APPEARANCE AND REALITY IN CHINESE BUDDHIST

·期刊原文

APPEARANCE AND REALITY IN CHINESE BUDDHIST

METAPHYSICS FROM A EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHICAL

POINT OF VIEW

BONGKIL CHUNG

JOURNAL OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

Vol.20 1993

pp.57-72

COPYRIGHT @1993 BY DIALOGUE PUBLISHING COMPANY, HONOLULU,
HAWAII, U.S.A.

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p.57

preliminary Remarks

One of the perennial problems in philosophy turns around the

question of the ideality of the phenomenal world. Arthur

Schopenhauer thought that we are aware of the world only as

mediated through our senses and intellect and hence the world

is idea or representation.(1) William Alston holds that the

really of the world is independent of any sentient being He

says:

Realism is here being understood as the view that

whatever there is [is] what it is regardless of how we

think of it. Even if there were no human beings, whatever

there is other than human thought (and what depends on

that, causally or logically) would still be just what it

actually is."(2)

Anti-realists flatly reject this view. Hilary Putnam holds

the anti-realist view:

[T]he mind makes up the world....Rather,if one must use

metaphorical language,then let the metaphor be this: the

mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the

world....The empirical world...depends upon our criteria

of rational acceptability...we must have criteria of

rational acceptability to even have an empirical

world....I am saying that the 'real world'depends upon

our values.(3)

p.58

Putnam here argues in the conceptual framework of Immanuel

Kant. According to Kant, we perceive something as duck only

through the a priori forms of sensitivity and understanding.

According to Nicholas Wolterstorff, the fundamental issue is

whether there are properties which can both be grasped and

instantiated And if there are, then the suggestion that

concepts [Kant's a priori forms of understanding] are

graspings of properties is obvious.(4) According to Kant and

Putnam, we cannot experience the world as we do unless out

mind constructs it out of whatever is beyond our sensitivity

and understanding. Thus the fundamental issue is whether the

world is the creation of mind as we experience it. Is the

color gold of this watch independent of my perceiving it? The

realist affirms and the anti-realist denies this. This

question cannot be answered unless there is a third agent

which does not use the human perceptual apparatus, and this

is at the moment of no avail. Until such an agent becomes

available, the issue will remain an unsolved philosophical

problem. Modern philosophers starting with Rene Descartes and

George Berkeley have embraced the idealist view with a

variety of minor differences. In China, Hsuan-tsang(a)

(596-664) translated Vasubandhu's (420-500) work on Mere

Ideation (Vijnaptimatrata, Fa-hsiang(b) ) more than a

miliennium before Descartes and Berkeley and one can discern

an unmistakable mark of this idealism in later Hua-yen and

T'ien-t'ai metaphysics.

This study examines the relevance of Chinese Buddhist

metaphysics to the question of appearance and reality.

Through Buddhist discourse is mainly concerned with Buddhist

soteriology - viz., helping sentient beings enter nirvana by

severing their clinging to illusory ego and the phenomenal

world- one can clearly identify some aspects of their

metaphysical views that contribute to the issue under

discussion. Since this study will look at Chinese philosophy

from a European view point, I will first lay out a European

view point from which we can approach Chinese Buddhist views.

I.

1.1. The premises leading to metaphysical idealism are found

in Descartes'

p.59

distinction between the mental and the physical. This

distinction provides the basis for the identification of a

realm of appearances as distinct from reality. For Descartes

the direct objects of perception in the mind are ideas of

three kinds, viz., innate, adventitious, and factitious, all

of which are modifications of the mind. All of these ideas

are caused and some have more reality than others in the

representation of their corresponding reality.(5) In his

proof of the external world, Descartes maintains that God

creates the world and puts impressions of its ideas in our

mind.(6) These ideas do not constitute a reality of public

and physical objects, they can be thought of as a realm of

appearance only. As D.W. Hamlyn points out, idealism stems

from this - with the additional premise that since we do not

have access to anything beyond ideas, the only reality which

we have any justification to assume is that of ideas, of the

appearances themselves.(7) 1.2. Descartes' view that ideas

stand as a veil of perception between us and the world of

reality is more clearly stated by John Locke. According to

Locke, "whatever is so constituted in nature as to he able,

by affecting our senses, to cause by perception in the mind,

doth thereby produce in the understanding a simple idea."(8)

