Approaching the numinous Rudolf Otto and Tibetan tantra

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Approaching the numinous Rudolf Otto and Tibetan tantra

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p.467

In Oriental art there may be no more evocative
portrayal of what Rudolf Otto calls the mysterium
tremendum than the wrathful deities of Tibetan
Tantric Buddhism. Fearful in form, wreathed in
flames. adorned with garlands of human heads, and
brandishing dagger and skull-cup, their painted
images conjure the feelings of dread and fascination
which Otto describes in The Idea of the Holy. In
this seminal work, he sets out to describe the
central element of religious experience such that
there is "no religion in which it does not live as
the real innermost core, and without it no religion
would be worthy of the name." (1)
This article will be an inquiry into whether the
holy, described as mysterium tremendum, does indeed
stand as the core of the tantric path of Tibetan
Buddhism and will be a comparison of the methods of
approaching the holy or "numinous" as set forth by
Otto and Tibetan scholars. The presentation of tantra
given here will follow that of the Gelukba order of
Tibetan Buddhism, relying especially on the writings
of Tsong-ka-pa (1357-1419), its founder.
In The Idea of the Holy Otto rejects the views
held by many psychologists, historians of religion,
philosophers, and anthropologists that religion "is a
fact in nature and, to be understood, must be seen as
a product of the same laws of nature that determine
other natural phenomena."(2) Nor does he see
religion, as does Clifford Geertz, as a system of
conceptions formulated by man in response to
ignorance, pain, and injustice.(3)
Rather, Otto sees religion as a sui generis
category, which stands above all natural processes
and whose essence is irreducible and unevolvable. He
writes that "if there is any single domain of human
experience that presents us with something
unmistakably specific and unique, peculiar to itself,
assuredly it is that of religious life."(4) This
essence he calls the "numinous," which is the object
of religious experience, and which "we cannot but
feel"(5) for "it eludes the conceptual way of
thinking."(6)
Throughout Otto draws sharp distinctions between
the natural and the supernatural and between the
rational and the nonrational. The "numinous" is not a
natural phenomenon and our knowledge of it cannot be
gained empirically; instead, "it issues from the
deepest foundation of cognitive apprehension that the
soul possesses, and though it of course comes into
being in and amid sensory data and empirical material
of the natural world and cannot anticipate or
dispense with those, yet it does not arise out
of them, but only hy their means."(7) Further, the
numinous is nonrational and "completely eludes
apprehension in terms of concepts" (8) and "can only
be suggested by means of the special way in which it
is reflected in the mind in terms of feeling."(9)
_____________________________________________________
Donald S. Lopez, Jr. is a doctoral candidate in
Buddhist studies and an instructor in the Department
of Religious Studies, University of Virginia.

p.468

It is Otto's view that religion cannot be fully
understood through reason and rational thought. To
support his claim, he looks not to scripture or
theological treatise. but instead finds his affinity
in the words of the mystics. Weber's "religious
virtuosos," because they stress "the non-rational or
suprarational elements in religion."(10)
The numinous cannot be known through
ratiocination; awareness of it comes only through the
feelings it evokes. Consequently, Otto devotes a
great part of The Idea of the Holy to a description
of these feelings, the first of which centers in the
subject's sense of creature-consciousness, "the
emotion or a creature, submerged and overwhelmed by
its own nothingness in contrast to that which is
supreme above all creatures." (11) It is a
recognition of one's insignificance in the face of
the absolute, exemplified by Arjuna's response to the
theophany in the eleventh chapter of the
Bhagavad-giitaa.
Next Otto considers the experience of the
mysterium tremendum, which carries with it a complex
of feelings, with mysterium denoting "that which is
hidden and.esoteric, that which is beyond conception
or understanding, extraordinary and unfamiliar."(12)
Tremendum evokes a "peculiar dread" of something
uncanny, aweful, weird, eerie, and absolutely
unapproachable, causing the flesh to creep.
Throughout his description, Otto stresses that
although these feelings may have analogs among
"natural" moments of consciousness, there is a
qualitative difference between them. For example, he
characterizes the dread of the tremendum as something
other than natural fear, "a terror fraught with an
inward shuddering such as not even the most menacing
and overpowering created thing can instil."(13)
As the object of these feelings, the numinous is
endowed with might, power, transcendence, absolute
overpoweringness, majesty, and a "plenitude of being"
surpassing any created thing. It has urgency, energy,
passion, and emotional temper. Because it is that
"which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the
intelligible, and the familiar,"(14) it is called
"the wholly other" which brings forth feelings of
wonder, amazement, and astonishment. The numinous
produces a captivating attraction in one sensitive to
it the element of fascination. Otto finds these
feeling-responses to be common to all forms of
mysticism.
Not only does he enumerate these various
reactions to the numinous, he also emphatically
contends that these feelings are the only media
through which the numinous, or reality, can be known.
Words, concepts, reasoning, and rational thought are
incapable of producing true experience of the wholly
other, which can only be "firmly grasped, thoroughly
understood, and profoundly appreciated, purely in,
with, and from the feeling itself." (15)
Otto traces these experiences of the numinous to
the most primitive religious consciousness, where the
feeling-response was one of "daemonic dread." This
crude consciousness of the numinous evolved over the
centuries to a more elevated and noble experience.
Throughout this process of religious

