seems in most cases to be for the purpose of

balanced construction. In any case the distinction

between shih and fa may still be maintained by

admitting that while fa may also be shih, not all

shih are fa, In other words, the category of shih

may be regarded as both broader than and inclusive

of the category of fa. Among shih we find both

commonsense things and events and dharmas, but the

former farout-number the latter. The Sarvaastivaada

Abhidharma, for example, lists only seventy-two

sa^msk.rta dharmas; the Vij~naanavaada of

Hsuan-tsang only ninety-four. The term dharma is

here used in only one of its many senses.

27. I have in mind here, for example, the "third

world" of Karl Popper, which he defines as "the

world of intelligibles, one of ideas in the

objective sense...the world of posible objects of

thought, the world of theories in themselves...."

See Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge: An

Evolutionary Approach (London: OXford University

Press, 1972), pp. 154 passim.

28. Hsiu Hua-yen ao-chih wang-chin huan-yuan

kuan(dp) (T1876: 45.637b15-16). Fa-tsang is here

dating the notion of the "substance of suchness"

(chen-ju chih-ti(dq) from the Ta-ch'eng

P135

ch'i-hsin lun(dr) (T1666:32.579a12-20). For a useful

comparison of this work of Fa-tsang with the

Kuan-men itself see Kamata Shigeo(ds), Chuugoku

Bukkyo shisoshi kenk yu(dt) (Tokyo:Shunjusha, 1969),

pp. 357-379.

29. See Gilbert Ryle, "Categories, '' in

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 38

(1937):189-206. This is his initial statement of the

idea. It proved very influential in modern British

philosophy, and Ryle developed it further in several

of his later works.

30. This, of course, is not to say that

analogous developments from the emptiness teaching

were not to be found in other and later traditions

of Indian Mahaayaana. We do find them. for example.

in Yogaacaara and Tathaagatagarbha thought, and

these traditions did influence Hua-yen. But in the

Kuan-men itself they play only a relatively minor

role.

31. Frederick Ferre, "The Definition of

Religion, " Journal of the American Academy of

Religion, 38 (1970):11.

32. Recently another Western philosopher has

noted elsewhere in Buddhism this same sense of the

value of life in the world: "When the distinction

between the sa^msaara world, the perpetual cycle of

rebirth, and Nirvaa.na is collapsed, our daily life

is stained with religious significance. The entirety

of life is religious, rather than a restricted

portion of it reserved for ritual and specific

observances marked out as 'religious.' Everything we

do becomes a religious act, even...eating and

sleeping." Arthur C. Danto, Mysticism and Morality:

Oriental Thought and Moral Philosophy (New York:

Basic Books, 1972), p. 80.

33. Muulamadhyamikakaarikaa, 25:11:T1564:30.32a.

34. The two terms derive originally from the

theology of Pseudo-Dionysisius. For a useful

disscussion of them see Vladimir Lossky, The

Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (London:

James Clarke & Co., 1957), pp. 25-43.

35. Frederick Streng (''The Significance of

Pratiityasamutpaada for Understanding the

Relationship between Sa^mv.rti and Paramaartha in

Naagaarjuna," in The Problem of Two Truths. Mervyn

Sprung, ed. [Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974], pp. 27-39)

has recently described Naagaarjuna's view of the two

truths in such a way as to suggest that my use of

the word "merely" as a qualifier to sa^mv.rti is

illegitimate. This, of course, is an issue worthy of

separate consideration and we have not the space for

it here, but suffice it to say that while it is true

that Naagaarjuna does not really subordinate

sa^mv.rti to paramaartha and though he deems both

necessary, nevertheless he leaves much unsaid about

the kind of truth sa^mv.rti is. How, for example,

does it differ from conventional untruth? How does

one account for its practical efficacy (upaaya). if

from the ultimate perspective it is untrue? In view

of these and similar problems I hesitate to agree

that the notion of sa^mv.rti offers relief from the

relentless apophasis of Maadhyamika.

36. Professor Ruegg has shown that there were

some thinkers especially concerned with the

Tathaagatagarbha-those of the Jo na^n pa tradition

in Tibet--who may indeed have believed that language

could be used in this way. Their kataphasis is not

Tu-shun's. See D. S. Ruegg, La theorie du

Tathaagatagarbha de Bu ston (Paris: EFEO, 1974).

37. Ma~nju`sriparip.rccha (Wen-shu-shih-li wen

ching(du)) T468:14.503a25.

38. Ta-chih-tu lun T1509: 25.205b1-20 and

229al-17.

a 虚妄分别 m 始

b 故说一切法，非空非不空 n 终

有无及有故，是名中道义 o 圆

c 以隐密相 p 华严法界观斗

d 犹未了义 q 杜顺

e 以显了相 r 观

f 真了义 s 真空观法

g 不空 t 色

h 空 u 自性空

i 常 v 见

j 静 w 空空

k 我 x 不即断空

l 判教 y 相

p136

z 空之理 bx 理事相望各非一异

aa 无体 by 周遍含空观

ab 会 bz 理如事

ac 归空 ca 事如理

ad 无碍 cb 事含理事无碍

ae 一味法 cc 遍局无碍

af 此语亦不受 cd 广狭无碍

ag 行境 ce 遍容无碍

ah 若守解不舍无以入兹正行 cf 摄入无碍

ai 玄学 cg 交涉无碍

aj 理事无疑观 ch 相在无碍

ak 理 ci 普融无碍

al 事 cj 妙

am 镕融 ck 有

an 存亡 cl 一中一

ao 逆顺 cm 一切中一

ap 理遍于事 cn 一中一切

aq 事遍于理 co 一切中一切

ar 依理成事 cp 不思议

as 事能显理 cq 洗除

at 以理夺事 cr 智水

au 事能隐理 cs 分别

av 真理即事 ct 思惟

aw 事法即理 cu 想

ax 真理非事 cv 无住

ay 事法非理 cw 正思惟

az 澄观 cx 智慧相应想

ba 色空无碍为真空 cy 键主良敬

bb 未显真如之妙有 cz 华严教学序说，真如(日文)

bc 亡理事 da 注维摩经

bd 不广显无碍之相 db 真谛

be 宗密 dc 慧远

bf 本嵩 dd 净影寺

bg 但是拣情显理 de 华严法界玄镜

bh 如金矿未为器用 df 注严法界观门

bi 会色归空 dg 华严七字经题法界观三十门颂

bj 断 dh 显出禅门眼目

bk 智障 di 一切法本来无生

bl 忍 dj 不动

bm 无生法 dk 十地经论

bn 法藏 dl 大智度论

bo 体 dm 不疑不悔

bp 非生因之所生唯了因之所了 dn 法忍

bq 即 do 事法

br 不异 dp 修华严奥旨妄尽还源观

bs 理即全体遍一尘何故非小 dq 真如之体

bt 一尘全于理性何故非大 dr 大乘起信论

bu 事虚而理实 ds 鎌田茂雄

bv 全事中之理挺然露现 dt 中国佛教思想史研究

bw 举体全理而事相宛然 du 文殊师利问经