Locke distinguishes ideas in the mind and qualities in the

bodies which cause them: "it will be convenient to

distinguish them as they are ideas or perceptions in our

minds: and as they are modifications of matter in the bodies

that cause such perceptions "(9) For Locke an "Idea" is

whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, in us. or is the

immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding,

and the power to produce any idea in our mind is the quality

of the subject wherein that power is.(10) Locke calls the

solidity, extension,figure,and mobility of any body original

or primary qualities which produce simple ideas in us, viz.,

solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number.

Secondary qualities are such qualities as are nothing in the

objects themselves but are powers to produce various

sensations in us by their primary qualities. Such qualities

as color,slund and taste which we mistakenly attribute to

objects are in truth nothing in the objects themselves,but

powers to produce various sensations in us; and depend on

primary qualities, viz., bulk,figure,texture,and motion of

parts.(11) According to Locke, "the ideas of primary

qualities of bodies are resemblances of them,and their

patterns do really exist in the bodies

p.60

themselves, but the ideas produced in us by the secondary

qualities have no resemblance of them at all. There is

nothing like our ideas, existing in the bodies

themselves."(12) In Locke's view, we cannot imagine that

these simple ideas subsist by themselves, hence we accustom

ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist,

and from which they do result, which therefore we call

substance, which is nothing but a supposed but unknown,

support of those qualities we find existing.(13) 1.3. George

Berkeley's idealism replaces the notion of material substance

as the substratum with an infinite spiritual substance. He

says, "... it is infinitely more extravagant to say -- a

thing which is inert operates on the mind, and which is

unperceiving is the cause of our perception."(14) Thus,

Berkeley's idealism is a consequence of Locke's version of

the causal theory of perception. If we can only see our own

ideas caused by the primary and secondary qualities which we

can ex hypothesis never have direct access to, then, argues

Berkeley, it is nonsense to say either our ideas do or do not

resemble the primary or secondary qualities themselves.

Berkeley says that only ideas can resemble another idea; and

"as the supposed originals are in themselves unknown, it is

impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them; or

whether they resemble them at all."(15) Once the notion of

material substance is removed, Berkeley's idealism is the

conclusion to the following argument. All sensible qualities

are nothing but ideas and all physical objects are nothing

but sensible qualities, hence all physical objects are

nothing but ideas. Ideas cannot exist unperceived; an

unperceived idea is therefore self-contradictory. Physical

objects exist unperceived by finite minds.Therefore,they are

perceived by an infinite mind, namely, God.(16) For

Berkeley,mountains,rivers,and stars are all ideas. So,Hegel

pointed out that Berkeley says very little when he says that

things are ideas since this only amounts to recommending a

change of nomenclature and calling things ideas.(17) 1.4. For

David Hume, an unperceived idea is not self-contradictory.

For Hume,perceptions are distinct,independent,self-sufficient

and they occur in bundles as far as we know.The unperceived

perceptions are suggested by two features of our

impressions, constancy and coherence. When I notice

interruptions in my impressions of a mountain,I resolve the

contradiction by supposing unperceived perceptions filling

the gaps

p.61

in the series. Consistency of the mountain despite my

interrupted perceptions of it proves the mountain a bundle of

ideas which continues unperceived. Changing objects are

believed to exist independently if the impressions of them

display coherence. If my fire dies down slowly, the room

temperature goes down whether my impressions of it are

interrupted or not. Hume has to hold this view because

"spiritual substance" and "corporeal substance" are both

pieces of meaningless metaphysical jargon."(18) Thus, neither

Locke's material substance nor Berkeley's spiritual substance

is available to rescue unperceived perceptions. 1.5. Kant

agrees with his predecessors in that we are confined to ideas

or representations (Vorstellungen) even if there is in fact a

reality of things-in-themselves beyond them to which

experience can have no access, he says, "we can know objects

only as they oppear to us (to our senses), not as they may be

in themselves."(19) For Kant, the phenomenal world is totally

dependent on the mind:

All our intuition is nothing but the representation of

appear ance; that the things which we intuit are not in

themselves what we intuit them as being, nor their

relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to

us, and that if the subject, or even only the subjective

constitution of the senses in general. be removed, the

whole constitution and all the relations of objects in

space and time, nay space and time themselves, would

vanish. As appearances, they cannot exist in themselves,

but only in us.(20)

Kant's view,however,differs form Berkeley's since he makes a

distinction within experience between what is subjective and

what is objective. Kant thinks that the objective world as we

take it to be is empiricallly real in the sense that it

differs from the products ot the imagination, but it is

transcendentally ideal since it is stil a matter of

representation by comparison with things-in-themselves.(21)

Kant says, "external objects(bodies), however, are mere

appearances,and are therefore nothing but a species of my

representations,the objects of which are something only

through these representations. Aparts from them they are

nothing."(22) He says

p.62

further, "these external things, namely matter, are in all

their configurations and alterations nothing but mere

appearances, that is, representation in us, of the reality of

which we are immediately conscious."(23) 1.6. Francis H.

Bradley (1864-1924) finds contradictory nature in the

phenomenal world."(24) Bradley appeals to the fact that the

perception of secondary qualities, color, taste, sound, etc.

are circumstance-depedent. He then follows Berkeley in

generalizing that primary qualities such as size and shape

are also nothing but ideas.(25) Berkeley concludes that,

besides God, reality consists solely of ideas; Bradley

concludes that experience is not true.(26)

...There is the one undivided life of the Absolute.

Appearance without reality would be impossible, for what

then could appear? And reality without appearance would

be nothing, for there certainly is nothing outside

appearance. But on the other hand Reality (we must repeat

this) is not the sum of things. It is the unity in which

all things, coming together, are transmuted, in which

they changed all alike, though not changed equally.(27)

1.7. Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Kant, then, agree on one

point: the phenomenal world as we experience it is dependent

on our mind for its being. What is presupposed in this view

is that the mind is so marvelous and mysterious as to create

the phenomena of the wonderful world. This point is expressed

in Chinese Buddhist metaphysics by the dictum that the world

is the creation of the mind. This view is explored below in

the works of Hsuan-tsang(a)(596-664), Fa-tsang(c)(643-712),

and Hui-ssu(d)(515-577). Just as the Western philosophers we

have considered disagree on the issue of reality while

agreeing broadly on the nature of the phenomenal world as

appearance, Chinese Buddhist metaphysicians have agreed on

the phenomenality of appearance and disagreed on the

relationship between appearance and reality.

p.63

2.1. Hsuan-tsang's Cheng Wei Hsih Lun(e) (Completion of the

Doctrine of Mere Ideation) echos the views of Berkeley, Hume

and Kant.

According to the Mere Ideation theory,(28) the phenomena

of both ego and things of the external world are equally

evolved by consciousness. Though both are within

consciousness, they seem to be manifested in the external

world. Thus, the seeming ego and external things which are

evolved within the consciousness, although they do not exist

in one sense, nevertheless do not have the nature of a real

ego and real objects, despite their seeming appearance as

such.(29) In other words, what we believe to be external

objects are established in accordance with mistaken beliefs,

and do not exist in the same way as does consciousness. Inner

consciousness, however, being the causation on which the

appearance of external objects depends, is not non-existent

in the same way as the external objects."(30)

This view seems to be identical with Berkeley's idealism

since for Berkeley only the infinite mind, God, and ideas are

created thereby The two views differ, however, in that while

mountains and rivers as ideas are real and distinct from the

infinite mind for Berkeley, they are nothing but

consciousnesses themselves for the mere ideation theory. The

mere ideation theory, however, provides an explanation of the

rela- tionship between ideas and the mind in terms of three

evolving agents, namely, the maturing consciousness(f)

,intellection(g) and discrimination(h).