p.469

evolution, however. the object of these feelings
remains the nonrational numinous, and the element of
dread felt by the primitive savage, though superseded
by other responses. "does not disappear on the
highest level of all. where the worship of God is at
its purest."(16) And although this process of
evolution has occurred in all the great religions, it
has reached its culmination in Christianity, which
"stands out in complete superiority over its sister
religions."(17) Thus. against all those who would
see the rise of religion emanating from any number of
"natural" factors, Otto holds the numinous to be "the
basic factor and basic impulse underlying the entire
process of religious evolution." (18)
Although Otto discounts reason as having any
relation to the numinous whatsoever, he discovers a
close relationship between the feeling of the
numinous and aesthetic experience. He finds the
feelings of the sublime, the beautiful, and the
experience of music to be nonconceptual, nonrational,
and wholly other, much like that of the numinous.
Weber also notes such a similarity between
religion and art. However, Weber observes that for
the mystic "the indubitable psychological affinity of
profoundly shaking experience in art and religion can
only be a symptom of the diabolical nature of art."
(19) The mystic is seeking to transcend all form in
order to achieve union with a reality that is beyond
form. Weber perceives a contradiction between
religion and art, with the result that "the more
religion has emphasized either the supra-worldliness
of its God or the otherworldliness of salvation, the
more harshly has art been refuted."(20)
Otto on the other hand, far from refuting art,
suggests that aesthetic feelings reveal the
transcendent reality, that "in great art the point is
reached at which we may no longer speak of the
'magical, ' but rather are confronted with the
numinous itself, with all its impelling power,
transcending reason, expressed in sweeping lines and
rhythm."(21)
Nonetheless, the numinous is a purely a priori
category, underivable and irreducible. It cannot be
explained but only presupposed. This numinous
undergoes a process of development whereby it becomes
"moralized," gaining ethical meaning through being
endowed with rational qualities of absoluteness,
completeness, morality, purpose, justice, goodness,
and love. The wholly other numinous, having become
"completely permeated and saturated" by these
rational qualities, becomes what Otto calls "the
holy." He finds these rational qualifies also to be
a priori and "not to be 'evolved' from any sort of
sense perception."(22) Further, the connection of the
numinous to these ethical qualities, the relation of
the nonrational to the rational, is not to be derived
from reasoning, but is also a priori.(23)
Finally, our capacity for experience of the
numinous is a priori as well. The object of religious
experience is the numinous, of which we are aware
through numinous feelings. Objectively, the numinous
seems to act as a stimulus for these feelings.
However, from the subject's side there exists an a
priori