As regards the (external) localization (of mental

representations), what is meant is that the maturing

consciousness, through the 'maturing' influence of

its'universal'seeds evolves the manifestations of the

seeming matter, etc.,of the receptacle-world,that is,the

external major elements and the matter formed upon

them.Although what is evolved by sentient beings in this

way is separate for each, the resulting appearances are

each like the other,so that there is no differentiation

in their (external) localization.The case is like that of

the illuminations cast by many lamps, which though

separate for each,seem to form a common whole."(31)

p.64

Thus, such objects as mountains and rivers are evolved out of

the universal seeds which belong all to Alaya consciousness

in common. Again, this view is identical with Berkeley's

idealism and more coherent than Hume's phenomenalism which,

as we saw, implies such unperceived perceptions as mountains

and dying fire. However, the mere ideation theory denies any

reality to such mountains and fires if they are not mere

ideas evolved out of the storehouse consciousness.

Hume's claim that such notions as spiritual substance and

corporeal substance are meaningless metaphysical jargon, is

echoed by the Mere Ideation theory. According to the theory,

there are three evolving categories of consciousness and

their mental qualities, all of which are capable of evolving

into two seeming aspects: that of the perceiving division and

that of the perceived division.(32) The evolved perceiving

division is termed "discrimination", because it takes the

perceived division as the object of perception. The evolved

perceived division is termed 'what is discriminated', because

it is taken by the perceiving division as the object of

perception. According to this principle, there are no real

ego or material objects aside from what is thus evolved from

consciousness.(33) What is denied is not mental functions,

Hume's bundles, as inseparable from consciousness, but the

'real' things apart from the aspects of consciousness. The

seeming reality of ego and material objects results from the

discriminating aspect of consciousness. In this way

discrimination evolves what seem to be external objects which

consist of a false ego and material objects.(34)

The Mere Ideation theory, however, anticipates Kant's

world view which admits the noumenal world, for it maintains

that the true nature of all things is chen ju(i)

(Bhutatathata) or Jenuine Thusness.Genuine Thusness, the

reality of all,does not evolve or change,remaining under all

conditions, constantly thus in its nature.(35) Genuine

Thusness as the nature of all phenomenal objects is in no way

connected with the specific character of phenomenal

objects.The thing as in itself is separate forever from the

thing for us.Genuine Thusness or noumenon will never be

perfumed by actual life; it has no relation at all with

phenomenon.(36) This is exactly Kant's view concerning the

relation of noumenon and phenomenon when he says that the

concept of causality is true only of

p.65

the phenomenal world.

2.2. Fa-tsang's Chin shih-tzu chang(j) (Essay on the Gold

Lion) provides a clearer analogy to illustrate the relation

between appearance and reality or phenomenon and noumenon. Of

the Gold Lion, the gold metal symbolizes noumenon and the

figure of the lion symbolizes phenomenon. Fa-tsang identifies

the noumenal world with the realm of principles and the

phenomenal world with the realm of things.(37) The point of

the analogy lies in explaining how the phenomenal world

arises out of the noumenal world. Gold is the primary cause

and the artisan the contributing or secondary cause (material

and efficient causes respectively, to use Aristotle's

terminology). For Fa-tsang, all things and events in the

phenomenal world arise only through the combination of such

causes.

Once the relation of phenomenon to noumenon is

illustrated, the Essay explains the nature of the phenomenal

world. Just as the outward aspect of the lion is illusory,

the phenomenal world is devoid of its own reality while the

noumenal world is free from generation and destruction like

the gold in the analogy."(38) Things of the phenomenal world

are all manifestations of illusions or sole imagination like

Descartes' factitious ideas. Fa-tsang explains the three

characters of things:

The fact that, from (the point of view of) the senses,

the lion exists, is called its (character of) sole

imagination. The fact that (from a higher point of view)

the lion only seemingly exists, is called its (character

of) dependency on others. And the fact that the gold (of

which the lion is made) is immutable in its nature, is

called (the character of) ultimate reality.(39)