p.470

potency which allows the numinous to be experienced.
This Otto calls "a hidden, substantive source, from
which the religious ideas and feelings are formed,
which lies in the mind independently of
sense-experience."(24) It is a "primal element of our
psychical nature that needs to be grasped in its
uniqueness and cannot itself be explained by anything
else."(25)
Despite philosophical problems that may inhere in
such a wholesale attribution of the a priori category
to all things religious,(26) it is important to
consider Otto's purpose at this point. The Idea of
the Holy is not intended as a philosophical treatise
proving the existence of the numinous; rather it is
an apology for the intuitive element of religious
experience. Otto does not intend to persuade the
unconvinced with his arguments. His words are offered
only to kindred spirits, those whose innate capacity
for the numinous has been awakened, for whom he
eloquently verbalizes the experience of the holy,
"the feeling which remains where the concept fails."
(27) At the very outset, Otto invites the reader "to
direct his mind to a moment of deeply-felt religious
experience, as little as possible qualitied by other
forms of consciousness. Whoever cannot do this,
whoever knows no such moments in his experience, is
requested to read no further."(28) It is his purpose
then, to "suggest this unnamed Something to the
reader as far as we may, so that he may himself feel
it."(29)
Thus, having stressed the intuitive aspect of
religious experience, having presented numinous
feeling for the sake of awakening that feeling, Otto
in the end makes his appeal to feeling. The numinous
is "something which the 'natural' man cannot, as
such, know or even imagine, "(30) and no
"intellectual, dialectical dissection or
justification of such intuition is possible, nor
indeed should any be attempted, for the essence most
peculiar to it would be destroyed thereby."(31)
Rather, the numinous must be directly experienced to
be understood.
Once experienced, there need not be doubt
concerning the validity of these numinous feelings
for they are a priori by which Otto means that "as
soon as an assertion has been clearly expressed and
understood, knowledge of its truth comes into the
mind with the certitude of first-hand insight." (32)
In short, religious experience is autonomous,
self-validating, and infallible. When the numinous
feelings that Otto describes are experienced, there
is immediate certainty that this is a realization of
the deepest truth; religious experience "represents a
perception which provides its own evidence."(33)
It is Otto's contention that the numinous and the
feelings it evokes are common to all religions. To
test this claim in the case of Tibetan tantra, it is
first necessary to identify the numinous element in
Buddhism.
According to the Praasa^ngika-Maadhyamika school,
the highest system of tenets in Tibet, every object
of knowledge, permanent or impermanent, is a
phenomenon (dharma). Even the highest nature of an
object, its emptiness, is

p.471

a phenomenon. Taking phenomena in this sense, there
are no noumena apart from phenomena in Buddhism, and
our inquiry is cut short.
However, if we take the view found in Western
metaphysics that phenomena refer to sense objects and
that "behind the phenomena which present themselves
in everyday experience, there lie realities whose
existence and properties can be established only by
the use of the intellect and which can hence be
described as noumena,"(34) we then have a distinction
between noumena and phenomena that can be applied to
the Praasa^ngikaMaadhyamika view. That is,
impermanent things or products (samsk.rta) , the
appearing objects of direct perception (praryak.sa),
are phenomena and those objects which initially must
be known through relying on inference (anumaa.na) are
noumena.(35) For the purpose of comparison with Otto,
we may consider only the most important of such
objects--emptinesses ('Suunyataa) --the ultimate
truths (paramaarthasatya) of the
Praasa^ngika-Maadhyamika system, the realization of
which leads to liberation from cyclic existence
(sa.msaara) . Otto identifies emptiness as the
numinous element in Buddhism, writing that "the
'void' of the western, mystic is a numinous ideogram of the
'wholly other.' " (36)
An emptiness, according to Praasa^ngika, is an
object's lack of inherent existence
(svabhaava-siddhi); and when it is realized "what
appears to the mind is a clear vacuity accompanied by
the mere thought,'These concrete things as they now
appear to our minds do not exist at all.'"(37) In the
direct realization of emptiness, the mind and
emptiness are said to be mixed like fresh water
poured into fresh water.(38)
Since Buddhism is an atheistic religion in the
sense that it denies the existence of a preexistent
creator deity, the experience of the numinous does
not carry with it the feeling of
creature-consciousness which Otto describes, (39)
Emptiness is a mere negative, a lack of a falsely
conceived predicate of existence.(40)
Reference is made in Praasa^ngika to a fear which
arises in the practice of emptiness. it is said that
a person with a slight understanding of emptiness
becomes fearful because "the phenomenon suddenly
appears to his mind as not existing at all,"(41) When
emptiness is realized directly, however, all fear is
dispelled because the source of fear--the conception
of true existence--has disappeared. This fear bears
little resemblance to the dread and terror that Otto
describes which produces creeping flesh and which
never disappears, even at the highest level of
mystical experience.
Emptiness is neither shrouded in mystery, nor is
it a "numinous ideogram of the wholly other."(42) An
emptiness is not other than the phenomenon it
qualifies in that they are of the same entity.
Through the practice of the path, emptiness can be
realized in a direct, nonconceptual, nondualistic
experience free of doubt and mystery.(43)

p.472

Otto holds the mysterious to be an essential
attribute of religious experience and for support
points to a "mode of manifestation that in every
religion occupies a foremost and extraordinary
place,"(44) namely, miracle. Although the settings
and circumstances of many Buddhist suutras,
especially in the Mahaayaana, may be termed magical
or miraculous, miracles are not a central teaching
technique of Buddha.

Buddhas neither wash sins away with water
Nor remove beings' suffering with their hands
Nor transfer their realizations to others; beings
Are freed through the teaching of the truth, the
nature of things.(45)

Regarding miracles, it is noteworthy to compare
the reactions of Christ and Buddha in a similar
situation--being request to restore the life of a
dead child. Christ resurrected Jairus' daughter,(46)
while Buddha, in the Parable of the Mustard Seed,(47)
used the opportunity to teach the mother of the child
the all-pervasive nature of suffering. In both cases,
it can be assumed that one result was that witnesses
were inspired to follow the teaching, although the
techniques of the two teachers were quite different.
Weber notes a more general difference in the
style of teaching of Buddha as compared to those of
Jesus and Muhammad:

Neither the short parable, the ironic dismissal, or
the pathetic penitential sermon of the Galilean
prophet, nor the address resting on visions of the
Arabic holy leader find any sort of parallels to the
lectures and conversations which seem to have
constituted the true form of Buddha's activity. They
address themselves purely to the intellect and
affected the quiet, sober judgement detached from all
internal excitement; their factual manner exhausts
the topic always in systematic dialectical
fashion.(48)

The emphasis on reason and analysis which Weber
observes in the Theravaada suuttas is also an
essential element in the tantric path. In
Tso^ngkha-pa's major work on tantra, The
Great.Exposition of Secret Mantra, he explains that
before beginning practice one must have firm
conviction that the system one has chosen to follow
is correct. A choice between two systems is not an
act of partisanship but should be based on reasoned
analysis. Specifically, "the scriptures of the two
systems are what are to be analysed to find which
does or does not bear the truth; thus, it would not
be suitable to cite them as proof (of their own
truth). Only reason distinguishes what is or is not
true."(49)
Citation of scripture, mere belief, or respect
are not suitable bases for strong conviction in a
system of practice, as is evident in this quotation
from the Buddha:

Monks and scholars should
Well analyze my words,
Like gold (to be tested) through melting,
cutting, and polishing,
And then adopt them, but not for the sake of
showing me respect.(50)

p.473

Reasoning is also essential to the practice of
emptiness, through which the wisdom is generated
which bestows liberation from suffering. According to
Tso^ng-kha-pa's Ge-lug-pa order, it is a basic tenet
of all three Buddhist vehicles--Hiinayaana,
Perfection, and Mantra (or Tantra) -that direct
realization of emptiness is gained through an initial
acquaintance with an inferential realization of
emptiness gained through reasoning, the basis of
which is empirical. The fourteenth Dalai Lama, the
current leader of the Gelukba order, states that the
generation of a conceptual consciousness realizing
emptiness "must depend solely on a correct reasoning.
Fundamentally, therefore, the process traces back
solely to a reasoning, which itself must
fundamentally trace back to valid experiences common
to ourselves and others."(51) Such reasonings are
those set forth by Naagaarjuna in his Treatise on the
Middle Way (Madhyamaka'saastra).
According to Ge-lug-pa, the many reasonings
presented by Naagaarjuna are explicitly intended for
the purpose of destroying the conception of inherent
existence, the root cause of suffering. As far as
this false conception forms the basis of
philosophical systems, it can be said that
Naagaarjuna's arguments refute the positions of those
systems. Nevertheless, the fundamental purpose of
reasoning in Praasa^ngika-Maadhyamika is to generate
the wisdom which eradicates suffering and its causes.
Refutations of opposing tenet systems are subsidiary.
A number of differences are thus evident between
Otto and the Buddhist Ge-lug-pa position regarding
the numinous element of religious experience. Otto's
observations are astute when applied to the Abrahamic
religions and theistic Hinduism. Yet the strength of
his argument often relies on the existence of a
creator deity endowed with the qualities of
transcendence, majesty, and power, from whom man
seeks atonement, which Otto sees as "a longing to
transcend this sundering unworthiness, given with the
self' s existence as 'creature' and profane natural
being."(52)
It is difficult to construe a parallel with
Buddhism, which lacks such a creator god of whom we
are creatures. The religious impulsion in Buddhism is
not a priori, but a "natural" reaction to suffering
and the practice of a prescribed set of teachings to
escape that suffering, for the sake of oneself in
Hiinayaana, for others in Mahayana.(53) The dharma is
not an end in itself but, like a raft, is to be
discarded upon reaching the further shore.(54)
According to Malinowski's distinction between
magic and religion, one is then forced to assign
Buddhism to the category of magic, which he defines
as "a practical art consisting of acts which are only
means to a definite end expected to follow later
on"(55) and which are not ends in themselves. This is
not to suggest that Buddhism is indeed magic, but
rather to point out the difficulty, also encountered
in Otto, in making general statements which are
intended to hold true for all religions.
Returning to Otto, the more important point,
however, is his contention