The implication of this analogy is that the events and things

of the pheonmenal world have illusory being as the result of

causation but lack any inhernt nature of their own.All beings

in the phenomenal world depend on something else for their

existence.Underlying these appearances,however,there is the

immutable noumenon,which is the ultimate reality,the reality

which Descartes calls 'substance' in its primary sense.The

immutability of the noumenon in the Essay is called

'non-generation'.(40)

The generation of the events and things of the phenomenal

world

p.66

is explained in terms of primary and contributing causes. For

Locke ideas of secondary qualities are the mental

representations of the secondary qualities themselves. For

Fa-tsang, matter is the contributing cause of mind, and mind

is the primary cause of matter. Through the combination of

these causes, illusory manifestations are generated. Being

thus generated through causation, they cannot have any nature

of their own.(41) Descartes and Locke on the nature of what

they call 'idea' seem to have been anticipated by Fa-tsang:

Matter is not self-caused, but necessarily remains

dependent on mind. Mind, however, does not derive from

itself, but is likewise dependent on (phenomenal)

causation. Because of this mutual dependency, what is

generated through causation is indeterminate. It is this

fact of indeterminateness that is called

non-generation.(42)

The claim that matter is dependent on mind resembles Locke's

view that secondary qualities such as color, sound, taste and

odor are, being ideas, dependent on mind for their being.

Descartes' adventitious ideas as modes of the spiritual

substance depend on matter in the external world. Ideas last

as long as they are in the mind. There is no experience of

sweetness in the lump of sugar on the table until it is

produced as an idea in the mind. Fa-tsang says, "matter

[dust] is manifestation of mind. But having thus manifested,

it becomes the contributing cause of mind. There must first

be this causation before any 'mental things' (hsin fa(k)) can

arise."(43) Thus, Locke's causal theory of perception seems

to have been anticipated by Fa-tsang.

Mind and matter discussed here still belong to the

phenomenal world in Kant's conceptual scheme if mind and

matter somehow cause each other. As Fung Yu-lan points out,

(44) the central element in Fa-tsang thought is a permanently

immutable 'mind' which is universal of absolute in its scope

and is the basis for all phenomenal manifestations. This

absolute and immutable mind is more like Berkeley's infinite

spirit or God in which all events and things of the

phenomenal world subsist as archetypal ideas and become

ectypal ideas in time. Thus, Fa-tsang

p.67

explains the phenomenal world as arising from the noumenal

world in terms of 'causation by the realm of noumenon (li fa

chieh(p))'. If we take the term 'noumenon' in the Kantian

sense, the philosophical problem of how what is outside of

time and space can be the cause of the phenomenal world which

is within the realm of space and time, the problem remains

unsolved.

The view of Tung-shan. Liang-chieh (807-869) on noumenon

(li(m) and phenomenon (shih(n)) expounded in his work The

Five Ranks (wu-wei(o)) can be of some help. Two concepts in

the fivefold formula cheng(p) and p'ien(q) signify literally

"the straight" and "the bent." They refer to what is

absolute, one, identical, universal, and noumenal set up in

tension with what is relative, manifold, different,

particular, and phenomenal.(45) The relation of the two

realms is explained in the statement that the absolute

becomes manifest in appearance. In this view, however,

absolute and relative phenomenal are regarded as non-dual

because they are correlative. Relative phenomenal is also

called "marvelous being" and absolute "the true emptiness."

The two are then identified by the expressions "the marvelous

being of true emptiness" and "the true emptiness of marvelous

being." These terms express the quintessence of the

enlightened view of reality.(46) Thus, noumenon as true

emptiness is the gold of the gold lion in the sense that gold

is devoid of the form of lion. The phenomenal world as

representation is empty of its own reality and yet it is a

marvelous appearance of the noumenal.