p.474

that reasoning has no part in religious experience,
where "coercion by proof and demonstration and the
mistaken application of logical and juridical
processes should be excluded."(56) For him, "the
absolute exceeds our power to comprehend; the
mysterious wholly eludes."(57) The nonconceptual,
nonrational numinous cannot be approached with
conceptuality and reason; "mysticism has nothing to
do with 'reason' and 'rationality.'"(58)
According to the Ge-lug-pa position the direct
experience of emptiness, in both the suutra and
tantra systems, is nonconceptual. Yet without relying
on reasoning and analysis, such an experience is
impossible. In answer to how analysis and thought can
serve as a cause for nonconceptuality, the fifth
Dalai Lama (1617-1682) cites the Kaa'syapa Chapter
Suutra (Kaa'syapa-parivarta): : "Kaashyapa, it is
thus: For example, fire arises when the wind rubs two
branches together. Once the fire has arisen, the two
branches are burned. Just so Kaashyapa, if you have
the correct analytical intellect, a superior's
faculty of wisdom is generated. Through its
generation, the correct analytical intellect is
consumed."(59) That is, conceptual thought can lead
to experience of the nonconceptual, that which is
beyond thought.
Reasoning alone, however, is not sufficient; the
process of insight is not merely an intellectual
exercise. Reasoning is an essential element of
wisdom, the third element in the triad of ethics
('siila), meditative stabilization (samaadhi), and
wisdom (praj~naa), all of which are necessary for
realization of emptiness, For example, a bodhisattva
of the suutra system must engage in limitless forms
of the six perfections (paaramitaa)--giving, ethics,
patience, effort, concentration, and wisdom--over
many aeons in order to accumulate the merit which
wi11 empower his mind to penetrate emptiness and
eventually overcome all obstructions.(60) In the
tantra system, a special technique--deity yoga--is
taught which allows this accumulation of merit to
proceed more quickly.(61) Thus, the process of
reasoning must be conjoined with ethical and
meditative practices to yield realization of
emptiness.
Reasoning must be used because emptiness is a
hidden phenomenon (parok.sa), unable to appear to
direct perception without initially depending on
reasoning.(62) For Otto too, the numinous is hidden
in the sense that it is something "which has no place
in our scheme of reality but belongs to an absolutely
different one, and which at the same time arouses an
irrepressible interest in the mind."(63) For him,
reasoning cannot be the key to the experience of the
numinous because "our knowledge has certain
irremovable limits." (64)
We find then, two different approaches to this
hidden numinous, inaccessible to ordinary sense
perception. For the Ge-lug-pas. the process of
reasoning and analysis leads to the experience of
reality. For Rudolf Otto, reasoning must be
discarded, for reality--the holy--is only to be known
through feeling.

p.475

NOTES

1. Rudolf Otto. The Idea of the Holy, trans. John
W. Harvey (London: Oxford University press,
1976), p. 6.

2. Anthony F. C. Wallace, Religion: An
Anthropological View (New York: Random House,
1966), p.vi.

3. Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System,"
in Reader in Comparative Religion: An
Anthropological Approach, ed. William A. Lessa
and Even Z. Vogt, 3d ed. (New York: Harper and
Row, 1972) , pp. 171-174.

4. Otto, p.4.

5. Ibid., p.5.

6. Ibid., p.2.

7. Ibid., p.113.

8. Ibid., p.5.

9. Ibid., p.l2.

10. Ibid., p.22.

11. Ibid., p.10.

12. Ibid., p.13.

13. Ibid., p.14.

14. Ibid., p.26.

15. Ibid., p.34.

16. Ibid., p.l7.

17. Ibid., p.142.

18. Ibid., p.15.

19. Max Weber, "Religious Rejections of the World and
their Directions," in From Max Weber. Essays in
Sociology, ed. and trans. Hans H. Gerth and C.
Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press,
1976), p. 342.

20. Ibid., p. 343.

21. Otto, p.67.

22. Ibid., p. 112.

23. Wach notes that critics have found this to be the
weakest element in Otto's presentation. See
Joachim Wach, Types of Religious Experience
Christian and Non-Christian (Chicago, Illinois:
University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 222. For
an analysis of this relationship between the
numinous and morality and of the process of
"schematization" whereby the numinous becomes
endowed with rational qualities see John P.
Reeder, "The Relation of the Moral and the
Numinous in Otto's Notion of the Holy," in
Religion and Morality: A Collection of Essays,
ed. Gene Outka and John P. Reeder, Jr. (Garden
City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1973), pp. 255-292.

24. Ibid., p. 114.

25. Ibid., p. 124.

26. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Otto,
Rudolf," by William J. Wainwright.

27. Ibid., p. xxi.

28. Ibid., p. 8.

29. Ibid., p. 6.

30. Ibid., p. 51.

31. Ibid., p. 147.

32. Ibid., p. 137.

33. Joachim Wach, Understanding and Believing. Essays
by Joachim Wach, edited with an Introduction by
Joseph M. Kitagawa (Boston, Massachusetts: Harper
and Row, 1968), p. 8.

34. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v.
"Metaphysics, Nature of," by W. H. Walsh.

35. Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, Practice
and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism (Rider: London,
1976), p. 134.

36. Otto, p. 30.

37. Tenzin Gyatso, The Buddhism of Tibet and the Key
to the Middle Way (New York: Harper and Row,
1975), p. 77.

p.476

38. Tsong-ka-pa, Tantra in Tibet: The Great
Exposition of Secret Mantra (London: Allen and
Unwin, 1978), p. 191.

39. Ninian Smart criticizes Otto on this point using
the example of Theravaada Buddhism. See Ninian
Smart, Philosophers and Religious Truth (London:
SCM Press Ltd.. .gif border=0 align=middle>969), p. 113.

40. Tenzin Gyatso, p. 77.

41. Ten-dar-hla-ram-pa (bsTan-dar-lha-ram-pa) , A
Presentation of the Lack of One and Many. an
Elimination of Error Collected from the 0cean of
Good Explanations (Gcig du bral gyi rnam gzhag
legs hshad rgya mtsho las btus pa'i 'khrul spong
bdud rtsi'i gzegs ma) (Lhasa: Great Press at the
base of the Potala, Fire Dog Male year of the
sixteenth cycle), blockprint of 43 folios, pp.
3a-3b.

42. Otto, p. 30.

43. Tso^ng-kha-pa, pp. 191-192.

44. Otto, p.63.

45. Kensur Lekden, Meditations of a Tibetan Tantric
Abbot, trans. and ed. Jeffrey Hopkins
(Dharamsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and
Archives, 1974). p. 109.

46. Mark 5:21-43.

47. Sutta Nipaata, trans. V. Fausboll, in Sacred
Books of the East (Oxford, 188 1), Vol. 10, pt.
2, pp. 11-15.

48. Max Weber, The Religion of lndia: The Sociology
of Hinduism and Buddhism, trans. and ed. Hans H.
Gerth and Don Martindale (New York: The Free
Press, 1967), p. 225.

49. Tso^ng-kha-po, p. 87.

50. Tenzin Gyatso, p, 55.

51. Ibid., pp. 55-56.

52. Otto, p. 55.

53. Tenzin Gyatso, pp. 28-29.

54. Middle Length Sayings (Majjhima-Nikaaya), trans.
I. B. Horner, Pali Text Society Translation
Series, No. 29(London: The Pali Text Society,
1976), 1:173-74.

55. Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion
and Other Essays (New York: Anchor Books, 1954),
p. 88.

56. Otto, p. 145.

57. Ibid,, p, 141.

58. Ibid., p, 4.

59. The Fifth Salai Lama, The Practice of Emptiness,
trans. Jeffrey Hopkins (Dharamsala, India:
Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1974), p.
21.

60. Na-wang-pel-den (Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan) ,
Presentation of the Grounds and Paths of the Four
Great Secret Tantra Sets (gSang chen rgyud sde
bzhii sa lam gyi rnam gzhag rgyud gzhung gsal
byed) (modern blockprint, rGyud smad par khang,
date and place of publication not given), pp,
7a3-8al.

61. Tso^ng-kha-pa, p. 60.

62. Ibid., p. 32.

63. Otto, p. 29.

64. Ibid., p. 59.