2.3. In the Ta-ch'eng chih-kuan fa-men(47) (Mahayana Method

of Cessation and Contemplation) traditionally attributed to

Hui-ssu (515-577), one finds what may be called the absolute

idealism of Bradley. Just as Bradley believes that appearance

without reality is be impossible, so the T'ien-t'ai school

regards the whole universe as consisting of a single absolute

mind, known as Chen ju(i)(genuine thusness, Bhutatathata) or

Ju-lai chang(s) (Storehouse of the thus come,

Tathagata-garbha) . These two concepts were previously

met(2.1) in our discussion of the mere ideation school. The

T'ien t'ai(t) school demonstrates an unmistakable influence

of idealism. Thus, we read:

p.68

All things depend upon this mind to have their being, and

take mind as their substance. Regarded in themselves,

they are all void and illusory, and their being is not

(real) being. In contrast to these illusory things, it

(mind) is said to be genuine. Furthermore, though really

not existent, they, because of illusory causation, have

the appearance of undergoing generation and destruction.

Yet when these void things undergo generation, mind

itself is not generated nor, when they undergo

destruction, is it destroyed.(48)

Concerning the identity of the reality in all beings in the

phenomenal world, the text continues: "The Buddhas of all the

three ages together with sentient beings, all equally have

this one mind as their substance. All things, both ordinary

and saintly, each have their own differences and diverse

appearances, whereas this genuine mind is devoid of either

diversity or appearance."(49)

The phenomenal world as appearance of reality is

explained in terms of the substance and function of

Tathagata-garbha or "the Storehouse of the Thus Come." The

storehouse in its substance (ti(u)) is everywhere the same,

and in actual fact is undifferentiated. It is devoid of

differentiation. In its functioning (yung(v)), however, it is

diverse, and hence embodies the natures of all things and is

differentiated."(50) The best simile in the Buddhist

literature- as in the Awakening of Faith in Mahayana-

concerning substance and its function is water and waves.(51)

The two cannot be separated from each other. Water is the

substance of waves and waves are appearance of water. In the

T'ien-t'ai school, the ultimate reality of the universe is

taken to be the clear and pure mind, and is thus a version of

absolute idealism: "We known that all things are the product

of mind."(52) Thus, in this school, nothing real exists

outside of mind, and hence all phenomena are manifestations

of that mind.

III.

What can we say to Alston, Putnam, and Wolterstorff? Is the

lump of sugar on the table white, sweet, and hard when no one

sees, tastes or

p.69

feels it? Alston and Worterstorff think so while Putnam does

not. What about color and the sound of my stereo in my room

where there is no one inside? The tape recorder and camcorder

cannot favor the realists view since there is no third agent

to watch and listen to them who does not have a human

perceptual apparatus.

Descartes, Locke, and Kant admit a reality behind the

veil of perception and hold that the phenomenal world from

the epistemological point of view is an idea or mental

representation. Berkeley cannot allow any real existence

outside of God's mind, so he takes the phenomenal world as

reality in the mind of God. These philosophers all provide

premises for Schopenhauer to conclude that the world is

nothing hut the representation of the will.

The Buddhist schools presented above all agree that the

phenomenal world is the production of the mind. There seems

to be no conclusively valid argument or proof for the truth

of this view; Buddhist views seem to be based on intuitive

insight. If we agree, as in the West, that all of the

qualities we ascribe to physical objects are in reality our

own ideas caused by the objects, then, since cause is utterly

different from effect (ideas) and since we can ex hypothesis

never directly perceive the cause (reality) . then the

Buddhist mere ideation theory can he identified with the

subjective idealism of Berkeley's version, for one admits God

who can be independent of any phenomenal world he creates and

the other Chen hui (genuine thusness) as ultimate reality

which is independent of the appearance of mind as the

phenomenal world.

Fa-tsang and Hui-ssu, both influenced by the philosophy

of mere ideation regard the phenomenal world as the

manifestation of mind. Just as deluded beings can only see

waves without seeing water, deluded beings do not see the

phenomenal world as the manifestation of mind. Here, I

suspect that the notion of Chen ju(Bhuttathata) and

Storehouse of the Thus Come (Tathagata-garbha) are Buddhist

resurrections of the Vedic Brahman as S. Sharma contends.(53)

Brahmanism is, of course, absolute idealism.

Surprisingly enough, then, we can say that the problem of

appearance and reality has troubled philosophers of the East

and the West. I remain unsure whether Putnam or Alston is

right. I have only an intuition

p.70

that my phenomenal world is the representation of my

sentience caused by the external world. My mind is like a

flash light in the night, without which things cannot appear

with all their qualities.

NOTES

1. Die Welt as Wille und Vorstellung, translated as The

World as Will and Representation by E.F.J Payne, 2 vols

(Indian Hills, Colo.,1958).

2. William Alston,"Yes, Virgina. There is a Real World,"

Paul K. Moser ed., Reality In Focus (Englewood Cliffs,

N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1990), p.18.

3. Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge:

Cambridge University press, 1981), pp.134-135.

4. Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Realism vs. Anti-Realism," in

Moser, Reality in Focus, p.62.

5. Rene Descartes,"Meditations on First Philosophy," in

Ralph M. Eaton ed. Descartes (New York: Charles

Scribner's Sons, 1955), Meditation III.

6. Ibid., Meditation V.

7. D.W. Hamlyn, Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1984), pp.15-16.

8. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,

Comp., Collated, & Annotated by Alexander Campbell Fraser

(New York: Dover Publishing Co., 1957), Bk.II Ch.VIII， (Vol.One), p.166.

9. Ibid., p.168 [Locke's emphasis]

10. Ibid., p.169

11. Ibid., p.173

12. Ibid., p.173

13. Ibid., Ch.XIII, pp.390-392

14. Ibid., p.198

15. George Berkeley, "Three Dialogues between Hylas and

Philonous, " in David M. Armstrong ed. Berkeley's

Philosophical Writings (London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd.,

1965), p.208.

16. Ibid., pp.174-175.

17. H.B. Acton,"Idealism," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

8 vols. ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), IV,

p.115. Acton refers to Hegel's Lectures on the History of

Philosophy.

18. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature ed. Selby-Bigge

(Oxford, 1896), p.71

Bk.1, Pt. iv; Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed.

C.W. Hendel (New York, 1958), Sec.XII.

19. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics,

trans, L.W.Beck (New York, 1951), Sec.10.

20. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (Hamburg: Felix

Miener Verlag, 1956), Seite, 83. Quoted from Norman Kemp

Smith trans, Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (New

York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), p.82.

21. Ibid., pp.346-347.

22. Ibid., p.346.

23. Ibid., 437.

24. F.S. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (Oxford: The

Clarendon Press, 1893, 1968), Chapters I & II.

25. Ibid., pp.10-12.

26. Ibid., Chapter IV.

27. Ibid., p.432.

28. Taisho shinshu taizokyo(w) [hereafter "I"] (Tokyo: Taisho

lun]. 31:1b. I owe this study to Fung Yu-lan's Chung-kuo

ssu-hsiang hsih(x) and Derk Bodde's English translation

of the work: A History of Chinese Philosophy Vol.II

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953).

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. I 1585.31:10a. Fung, History, pp.307-308.

32. I 1585.31:38c.

33. Loc cit.

34. Loc cit.

35. I 1585.31:48a.

36. I 1585.31:48a.

37. I 1875 (Hua-yen yi-hai pai-men(y)).45:627b.

38. I 1880 (Chin shih-tsu chang yun-chien

lui-chiai(z)).45:663c-664a.

39. I 1880.45:664a. Derk Bodde's translation.

40. I 1880.45;664a.

41. I 1875.45:627b-c.

42. I 1875.45:727b-c. Bodde's translation.

43. Ibid.

44. Fung Yu-lan, Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang hsih, p.749; Bodde's

trans., History of Chinese Philosophy, p.359.

45. Heinrich Dumoulin, Zen Buddhism: A History, trans., J.W.

Heisig and P. Knitter (New York: Macmillan, 1988), p.225.

46. Ibid.

47. I 1924.46:641-664.

48. I 1924.46:642b. Bodde's translation.，p.72

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., 648a.

51. I 1664 (Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun(aa)).32:576c.

52. Ibid., 650b.

53. See his A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy (Delhi:

Motilal Banarsidass, 1960), pp.121-123.

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